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 3 
Abstract 
 
 
Although Vietnam has achieved high rates of economic growth over two decades 
and attained middle-income status in 2008, much of the country’s economic structural 
changes do not appear to address its underlying political conflicts, pervasive market 
failures, or speculative investment activities, and increasingly robust global competition. 
In assessing Vietnam’s industrial failures and successes, this research project starts by 
asking: What are the key political and institutional processes that shaped the structure of 
incentives and pressure for technological adoption and capability-building in the 
Vietnamese industrial sector since the country’s economic 1986 reform known as Doi 
Moi? This thesis uses the current literature on rents and rents-seeking to develop a new 
analytical framework that I call developmental rent management analysis (DRMA), 
which examines Vietnam’s industrial transformation in the telecommunications, textile 
and garment, and motorcycle industries. The empirical evidence for this study is 
primarily based on 68 semi-structured interviews with government officials, firm 
managers, workers, and industry experts. 
 
My investigation provides a new and nuanced analysis of the development of 
Vietnam’s industrial sector. On the one hand, the textile and garment industry provides a 
unique case of limited industrial progress, which is based largely on Vietnam’s low-paid 
and low-skilled workforce. On the other hand, the telecom industry offers insights to the 
making of a successful industrialised sector. This success can be explained partly by a 
long period of protection by the government, effective rents management, and credible 
threats of foreign competition. The motorcycle industry, in contrast to both industries, 
imparts a distinct example of the Vietnamese government’s failure to implement learning 
rents for technological upgrading. However, market competition among Japanese and 
Chinese manufacturers led to significant technical learning and capability-building for 
local firms.  
 
Although there was not one fixed successful configuration of rent management 
that worked in all three industries, a successful synthesis comprises a cluster of factors 
including, although not exclusive to (1) the political will and/or competition among 
political and economic interests that support the formal and informal development of the 
sectors, (2) effective formal and informal institutional structures of rent allocation and 
implementation, (3) incentives for profits and pressure from market competition, (4) 
effective time horizon and (5) the initial capability of firms and workers to be receptive 
to learning new technologies and skills, and gaining expertise. The findings of this 
research shed light on the types of rent strategies that are beneficial to further Vietnam’s 
development. 
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 Rent Management as Development Chapter 1.
 
 
1.1. Technological Adoption in Rent-Seeking Economies 
 
The literature on rents and rent-seeking tends to narrowly depict these 
phenomena as inherently bad and growth-reducing (Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 
1980; Krueger, 1998; Posner, 1975; Tullock, 1967), with rarely any attention to the 
potential of these phenomena to contribute to positive developmental outcomes.  More 
problematic is the claim, which is widely spread by donor agencies, that development 
failures in poor countries are due to the pervasive nature of rents and rent-seeking 
(Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Mauro, 1997). For example, donors’ 
conditionalities in many poor countries are often meant to curb rents and rent-seeking on 
grounds that they necessarily undermine development outcomes.   
One country where that last argument has been advanced is Vietnam. Vietnamese 
experts and specialist frequently attribute Vietnam’s development challenges to rents and 
rent-seeking. The warning from Work Bank 2003 Development Report is representative: 
 
[Vietnam] may fail to remove the obstacles in its reform path, let the vested 
interests capture government transfers to offset their inefficiencies, and see an 
unhealthy relationship develop between enterprises. . .and government officials. 
A weak macroeconomic situation, slower growth, increased inequality and 
generalised corruption could be the outcomes (World Bank, 2002, p. 4). 
 
Nonetheless, an emerging body of literature is beginning to challenge this narrow 
neoclassical analysis on rents and rent-seeking. Research on the topic by institutional 
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economists such as Khan and Jomo (2000b), North et. al. (2007), Chang and Cheema 
(2002), and Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) provide evidences and insights that 
certain type of rents can be value-enhancing and rent seeking can produce good 
outcomes. “In a world where learning and innovation have to be rewarded, distributive 
conflicts dealt with, where incentives have to be created to deal with asymmetric 
information and where scarce natural resources have to be conserved, many types of 
rents are socially desirable” (Khan & Jomo, 2000a, p. 8). An illustrative example of this 
emerging thought is the Africa Power and Politics Programme, which introduced the 
concept of “developmental patrimonialism” (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 1). In 
the case study of Rwanda, research from this programme asserts that: 
 
The interest and ability of the ruling elite to impose a centralised management of 
the rents which are an unavoidable feature of early capitalism…have provided 
Rwanda with the “early-stage venture capitalism” it needed to achieve economic 
recovery post-1994 and to maintain respectable rates of investment and socio-
economic progress under otherwise unfavourable conditions during the last 
decade (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 1). 
 
As rent and rent-seeking may be socially desirable and value-enhancing, Khan 
(2009b) suggests that a more general approach to utilize them is to incorporate political 
and institutional variables to explain, first, the types of rights and rents which are created 
as a result of rent-seeking and, second, the configuration of how this new rent creates the 
incentives and pressure to increase firms’ and workers’ effort to develop. This thesis is 
situated within this emerging literature. It argues that rents are better understood as a 
policy instrument that could either be damaging or developmental depending on the rent 
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management mechanism (RMM), which is defined as the configuration of politics, 
institutions, and industry organisation1 that produce the rent outcomes. I employed these 
insights to construct the developmental rent management analysis (DRMA) framework 
(see Chapter 3).  
Economic and industrial development can largely be viewed as a process of 
technological “catch up,” in which firms in developing countries learn to master new 
technologies of production already in use in more advanced economies. From this 
perspective, this thesis focuses largely on the political and economic relationship 
between the Vietnamese state and its industrial sector,2 prefacing the economic growth in 
a development context. This reveals how rents may be actively used to enhance growth 
via technological adoption and capability-building in the Vietnamese experience. These 
findings underscore the need to re-examine how economic actors and the state 
collaborate through formal and informal institutions to boost industrial upgrading in 
developing countries. This study of rent and rent management adds to the emerging 
scholarship that examine how rents may be used for growth-enhancing and 
developmental purposes in the context of a one-party state in Vietnam: the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV). 
	  
1.2. The Case of Vietnam 
 
Vietnam is not a hidden Asian Tiger.3 Recent economic crises, starting in 2007, 
                                                
1 In this thesis, industry organisation is defined as the structure of market competition 
and internal organization of firms affecting responses to different types of rents. 
2 This thesis defines the industrial sector broadly to include all modern productive 
activities. 
3 The Asian Tigers is a term used in reference to the highly developed economies of 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong. These nations and areas were notable 
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have revealed and challenged the Vietnamese state’s “market economy with socialist 
orientation” approach to economic reform. By late 2012 the Vietnamese economy was 
dealing with a gathering storm of high inflation, endemic corruption, and a largely 
unproductive state-owned sector. The country’s banking system was saddled with the 
highest bad debt in Southeast Asia as it maintains the highest percentage of 
nonperforming loans among the ten countries in the region (Manthorpe, 2012). Bad debts 
had nearly doubled, amounting to approximately 10 per cent of total lending, of which 
half of this bad debt was said to be unrecoverable (Tran, 2012c). Meanwhile, public 
discontent over inflation, disparities between rich and poor, and declining living 
standards raised concerns for surging political stability (Manthorpe, 2012). 
In October 2012, major political turmoil took place behind the closed doors of the 
Central Party Committee's Sixth Meeting, where lines of division between the economic 
power, represented by Prime Minister Dung Tan Nguyen, and the political power, 
represented by Party Secretary Trong Phu Nguyen (with support of President Sang Tan 
Truong) were evident. During this important meeting, Dung’s leading position as the 
prime minster was reconsidered among the 175-committee members, and options for 
corrective economic measures were weighed against the interest of various factions 
within and around the Party. Nevertheless, economists and experts could only stand 
quietly on the side-lines watching the unfolding power struggle. This lack of action and 
advocacy is partly due to an incomplete understanding of the Vietnamese political 
economy that rapidly transformed over the last two and a half decades. More importantly, 
neoclassical tools reflected in the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus4 could 
                                                                                                                                           
for maintaining exceptionally high growth rates (in excess of 7 per cent a year) and rapid 
industrialisation between the early 1960s and 1990s. 
4 The World Health Organization (2013) describes the Washington Consensus as “the set 
of 10 policies that the US government and the international financial institutions based in 
the US capital believed were necessary elements of ‘first stage policy reform’ that all 
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not adequately address many of the political economy issues that had emerged and 
endangered Vietnam’s economic development. 
The Vietnamese experience is valuable for understanding the political economy 
of development, including its rent and rent-seeking dimensions, for two reasons. First, as 
a transitional economy, Vietnam faced a number of constraints and externalities during 
its growth process. Consequently, understanding how Vietnam handles these restraints to 
transform itself from a low-income developing to a middle-income country provides 
important lessons for other poor countries that embark on similar developmental path.  
Second, so far debates on Vietnam's industrial development have focused largely 
on improving its transparency and enhancing its trade openness, privatisation (known as 
equitization in Vietnam), and market liberalisation. However, given the ubiquitous and 
dominant existence of rents and rent-seeking in Vietnam, little attention has been paid to 
understand how rents and rent-seeking enhanced or impeded development, especially 
from industrial upgrading and learning perspectives. This research seeks to bridge this 
gap by examining Vietnam’s industrialisation and development from a political economy 
perspective of rent and rent-seeking: how these phenomena took place, and how, under 
their influence, the roles of politics and institutions have shaped the path of development 
in the industrial sector. Addressing these issues requires identification of the bottlenecks 
that constrain the industrial sector and an examination of the how rent and rent-seeking 
operate in response to the macro-political and institutional order in the Vietnamese 
context.  
	  
                                                                                                                                           
countries should adopt to increase economic growth”. At its heart is an emphasis on the 
importance of macroeconomic stability and integration into the international economy... 
The framework included … fiscal discipline, financial liberalization, trade liberalization, 
deregulation, secure intellectual property rights, increasing foreign direct investment by 
reducing barriers, and privatization (World Health Organization, 2013). 
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1.3. Research Approach 
	  
1.3.1. Thesis Threefold Aim and Research Question 
 
The overall purpose of this research is threefold. First, it seeks to provide 
empirical evidence to support an alternative view on rents and rent-seeking: how rent, as 
an outcome, can be developmental and growth-enhancing under the right configuration 
of rent management. The second objective is to improve the understanding of how 
different rent management mechanisms affect the structure of incentives and pressure 
that ensure firms’ and worker’s effort for technical learning, upgrading, and innovation 
in a developing country context. This was accomplished by examining the rents 
management mechanisms that support or deter Vietnamese industries and firms from 
upgrading by taking into account the configuration of politics, institutions, and industry 
organisation. Finally, the research aims to examine factors shaping technological 
adoption in the Vietnamese industrial sector focusing on the telecommunication, textile 
and garment, and motorcycle industries. With these general aims in mind, the research 
undertaken for this thesis was structured along the following main research question:  
 
What are the key political and institutional processes that shape the structure of 
incentives and pressures for technological adoption and capability-building in the 
Vietnamese industrial sector since the country’s economic reform known as Doi 
Moi in 1986? 
 
1.3.2. Analytical Approach 
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To address these research objectives and question, this thesis combines a variety 
of methodological approaches. It first starts by presenting a literature review of the 
theoretical debates on technological adoption, rent, and rent-seeking in a development 
context. A number of issues, such as learning externalities, politics, and informal 
institutions that are particularly relevant to answer the research question, are discussed. 
This review includes both the neoclassical and the alternative literature. 
The second key element is the analytical framework. Based on insights provided 
from the alternative literature on rent and rent-seeking, this thesis develops a 
developmental rent management analysis (DRMA) framework to examine the factors 
that affect the process of technological upgrading and capability-building in the face of 
Vietnam’s political economy of being a one-party state. The DRMA framework is based 
on a fundamental assertion that no one combination of political and institutional 
arrangement provides exclusive access to successful rent management and 
developmental outcomes. Successful rent management strategies must be specific to the 
political and institutional contexts of a country and its political economy. Analytically, 
DRMA provides an approach that assesses how rents are created, destroyed, contested, 
and reallocated, and how rent-seeking can influence development outcomes in a 
developing country.  
More specifically, DRMA utilises four analytical steps. The first step identifies 
the type of rent involved in a particular industry. The second step establishes the 
potential incentives and effects of the rent, given the existing political and institutional 
structures. The third step analyses the configuration of politics, institutions, and industry 
organisations that shape rent outcomes. This step is named configuration of rent 
management. This thesis also refers to this configuration as rent management mechanism 
(RMM). Here, the discussion involves the most substantive analysis of the DRMA 
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framework. It inquires into the political, institutional, and industry organisations and how 
they interact to generate incentives and pressure for high or low performance in 
technological adoption and capability-building. The fourth step reviews the 
transformation of firms and industries and actual rent outcomes in relation to this 
configuration of rent management. 
As for the last analytical approach, this thesis employs inductive approach by 
utilising the DRMA framework to assess in-depth how the process of technical learning 
and capability-building is structured and achieved (or not) in Vietnam and how such a 
process was instrumental in Vietnam’s industrial development. Three important 
industries are the subject of this analysis: the telecommunications, textile and garment, 
and motorcycle industries. The analysis employs qualitative techniques to gather 
evidence and to analyse eight case studies, examining in depth the rent management 
mechanisms that were conducive or inhibitive to development in these industries. 
	  
1.3.3. Methodological Approach 
 
The empirical research on the Vietnamese industrial experience is based on data 
collected during three fieldwork sessions, which total an 8-months period: December 
2010, April–October 2011, and June 2012. The fieldwork yielded 68 semi-structured 
interviews, each lasting between one and three hours. Being fluent in Vietnamese, I had 
significant and prolific access to numerous government official documents and 
newspapers that are not available to English-speaking audiences. In addition, this 
research benefited from the author's consultancy experience in Vietnam working for the 
World Bank in September 2011 and for the Ministry of Planning and Investment from 
October 2011 to April 2012. Together, these experiences provided invaluable insights 
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into the World Bank’s agenda to promote Vietnam’s development, as well as the 
Vietnamese policy-making process and institutional settings of the CPV. This latter 
insight is one of the three central elements of the rent management analysis presented in 
the DRMA framework. 
My interviews with managers, and workers in public, private, and foreign firms 
bring into focus the various constraints in firms’ upgrading efforts and how technological 
adoption and learning takes place. In addition, interviews with a number of Vietnamese 
high-profile government officials and industry experts enhanced my understanding of the 
Vietnamese institutional structure, the internal political and economic arrangements 
among various interest groups, as well as the recent power struggles within the 
Vietnamese key state apparatus. Through networking, I also collected numerous 
secondary data from government offices, international organisations, and research think 
tanks. From this large database, I developed and analysed eight case studies of industrial 
development in the telecommunications, textile and garment, and motorcycle industries. 
Finally, it is important to note that observations and policy options suggested in 
each industry may not be applicable to others. In addition, given that this research 
centres exclusively on Vietnam, research findings may not be generalizable to all 
developing economies due to varied historical, cultural, political, and economic contexts. 
For example, the fact that Vietnam is a one-party state may imply that it would exhibit 
different political and economic dynamics when compared to other Southeast Asian 
countries with multiparty polities.  
 
1.3.4. Original Contribution of the Thesis 
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This thesis makes three distinct original contributions to the literature. First, it 
highlights the limitations of neoclassical arguments in understanding the development 
trajectories of transitional economies and low developing countries. It rejects the “state 
versus market” debate as an analytical starting point, with the presumption that 
developmental prospects depend upon either the free functioning of the market or upon 
an embedded, and autonomous state. I argue that actions and interaction of the state, the 
firms, and the market are determined by economic, political, and ideological interests, 
which seek rents for their own benefits. As a result, this thesis argues that the 
neoclassical literature misreads and overlooks crucial political and institutional factors, 
including informal mechanisms that are critical in understanding the dynamic economic 
transformations in developing countries.  
Second, I put forward an alternative analytical framework—the DRMA 
framework—to evaluate the configuration of politics, institutions, and industry 
organisations using the concepts of rents and rents management. This analytical 
framework provides insights into the types of rent management mechanisms that may 
build Vietnam’s competitiveness based on its configuration of the political, institutional, 
and industry conditions.  
Third, to understand the rent management mechanisms that drove the process of 
technological upgrading and capability-building, my research analyses the three selected 
industries mentioned above: telecommunications, textile and garment, and motorcycle. 
These industries were selected based on the diverse levels of technological upgrading 
that they achieved. On the one hand, the textile and garment industry provides a unique 
case of limited industrial progress, which is based largely on Vietnam’s low-paid and 
low-skilled workforce. On the other hand, the telecom industry offers insights to the 
making of a successful industrialised sector. Finally, the motorcycle industry imparts a 
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distinct example of how market competition among Japanese and Chinese manufacturers 
led to significant technical learning and capability-building for local firms. Nonetheless, 
technical progress in this industry was held back due to a number of coordinated 
problems in policy and implementation. 
The analysis identifies externalities in each industries and the configuration of 
rent management that affects the structure of incentives and pressure, which in turn 
motivate technical learning, upgrading, and innovation in Vietnam. By doing this, this 
thesis observes the transformation that this configuration induced in rents recipients at 
the firm and industry levels. 
On the whole, my analysis suggests, first, that Vietnam has experienced uneven 
growth due to a mixture of ad-hoc rent policies and rent seeking activities. Second, some 
learning and technological upgrading took place despite being extremely inconsistent 
across sectors and firms, owing to the internal political arrangement among the state’s 
interests. Third, the state sector, including some powerful state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), plays a dominant role in rent-seeking and rent distribution. This sector will 
continue to exert its power over the state and the economy. Fourth, the private sector, 
which initially did not get significant rents, has thus far achieved some industrial 
upgrading, though it is limited in the face of the government’s SOE-centric agenda. 
Finally, by late 2012, the Vietnamese political arrangement had become increasingly 
volatile and appeared to be unfavourable for the country’s growth process. These 
observations impart a critical understanding to formulate practical and developmental 
rent management strategies as Vietnam attempts to move to the next stage of 
development. 
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1.4. Vietnam’s Economic Development 1986–2012: A Brief Overview 
 
The collapse of the centrally planned model after reunification of North Vietnam 
and South Vietnam in 1975 forced the country eventually to undertake economic reforms 
known as Doi Moi. The first significant reform occurred in 1986, followed by an even 
greater and more radical market-oriented reform in 1989, which marked a turning point 
in the history of Vietnam’s economic development. Together, these two reforms 
transformed the Vietnamese economy from a centrally planned one into a “market 
economy with a socialist orientation.” That is, while the private sector is now allowed to 
participate in a variety of economic activities, the public sector remains in charge of 
commissioning social and economic programmes instituted by the state. Consistently, the 
public sector has been the instrument for the state and the CPV to regulate the 
Vietnamese economy (Doan, 2012a; Masina, 2006, p. 123).   
In the last two and a half decades, the Vietnamese government has employed 
policies with extensive investment and credit expansion for a protracted period to 
achieve high gross domestic product (GDP), especially in the 1990s and 2000s. During 
this period, Vietnam gained access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 and 
signed bilateral trade agreements (BTAs) with a number of strategic trade partners such 
as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and several Southeast Asian countries. 
Before the global recession in 2008, Vietnam experienced a high growth rate, averaging 
6.91 per cent between 1986 and 2007 (see Figure 1.1). However, starting in 2008 the 
Vietnamese economy entered a new phase of development and experienced a number of 
structural problems while the global economy was falling fast into a deep recession. This 
next section briefly highlights important issues of Vietnam’s economic development 
before and after the economy experienced a major slowdown in 2008. 
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1.4.1. Development Overview from 1986 
 
In 2012 Vietnam’s population numbered 91.51 million people and had a 
population growth rate at 1.054 (CIA World FactBook, 2013a). Based on the CIA World 
Factbook (2013b), the gross domestic income per capita on a purchasing power parity 
basis was $3,500, making Vietnam a middle-income country. Since the start of its 
economic reform in 1986, the country's average GDP has been phenomenal. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the country’s growth rate during this period. It shows that while GDP rate 
fluctuates, it remains positive and high for a large part of the 25-year period. As 
mentioned, in 2008 the Vietnamese economy experienced a slow down, as did the global 
economy, except for the year 2010 when Vietnam’s stimulus package was put into effect.  
	  
Figure 1.1: Growth Rate 1986–2012 (in per cent)	  
	  
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Nguyen et al., (2010) and the World 
Bank (2013) 
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Figure 1.2 compares Vietnam’s output performance with transitional economies 
in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 2010. The vertical axis quantifies output 
performance of a number of surveyed countries; 1989 is the base year and is given 100 
points. The horizontal axis represents the corresponding years surveyed. The figure 
shows that Vietnam’s performance in output growth outperformed Eastern European 
countries, which were also once also under a centrally planed economy.  
	  
Figure 1.2: Vietnam's Output Performance Relative to Other Transitional 
Economies	  
	  
Source: World Bank (2012b, p. 12)  
 
Parallel with the rapid growth rate in GDP, Vietnam’s manufacturing sector 
dramatically increased its output over the same period. Figure 1.3 shows that 
manufacturing output rose from VND 26,624 billion (USD 1.25 billion) in 1994 to VND 
491,777 billion (USD 23.2 billion), an 18.47 times increase. However, the slowdown that 
started in 2008 was felt most acutely in the industrial sector, causing great concern over 
the country’s long-term growth. This is because the industrial sector has been the 
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backbone of Vietnam’s competitiveness and development thus far, employing around 7 
million people, or one-tenth of the Vietnamese labour force.  
	  
Figure 1.3: Manufacturing Output 1994–2010 (in billion VND)	  
	  
Source: Data retrieved from Asian Development Bank (2013) 
	  
Over the course of Vietnam’ economic development, the structure of its economy 
has experienced a gradual change as reflected in Figure 1.4. The service sector has been 
relatively stable though with a slight downward trend, and the agriculture sector has 
declined from 27.4 per cent in 1994 to 22 per cent in 2011. In contrast, the share of the 
industrial sector rose from 28.9 per cent in 1995 to 40.3 per cent in 2011 (Asian 
Development Bank, 2013). This shift reflects Vietnam’s efforts to industrialise and 
modernise its economy and to move from an agriculture-based economy towards an 
industrialised one. Figure 1.4 details the structural transformation of the economy from 
1994 to 2011. 
	  	  
0 
100000 
200000 
300000 
400000 
500000 
600000 
O
ut
pu
t i
n 
bi
ill
io
n 
V
N
D
 
Year	  
 36 
Figure 1.4: Structure of Output by Industry Measured by per cent of GDP, 
1994– 2011	  
	  
Source: Data retrieved from Asian Development Bank (2013) 
	  
In the mid-1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) accounted for 30 per cent of 
total investments in Vietnam. However, the share of FDI fell to 20 per cent in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2013; Nguyen, et al., 2010). 
However, Vietnam’s accession to the WTO during the late 2000s led to new FDI inflows. 
This was due in part to reforms that Vietnam committed that relaxed rules restricting FDI, 
which created an expectation among international investors about the development 
prospects of the country. Thus, Vietnam appears to be a more attractive FDI destination 
than other transitional economies (see Figure 1.5). In 2007 and 2008, FDI became the 
most important source of investment in Vietnam. Although Vietnam has been successful 
in attracting FDI, the real benefits from FDI seem controversial. Previous studies have 
found little evidence of technical spillovers from FDI enterprises to local counterparts 
(Nguyen et al., 2008) and that Vietnam has become heavily dependent on FDI capital as 
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a source to sustain economic growth (Nguyen, et al., 2010). 
	  
Figure 1.5: FDI in Vietnam 1990–2008 
	  
Source: Nguyen et. al. (2010, p. 30) 
	  
With slowing credit growth and the push to restructure public investments in 
recent years, total investment in Vietnam has fallen sharply: from 41.9 per cent of GDP 
in 2010 to 34.6 per cent in 2011, and it was estimated to be approximately 28.2 per cent 
in 2012 (CIA World Factbook, 2013c). This decline has been uniformly spread across 
the state and the private sector. Within the private sector, domestic private enterprises 
have drastically cut back their investment plans, though investments from foreign firms 
have not slowed down significantly in absolute terms (World Bank, 2012a). The flow of 
FDI into Vietnam remains high after 2008, with implemented foreign capital ranges 
between VND 207.77–228.55 trillion (USD 10–11 billion) (see Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6: Foreign Investment in Vietnam 2002–2012 (in billion USD) 
	  
Source: World Bank (2012a, p. 15) 
	  
Over the last two and a half decades, Vietnam’s export growth rate has stayed on 
average 20 per cent per year thanks to foreign investment. Export growth in the 
industrial sector has been high, although value addition has been low since Vietnam 
relies heavily on imported inputs from abroad (see Figure 1.7). In 2009 exports slowed 
down slightly due to a demand drop in the global market but it increased in 2010.  
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Figure 1.7: Import and Exports of Goods and Services 1994–2011 (in billion 
VND) 
	  
Source: Data retrieved from Asian Development Bank (2013). 
	  
1.4.2. The State Sector 
	  
In recent years, few issues illicit more fervent debate in Vietnam than the topics 
that revolve around the Vietnamese state economic groups and state ownership. In truth, 
the state sector plays a pivotal role in the Vietnamese economy. According to the 
Committee for Enterprise Reform and Development and the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, SOEs hold 70 per cent of the total real property; account for 20 per cent of 
investment capital throughout economy; and devour a staggering 60 per cent of the credit 
in the commercial banking system, 50 per cent of state investment capital, and 70 per 
cent of official development aid capital (see AmCham Vietnam, 2012). Meanwhile, these 
same enterprises are responsible for only 25 per cent of total sales revenues, 37 per cent 
of pre-tax profits, and 20 per cent of the value of national industrial output. The rate of 
credit used by SOEs to generate revenue is definitely higher than that of other enterprises. 
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It takes VND 22,000 (USD 1.03) in capital to create VND 10,000 (USD 0.47) in revenue, 
as compared to VND 12,000 (USD 0.56) in capital spent by businesses outside the state 
sector and VND 13,000 (USD 0.61) in capital expenditures by foreign enterprises 
operating in Vietnam (AmCham Vietnam, 2012). 
In the last two and a half decades, Vietnam equitized about 4,000 SOEs, mostly 
between 2000 and 2006 (see Figure 1.8). Doan (2012a) points out that the overall 
number of SOEs, commonly referred to as enterprises, with controlling shares of the 
state has declined considerably, from nearly 7,000 in 1995 to less than 3,300 in 2010. At 
present, there are about 1,300 SOEs that are wholly owned by the state (Doan, 2012a). 
Despite the reduction in this number, SOEs’ scale and influence remained intact 
throughout the Vietnam’s development. In addition, little changes have taken place in the 
sectoral structure of SOE engagement in the economy, especially in sectors in which 
private enterprises can operate efficiently. Figure 1.8 shows that the state sector reduced 
its number of enterprises, but its share in the overall structure of the economy declined 
only slightly from nearly 40 per cent to roughly 38 per cent in 2011. 
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Figure 1.8: Structure of Vietnam GDP and Number of SOEs (1995–2011) 
	  
 Source: Doan (2012a, p. 7) 
	  
Keen to emulate the experience of Japan’s Keiretsus5  and the Republic of 
Korea’s Chaebols, 6  in 2005 Vietnam accelerated the process of creating general 
corporations (GCs) and state economic groups (SEGs)—an alliance of several SOEs 
with similar business interests before the country’s accession to the WTO. The GCs and 
SEGs initially did well, but their weaknesses were revealed in 2010 when one of their 
members, the state-owned shipbuilder Vinashin, failed to pay its international lenders 
and the state inspectorate found widespread financial irregularities and mismanagement 
in the company (World Bank, 2012b). Vinashin incurred a debt estimated at VND 93.5 
trillion (USD 4.5 billion) (AmCham Vietnam, 2012). In 2012, mismanaged SEGs again 
                                                
5 Keiretsus refers to grouping of large Japanese financial and industrial corporations 
through historical associations and cross-shareholdings. In a keiretsu each firm maintains 
its operational independence while retaining close commercial relationships with other 
firms in the group. 
6 Chaebol refers to a South Korean form of business conglomerate. It is typically global 
multinationals owning numerous international enterprises, controlled by a chairman who 
oversees all chaebol operations. 
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gathered considerable public criticism surrounding the case of Vinalines, Vietnam’s 
largest and state-owned shipping company and port operator. Vinalines was reported to 
have defaulted on loans worth VND 22.85 trillion (USD 1.1 billion) (AmCham Vietnam, 
2012). The head of the Ministry of Transport’s Maritime Administration, Dung Duong, 
and six other Vinalines officials were held for allegedly deliberately mismanaging the 
company’s resources by spending VND 103.88 billion (USD 5 million) on a floating 
dock and purchasing more than 70 dilapidated foreign ships (AmCham Vietnam, 2012).  
In recent years, the Vietnamese government appears to have veered towards a 
model of state capitalism in which the SEGs have enjoyed privileged access to factor 
inputs and a high level of operational autonomy from the state. This has led to more 
questions being raised about the SEGs’ usefulness. Vietnamese scholars such as Painter 
(2005), Masina (2006, 2010) and Pincus (2009) persistently argue that this model of state 
capitalism has led to profit-seeking activities, inefficient use of state capital especially 
toward speculative activities and failure to create jobs for Vietnam’s growing workforce. 
In addition, the GCs and SEGs crowd out the private sector and thus “prevent a genuine 
development of national economic force” (Masina, 2006, p. 155).  
The situation was exacerbated when a few SOEs, taking advantage of weak 
oversight and transparency within the system, expanded their operation into areas 
beyond their core competency, mismanaged their finances, and concealed information 
from the government, thereby inhibiting the country’s development progresses (World 
Bank, 2012b). As a result, in Decision 292, the Vietnamese government indicated that a 
restructuring of the SOEs would be a top priority of the government in the next Socio-
Economic Development Plan, spanning from 2011 to 2015. In his paper, Doan (2012a) 
reviewed the guiding principles for SOE reform and pointed to fundamental and critical 
discrepancies in the principles. He questioned whether the next wave of reform 
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programmes, as set out in Decision 929, will make a difference in improving SOEs’ 
performance, given previous reform experiences	  begun in the late 1980s (Doan, 2012a).  
	  
1.4.3.  Structural Problems after the Great Recession 
 
Since 2008, Vietnam has experienced macroeconomic turbulence: double-digit 
inflation, large fiscal and trade deficits, depreciating currency, capital flight, loss of 
international reserves, and eroding investor confidence (Pincus, 2009; World Bank, 
2012b). After more than two decades of rapid growth, Vietnam’s economy has revealed 
new structural problems. The first sign of weakness was a persistent macroeconomic 
instability. For four years in a row, between 2008 and 2011, Vietnam had one of the 
highest inflation rates in Asia, averaging nearly 16 per cent a year (see figure 1.9).  Core 
inflation, which is calculated after excluding some of the more volatile components of 
the Consumer Price Index basket such as food and fuel prices, was still very high at 11 
per cent in 2011 (World Bank, 2012a). 
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Figure 1.9: Vietnam’s Inflation Rate, 1994–2012 (in per cent)	  
	  
Source: Author’s compilation. Data from 1994 to 2007 based on Nguyen et al. (2010); 
data from 2008 to 2011 based on Asian Development Bank (2013); and data from 2012 
based on Hanoi Newsroom (2012). 
	  
Along with high inflation, Vietnam has also been coping with persistent pressure 
on its currency from falling levels of foreign exchange reserves, an underperforming 
stock market, high sovereign spreads, and domestic capital flight. Vietnam has thus 
become an exception to the broader trend of the rest of the emerging markets in Asia, 
which are dealing with appreciating currencies, rising foreign exchange reserves, and 
increasing capital inflow (World Bank, 2012b). In addition to macroeconomic instability, 
the most worrying sign for Vietnam’s sustainable and long-term growth is the fact that 
its economy experienced a decline in manufacturing productivity. Starting in 2007, the 
country’s economic growth has increasingly been based on factor accumulation, not 
productivity (World Bank, 2012b). Figure 1.10 illustrates the steady decline of total 
factor productivity (TFP). In 2010, a large part of the GDP composition was based on 
capital investment while TFP was close to 0 per cent. 
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Figure 1.10: Decomposition of Real GDP Growth into Contribution by Capital, 
Labour and Total Factor Productivity 1986–2010 (in per cent)	  
	  
Source: World Bank (2012b, p. 16) 
	  
In a study done by Nguyen and colleagues (2010), shown in Figure 1.11, 
observes similar results. The figure shows that TFP started to decline in 2005 and it hit a 
negative point in 2008. In sum, the quality and sustainability of Vietnam’s economic 
growth remain a major concern given the resource-intensive pattern of growth, decline in 
productivity, high cost of imported inputs, lack of diversification, and low value addition 
in exports. 
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Figure 1.11: Total Factor Productivity in the Period 1987–2008	  
	  
Source: Nguyen et al. (2010) 
	  
1.4.4. Final Remarks on Vietnam Economic Development 
	  
Despite two and a half decades of strong growth and an attainment of middle-
income status, starting in 2008, Vietnam has faced a transitional period both politically 
and economically. Rising inflation, and unemployment, as well as slowed economic 
growth exposed a large part of the population to hardship and difficulty in making a 
living. In addition, growing discontent over the country’s income inequality, as well as 
disputes over property rights in a number of rural regions, have increased the prospects 
for social and political instability. The above-mentioned October 2012 Central Party 
Committee's Sixth Meeting was the first time in Vietnam’s contemporary history that the 
contestation between two CPV groups were exposed and known to the public 
(Bloomberg News, 2012). This meeting was said to be the longest and most important 
meeting since 1975, and gave rise to a French newspaper’s headline: “Vietnam PM's 
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future uncertain as communists meet” (Agence France Presse, 2012). At the end of the 
two-week meeting, Dung kept his seat, while the economy continues to go deeper into a 
recession. The Party Central Committee decision to keep Dung was said to reflect the 
CPV’s concern over the political stability and legitimacy of the Party among the growing 
Vietnamese discontents who frustrate with the government and the CPV (Bloomberg 
News, 2012). However, experts suggest that the power struggle continues within the 
CPV.7   
The question of how Vietnam may overcome these economic and political 
challenges reflects the critical need to understand the power structure and the actual 
forces that drive the economy and the country as a whole. Given such enormous tasks, 
this thesis analysed Vietnam’s political economy from the perspective of rent and rent-
seeking in the industrial sector, especially its technological dimension. The industrial 
sector has been at the core of the CPV and the government’s development agenda in the 
last two and a half decades. Consequently, there were considerable rents and rent-
seeking in this sector that generate important upgrading for the country’s industrial 
development. A better understanding of this transformation is pivotal in order to devise 
development strategies that work in the Vietnamese context of rent management.  
	  
1.5. Thesis Structure and Overview 
 
The thesis is organised in seven chapters. After this introduction, Chapter 2 
reviews the theoretical literature on technological adoption, rent, and rent-seeking in the 
context of development. The aim of the review is to provide characterisations of the 
                                                
7 Carlyle Thayer, professor of politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy in 
Canberra, in Bloomberg News (2012). 
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process of technological change and its links to economic performance in the face of 
rents and rent-seeking activities in developing countries. This chapter reviews the 
important roles of informality and informal institutions in the creation and 
implementation of rents. It argues that the process of technological upgrading and 
capability-building in a developing country is subject to a number of market 
imperfections, which undermine firms and industries abilities to optimise their 
performances. As a result, appropriate rent and rent management strategies are needed to 
create the necessary incentives and pressure that address these externalities, especially 
those that may support learning and innovation. 
Chapter 3 constructs a conceptual framework for the analysis of rents and rent 
management. As mentioned above, I refer to this framework as a Developmental Rent 
Management Analysis. The central utilisation of the DRMA framework is to help 
observe how the three rent management factors—politics, institutions, and industry 
organisation—affect the structure of incentives and pressure that ensure firms’ effort 
towards technical learning, upgrading, and innovation. This is based on the premise that 
successful rent management primarily depends on formal and informal political and 
institutional arrangements to produce incentives and pressures for upgrading. Investors 
who receive rents are expected to provide their best effort in order to achieve 
developmental outcomes. Furthermore, while rents are created for a variety of purposes, 
rent outcomes, whether good or bad, depend on a set of political, institutional, and 
market conditions that, in many cases, take place informally. One of the key objectives 
of the DRMA framework, therefore, is to understand this informality and how politics 
and institutions are configured. In essence, DRMA enables a broader understanding of 
the various factors at play—political, institutional, and economic—in the process of 
development, including its technological dimension. DRMA therefore allows for a fuller 
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and more complete understanding of how and why developing countries succeed or fail 
to industrialise and catch up with their developed counterparts. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyse the industrial development of the 
telecommunications, textile and garment, and motorcycle industries, respectively, 
especially from the perspective of technical learning and upgrading. The qualitative 
analysis in these three chapters comprises eight case studies. The three in chapter 4 focus 
on the telecommunication industry; the three in chapter 5 focus on the textile and 
garment industry; and the two in chapter 6 focus on the motorcycle industry. A common 
structure is adopted for these three empirical chapters, starting with an overview of the 
respective industry’s historical development before turning to identify the constraints or 
bottlenecks that restrict their development. Following this review, case studies which 
employ the DRMA framework discuss in-depth the rent management mechanisms that 
determine the success or failure of the respective industry’s industrial development. 
These mechanisms take into account rents and rent seeking activities taken place 
throughout the reform period of the industry. Each chapter concludes with observations 
and policy options for the development of a developmental rent management strategy 
(DRMS) as Vietnam moves forward. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the evidence and suggests that there were three different 
configurations of the rent management that drove Vietnam’s industrial development 
since Doi Moi. In addition, this chapter draws out the implications of the findings for 
both theory and policy. Finally, this chapter puts forward potential areas for further 
research on rent and rent management in Vietnam. 
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 Technology Adoption In Rent-Seeking Economies: A Chapter 2.
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The issues of development in developing countries are twofold. First, growth and 
development requires technological upgrading and industrial capability-building (Lall, 
2004). Second, embedded within each developing economy is a rent-seeking society, 
which operates both formally and informally. Rents and rent-seeking in developing 
countries are ubiquitous because the political, institutional, and market structures are 
such that a state plays a direct role in creating and implementing them while 
simultaneously being under the pressure of various interests that seek rents (Chang & 
Cheema, 2002; Khan, 2000b; Medema, 1991; Mueller, 1989). The first element is 
necessary for growth and development while the later either enhances or deters industrial 
upgrading and technological adoption.  
This chapter assesses each of the two issues in turn by presenting an overview of 
key contributions in the literature on the political economic analysis of technological 
change, learning, rents, and rent-seeking. The purpose of this exercise is to construct a 
theoretical framework to examine the critical problems of technological upgrading and 
capability-building in the industrial sector of developing countries from a rent and rent 
management perspective. In this thesis, rent policy8 is defined as a policy that creates 
                                                
8 Generally, rent policy is any government policy that creates rent. Consequently, this 
type of rent is labeled policy-created rent in this thesis. Some portion of the rent policy 
may target market failures, though not necessarily related to an industrial sector. Where 
rent policy does target the industrial sector or economic development, it is thus a form of 
industrial policy. The portion of the rent policy, which does not aim to correct market 
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rent formally for the purpose of promoting development or informally to be extractive. 
Based on this definition, rent policy often emerges from formal political and institutional 
mechanisms. Extraction and redistribution could be the unintended effects of this rent 
policy. 
This thesis argues that in order to achieve growth through technological 
upgrading and capability-building, rent policies must satisfy the political and 
institutional conditions for effective rent management under the pressure of rent-seeking. 
Technological upgrading is defined as any type of technical learning, as well as 
technological transfers, adoption, adaptation and innovation. Capability-building in 
productive activities is defined as the enhancement of organizational, technological and 
managerial capabilities relevant for producing higher quality products or similar products 
at lower cost. Thus, capability-building is related to the organizational and functional 
levels, as well as to individuals, groups, and institutions. In this context, industrial policy 
is a subset of rent policy, although the latter may be created for a purpose other than 
supporting the industrial sector. Subsequently, an effective rent management system is 
one that creates the incentives and pressure for technical learning and upgrading. More 
importantly, this thesis maintains that these conditions are not limited to the formal 
political and institutional arrangements within a state, but are taken from a wider context 
of the configuration between politics, institutions, and the structure and the boundaries 
between the market and the firms.  
To this end, this chapter is organized into four sections. Section 2.2 assesses the 
characteristics of technological upgrading in a development context. It first reviews the 
                                                                                                                                           
failures are devised for redistributive or extractive purpose, and thus they are damaging, 
or growth-reducing, rents. This is a general definition of rent policy. In this thesis, rent 
policy is defined as developmental and not created for redistributive purpose. However, 
rents that emerge through various mechanisms could produce either growth-reducing or 
growth-enhancing outcomes. 
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neoclassical literature on technology and growth, which was largely derived from 
Solow’s (1956, 1957) model on growth and technical change. Second, alternative 
approaches to technological transfers and the appropriation of knowledge are presented. 
These approaches challenge Solow’s and others’ assumptions by pointing out that the 
appropriation of knowledge is neither automatic nor costless. It is in this context that a 
state’s intervention in the forms of industrial policies is arguably essential for catching 
up. Section 2.3 surveys the theoretical debate on rents and rent-seeking with special 
attention on technological upgrading and capability-building at the firm and industry 
levels. This thesis agrees with the heterodox economists’ assertion that, under certain 
conditions, rents could be value-enhancing (Chang & Cheema, 2002; Khan, 2000b; 
North, et al., 2007) and thus, effective development strategies should take into 
consideration the creation and management of value-enhancing rents (Khan, 2000b). 
Section 2.4 first presents alterative approaches to the issue of rent and rent-
seeking. It then discusses the theoretical analysis on some of the most critical problems 
in development, especially as related to the issue of learning. This includes the notable 
research of Joseph Stiglitz (1989, 2013b), Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik (2003; 
2008), and Mushtaq Khan (2000a, 2000b, 2009b, 2011). The discussion uses the analysis 
of market failures as a point of departure. Finally, considerations about the roles of 
politics and informal institutions, especially the research of Douglas North and 
colleagues (2007; 2006), Ha-Joon Chang (1999), Ha-Joon Chang and Ali Cheema (2002) 
and Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2000a, 2011), in solving the critical two-fold problem of 
development identified at the start of this chapter.  
All these strands of literature clearly do not constitute a unified school of thought. 
Nevertheless, they present strong analytical complementarities and share a common 
belief that the analysis of technological upgrading and capability-building for developing 
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countries should be based not only on economic theories on technology, growth, and 
development, but also on a wider understanding of the formal and informal dynamics of 
rent-seeking and rent management processes. This literature provides useful insights in 
examining the determinants of technological upgrading and capability-building in the 
industrial sector of developing countries from a rent management perspective. 
	  
2.2. Characteristics of Technological Adoption, Capability-building, and Growth 
in Development Context 
 
Economic and industrial development can largely be viewed as a process of 
technological “catch up,” in which firms in developing countries learn to master new 
technologies of production already in use in more advanced economies. In this sense 
technological catch up is seen as a primary instrument that closes the technological gap 
between developing countries and the international technological frontier. By and large, 
this process facilitates developing countries to increase productivity levels, strengthen 
international competitiveness, and enter new markets or market segments for higher 
value-added goods (Warren, 2007). 
The leading roles of technology and technological progress for economic growth 
and development are widely acknowledged in economics literature. In “An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” Adam Smith identified the gains to be 
made from the division of labour and production specialisation. Smith highlighted the 
benefits derived from a specific form of technological progress: organizational change. 
This change is also central to Marx’s (1906) and in a somewhat similar way 
Schumpeter’s (1942) analysis of the dynamics of capitalism, where innovation and 
competition drive processes of capitalist accumulation and growth. Similarly, it is also 
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instrumental in Kaldor’s (1957; 1967) examination of industrial growth, capital 
accumulation, and economic development. Even neoclassical theory, which is generally 
more concerned with allocative efficiency at the exclusion of other types of efficiency, 
defined technological change, as articulated by Solow (1957), to be central to the growth 
processes. 
This section first provides the neoclassical approach to technology adoption and 
growth, which is followed by alternative views to the neoclassical approach. The final 
section presents a paradigm shift from the neoclassical perspective of technological 
change to the theory of rents and rent management. This thesis argues that the 
understanding of rent management mechanisms—defined as the configuration of politics, 
institutions, and industry organisations that produce the rent outcomes—is critical to 
improving technological adoption and upgrading in developing countries, because this 
understanding provides insights into how rent policies can succeed under the pressure of 
rent-seeking in specific development contexts. 
	  
2.2.1. Neoclassical Debates on Technology and Growth 
	  
Over the past 30 years, the debate on technological change and industrialisation 
in the context of development has largely been dominated by neoclassical thinking on 
economic development. Key policy and academic documents, such as the World Bank’s  
“World Development Reports 1987: Industrialization and Foreign Trade” and World 
Development Reports 1991: The Challenge of Development 1991” or Anne Krueger’s 
(1974, 1998) work on trade and development, continue to provide the basic theme for 
neoclassical analysis on technology and industrial development. This strand of literature 
presents firms as optimising agents with perfect information. Firms are also deemed to 
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function in perfectly competitive market environments, including markets for 
technological goods, among others, with price signals that are accurately set by the 
market. In the absence of policy restrictions, it is argued, technology is taken to be freely 
available across countries and costless to apply within the firm. 
From a growth perspective, neoclassical thinking, notably presented by Solow 
illustrates the process of technological and economic development as essentially one of 
“automatic” convergence towards an internationally given technological frontier (in 
Warren, 2007). In this context, countries at different stages of development are to 
converge over time in their home per capita levels; that is, absolute convergence where 
adjusting for population growth and saving rates. Diminishing returns on factors of 
production is presumed. 
With regard to the role of trade and international factor movements, the 
assumption is that the most efficient and appropriate technologies from advanced 
countries are free and available for developing countries to adopt at each and every stage, 
given their relative factor endowments. It is thus expected that it is only a matter of time 
before developing countries catch up with more advanced economies in technological 
and economic terms. When it appears that different economies grow at different growth 
rates that are not consistent with the absolute convergence theory, the inconsistency is 
considered to be the consequence of distortions induced by industrial or interventionist 
policies. In addition, differences in performance are regarded as the result of policy 
barriers, which slow technological trickledown effects from technological advanced 
countries to developing economies (Warren, 2007). In other words, government 
intervention deterred the “automatic” transfer of technology from advanced to developed 
countries.	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From this perspective, neoclassical thinking asserts that technological progress in 
developing countries can be achieved by improving the channels and mechanisms9 
through which advanced technologies in developed economies can reach developing 
economies. In other words, developing countries should focus on improving the 
incentives for the transfer of technologies. To achieve these objectives, the neoclassical 
literature identified four main mechanisms that promote technological catching up and 
development: (1) trade, (2) market (internal and external) deregulation leading to 
increased competition, (3) foreign direct investment, and (4) macroeconomic stability.  
These mechanisms are largely reflected in the Washington Consensus agenda led by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the late 1980s.  
The focus on these four mechanisms as avenues of technological upgrading for 
developing countries reflects the assumption that technology can be unconditionally 
imported from abroad via trade and FDI. However, over-regulation, interventionist 
policies, and macroeconomic instability are barriers to technological adoption in 
developing countries because they deter investment and the full development of market 
forces. At the policy level, neoclassical views on the process of development, including 
its technological dimension, have provided the basis for the implementation of structural 
adjustment and macroeconomic stabilisation across the developing world, and most 
notably embedded in the Washington (and Post-Washington) Consensus and the 
International Monetary Fund’s financial reform agenda. 
	  
2.2.2. Critics of the Mainstream Approach 
 
                                                
9 The term ‘mechanism’ describes the formal and informal process that institutions 
implement and sustain. 
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There are a number of shortcomings in the neoclassical economic approach to 
technology and growth. First, the neoclassical primary concern is allocative efficiency at 
the exclusion of other and perhaps more important types of efficiency. Neoclassical 
economics assume that by construction, market mechanism is efficient and nonmarket 
mechanisms are inefficient (Fine, 1997). This view is far from reflecting the reality, 
especially in developing countries where distorted price signals and market failures are 
much more pervasive and damaging than in developed countries (Fine, 1997; Khan, 
2000b; Rodrik, 1995, 2004b; Stiglitz, 1989, 1994). Second, the neoclassical approach, 
which largely focuses on allocation of resources at the margins in a competitive 
environment, provides little insight in response to a number of fundamental questions 
concerning: (1) how to mobilise and deploy new resources and to create new capacities; 
(2) how finance, trade, employment, and the exchange and interest rates are associated 
with industrial strategy; and (3) how an industrial strategy fits in with the development of 
the economy as a whole (Fine, 1997).  
Third, transfers of technology from FDI are not voluntary and automatic. 
Amsden (2009) points out that most cases of accelerated accumulation of technological 
and managerial capabilities have historically occurred within domestic firms, not within 
subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms operating in a developing country. This is because 
“even when MNCs [multinational corporations] are an important source of capital 
investment, they often carry relatively limited technology transfer, with the most tacit 
forms of knowledge and a good deal of R&D activities being kept in developed countries” 
(Cimoli, Dosi, & Stiglitz, 2009a, p. 8). Finally, new (endogenous) growth theory 
dismisses the standard neoclassical proposition in two fundamental ways. First, 
technology is endogenous, and thus different firms and countries may operate under 
significantly different technological conditions and costs (Fine, 1997). Second, given the 
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determinants of the returns on capital, the direction of investment decisions is no longer 
solely determined by its relative scarcity, but also by labour, education, and skills (Fine, 
1997). 
Given the simplistic and impractical assumptions put forward by Solow’s growth 
model, policy agendas set by neoclassical thinking are not achievable. More importantly, 
a partial move towards such policies advocated by the New Washington Consensus10 can 
be damaging for countries because it does not solve the pressing issues of development, 
such as market externalities and political, financial, and fiscal instabilities (Rodrik, 
2004b). In addressing these shortcomings, the heterodox view reviewed in the next 
section asserts that historically and realistically technological upgrading takes place in 
vastly different ways from the processes asserted by the neoclassical literature.  
	  
2.2.3. Alternative View: Technological Capability and the Appropriation of 
Knowledge  
 
Countering neoclassical thinking, the alternative view points out the idiosyncratic, 
context-dependent nature of firm-level dynamics. This view calls attention to the cost of 
adoption and efficient use of technologies, which is difficult to adopt and adapt at the 
firm level (Cimoli, Dosi, & Stiglitz, 2009b). In addition, the alternative literature stresses 
the prevalence of market failures facing the development of key technological inputs, 
such as skills and capability, as well as market failures in the diffusion of technological 
and business development knowledge throughout the economy (Cimoli, et al., 2009a; 
Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Khan, 2009b; Stiglitz, 1989).	  	  
Economists who advocate state intervention in reducing the technology gap in 
developing countries point to the fact that learning and technology adoption requires a 
                                                
10 Rodrik (2006) named it the “Augmented Washington Consensus.” 
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great deal of effort, financial resources, and time (Chang & Cheema, 2002; Hausmann & 
Rodrik, 2003; Khan, 2000b, 2009b; Rodrik, 2007). This is because learning new tacit 
knowledge requires numerous trials of learning-by-doing, which takes time and effort to 
adapt to the new technology and to put the new skills into use. In addition, a 
distinguished feature of developing economies is that significant effort must be devoted 
to the adaptation and improvement of products and to develop competitiveness in 
operational management and production organisation. 	  
There is a great deal of literature, which provides theoretical and empirical 
evidences on the role of domestic firms in adopting new technology. Metcalfe (1994) 
Evenson and Westphal (1995), Deraniyagala (2000a, 2000b) argue that domestic firms in 
developing economies have to play a more active role in the process of technological 
development because efficient use of foreign technologies involves small product 
developments, modifications of production machinery, and so on. More specifically, Lall 
(1992) maintains that technological change in developing countries takes place mostly in 
the forms of importation and incorporation of foreign technologies that improve 
production processes and firms’ capability. To achieve this, firms operating in 
developing economies must be skilled and technologically capable if they are to make 
appropriate use of these foreign technologies and engage in efficient production – two 
elements that are mostly insufficient in developing economies. 
In a context where international comparative advantages are no longer 
determined only by factor endowments but also by the level of technological competence 
and progress, these issues are particularly significant. This is because in developing 
countries, the development of technological capabilities in sectors associated with higher 
learning-by-doing, value addition, or complex manufacturing could contribute to greater 
industrial deepening and economic growth through spillovers (Stiglitz, 1989, 2013b). 
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Given these considerations, it is clear that the question of how firms in developing 
countries engage in technological efforts and how these efforts impact economic 
performance cannot simply be reduced to a problem of accessing foreign technologies, 
nor to a narrow reading of the role played by market competition as an incentive 
mechanism for technological upgrading, as posited in the neoclassical literature. 
From this perspective, across-the-board liberalisation polices, if not accompanied 
by efforts to upgrade local technological capabilities, may lead to a situation where 
developing countries only reinforce existing advantages in simple, low-tech activities 
where they possess comparative advantages (Warren, 2007). An increase in foreign 
competition within the domestic market has also been known to discourage local firms 
from investing time and financial resources into new technology, instead opting to 
pursue low-cost production activities (Ohno, 2008) (see Chapter 5 and 6). Given 
challenges in technology and capability development, as well as the existence of market 
failures, development economists generally argue that developing countries must employ 
industrial policies to remove market externalities that constrain learning and to support 
technological adoption and innovation that go beyond the policy framework put forward 
by neoclassical theories. 
 
2.2.4. From Trade Liberalisation and Industrial Policy Paradigms to Rents and 
Rent Management 
 
Underlying Solow’s and the neoclassical discussion of the process of 
technological and economic growth is a presumption that the process of technological 
upgrading is automatic and that the role of the state should largely be limited to 
promoting market liberalisation, free trade, macro-stability, and incentives for foreign 
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direct investment. However, neoclassical theories do not provide the methodological 
tools for the state to cope with its important role during liberalisation or which policy 
instrument is appropriate to correct the pervasive market failures that constrain 
technological upgrading and learning in developing countries. Here, the fundamental 
issue is that political and economic interests, which create and seek rents through policy 
measures (Khan, 2000a; North, et al., 2007), are strong determinants of a state’s ability 
and strategy to undertake meaningful and effective reform. In addition, Fine (1997) 
points out that politics and its arrangement within a state apparatus strongly correlates 
with socioeconomic conditions and the way the state and the private sector interact.  
 
Interest groups operate through the state, such that they influence, and are 
influenced by state strategies and policy. … Markets do not mediate adequately 
between these different interest groups because they are dominated by the 
stronger ones; and market-friendly theories have little to contribute about this 
problem because they are based on the assumption that economic agents are 
atomistic and therefore they assume away political power or only deal with it 
within the narrow boundaries of imperfect competition and government failure 
(Fine, 1997, p. 7).  
 
While the technology-capability literature provides valuable insights into the 
basic process of technology and industrial development, a full understanding of how 
these processes evolve in specific country contexts requires an in-depth assessment of 
the historical, political, and economic settings in which they take place. This 
understanding could be achieved through broader conceptualisation of rents, rent-seeking, 
and policies that promote technological change and economic transformation. 	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Recent contributions in the political economy of development analysis and by the 
more heterodox literature on rents, and rent-seeking provide a practical approach to 
assess and address some of the shortcomings in the neoclassical literature. This strand of 
literature provides an effective analytical tool to evaluate important development factors 
at play in the process of economic development, including its technological dimension. 
These factors include formal and informal political and institutional conditions and 
dynamics of the industry organisation. The next section provides a theoretical review on 
rent and rent seeking with the inclusion of research and discussions on market failures, 
political settlement, and informality in the context of development. 
	  
2.3. Rents and Rent Seeking in a Development Context 
 
A distinction in rent-seeking activities between developed and developing 
countries is the rule of law, as well as the characteristics of their political and 
institutional structures. In developing countries the latter are more underdeveloped and 
incomplete as compared to developed countries. As a consequence, informal 
relationships, between organisations and with the state frequently take place behind 
formal institutional structures and relationships. As a result, rents—damaging or not—
and rent-seeking are ubiquitous and more widespread in developing countries (Khan, 
2009b; Medema, 1991; Mueller, 1989). The literature on rents and rent-seeking 
increasingly include heated debates on the cost and effects of rents, especially in the 
context of development. In the next section, the analysis of rents and rent-seeking, based 
on the neoclassical school, are reviewed. The heterodox approach to rents and the 
potential of value-enhancing rents are discussed. This thesis argues that an industrial 
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policy is a form of rent policy11 because any strategy that corrects or tries to correct 
market failures to boost industrial development inevitably changes the distribution of 
benefits to society and therefore inevitably creates rents (Khan, 2000a, 2009b).  
	  
2.3.1. Neoclassical Definition and the Agenda to Eliminate Rents 
 
The neoclassical literature, as part of the field of public choice theory, refers to 
rents as excess income and to rent-seeking expenditures as socially wasteful; and this 
latter expense diverts resources from productive activity (Buchanan, et al., 1980; 
Krueger, 1974; Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; Posner, 1975; Tullock, 1967). From 
this perspective, value-enhancing rents cannot exist. The suggested policy implication is 
that, in addition to liberalising an economy to achieve optimal growth rates, developing 
countries should either have a set of institutions that minimise rent-seeking (Krueger, 
1974) or avoid setting up institutions that create rents (Mueller, 1989, p. 245).	  When 
market externalities are said to trouble development (Stiglitz, 1989), this literature argues 
that no matter how imperfect the market is, more market is better than less (in Fine, 
2011). Thus, this strand of literature not only dismisses the role of rents based on the 
premise that a no-rent society is desirable for growth, it also presses for free market, free 
entry and exit, and accountable politics to deliver public goods: a combination that is 
virtually unachievable in developing countries. Subsequently, this position not only 
advocates for a good governance agenda, but also a market-driven growth agenda as 
well.	  	  
                                                
11 In general, all industrial policy is rent policy but not all rent policy is industrial policy. 
Policies that create rents may have broader aims than promoting industrialisation; for 
instance, policies that focus on social development. 
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Using a definition that is consistent with standard neoclassical textbooks, Khan 
(2000b, p. 21) defines a rent as something a person gets if “he or she earns an income 
higher than the minimum that person would have accepted, the minimum being usually 
defined as the income in his or her next best opportunity.” Similarly, Samuels and 
Mercuro (1984) define rents as “income received over and above the amount that would 
be received under a different institutional, or rights, arrangement” (p. 55). In this context, 
policy or legal change alters the pattern of resource allocation and exposures in society, 
thus creating rents. Further, the possibility of legal change presents the potential for a 
different allocation of rents since such a change alters rights of individual and groups. 
Hence, once there is the possibility and desirability of change in legal and economic 
relations, rent-seeking emerges (Medema, 1991).  
The first generation of rent-seeking models argues that even if only mildly 
damaging rents exist, the net effect is crippling because of high rent-seeking costs 
(Kruger 1974, Posner 1975, Buchanan et. al. 1980, in Khan, 2000a). This is because as a 
state creates rents, economic actors pay money to seek these rents. Such expenditures are 
considered wasteful from society’s perspective (Medema, 1991). Hence, one needs to 
include the costs associated with rent-seeking in the estimate of the total costs of rents. 
Subsequently, a cost combination model, which combines the established cost of 
monopolies with the high cost of rent-seeking was developed. Tullock (1967, 1980) 
contends that in a competitive rent-seeking model, the aggregate resources devoted to 
pursuing redistribution of wealth can equal the value of the rents to be distributed.  
Furthermore, using the competitive market model, economists of this first 
generation show that a monopoly created and sustained through rents results in lower 
production output compared to the competitive market (in Mueller, 1989, pp. 229–246). 
This result signals inefficient allocation of resources and has a social cost that is the loss 
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in social benefit to society: the deadweight welfare loss. Broadly speaking, the public 
choice literature basically focuses on these negative consequences of rent seeking. 
Buchanan and colleagues’ (1980, p. 359) view is typical and influential: 
 
Rent seeking involves social waste. Resources that could otherwise be devoted to 
value-producing activity are engaged in competitive effort that determines 
nothing other than the distributive results. Rent seeking, as such, is totally 
without allocative value, although, of course, the initial institutional creation of 
an opportunity for rent seeking ensures a net destruction of economic value. 
 
The inference of this analysis lends supports to the argument that there should not 
be any rents in the competitive market (Krueger, 1974). This conclusion is deemed to be 
the goal for all developing countries because it maximises net social benefit given a set 
of resource endowments and technology (Khan, 2000a). 
The second generation of the rent-seeking model reveals that under different 
institutional structures, the cost of rent-seeking could be substantially lower (Congleton, 
1980; Rogerson, 1982). As a result, rent-seeking costs could fluctuate over a much wider 
range, so rent-seeking would not necessarily be expensive. In addition, models in this 
second generation relax some assumptions, especially one that assumes rent-seeking 
always results in the creation of value-reducing rents. Putting forward his theory of 
unproductive profit-seeking activities, Bhagwati points out that due to the intrinsic 
second-best consideration, there may not exist the positive shadow prices12 on resources 
used in rent-seeking, implying that individuals’ quest to secure biddable rents need not 
                                                
12 Shadow prices indicate the highest price a producer could pay for that added resource 
without becoming worse off overall from adding the resource.  
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always entail socially wasteful activity (in Hillman & Katz, 1984). In addition, 
Bhagwati’s analysis also shows that rent-seeking outcomes can theoretically have a 
positive net-social value (in Hillman & Katz, 1984). Nevertheless, Bhagwati did not 
conclude that rents could therefore be value-enhancing.  
 
2.3.2. Heterodox Approach and the Potential of Value Creating Rents 
 
In contrast to the mainstream contention to rents and rent-seeking, the heterodox 
literature not only looks at costs, but also looks at the outcomes that rents produce, which 
arguably can be either negative or positive. Khan (2000b, p. 71) points out that “one 
problem in most of the rent-seeking literature has been that it has concentrated almost 
exclusively on the social costs of the resources used up in rent-seeking and very little on 
the different types of rents and outcomes which rent-seeking has created in different 
context.” The author suggests that the overall effect of rent-seeking must be calculated 
using both the costs incurred and the rent outcomes created. Therefore, rents can be seen 
as possibly value-enhancing when the positive outcome outweighs the cost. Analysing 
rent-seeking from a property rights perspective, Khan (2000b) suggests that rent-seeking 
should be framed as a process that creates and alters rights, which can lead to a more 
efficient allocation of resources within an economy. 
This assertion is partly based on earlier insights on how rent-seeking could create 
rents that are beneficial, which gained momentum in the 1990s, especially in view of the 
East Asian development model. Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) point out that during 
their industrial development, both Taiwanese and Korean governments had allocated 
subsidies to promote industrialisation in socially beneficial manners. Similarly, Cowen 
and colleagues (1994) assert that “rent seeking can increase political effort and thereby 
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increase social welfare” (p. 132). This is because when some public policies generate 
rents for public officials who otherwise have little incentive to spend time and effort 
proposing policies that benefit others, rent-seeking in politics can motivate officials to 
provide public goods (Cowen, et al., 1994). In making this assertion, the authors assume 
that public officials receive more rents the more they promote policies, and if these 
policies profit the public, they increase social welfare (Cowen, et al., 1994). In other 
words, if the policies are useful for the public, the usefulness of the policies can 
compensate for the costs of rent seeking. 
In focusing on the role of rent-seeking in the creation of new markets for value-
enhancing products, Abbott and Brady (1991) show that rent-seeking that succeeds in 
lifting regulatory restrictions and, thereby, creates markets that would not have existed 
but for rent- seeking could enhance, rather than diminish, welfare. This is particularly the 
case if the regulatory restriction retarded technological innovation. Removal of the 
restriction allows for firms and products that embrace new technologies and innovations 
to emerge and integrate into the production organisation. Here, the authors assume that 
inefficient restriction was maintained because it benefited specific groups that had 
interest in prolonging the restriction in order to sustain their rents. 
As certain rents can be value-enhancing (especially those that promote learning 
and innovation), portraying rents and rent-seeking as value-reducing in every possible 
circumstance is misleading. Khan (2000b) argues that developing countries do not need 
an institutional structure that focuses on minimising rents but one that achieves a 
distribution of rents and a configuration of the rent-seeking process that is growth-
enhancing. As a result, and in agreement with Khan, the analytical focus of this thesis is 
on the institutions and politics that create value-enhancing rents and that support 
economic development.  
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2.4. Review of Rents Management as a Development Strategy 
 
Many institutional and development economists agree that governments have a 
positive and catalytic role in promoting development in the economy, especially in the 
industrial sector, through technological upgrading and capability-building. This thesis 
argues that developing countries need an effective rent management system; one that 
makes rents value-enhancing and developmental because they are associated with 
incentives and pressures that force learning and effort, despite the costs of rent-seeking 
activities. From this perspective, an effective rent management system requires 
economists to first identify the most important economic problems for development. 
Dani Rodrik (2004b) calls these problems the “binding constraints” facing development. 
To answer this query, the modern theory of market failures provides useful insights to 
clarify these problems, or constraints, to development. It should be pointed out, though, 
that most institutional and development economists differ as to what these are. This 
discussion is provided in sections 2.4.1. 
Some development economists, notably North, Wallis and Weingast (2007, 2006), 
Chang (1999) and Chang and Cheema (2002), and Khan (1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2011) 
take the issue of development one step further by asking: “How do governments in 
developing countries solve these critical constraints given that politics and informal 
institutions matter?” There are additional notable contributions in the literature that 
attempt to answer this political economy question, despite the diverse variation in 
approaches and analytical methods. This discussion is provided in sections 2.4.2 and 
2.4.3.  
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This thesis concludes the theoretical review by appealing for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms that manage rent and rent-seeking activities, going 
beyond the scope of the efficient and self-regulating market as well as the developmental 
state. These rent management mechanisms must also encompass (1) the political context 
of rent creation, allocation, and implementation, (2) the formal and informal institutions 
that create and manage the rent, and (3) the organisation of the industry which affects the 
incentives and pressures ensuring learning effort. To this end, this theoretical review 
touches upon important discussions that focus on these three factors. This broader review 
sets the fundamentals for the analytical framework discussed in the next chapter.  
 
2.4.1. Market Failures as Constraints to Development 
 
The modern theory of market failures has helped identify the most important 
problems facing economic development. Market failure is a general term describing 
situations in which resources are not allocated in the most efficient manner, causing 
market outcomes to fall short of achieving optimal efficiency. The argument here is that 
markets, on their own, are not efficient in promoting growth and development. 
Market failures in technological adoption arise due to the existence of a number 
of supply-side constraints such as technological externalities, informational problems, 
the problem of contracting for effort in the learning process, insufficient access to 
financing by manufacturing firms, spillovers, and the uncertain nature of technological 
investment. In addition, they are also the result of deficiencies in capital markets used to 
finance technological investments and learning. From the perspective of industrial 
capability-building through technology adoption and transfer, the pervasiveness of 
market failures in the supply of technology-related inputs is particularly damaging 
 70 
because they deter the utilisation of new technology in competitive production (Lall, 
1992; Lall & Larsch, 1999). 
In addition to the supply-side externalities, the market failures that the literature 
identifies as demand-side also constrain the process of firm-level technological 
accumulation. These essentially refer to the lack of incentive framework for 
manufacturing firms to put forth serious effort to learn new technology, to upgrade 
organisational capability, and to innovate. Directly related to the demand-side constraints 
are problems such as a high degree of competition and macroeconomic and political 
instability. These issues undermine firms’ investment decisions and their technology 
development efforts.  
In the context of using state interventions to correct market failures, which 
developing countries cannot quickly fix via by market reform, corrective policy 
interventions create rents, and thus rents become relevant to market failure analysis. 
Those who agree that there are market failures that the market itself cannot not resolve, 
will contend that some rents are useful because a rent policy can address some of these 
market failures so as to enhance the speed of technological upgrading and learning for 
domestic firms. Following this argument Chang (2000), Chang and Cheema (2002), 
Khan (2000b, 2006; 2009), Rodrik (2004a), Stiglitz (1989; 2001) and Wade (1990) are in 
agreement that rents (or policies made by a developmental state) can be an instrument for 
promoting growth and development via learning and technological upgrading.  
Central to the debate of market imperfections are the externalities that impact 
learning, described first by Arrow (1962) and then Stiglitz (1989) and Khan (2000b) 
under the concept of “learning-by-doing,” and by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) as 
“learning-by-discovery.” These development economists use slightly different analyses 
in examining learning failures in developing economies.  
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2.4.1.1. Stiglitz: The creation of a learning economy 
 
For Stiglitz, the point of industrial policies is to identify externalities and market 
failures because nearly every successful country has had industrial policies in which the 
private sector was assisted in bringing innovation to the marketplace. Stiglitz (1989, 
1994) and Stiglitz and Snowdon (2001) contend that a government should finance 
learning either directly or through subsidies on two important premises. The first premise 
is that successful and sustainable growth and development requires creating a learning 
society. This is especially true in the 21st century, as markets move to a knowledge 
economy. However, marked market failures, particularly those associated with impeded 
learning, are pervasive in developing countries.  
To explain market failure, Stiglitz (1989) employs the analysis of first mover’s 
positive externalities. People who first invest in technical learning or innovation in the 
industrial sector tend to lose out because their investment has positive externalities, so 
the first mover assumes risks which second and third movers do not want to take. As a 
result, businesses wait for the first mover to invest in the industrial sector. However, 
once the risk is transformed into profitable learning, the first movers often do not have 
enough time to make a monopolistic profit over the knowledge as the second and third 
movers use this knowledge. In the development environment, where market failures in 
information and capital markets are widespread, the first mover externalities may deter 
investments, especially in learning and innovation, given the risk associated with being a 
first mover (Stiglitz, 1989). 
As for the second premise, Stiglitz argues that developing countries need a strong 
industrial sector because it is related to the rate of productivity increases (Stiglitz, 1994). 
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The industrial sector also maintains important advantages such as high returns: to 
economy of scale, from the completion of learning (industrial upgrading), from learning 
continuity, and most importantly from diffusion and spillovers. Based on these two 
premises, Stiglitz (2013b) contends that it is desirable to encourage learning and 
development in the industrial sector13 as it embeds larger societal learning benefits, 
taking into account both direct learning and cross-sectoral spillovers. Therefore, the 
government must employ subsidy strategies that lead to an expansion of the industrial 
sector. In summary, industrial policies, which Stiglitz (2013a) defines as any policy 
affecting economic structure, can help “correct” market failures in the form of subsidies 
(or rents). Such policies are optimal solutions to promote the development of the 
activities with positive externalities, such as education, information, and first-mover 
investment, to create a learning society that enables sustainable development and growth. 
 
2.4.1.2. Hausmann, Rodrik, and Valesco: Learning by discovery 
 
While observing the performance of developing countries throughout their 
reforms, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) noticed that free-market followers, such as 
countries in Latin America, failed to perform despite successful adoption of foreign 
technologies, whereas, countries with initially weak market foundations and heavy state 
interventions, such as China, Taiwan, and South Korea, achieved phenomenal growth 
rates in the last three decades of the twentieth century. In their assessment, Hausmann 
and Rodrik (2003) highlight two major failures of laissez-faire approaches: “There is too 
little investment and entrepreneurship ex ante, and too much production diversification 
                                                
13 Stiglitz defines the industrial sector broadly to mean the modern sector, because he 
also includes many services in this sector. 
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ex post” (p. 1). The authors later in the book described this as market failure of discovery 
and self-discovery. 
In modelling these externalities, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) use a first-mover 
externality analysis that is similar to Stiglitz’s. Under a free market system, the first 
entrepreneur often has less incentive to invest due to insufficient ex post profits. 
Moreover, it is uncertain when the second (or third) investor will enter the market to take 
advantage of the discovery, which in turn drives down monopoly profits from the 
discovery. If the first inventor cannot guarantee profits from his investment ex ante, he 
has very little pretext and motivation to invest in new technology. In the event that this 
behaviour becomes systemic in all industries within an economy, the country could 
suffer not only tremendous social and economic losses, but also potential technological 
backwardness due to lack of new discovery (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003).  
In their model, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), on the one hand, assume that every 
developing country has various comparative advantages, but that investors do not have 
prior knowledge of what those advantages are. This distinguishes their approach from 
Stiglitz’s (and others’) model of externality in learning, because the latter do not assume 
that developing countries have a number of hidden comparative advantages that need 
discovering. On the other hand, Hausmann and Rodrik assert that discovery comes with 
time and effort but it does not always produce expected and desirable outcomes. In other 
words, the first investor’s gain from investments is not guaranteed. 
To correct this externality, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Rodrik (2004a, 
2007) argue that industrial policies such as subsidies and taxes need to be selective and 
focus on the actual binding constraints in learning and discovery, rather than tackling 
across-the-board reform. Based on the learning-by-discovery model, Hausmann et al. 
(2008) identify three major constraints which are widely seen to slow growth: (1) low 
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private and social returns to investment, (2) poor appropriability of those returns, and (3) 
inadequate access to finance. As a result, Hausmann and colleagues advocate a cautious, 
experimental industrial policy. To identify, prioritise, and overcome the most critical 
constraints in growth, they developed “growth diagnostic” as a broad growth analysis 
framework (Hausmann, et al., 2008, p. 1). Growth diagnostic is an “approach to 
development that determines the action agenda on the basis of these [diagnostic] signals 
is likely to be considerably more effective than a laundry-list approach with a long list of 
institutional and governance reforms that may or may not be well targeted on the most 
binding constraints to growth” (p. 25). However, the authors contend that the process of 
diagnosis and policy response needs to be institutionalised gradually so as to ensure that 
the policy does not fall apart during the reform process.  
 
2.4.1.3. Khan: Building organisational capability and ensuring high level 
of learning efforts 
 
In his 2009 paper, entitled “Learning, Technology Acquisition and Governance 
Challenges in Developing Countries.” Khan focuses on the development of 
organisational capabilities within firms as a necessary condition for achieving global 
competitiveness. This, rather than the difficulty of acquiring machinery or skills, is the 
most important constraint limiting the ability of developing countries to acquire 
competitiveness in known technologies in which they already have formally skilled 
workers. The missing organizational capabilities are largely missing tacit knowledge. 
Khan observes that while some firms in developing countries may have the required 
number of workers and new machinery, they simply are not able to produce a product at 
the price and quality of firms in more advanced countries. The difference here lies in 
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building the organisational capability through learning by doing because this is the only 
way for firms to embed routines and tacit knowledge into their production organisation. 
Without this tacit knowledge that Khan describes as organizational capability, 
competitiveness cannot be achieved. The main problem of development is therefore not 
the discovery of already existing comparative advantage, but the creation of new 
comparative advantage through the development of the appropriate organizational 
capabilities.  
In this sense, Khan’s work is distinguishable from both Stigtliz and Hausmann 
and Rodrik. For Khan, subsidising the first mover for discovery or for the positive 
externality does not guarantee that the first mover will be able to produce something 
productively, especially if that first mover does not have the organisational capability to 
produce it effectively. This is because learning is not only about bringing in new 
machinery and learning how to use it, but it is also about creating entirely new 
organizational structures that can use the new machines to produce products of a given 
quality and price (Khan, 2009b). Therefore, unless firms achieve organisational 
capability to produce something competitively the subsidies proposed by the models of 
Stiglitz (1989) or Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) will not work.  
The achievement of organizational capabilities through learning by doing 
requires a high level of learning effort by the firm. In defining effort, Khan (2009b) 
specifically implies the effort in learning to acquire tacit knowledge, which improves a 
firm’s organisation of production and capability (to be distinguished from the effort of 
workers in the work process.) More specifically, Khan suggests firms must exert high 
levels of effort in trying out different organisational designs, internal management 
structures, inventory control systems, quality control systems (and so on) that can reduce 
costs and improve quality and productivity. 
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Khan (2009b) point outs that, “The market failure that constrains economic 
development most seriously is that investors cannot be sure that they will be able to 
enforce the levels of effort that will make this investment in learning viable” (p. 1). At 
the firm level, a high level of management effort is a prerequisite to creating competitive 
organisational capability for higher productivity. This may translate down to the 
individual worker level as a requirement for flexibility and effort as well, but high 
worker effort is not sufficient to ensure the rapid acquisition of tacit knowledge and 
technical capability to improve productive competitiveness.  
Khan contends the problem in ensuring high level of efforts is twofold. First, 
external investors can only observe firms and workers’ effort ex post. Second, it is 
difficult to contract for high effort because of a potentially large number of contingencies 
that can affect outcomes independently of effort. This is why private financing of 
significant new learning of this type is rare in developing countries, and needs to be 
distinguished from the first-mover problem.  
To address these constraints, Khan suggests that there needs to be a mechanism 
for financing the learning-by-doing process together with strong incentives and 
compulsions for significant effort, since only part of the latter requirement can be 
included in a formal contract. In his paper, Khan (2009b) listed different kinds of 
mechanisms that historically have ensured such effort. In some countries, for example, 
the government achieved needed effort by imposing penalties for the failure of learning 
ex post, as happened in South Korea in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In other cases like 
the Indian automobile industry, successful learning was achieved when governments 
offered large rents as ex post rewards with conditions that ensured that the reward could 
only be captured if significant organizational learning took place.  
 
 77 
2.4.2. The Role of a Political State in Rent Management 
 
A common strand running across the theoretical discussions in section 2.4.1 is the 
significant role of institutions and the developmental state in solving critical market 
failures, especially those associated with learning and effort. While Khan (2009b) 
stresses the importance of finding an incentive and compulsion mechanism to enforce 
learning, both Stiglitz (2013a) and Rodrik (2004b) explicitly contend that the state plays 
a catalytic and central role in correcting externalities that constrain development, 
especially in the industrial sector. This section of the chapter focuses on whether the 
state has the political capacity to implement the necessary policies to promote growth. In 
other words, how is the state able and willing to be independent of and to override 
particular interests, as well as to use that independence to adopt and implement 
developmental goals? 
Although Stiglitz (2013a) observed that “successful developing countries learned 
how to manage the political economy problems,” he did not discuss how it was done 
other than reasserting that solving externalities in learning requires the participation of 
nonmarket institutions and government intervention (p. 11). Being a bit more explicit, 
Rodrik (2004b) contends that the details of industrial policy will depend on the political 
context of the developing country, such that economic reform must be “politically 
popular and ultimately sustainable” (p. 6). Thus, policies that work in one country may 
not work in another because of the specific political context that either enhances or 
deters policy implementation (Rodrik, 2004b).14 Nonetheless, Rodrik does not develop a 
framework to observe different political economy models, especially those that relate to 
                                                
14 In his most recent, and somewhat controversial, discussion on the issue of political 
economy, Rodrik (2013) criticizes political economists’ excessive focus on defeating 
vested interests in the implementation of economic policies. He asserts that this focus 
can easily divert scholars from the critical contributions that policy analysis can make. 
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the issues of rent and rent-seeking among powerful interests embedded within and 
around the state. 
On the other hand, some development economists, notably Chang, Cheema, 
North, and Khan take it one step further from the discussion of market failure and each 
observe that political processes within a government could potentially deter or enhance 
the implementation of any policies that correct market failures. In other words, politics 
matters in the success and failure of implementing developmental rent policies (or 
industrial policies). In their respective works, they identify the interface between politics 
and economics, which determines how to solve the most critical problems in 
development. From the dimension of technological adoption and capability-building, the 
question is how to solve the most important problems in learning and effort, given that 
politics matters. In addressing these questions, Chang, Cheema, North, and Khan all put 
forward their own observations and analyses. The next three sections discuss these 
various models from the perspective of rent management.  
 
2.4.2.1. Chang and Cheema: The autonomous developmental state 
 
The first generation of development economists notably associated with the “Big 
Push” literature 15  (Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); Scitovsky (1954); Baran (1957); 
Gerschenkron (1962); Myrdal (1968); and Kuznets (1973) contends that economic 
development requires a developmental state: one that is capable of creating and 
regulating economic and political relationships in order to support sustained 
                                                
15 The theory of the “Big Push” model emphasises that underdeveloped countries require 
large amounts of investments to embark on the path of economic development from their 
present state of backwardness. This theory proposes that a “bit by bit” investment 
programme will not impact the process of growth as much as is required for developing 
countries. 
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industrialisation (see Chang, 1999). As part of the second generation of development 
economists, Chang and Cheema (2002) draw on Khan (2000a, 2000b) to contend that 
“the presence of transaction costs imply that market imperfections cannot be addressed 
through voluntary contracting among economic agents, thus lending further advantage to 
state mediation and arbitration” (p. 393). Their model calls for an “activist technology 
policy” in which the state actively invests in creating dynamic efficiencies by using a 
combination of rents for learning, while, at the same time, managing the rent by way of 
conditioning them upon specified performance criterion, such as technological upgrading 
and subsequently exports (p. 375).  
To achieve this goal, Chang (1999) argues that there is the need to reconstruct the 
developmental state, one that is capable of managing rents. The essential characteristics 
of this developmental state are autonomy, political management capability, and visionary 
leadership. According to Chang (1999), the state must make the goals of long-term 
growth and structural change as its primary goals. More importantly, it must “politically” 
manage the economy to ease the conflicts inflicted by rent policies while keeping track 
of its longer-term goals. Finally, the state is to engage in institutional adaptation and 
innovation so as to achieve its developmental goals. Chang (1999) devised four specific 
functions that such a state must perform: (1) coordination for change, (2) provision of 
vision, (3) institution building, and (4) conflict management.  
Implicitly, Chang’s (1999) model of rent management requires strong and 
autonomous leadership, one that could drive the Big Push forward and overcome 
resistance and contestation from interests that lose out in the reform process. He 
proposes what the South Korean state did during most of its industrial development from 
the 1960s to 1980s. However, this approach to development is unachievable in most 
countries because the political arrangement is different in historical, social, and political 
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contexts and is often characterised with weak capability, fragmentation and contestation; 
much more so that what is seen in the South Korean experience. Hence, to convert a 
developing country’s fragmented political arrangement into a South Korean rent 
management model, it most likely requires a major political and social shakeup that may 
be entirely unachievable. Additionally, the South Korean state-led model is not the only 
one that has produced growth and development. Historically, countries that did not have 
such an autonomous and integrated state did occasionally overcome market constraints 
and achieve growth, such as in some sectors in India and Thailand (see Khan, 2000a, 
2009b). Chang’s (1999) approach falls short in that it simplifies the complexity of rent 
management, the diversity of different political arrangements and the difficulties in 
overcoming contestations among political and economic interests in most developing 
countries.  
 
2.4.2.2. North, Wallis, Webb, and Weingast: Limited access order 
 
For North and his co-authors Wallis, Webb, and Weingast (2009), “economics is 
politics by other means” (p. 42). They did not view the problem of development through 
the analysis of market failures. Instead, they developed the conceptual framework of 
Limited Access Order (LAO) to interpret recorded human history. Limited access order 
are defined as “orders using the political system to limit economic entry to create rents, 
and then using the rents to stabilise the political system and limit violence” (North, et al., 
2006, p. 2). North and colleagues assert that each developing country is classified in one 
of the three forms of LAO: fragile, basic, or mature.  
According to North, Wallis, and Weingast (2007), to catch up to developed 
countries, developing countries must find ways to (1) reorganize itself, (2) improve 
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control of violence, and (3) create a legal framework for regulating non-state 
organizations based on a rule of law. Based on this argument, the limitation of violence 
and the prevention of disorder are important for movement along the LAO spectrum 
before transiting to an Open Access Order (North, Wallis, and Weingast’s description of 
advanced countries). From this perspective, rent creation and distribution (or rent 
management) could limit violence and prevent social disorder by motivating credible 
commitments among elites that they will not fight each other, since violence reduces 
elites’ rent. In order words, "the creation and distribution of rents therefore secure elite 
loyalty to the system, which in turn protects rents, limits violence and prevents disorder 
most of the time" (p. 8). Consequently, for North, Wallis, and Weingast, rent 
management largely serves the purpose of maintaining and enhancing social orders and 
limiting violence so that developing countries can move along the LAO spectrum to 
achieve development. As they wrote:  
 
The LAO gains stability when a dominant coalition emerges that provides 
powerful individuals and groups with incentives to refrain from violence. By 
limiting access, the LAO creates rents that help maintain peace. Limiting access 
and rent-creation is more than just service to interest groups; it is a solution to the 
problem of violence (North, et al., 2007, p. 42). 
 
Their analysis highlights a significant break with the neoclassical analysis of 
rents because it recognises that rents can be beneficial for maintaining social and 
political order, which then enhances development and growth. It also stress that rent 
creation can be functional in the sense that the creation of rent may serve different 
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development objectives (including the possibility of correcting market failures) and thus 
open room for the creation of more value-enhancing rents.  
 
2.4.2.3. Khan: Political settlement 
 
Similar to North and colleagues, (2007), Khan (1995, 2000b) argues that rents are 
essential for political stability16 and that we need to look at how developing countries 
manage different political interests, since the economic intervention carried out by a state 
has to be broadly consistent with the distribution of power within a political system.  
 
Theory and evidence suggest that developing countries are more likely to make 
an impact on market failures if they focus on building governance capabilities 
that allow them to address specific market failures on a scale and in areas that are 
consistent with their political settlements. This is an approach for developing 
growth-enhancing or developmental governance capabilities (Khan, 2011, p. 2). 
 
Unlike North et al., Khan argues that, on the one hand, there are value-enhancing 
rents in the economy and these rents could be created through a number of mechanisms 
other than LAO. On the other hand, the creation of value-enhancing rents must be 
consistent with the political configuration and the underlying distribution of power in 
society that allows rents to correct market failures and be developmental. As such, Khan 
points out that in addition to encouraging learning and innovation, rent policies first must 
be aligned with the interests that will produce the most efficient outcomes and must be 
shielded from the contestation of unproductive groups in ways that are themselves 
                                                
16 Khan (1995) defines and discusses the political settlement, and Khan (2000b) 
discusses redistributive rents and how they are essential for maintaining political stability. 
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feasible given the overall configuration of power in the political settlement. 
Consequently, rents are not only an instrument for stabilising social and political order, 
as North et al. (2007) suggest, but can also be used to directly stimulate industrial 
development and technological adoption, while being consistent with the distribution of 
power in a developing country.  
In this context, an effective rent and rent management strategy must address 
some of the specific structural constraints that developing countries frequently face such 
as weak and “inappropriate” property rights, weak incentives and compulsions for 
technical learning and upgrading, and political instability arising from short-term 
structural changes in property rights and technology adoption. For Khan (2011), the 
challenging issues in development and governance are to understand how, in a specific 
context, the management of political stability is achieved and whether feasible changes 
in political institutions and political organisations can strengthen political stabilisation 
and augment industrial transformation.  
Directly related to the challenge of managing political interests for development 
is the role of informality nested in the social, political, and economic structure of a state 
and its economy. Given the weakness of formal institutions in developing countries, 
informality is not just ubiquitous, it could complicate or assist the implementation of 
industrial strategy in developing countries. The next section provides a brief theoretical 
review on the issue of informal institutions.  
 
2.4.3. The Role of Informality in Rent Management  
 
As discussed in the previous sections, developing countries face serious 
challenges in solving market failures that constrain their growth. This is especially the 
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case if their political arrangements involve a significant role of informal rent allocations 
that can weaken the enforcement of formal institutions (Khan, 2011). This observation 
implies that development strategies that primarily rely on the enforceability of formal 
institutions are not appropriate (and would not be effective) as the primary response to 
correct externalities in these contexts, if the solutions did not account for the likely 
informal modifications in their implementation. It also implies that effective rent 
strategies must account for the informal institutions supported by the macro-political 
arrangement that is specific to a developing country. In this sense, the context of formal 
and informal political and institutional arrangements matter a great deal in development 
strategy.  
Informality also plays a critical role in the analysis of rent management because it 
provides useful insights into the political and institutional mechanisms, which affect the 
outcomes of the rent. In addition, informal institutions and their dynamics also explain 
why and how the manner in which rents operate in developing countries is distinct from 
the formal structure of a country’s politics and institutions. Similarly, informality also 
untangles the distinction between the official reasons why rents are created from what 
these rents are actually expected to achieve, and the actual outcomes associated with the 
rents. This is because powerful state and non-state organisations in developing countries 
that seek to create rents may not achieve their objectives through formal mechanisms 
alone and may significantly depend on informal mechanisms of rent creation and 
allocation. 
While a great deal of the literature in institutional and development economics 
has focused on formal rules and institutions, the LAO framework gives equal emphasis 
to informal rules in that the limitations described in LAOs today are frequently informal 
(North, et al., 2007). North and colleagues (2007) assert that institutions involve more 
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than explicitly written rules: “They also include informal norms, behaviour, the 
mechanism by which the rules are enforced, and individual beliefs and expectations 
about how the institution and other individuals will behave” (p. 26). This definition 
stresses the importance of informal institutions in the enforcement of rules and rent 
management in developing countries. 
Furthermore, North and colleagues (2007) observe that in developing countries 
today informal limitations on market entry and privileges are often achieved by using the 
formal institutions associated with open access in the developed countries: political 
parties, legalised property rights, and corporate organisations. In other words, formal 
institutions are frequently used to create informal limitations for accessing rents. These 
informal limitations on access to rents and privileges are deliberately imposed by the 
elites, and they may arise for instance from the informal ways in which the bureaucracy 
and corruption operate in government (North, et al., 2007). 
Similarly, but viewing informality from the perspective of a social distribution of 
power, Khan employs a broad definition of informality. Informal institutions are all 
patterns of behaviour (enforced or otherwise) where the implicit enforcement mechanism 
does not involve enforcement by formal state organizations (Khan, 2011). Thus, 
“informal institutions include the operation of habits, customs, cultures and values… [as 
well as] rules enforced by informal agencies like mafias and patron-client organizations” 
(p. 12). In this perspective informal institutions include in particular all institutions 
where the enforcement does not involve the formal activities of the state. Even if the 
enforcement is done by state organizations like the police, the institution can still be 
informal if the enforcement agencies are acting other than in rule-following ways. This 
perspective on informality means that some informal institutions can indeed be attributed 
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to culture but the focus on non-state enforcement means that there are many other 
important areas of informality in developing countries. 
According to Khan (2011), much of politics in poor countries is not rule-based. 
In fact, informal rules frequently regulate internal power structures and the competition 
between different types of patron–client networks. For that reason, Khan contends that 
the focus of rent management should include an analysis of the actual rules governing 
rents, even when these rules are based on the informal or non-rule-follow exercise of 
power. This suggests that to identify significant informal institutions or informal 
arrangements embedded in formal institutions, we have to begin by tracing the allocative 
rules that generate rents in developing countries. This may help to identify the 
configuration of politics and institutions that is responsible for important rent allocation 
decisions. 
The important role of informality in development can be clearly seen in the 
Vietnamese experience. Vietnam is formally a Communist state, and the Communist 
Party of Vietnam is at the centre of the political and economic power of the country. 
Despite the rather simple and straightforward formal structure of the CPV, the political 
system in Vietnam is not unusual in having a significant informal component in its 
politics. A closer analysis (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6) shows that many Vietnamese formal 
organisations have informal characteristics and consist of a dynamic set of personal 
relationships, social networks, communities of common interest, and emotional sources 
of motivation. Informal organizations in Vietnam are also dynamic, responsive, fluid, 
evolving constantly, often based on trust and reciprocity, and difficult to pin down. This 
fluidity reflects the rapid evolution in the underlying distribution of political and social 
power within the elites in Viet Nam, within the Communist Party, and in the emerging 
economic players. More importantly, the informal organisations and institutions within 
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this one-party political system have a major impact on rent creation and management in 
Vietnam, some of which is developmental while others are growth-reducing. This impact 
is analysed in Chapters 4, and 5.  
The review of the literature in this section supports the observation that while a 
state may adopt formal industrial policies by creating rents and working steadily to 
improve its institutional structure so as to be capable of implementing rent policies, the 
effectiveness of these policies may be constrained by patterns of power outside formal 
political and institutional structures. As a result, successful rent management strategies 
must account not only for the formal but also the informal political and institutional 
arrangements through which rents are sought, created, and managed. This is because 
much of the actual activities of creating and enforcing rents are in the informal 
relationships between organisations, between members of an interest group, and between 
groups. These informal dynamics are often missing in the economic analysis of 
development. 
 
2.4.4. Final Considerations 
 
In this section this thesis has provided a brief theoretical review of some 
development economists who have attempted to answer the two important questions set 
out in this review: (1) What are the most important economic problems in development, 
and (2) how to solve these economic problems given that politics and informal 
institutions matter? To answer the first question, notable economists, namely Stiglitz, 
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Khan provide different contentions, particularly on the issue of 
learning and technological upgrading using the analysis of market failures. In responding 
to the second question, the literature provided by Chang, Cheema, North, Wallis, Webb, 
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Weingast, and Khan offers important insights on the interface between politics and 
economics in developing countries. Chang (2011) and Chang and Cheema (1999) assert 
the necessity of an autonomous developmental state. North and colleagues (2002) press 
the critical movement along the Limited Access Order, with special attention to the 
limitations of violence and social disorder via rent creation. Lastly, Khan (2007) offers 
analysis of the underlying distribution of power in a society that is critical to generate 
growth and development. The final discussion of this section considers the important 
role of informality and how it contributes to the dynamics of rent creation and 
management in developing countries. 
Central to the argument of this thesis is that rent management is an outcome of 
institutions, politics, and industry organisation, within which rents are created, allocated, 
and contested. As an outcome, rent management describes the process of organisational 
competition and transformation. The ways in which rent is managed affects the structure 
of incentives and pressures on the participants, which in turn determines whether they 
use their rent opportunities for learning, innovation and investment. As a result, the 
“management” of industrial policies or rent policies does not necessarily take place from 
above by the central government. Instead, value-enhancing outcomes can happen without 
any explicit plan, as the outcome of the types of rents created by the matrix of formal and 
informal institutions in a society. This interaction could occur laterally at the firm level, 
between the entrepreneurs and the political and state institutions in a developing country. 
As a result, the management of rents is usually an outcome of an interaction between 
organisations and institutions, given the configuration of formal and informal institutions 
and politics. Consequently, an understanding of rent management mechanisms can help 
to explain the types of rent that are being created and their role in resolving or 
complicating the critical binding constraints in poor countries. 
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2.5. Towards an Analytical Framework for Rents Management 
 
This chapter provided a theoretical review of some of the most important 
advances in research on the political economy of technology adoption, learning, rents, 
and rent management. It identified significant differences in the analysis of development 
economists such as Stiglitz, Hausmann and Rodrik, Chang, Cheema, North, Wallis, 
Webb, Weingast and Khan in their identification of the critical problems for 
development, as well as in their analytical framework for investigating the political 
economy solutions that are feasible for tackling these problems. 
Underlying some of the discussions of the process of technological and economic 
development is a presumption that the process of technological change can either take 
place automatically or be achieved through state intervention. For some theorists, the 
relevant policy is simply one of providing an institutional framework to support either 
market liberalisation, or rents to correct critical externalities that constrain learning and 
upgrading. However, a fuller understanding of the process of technological change and 
growth in developing countries, as well as the analysis of political economy, suggests 
that we require a wider conceptualisation of these processes than those presented in 
neoclassical theories on technology and development (see section 2.2.1), or by those 
strands of the statist literature that examine technological upgrading based on a ‘black-
box’ correction of market failures by a visionary and high-capability state (see section 
2.4.1)  
Theoretical discussions in this chapter also establish that in order to achieve 
growth through technological upgrading and capability-building, rent policies must not 
simply aim to remove constraints in the development process, but must also satisfy the 
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political and institutional conditions of viability in that society for effective rent 
management (see section 2.4.2). In addition, these conditions cannot be limited to the 
formal political and institutional processes, but must be taken from a wider context of 
informal political, institutional, and organisational arrangements among political and 
economic interests that impact rent outcomes (see section 2.4.3). From this perspective, 
the best policy approach is to first analyse and map the existing mechanisms of rent 
management. The purpose is to examine the effects of these mechanisms on learning, 
technological adoption, and capability-building, given the political and economic context 
of a specific country. Only when there is a clear understanding of a working rent 
management system in the specific context of a developing economy can proposals for 
incremental improvement be made. This thesis employs this very approach in analysing 
Vietnam’s industrial development in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. 
Furthermore, this approach offers a hands-on, practical and meaningful policy 
reform, rather than choosing a one-size-fit-all model (such as the South Korean 
development model). It is from this perspective that this thesis constructs a conceptual 
analytical framework in the next chapter (Chapter 3) for the analysis of rent management, 
which can be applied to the examination of these issues in the case of Vietnam’s 
industrial sectors; namely textile and garment, telecommunications, and motorcycle. 
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 Developmental Rent Management Analysis: Learning, Chapter 3.
Upgrading, and Innovation  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis demonstrated and made the case that, in order 
to achieve growth through enhancing the capability of the industrial sector, rent policies 
must not simply aim to remove constraints in the development process, but must create 
incentives and pressures for ensuring effort in learning, via an effective configuration of 
rent management. From this perspective, analytical tools must provide us methods for 
assessing these interactions.  
Having examined the main theoretical contributions to the literature of 
technology adoption, rents, and rent-seeking, this chapter constructs a conceptual 
analytical framework for the analysis of rents and rent management. This framework is 
called Developmental Rent Management Analysis. DRMA provides analytical tools to 
analyse the larger political, institutional, and organisational dynamics that are at work 
and how they deliver productive rent outcomes without the presumption of an 
autonomous and capable guiding state. Rent management emerges from this discussion 
as a critical analytical instrument that explains the configuration of three important 
factors –  politics, institutions, and industry organisation – as the fundamental source of 
long-term economic growth for developing countries. To do so, this thesis asks, “How 
does the configuration of politics, institutions, and industry organisation, create, allocate, 
reallocate, contest or destroy rents in developing countries?” In other words, how are 
rents managed in reality? Note that ‘management’ is used here as a term describing the 
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outcome of a potentially complex interplay of forces and does not imply that there is an 
agency ‘managing’ these rents.  
This framework is based on a fundamental assertion that no one political or 
institutional arrangement provides exclusive access to successful rent management and 
developmental outcomes. In reality, a successful rent management strategy is specific to 
the political and institutional context of a country and its political economy. 
Subsequently, the purpose of employing this analytical framework is to assess the factors 
that drive the process of technological upgrading and capability-building in Vietnam’s 
transitional economy. Under this framework, this thesis specifically examines how the 
process of technical learning and capability-building is structured and embedded in 
Vietnam’s political economy, and how such a process affects Vietnam’s industrial 
development.  
In section 3.2, the DRMA framework is introduced and its value substantiated in 
detail. DRMA involves four analytical steps. The first step identifies four important 
types of rent: learning rents, Schumpeterian rents (also known as technology rents or 
innovation rents), monopoly rents, and redistributive rents. This list is by no means 
exhaustive, but is appropriate for this rent management analysis. The second step is the 
assessment of the potential incentives and effects of each rent, given the political and 
institutional structures of the developing country. Step three analyses the configuration 
of politics, institutions, and industry organisations that produces specific rent outcomes. 
Step four examines the transformation of the firms and their industries as a consequence 
of this structure of rents. These steps are used to assess a number of quite different rent 
management mechanisms that could be identified during the Doi Moi period in Vietnam. 
It explains the high or low performance in three industries – motorcycle, 
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telecommunications, and textiles and garments – and the political, institutional, and 
industrial organization that underpin the differences in their performance.  
 
3.2. Developmental Rent Management Analysis 
 
The developmental rent management analysis uses the four analytical steps 
detailed above. For clarity, the steps are organised in order. The first step identifies the 
type of rent involved in the case study. The second step establishes the potential 
incentives and effects created by the rent. The third step analyses the configuration of 
politics, institutions, and industry organisations that produce the actual rent outcomes. 
This configuration is known as the rent configuration created by the rent management 
system, or rent management mechanism.17 Here, the discussion involves the most 
substantive analysis of the DRMA framework because it investigates the political, 
institutional, and industry structures and how they interact to create the actual rents and 
the conditions under which they are available to different players. The fourth step looks 
at how firms and industries transform as a result. Figure 3.1 and Error! Reference 
source not found. map the steps in order, and which together constitute the DRMA 
framework.  
 
                                                
17 These two phrases are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
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Figure 3.1:  The DRMA Framework 
 
 
Analytically, step three requires the most important and substantive analysis 
within the DRMA framework, and covers three levels of rent management mechanism 
(RMM). The highest level analyses the configuration of politics and institutions that 
describes the macro-political order; namely, the political context of rent creation and 
management. The second level assesses the policy and policymaking structure that 
generates and implements particular rents; namely, the institutional structure of rent 
allocation. The third level studies the structure of and boundaries between the firms and 
the market that create incentives and pressures for efforts; and looks at the implications 
of the organisation of the industry. The following sections discuss the four-step analysis 
in greater depth. 
 
3.2.1. Step 1: Types of Rent 
 
In Chapter Two, this thesis argued that value-enhancing rents address certain 
market failures that developing countries confront, especially failures that affect the 
process of learning and innovation. In this context, learning and innovation rents are 
arguably the most important policy instruments for development, while the effects of 
monopoly and redistributive rents could vary greatly depending on the circumstances. 
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This section offers a rough illustration of the four different types of rents. For a 
comprehensive discussion on different types of rents, see Mushtaq Khan (2000b). 
 
3.2.1.1.  Learning rents 
 
In theory, learning rents provide the financing to enable learning-by-doing. This 
in turn has two important dimensions. The first is to enhance technical capability through 
learning-by-doing. The second involves the improvement of organisational capability. 
Conceptually, learning rents are rents that are given ex ante to target learning and 
technological progress in a specific industry or sector, though they could in principle also 
be allocated ex post as a prize (Khan & Blankenburg, 2009). Learning involves not just 
copying the operation of existing technologies, but also significant amounts of adaptation 
to local conditions. In other words, learning can involve a substantial amount of 
innovation to adapt technical and organizational capabilities to the technology. The 
success and effectiveness of learning can in principle be measured in terms of outcomes 
like productivity growth or exports and in some developmental states learning rents were 
allocated with conditions for specified achievements within a certain period of time. 
Learning rents can be intended and unintended, depending on whether they are 
the product of specific learning, technology acquisition or industrial policies. Intended 
learning rents are created by policy makers with the objective to induce technological 
adoption. Thus, it is a rent created for learning, though the outcome of the rent is not 
necessarily guaranteed. As such, whether this rent will in fact operate as rent for learning 
is an analytical issue that must be examined in terms of the institutional conditions and 
proven in terms of the empirical evidence. In the Vietnamese experience, a number of 
intended learning rents, in the end, operated as monopoly or redistributive rents.  
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Unintended learning rents are also important because rents that had other 
intentions can sometimes also have unexpected learning outcomes. In order words, the 
outcome of the rent (the learning effect) can emerge from an accidental configuration of 
factors. For example, a rent may be created for redistributive purposes to assist 
individuals in a particular region or firms of a particular type. However, if this rent 
emerges in a configuration of political and institutional factors that induce the recipients 
to use the opportunity to enhance their organizational and technical capabilities, the 
result may be the achievement of learning effects. We would describe these as 
unintended learning rents. Generally, any type of rent can have many different effects, 
regardless of the purpose of its creation.  
 
3.2.1.2.  Schumpeterian, or innovation, rents 
 
Schumpeterian rents reward innovation, often in the form of tax breaks, subsidies, 
patent protection, and so on. Innovating firms have an advantage over their competitors 
because they often develop a better product or a less expensive way of manufacturing an 
existing product, which traditional firms cannot instantly copy. Innovative firms can thus 
earn a rent. This rent is generated because, with new innovations, firms will either have a 
cost or quality advantage over its competitors, which allows them to earn a higher return 
compared to the next best alternative (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). If an innovation can 
be rapidly copied and, thus, become easily produced and sold, innovators can be 
discouraged to innovate. There are three important properties of effective innovation 
rents. First, the Schumpeterian rent signals the possibility of a significant prize for future 
innovators, providing them an incentive to innovate. To do so, the state may protect 
innovators through intellectual property rights that provide additional rents for profit 
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making. Second, the time horizon of protection is an important factor for ensuring 
desirable outcomes of Schumpeterian rents. Khan (2000b) argues that, on the one hand, 
because the process of innovation takes time, is risky, and requires effort and investment, 
Schumpeterian rents should ensure sufficient super-profits to induce innovative activities, 
and therefore, they should not be removed too quickly. On the other hand, such rents 
should also not be allocated for too long, beyond the necessity of inducing further 
innovations, because their survival has costs for consumers and after a point innovation 
rents can become indistinguishable from monopolistic or redistributive rents (Khan, 
2000b). Finally, Schumpeterian rent can either be ex post, such as patent-based rents, or 
ex ante, such as university research grants, and the most effective variant again depends 
on the characteristics of the innovation and the institutional context in which such rents 
are managed. 
 
3.2.1.3. Monopoly rents 
 
Monopoly rents for firms emerge as a result of entry barriers, which allow firms 
operating in protected markets to charge higher prices for their products. Entry barriers 
can be natural, which is when the technology of production involves large economies of 
scale, such that a single large producer can undercut newcomers. Entry barriers can also 
be state-made, based on exclusive protective rights or licensing for a particular producer. 
In the neoclassical form, the creation of monopoly power leads to a general reduction in 
welfare (Abbott & Brady, 1991). Khan (2000), however, contends that, “even in the 
extreme case of monopoly rents created by government protectionism to favour cronies, 
their dynamic effects are not always clear cut” (p. 31). In some cases, there may be 
genuine economies of scale in these industries, and super-profits may create incentives 
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for greater investment, which could counter, to some extent, the static inefficiency and 
X-inefficiency effects18 of the monopoly. In other cases, monopoly rents may indeed 
signal lost output and growth opportunities (Khan, 2000b). Schumpeterian rents can 
often be difficult to distinguish from monopoly rents because innovators often enjoy a 
temporary monopolistic position in the market for their innovation, which ends when the 
protection is removed or when the patent has expired. Conversely, monopolists often try 
to justify their monopoly on grounds of innovation and investment. As long as 
monopolistic power is monitored and temporary, Schumpeterian rents can create 
incentives for technical progress and new innovation. As a result, the overall effects of 
monopolies vary from case to case and depend on specific technologies, sectors, and 
firms (Khan, 2000b). 
 
3.2.1.4. Redistributive rents 
 
Unlike learning or Schumpeterian rents, redistributive rents serve various 
diversified purposes other than developmental goals. The purpose of the rent is to 
redistribute benefits usually on political grounds. For example, redistributive rents can be 
an important tool for maintaining political stability. The growth implications of the 
overall structure of redistributive rent can be either positive or negative. Khan (2000b) 
points out that the economic effect of redistributive rents can have two negative 
components. First, redistribution can have direct welfare implications because transfers 
may affect incentives and investible resources in sectors that are effectively taxed. 
                                                
18 The efficiency due to higher costs under monopolies is sometimes described as X-
inefficiency, to distinguish it from the allocative inefficiency, which relates to the static 
analysis. 
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Second, the rent seeking for redistributive rents can create political instability if the 
allocation of redistributive rents is continuously changing as a result.  
However, Khan (2000) also points out that redistributive rent may positively 
provide the benefited individuals or groups with the incentives and opportunities to 
utilise the rent for economically productive activities. In addition, investment decisions 
depend on political stability, which could be achieved through redistribution. In some 
countries, transfers were associated with rapid capital accumulation, development, and 
growth, such as in the case of Malaysia. In other countries, conversely, the result has 
been large-scale theft and transfer of resources to foreign banks by cronies and 
politicians. 
Because redistributive rent underpins both early capitalist accumulation and the 
political processes of maintaining order and legitimacy, the implication of redistributive 
rent – either negative or positive – is much more complex than the analysis suggested 
within the neoclassical literature of rents, and rent-seeking. Furthermore, the pattern of 
redistribution illustrates how well competing groups are organised and work together or 
otherwise. As a result, rent-seeking activities that result in redistribution and transfers 
can explain why transfers could be growth-enhancing rather than growth-reducing. 
Therefore, it is the pattern of economic and political distribution that matters much more 
for our analysis than the fact that transfers take place. 
 
3.2.1.5.  Unintentional effects of rents 
 
An important distinction between the neoclassical and the heterodox approach to 
rents and rent-seeking is the fact that neoclassical economists argues that all rents are 
damaging regardless of their outcome (Rajagopalan, 1996). Heterodox economists, such 
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as Khan (2000b), however, maintains that the reason a rent is created may have nothing 
to do with how it eventually operates, and thus rents and rent-seeking open up space for 
the possibility of both value-enhancing and value-reducing rents.  
A rent may create accidental effects if it operates differently from its intended 
purpose. As such, whether a rent gives rise to certain effects may have little to do with 
the intention of the rent. For example, the World Trade Organization’s Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) was originally created to protect the textile and garment 
manufacturing in the United States. However, it had an unintended effect of encouraging 
learning in developing countries through its increased demand of garment exports from 
countries that lacked these capabilities. Therefore, the MFA created unintentional 
learning rents for some countries.  
Many rents have unintentional effects that are extremely important. For example, 
a monopoly rent could cause accidental effects if, instead of providing monopolistic 
power to firms, it operates as a learning rent. The unintended effects, especially the 
productive ones, often emerge from the configuration of politics, institutions, market 
competition and the existing capability of the firm, which provide the incentive and 
pressure for learning and innovation. Many redistributive rents may also have learning 
benefits that can support growth-enhancing outcomes in the industrial sector.  
 
3.2.2. Step 2: Potential Incentives and Effects Derived from the Rent 
 
To assess the second element, the DRMA analysis seeks to identify what 
potential incentives and effects the rent actually induced, regardless of the rent’s initial 
purpose. In other words, what was the effect of the rent despite the original intention of 
its creation? While knowing the reasons that were declared by interested parties at the 
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creation of the rent is important, it is unnecessary in the analysis of the effects of the rent 
in this step because the question under consideration is the effect of a particular rent 
under specific institutional and political conditions. Did the rent offer a firm incentives 
and opportunities as well as compulsions, for example, in terms of time or financial 
resources to acquire a new technology, to learn how to use it, and to set up the 
production for a new product with the new technology; or did it motivate unproductive 
activities?  
One important aspect to remember is that although a rent is created with a 
specific development purpose, it may produce a number of different incentives or 
potential usages that are completely different, if not contradictory, to the original 
intention Second, the incentive created by a rent is context-specific because whether a 
firm will expand investment to acquire new learning and technology is dependent on 
whether it foresees a profit possibility from investment expansion and whether it is under 
pressure to use the opportunity productively. Third, in most cases, rents can potentially 
create either positive or negative incentives for the recipients. For example, a particular 
rent could provide incentives to spend resources to keep the rent without doing anything 
productive, or investing in research and development that could lead to new innovations. 
The actual outcome will depend on the wider institutional, political and market 
conditions that determine the incentives and compulsions of the firms receiving the rent. 
 
3.2.3. Step 3: The Configuration of Rent Management 
 
The third analytical step is the most involved element of the DRMA analysis and 
it examines the configuration of factors that describes the ‘rent management’ of the 
particular rent being examined. Here, the rent management mechanism is defined as the 
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ways in which politics, institutions, and the organization of an industry are structured 
both formally and informally, and how they actually interact to create certain sets of 
incentives and pressures for rent-receiving firms or individuals, for instance to upgrade 
their technical and organisational capability. In a development context, rent management 
is usually the outcome of a set of institutional and political pushes and pulls; the term 
“configuration” refers to this. Therefore, the rent management mechanism defined here 
is not a system that necessarily is under the control and monitoring of the state and its 
agencies as suggested by Chang (1999) and Chang and Cheema (2002), but instead is a 
dynamic configuration involving formal and informal institutions and organisations that 
influence firms and political actors to generate either growth-reducing or growth-
enhancing outcomes. In the context of technological adoption and capability building, 
this outcome could be either a new technical and organisational capability or 
redistribution of rents toward unproductive activities, such as asset speculation.  
In step 3, the rent management analysis evaluates the internal and external 
incentives and pressures that are placed on firms that directly or indirectly influence their 
industrial performance and therefore the outcomes eventually associated with the rent 
(which we describe in short as the rent outcome). The incentives and pressures discussed 
here do not necessarily stem from the state, but could come from the configuration of a 
number of forces; for instance, market competition, the time horizon available to make a 
profit under alternative strategies, and the market supply and demand conditions for the 
product produced by the firm. The incentives and pressure for performance are critical 
factors because if a rent is created without effective incentives and pressures for 
capability enhancement, there is no guarantee that the rent recipients will pursue high-
effort strategies for acquiring technical and organizational capabilities or engaging in 
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innovation, or new production. Figure 3.2 outlines the three levels of the rent 
management analysis in a development context.  
 
Figure 3.2:  Illustrative Map for Rent Management Analysis 
 
Rent management analysis first inquires into the macro-political context of rent 
creation and management (balloon #1 in Figure 3.2). The second level of analysis 
evaluates the institutional structures that generate and implement the particular rent 
(balloon #2). The third level of the analytical hierarchy looks at the interaction between 
the firm and the market and the market structure (balloon #3). These levels of analysis 
are now discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
3.2.3.1.  Political context of rent creation and management 
 
Interplay of 
factors creating 
incentives and 
pressures on 
firms and the rent 
outcomes 
1. Political Context of Rent Creation and Managment 
• Configuration of politics and institutions that describes 
the macropolitical order of rent creation and management  
2. Institutional 
Structure of Rent 
Allocation and 
Implementation 
• Policy and policy- 
making structures 
that generate and 
implement a 
particular rent 
3. Organization of 
the Industry 
• Structure of market 
competition and 
internal organization 
of firms affecting 
responses to 
different types of 
rents 
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As mentioned earlier, DRMA inquires into various mechanisms and how they 
interact to generate incentives and pressure for performance. Implicit and explicit in this 
DRMA framework is how politics plays a central role in rent management. This is the 
first level of analysis. This role is critical for three important reasons. First, politics 
matters because it is through political processes that economic institutions are adjusted, 
specific policy selections are chosen and performance is subsequently monitored (Moon 
& Prasad, 1998). Second, by mobilising powerful groups in society, political 
organisations compete for rents or attempt to affect the management of rents by forming 
coalitions with other political organisations. Third, as institutions and politics shape rent 
policies and firms’ performance, the pressures created by rent-seeking, policy choices 
and firms’ performances can also trigger political feedback, reshuffle political alliances, 
or induce new institutional design and rent policies. For these reasons, it is essential to 
assess how the formal and informal political organisations are structured, and the ways in 
which they create and allocate rents. In essence, we need to understand two separate 
issues about the political conditions of a developing country. The first issue that we must 
understand is how political organisations are actually structured, both formally and 
informally. The second issue that we must understand is how they formally and 
informally interact to create and manage rents. This knowledge will provide the crucial 
understanding of the political dynamics embedded in the political economy of an 
industry and an economy. 
Most importantly, the political context of any rent management system describes 
the specific configuration of the politics and institutions that make up the macro-political 
order in which rent creation and allocation are being organized. In this context, politics 
and institutions interact in a number of ways. On the one hand, the balance of political 
forces determines the ways in which formal and informal institutions operate to create 
 105 
and manage rents.  On the other hand, political mobilizations and struggles can change 
the political order and this can transform the ways in which rent-managing institutions 
operate. Therefore, the first task for an analysis of rent management is to describe the 
configuration of politics and institutions that describes the macro-political order.  
 
3.2.3.2. Institutional structure of rent allocation and implementation 
 
The second level of analysis is to understand the policy and policy-making 
structure that generates and enforces particular rents. In this thesis, institutions are 
defined as rules, both formal and informal, such as those which shape the authority 
structures of firms, or the rules allocating public resources to them both formally and 
informally (Moon & Prasad, 1998). Institutional rules may be formal, for instance, legal 
codes and statutes, or informal political and practices allocating resources and managing 
their allocation based on political bargaining, norms and group values. Although it is not 
a focal point of this analysis, it should be noted that cultural elements and ideology could 
also impact on both economic and political institutions. For example, elements of the 
Confucian tradition reflect deeply in the Vietnamese formal and informal social, 
economic, and political norms. 
Institutions and institutional structures matter a great deal for the rent-seeking 
processes because they determine how rents are formally and informally created. They 
also set the rules for rent-seeking by determining who can seek rents and how the rent-
seeking processes work. Here, the institutional conditions that are relevant to the rent 
management analysis are the formal and informal rules through which rents are actually 
created and implemented. For example, the analysis may include: 
• What are the policy instruments through which rents are created?  
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• How does the government intervene in the credit market, in land allocation, 
and in tax policies to promote industrialization and how do these policies 
create rents? 
• How significant are these rents and how are they allocated?  
• What are the formal and informal rules of allocation, continuation and 
management of the rent?  
Answers to these types of questions provide information for the analysis of the 
formal and informal institutions that create and implement rent policies.  
In understanding the structure of rent allocation, the informal rules are critical, 
perhaps more so than the formal rules, because many of the rules that compel actual 
performance and efforts are informally agreed upon among individuals and groups based 
on a set of informal values. Here, the analysis seeks to know:  
• What are the informal rules or agreements between the interests that are 
involved in the creation and maintenance of particular rents? 
• How do these rules and agreements come into place, and how are they 
implemented?  
It should be noted that the question of how particular informal rules emerge is 
very different from the question of how they operate in practice, and those are different 
from the question of the effects of these informal rules or norms on the efficacy of 
particular rents. Our focus will be on operation and effects.  
 
3.2.3.3.  Organisation of the industry 
 
Thus far, we have described the analysis of the political and institutional 
mechanisms that create and implement rents within the DRMA framework. 
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Subsequently, DRMA must also consider the organisation of the industry, which is 
defined as the structure of market competition and internal organization of firms 
affecting responses to different types of rents. This is the third level of analysis. In this 
context, the description of the organisation of an industry includes looking at factors 
such as (1) structure of market competition, (2) type of firm ownership, (3) the type of 
technology needed for upgrading and (4) the initial capability of the firms and workers in 
that sector since this can determine the feasibility of learning particular technologies, 
skills and expertise. Of particular importance is the degree of competition between firms 
that determines the disciplining pressures of the market. 
The structure of market competition matters because the effort put into learning 
or innovation with any given rent allocation depends on the competitive environment in 
which the firm finds itself, which in turn depends on factors such as the size of the firm 
in relation to the market, the minimum efficient scale of production; market 
concentration19; the uniqueness of the products20; entry barriers21; and the degree of 
vertical integration.22 
On the one hand, the level of competition in both domestic and international 
markets could support or inhibit investment and efforts to achieve new technical skills 
and technology. Similarly, changes in the international and domestic market structures, 
for instance, contraction in demand for goods, could provide new opportunities or 
constraints for industries. For example, the global financial crisis in 2008 caused a large-
scale recession in the developed world, which in turn severely slowed growth in the 
Asian economies because of weakened international demand for consumer goods. 
                                                
19 Market concentration is defined as the distribution of production within the industry or 
market power of firms measured by market shares. 
20 The uniqueness of products relates to the level of product differentiation. 
21 Entry barriers are those that place potential entrants at a disadvantage. 
22  Vertical integration is the extent of the upstream-to-downstream integration of 
production. 
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Strategies for investment and learning that may have been viable in a growing 
international market may turn out to be unviable in the new context. 
The organization of the industry also has to take into account the structure of firm 
ownership, whether a firm is public, private, or jointly owned by public and private 
owners. When a firm acquires a formal rent, it usually makes certain commitments for 
performance because the rent was very likely meant to help it overcome certain 
constraints in achieving capabilities, upgrading, or innovation. The structure of firm 
ownership has important implications for the acquisition of rents and the capability and 
incentives of the firm to deliver on its commitments. For instance, in the late 1990s, large 
Vietnamese SOEs, especially general corporations received most of the rents devised for 
industrial upgrading, while there were very limited rents created for the private sector. In 
addition, the Vietnamese government was also more active in channelling foreign 
contracts and joint ventures with foreign investors to large SOEs. In this case, the rent 
management largely involved the interaction between SOEs and the state in a (restricted) 
market economy. Hence, the type of firm ownership matters a great deal in the allocation, 
implementation and management of the rent.  
In addition to the market structure and types of firm ownership, the type of 
technology required for upgrading and its level of sophistication, matched with the firms 
and workers’ learning abilities, also matter a great deal. As Lall (2004) points out, the 
process of gaining technological mastery in a new setting is not instantaneous, costless, 
or automatic, even if the technology is well diffused elsewhere. Lall asserts: 
 
The learning process is highly technology specific since technologies differ in 
their learning requirements. Some technologies are more embodied in equipment 
while others have greater tacit elements. Process technologies (like chemicals) 
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are more embodied than engineering technologies (machinery or automobiles), 
and demand different (often less) effort. Capabilities built up in one activity are 
not easily transferable to another. Different technologies involve different breadth 
of skills and knowledge, some needing a narrow range of specialization and 
others a wide range (Lall, 2004, p. 12). 
 
Because technology transfer and upgrading can only occur where there is 
successful identification of the right type of technology, which a country is capable of 
learning and absorbing, choosing the appropriate type of technology to adopt is 
particularly crucial. The selection of inappropriate technology may have economic and 
social costs, and it would slow the process of ramping up capabilities. For example, a 
technology that is becoming out-dated may cause a developing country to lose its 
competitive advantage over its competitors. However, attempting to adapt a more 
sophisticated technology, which does not match with the learning capacity of the firms 
and the workers, could also be wasteful. In this context, the initial technological 
capabilities of firms determine the most appropriate technologies for adoption. As a 
result, a major task of DRMA is to identify the type of technology available, and to 
assess the level of technological capability of the firm and how such capability fits into 
the process of technological upgrading in each of the sectors. 
 
3.2.3.4.  International institutions and agreements 
 
Within the DRMA framework, international institutions, along with the home 
country’s commitment and privileges to its various bilateral trade agreements and its 
WTO membership, can play critical roles in rent management. This is because 
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globalisation, while it opens unprecedented opportunities for countries to engage in the 
world economy, poses profound challenges to less developed countries’ rent strategies 
by raising the cost of implementing rent policies and reducing the space for devising 
industrial or rent policies at national levels. For instance, intellectual property restricts 
the use of knowledge, and thus raises the cost of innovation (Stiglitz, 2008). In the 
context of globalisation and integration, trade agreements, which are forms of formal 
international institutions, have drastically changed the nature of rent policy in developing 
countries over the last three decades. For late developers, the policy options for 
industrialisation have been curtailed by various trade obligations and these have curtailed 
the policy instruments (rent strategies) that could stimulate learning and innovation.  
This is in contrast with the Asian Tigers’ industrial experience. In the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, a number of East Asian countries heavily utilised rent policies in the 
form of subsidies as a major instrument of their industrial strategy. The use of subsidies 
to target new learning and technological upgrading was widespread. Governments in 
these countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, targeted the development of certain 
industries and products through the supervision of the Industrial Development Bureau, a 
unit of the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Taiwan and the Economic Planning Board in 
South Korea. Such an option would be deemed illegal under the WTO today.  
Another example of a subsidy is the localisation requirement23, which had been 
used by both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments before they became members of 
the WTO. After Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, local content requirements were not 
permitted, and thus are no longer a policy option for Vietnam and other late developing 
countries. While China continues to succeed in using its market power to force 
                                                
23 A localisation requirement, or local content policy, implies a government has a 
requirement that there must be a certain percentage of local contents, or materials, in a 
final industrial product. This requirement is in violation of the WTO’s agreement. 
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technology transfers from FDI to local businesses, Vietnam has largely failed in its 
strategy of offering incentives to foreign technology providers to transfer significant 
technologies to local partners, either through negotiation with foreign investors or 
through other means of technology adoption (see Chapter 6).  
Often, time-bound preferential trade agreements with less developed countries – 
such as the MFA benefits for Vietnam in the 1990s and the preferential garments quotas 
that Vietnam (and other poor countries) were offered by the European Union in 1992 – 
are important formal international mechanisms that both created rents and provided 
incentives and pressure for learning. These arrangements offered less developed 
countries either enumerated quotas or quota-free access for some lines of garment when 
relatively more advanced developing counties faced quota restrictions. They also offered 
preferential (low) tariff rates to some less developed countries while advanced countries 
faced higher rates. As a result, significant rents were created from this international 
arrangement. A combination of institutional and political conditions created these trade-
related rents, and a combination of incentives and compulsions (because the rents were 
limited) enabled and ensured learning among, for example, Vietnamese garment 
manufacturers. 
 
3.2.3.5. Examples of rent management mechanisms 
 
The list below illustrates some important factors, which, in different 
combinations, can create the incentives and pressure for rent recipients to perform, 
especially to achieve technological adoption and capability-building. In this context, the 
rent is created in response to specific market failures faced by investors. This list 
provides a rough guideline, and is by no means an exhaustive list of conditions.  
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1. Time horizon: For a learning rent to be effective in inducing learning, it has to be 
available over a sufficient time horizon, such that investors have enough time to 
invest in new machines, new organizational capabilities and to acquire new skills to 
raise productivity and quality to the competitive level. This factor is especially 
important if the investment requires extra time to master new technology. In 
principle, rents that come with a time horizon must ensure that the time horizon is 
neither too short nor too long. It should be only sufficient to give investors the time 
to achieve technical and organisational capability. 
2. Loss of rent and other future benefits: If the political and institutional configuration 
ensures that firms are sure to lose their rents over time, this can create strong 
pressures to invest and achieve new learning to boost their industrial capability. This 
loss of future rents or benefits must be substantial enough that investors and firms are 
pressured to take advantage of the rents that they are currently receiving to achieve 
new competitiveness, in order to sustain their current profits into the future.  
3. Initial capability: Rent recipients must have initial technical and organisational 
capabilities that are sufficiently high to make the capability development strategy 
viable, given the nature of the technology, the gap with competitors, and the amount 
and time horizon of the rents that are available. For example, to transfer a new 
dyeing technique to domestic textile manufacturers, the firms must have the basic 
technical understanding about dyeing in order to absorb the new knowledge.  
4. Market competition: Market competition increases pressure to upgrade if there is a 
gradual opening up of the market. For example, a firm is pressured to learn when 
rents are temporary and the gainer can only take advantage of it for a period of time 
before new entrants are allowed to enter the market. The opening up of the market 
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could be due to formal institutions, such as signing a BTA with another country, or a 
change in government policy; for example, allowing more licenses to be issued or it 
could be an informal understanding with competing firms or agencies. In essence, the 
compulsion to raise productivity could come from competition gradually being 
opened up so that the learning firm or industry has to raise productivity and 
competitiveness to survive. On the other hand, a high level of competition from the 
outset can destroy incentives for learning effort because the time horizon for raising 
competitiveness may not be sufficient to make such a strategy viable. 
5. Other informal pressures: Some of the informal pressures are speculative but it is 
extremely important for a rent management analysis to investigate the types of 
informal pressures or arrangements that may exist, such as: 
• the holding power of the informal network within the political and economic 
system to which the firm belongs: this can determine its perceived capability 
to protect its rents, and may affect its strategies for productive effort versus 
investment in maintaining its holding power through its network; 
• the pressure from this informal network on the firm to perform so as to 
maintain the holding power of the network, to retain rents, and to seek new 
rents: sometimes the network itself may want the firm to become productive 
quickly, to generate profits that the network needs to maintain its power; 
• personal and emotional incentives based on cultural and social values;  
• the informal rules of benefit-sharing from rent outcomes among individuals or 
groups in the network can have important consequences: if the firm managers 
are the residual claimant they may have a greater incentive to put in effort than 
if they are involved in other types of surplus-sharing arrangements within the 
informal rent allocation network; 
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• the corporate culture can sometimes have important implications for efficient 
rent outcomes. For example, based on its military background, Viettel –the 
state-owned, and largest mobile phone provider in Vietnam - operates its 
business in an uncommonly disciplined working environment, much more so 
than other private and foreign businesses in Vietnam; 
• a system of formal and informal checks and balances among rent seekers or 
interest groups can sometimes help to prevent poor performers from 
permanently capturing rents and blocking efficient performers from achieving 
new capability and better productivity. Such a system can help to allow rents 
to achieve better outcomes. 
 
The significance of this analysis for policymaking is that, for historical, social, 
and political reasons, even if emerging economies could not follow the South Korean 
model of development, which requires an autonomous and strong leadership of the state, 
rents can still produce developmental outcomes if there is a combination of factors that 
influence firms’ incentives and pressures to invest in new technologies and capabilities 
when they receive rents. For instance, if investors have a sufficient time horizon 
(condition 1), and if market competition is limited but growing such that firms can reap 
benefits from investments in new learning and technology (condition 4), and if the 
bureaucrats and the politicians who created the rent exert pressure for performance 
(condition 5), then rents in that sector are likely to achieve a positive outcome.  
In reality, however, most sectors satisfy only some of these conditions. For 
instance, they may have a long enough time horizon (condition 1), but not enough 
pressure from elsewhere, i.e. the market, to boost learning and innovation (condition 4 or 
5). Therefore, even as rents are received, investors in the industrial sector may choose 
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not to increase investments, despite the rents. Or where there is neither a good time 
horizon nor the compulsion to increase productivity, the availability of rents for firms 
could result in speculative activities, especially in the real estate market or in the stock 
market. In that case, firms neither produce nor commit to long-term investment, as they 
will look only to capture short-term and speculative profits. Industrial capability-building 
would be non-existent. 
Data from my fieldwork in 2011 suggests that there are very few industrial 
sectors in Vietnam that satisfy sufficient conditions for ensuring productivity growth or 
competitiveness using the rents that are available to them. Even where the conditions are 
satisfied, the combination that produces positive outcomes may not be sustainable; for 
example, there may be insufficient time to make changes (see Chapter 6). However, 
where conditions have been met, Vietnam’s economy has experienced strong outcomes 
in both technological adoption and innovation, along with increases in productivity and 
growth (see Chapter 4).  
 
3.2.4. Step 4: Firm Transformations and Rent Outcomes 
 
In this section, the fourth step – the potential effects of the rent are compared 
with the actual outcomes. A rent management system produces three possible outcomes. 
In the first scenario, the rent allocation raises investment but it does not produce long-
term benefits because productivity does not increase. In other words, an initial increase 
in production is largely due to input expansion, not improvements in technical and 
organisational capability. This strategy does not usually result in sustainable growth 
outcomes. In the second scenario, rent raises both investments and productivity through 
learning and upgrading, which results in sustainable long-term growth. In the third 
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scenario, rents are captured or redistributed by unproductive interests, such as firms, 
investors or managers, and thus are not used appropriately. In this case, there may be no 
growth at all, or growth in damaging speculative activities.  
Because this thesis is largely concerned with technological adoption and 
industrial capability-building, it especially focuses on whether, in the end, rents operate 
as learning rents or as innovation rents. Again, the outcome can be completely different 
from the original intention of the rent, since the original intention may never be fulfilled.  
 
3.2.5. DRMA Wrap-up 
 
Throughout section 3.2, the analytical framework for a rent management analysis, 
namely DRMA, has been laid out. This framework is based on a fundamental assertion 
that no one combination of political and institutional arrangements provides exclusive 
access to successful rent management and developmental outcomes. In reality, a 
successful rent management strategy must be specific to the political and institutional 
contexts of a country and its political economy. To understand the factors that either 
drive or hinder successful rent outcomes, DRMA employs a four-step approach (see 
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1; for examples, see Table 3.2). First, it identifies the rent. Second, 
it establishes the potential incentives and effects given the existing institutional and 
implementation structures of the rent. Third, it analyses the configuration of politics, 
institutions, and industrial organisations that produce rent outcomes (see Error! 
Reference source not found.). Finally, it assesses and explains the growth-enhancing or 
growth-reducing outcomes. This framework thus provides an analytical approach to 
understand rent management mechanism in a developing country irrespective of the 
policy intention. It also points to the reality that rent management strategies, which result 
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in high productivity outcomes, only take place in a handful of sectors where there are 
effective structures of incentives and pressure to force the rent recipients to perform. The 
DRMA framework also allows analysts to evaluate the outcome of rents and to suggest 
areas for changes where rent management could be more effective, although this is not 
the primary focus of this thesis.  
 
Table 3.1:  DRMA Four-Step Approach 
Step 1: 
Identify the 
Type of Rent 
 
Step 2:  Identify 
Incentives and 
Opportunities that 
the Rent Creates 
 
Step 3: Analyse the 
Configuration of Factors 
Describing the Rent 
Management Mechanism 
 
Step 4: Assess 
the Outcomes 
of the Rents 
 
Monopoly  
 
Schumpeterian  
 
Learning  
 
Redistributive  
- Are developmental 
or damaging 
incentives created 
by the rent? 
 
1. Political Context: the 
configuration of politics and 
institutions that describe the 
macro-political order of the 
rent 
 
2. Institutional Structure 
of Rent Allocation: the 
formal and informal policy 
and policy- making 
structures that create and 
implement the rent 
 
3. Industry Organisation: 
structure of market 
competition, type of firms’ 
ownership, and initial 
capabilities of the firms 
- Identify the 
outcomes 
 
- Analyse how 
outcomes 
emerge given 
the 
configuration of 
rent 
management 
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Table 3.2: Examples of DRMA 
Benefits Effects Incentive / Pressure Outcomes 
 
1. Access 
to land 
2. Access 
to credit 
3. Access 
to 
business 
licenses 
 
Positive  
1. Opportunity for 
effective learning 
2. Incentive for 
innovation 
3. Output expansion 
4. Increase scale of 
production to 
achieve economies 
of scale 
5. Learning new 
capabilities or 
innovating  
 
Negative 
1. Redistribution, 
transfers within 
and across groups 
2. Prevention of 
market entry of 
competitors 
3. Monopolisation 
Incentives 
1. Sufficient profit margins 
to justify investments  
2. Financing of loss-
making period while 
learning takes place 
 
External conditions 
1. Market competition 
2. Time horizon 
3. Loss of rents and future 
benefits 
 
Internal pressures 
1. Consequences of failure 
2. Formal and informal 
pressures compelling the 
delivery of certain 
outcomes 
 
Other factors 
1. Capability of firm to 
perform 
2. Check-and-balance 
system to constrain 
inefficient rent seekers. 
 
1. Rent raised 
investment; did 
not produce 
long-term 
benefit  
(productivity 
not increased) 
2. Rent raised 
investment and 
productivity 
through 
learning and 
innovation 
(leading to 
sustainable 
long-term 
growth)  
3. Rents captured 
or redistributed 
by interests; no 
output 
expansion or 
productivity 
increases 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
The claim in the mainstream literature on technology adoption, rents, and rent-
seeking is that to achieve good outcomes there should be no rents or rent-seeking 24 
(Buchanan, et al., 1980; Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975; Tullock, 1967). In reality, not only 
is rent-seeking ubiquitous in developing countries, policy makers are under constant 
influence and pressure from rent seekers. In many cases, politicians receive some of the 
                                                
24 This is not to be confused with rent outcome. In the Krueger-Posner argument, rent 
outcome is a negative deadweight loss. 
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rents they create and indeed depend on these rents to maintain political stability and the 
ruling coalition. However, even in cases of corruption, rent-seeking does not necessarily 
produce unproductive outcomes and the benefits of rent policy are not always entirely 
destroyed. This thesis argues that the real problem for development is not rent-seeking, 
but rather that the interests of powerful groups run contrary to the collective interest of 
society. Here, the solution to this problem does not necessarily require a strong 
autonomous state to guide, discipline, and coordinate the public and private sectors 
through the strategic allocation of resources or rent policies, as argued by some 
development economists such as Chang and Cheema (2002), and Stigtitz (1989, 2013b). 
Rather, this thesis posits that the answer lies in understanding and mapping both 
successful and less successful instances of rent allocation within the existing rent 
management mechanism and to examine whether incremental policy changes can help to 
improve outcomes given the contracting failures, market imperfections, and constraints 
the country faces in different sectors. 
The central utility of the DRMA framework is to help analyse inductively how 
the three sets of factors – politics, institutions, and industry organisations – affect the 
structure of incentives and pressures that ensure firms’ effort towards acquiring technical 
and organisational capability. This is based on the premise that successful rent 
management primarily depends on the formal and informal political and institutional 
arrangements to produce incentives and pressure for learning and upgrading. In this 
context, while rents are created for a variety of purposes, the rent outcome, whether good 
or bad, depends on the configuration of these three factors of rent management that, in 
many respects have important formal and informal elements. In essence, DRMA enables 
a broader understanding of the various factors – political, institutional, and economic – at 
play in the process of economic development, including its technological dimension. It, 
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therefore, allows for a better understanding of how and why developing countries 
succeed or fail to industrialise and to catch up. 
In the next three chapters, this thesis applies the DRMA framework to three 
industrial sectors in Vietnam – the textile-garment, telecommunications, and motorcycle 
industries – and assesses for each sector how the three factors of rent management affect 
the structure of incentives and pressures that ensure effort in learning, upgrading, and 
innovation. The objective is to uncover the dynamics and processes that drove 
technological upgrading and capability-building in Vietnam’s transitional economy. 
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  The Telecommunications Industry: A Leap of the Giants Chapter 4.
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
After the embarrassment caused by the debt scandals of two large state-owned 
conglomerates – the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group in 2010 and the Vietnam 
National Shipping Lines in 2012 – the Vietnamese government now often cites its (new) 
favourite child, Viettel, as an example of Vietnamese industrial success. The Vietnamese 
government is also proud that the telecom industry has transformed itself from a 
technology receiver to a telecom service exporter (see Table 4.1). Overall, the 
telecommunications industry provides a unique case of industrial success in Vietnam 
given its rapid growth rate and transformation. In just over a decade and half, the 
telecom industry has transformed from a monopolistic industry dominated by one state-
owned enterprise, VNPT, to a diversified market with nine mobile phone operators in 
201125 and a sustained average growth rate of 35.5 per cent per year between 2006 and 
2010, as reported by the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) (2011). In 
2010, Viettel was not only the largest mobile phone operator in Vietnam, but it also 
provided telecom services to Cambodia, Laos, Haiti, Mozambique, Peru, East Timor, 
and Cameroon, and it earned nearly VND 12.55 trillion  (USD 600 million) revenue in 
its overall foreign markets in 2012 (Kien-Thuc, 2013).  
Table 4.1 demonstrates that Vietnam’s export of telecom services increased 
approximately 38 per cent between 2010 and 2012, from VND 11.89 trillion (USD 576 
million) to VND 16.34 trillion (USD 794 million). The market for telecom services also 
expanded at 38 per cent in the same two-year period. 
                                                
25 There were seven operators as of early 2013. 
 122 
 
Table 4.1:  Vietnamese Import–Export of Telecommunication Services 
(in USD million) 
 2010 2011 
2012 
(estimates) 
Total Market 
Size 5,200 5,980 7,176 
Total Local 
Production 5,363 6,167 7,400 
Total Exports 576 662 794 
Total Imports 373 429 514 
Source: The statistics are unofficial industry estimates compiled by the U.S. Department 
of Commerce (2012). 
 
Figure 4.1 below demonstrates the impressive growth in revenue of the telecom sector in 
Vietnam since 2006, including mobile phone service, landline phone service, and 
Internet service. 
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Figure 4.1: Total Revenue of the Telecom Sector in Vietnam Between 2006 and 
2011 (in USD millions) 
 
Source: Adapted from MIC (2011, p. 48) 
 
In 2009, Vietnam was one of the world’s top 10 countries in terms of information 
and communications technology (ICT) growth, and it was predicted to remain on that list 
for the next five years, according to Research and Markets Report (2009). Figure 4.2 
provides an overview of the market share for each type of telecom service in the 
Vietnamese market. The figure shows that the mobile market is the country’s most 
dynamic telecom sector, with an average growth rate of 80.6 per cent between 2005 and 
2010, reaching 153.7 million subscribers and a penetration of 172.3 per cent of the 
market by the end of 2010. Between 2008 and 2009, the revenue from mobile phone 
services increased substantially, while fixed-line telephone revenues decreased. In 2010, 
the number of mobile phone users accounted for 89.4 per cent of all telephone usage in 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese, like many people worldwide, are now using mobile phone 
service more than fixed telephone service.  
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Figure 4.2: Market Share by Types of Services in 2012 
 
Source: MIC (2012) 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the high growth rate of revenue in the telecom sector 
between 2006 and 2010. In the table, total revenue from landline phone, mobile phone, 
and Internet services grew rapidly between 2006 and 2009. Among all three types of 
telecom services, landline phone services slowed down in 2008 while Internet revenue 
grew gradually; revenue from mobile phone services grew fastest between 2006 and 
2009.  
 
Table 4.2: Total Revenue in the Telecom Sector, 2006-2011 (in USD millions) 
Total Revenue and Growth Rate 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Revenue 2769.3 3552.98 5144.14 6867.55 9410.79 approx. 
9000 
Growth by % 
year-on-year 
Base year  28 44 33 37 -4 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from MIC (2011) 
	  
 
Mobile  
91% 
Fixed 
3% 
Internet 
6% 
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Conceptually, this author divides the development of the telecom industry into 
three stages, as seen in Figure 4.3. In the first stage, between 1975 and 2004, the industry 
consisted of just VNPT, which held a monopoly. Case study 1 reviews the development 
of the industry during this period. The launch of S-Fone in 2003 and Viettel’s mobile 
phone service in 2004 marked the beginning of the second stage – the post-monopoly 
period, which lasted until 2012. There were both major development and industrial 
upgrading that took place during this period, which are analysed in all three case studies. 
In the third stage, starting in 2013, the telecom industry started to experience some major 
shake-ups, including a merger between Electricity of Vietnam Telecom (EVN) and 
Viettel, and the departure of S-Fone and three (out of four) foreign partners from 
Vietnam’s mobile phone market.  
 
Figure 4.3:  Stages of Vietnam’s Telecom Industry Development 
 
Note: The monopoly is VNPT. The duopoly is VNPT and Viettel. 
 
This chapter draws on three case studies to analyse the industrial development of 
the telecommunications industry. In applying the DRMA framework, the purpose of the 
analyses is to identify the configuration of rent management that drives industrial 
Stage 1: 
Monoply 
period 
(1975-2004) 
Stage 2: Post-
monopoly period 
(2004-2012 ) 
Stage 3: Duopoly 
and industry 
restructuring 
(starting 2013) 
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upgrading and capability-building of this industry and how the Vietnamese government’s 
management of rents has contributed to learning efforts and the rapid pace of 
industrialisation in the sector. The rent management analyses throughout this chapter 
identify that the configuration of rent management that was growth-enhancing for the 
industry was based on a number of factors. Some of the notable factors are the following.  
First, there was strong political will from the top leaders to develop the telecom 
industry in order upgrade the infrastructure for Vietnam’s industrialisation (all three case 
studies). Second, the case study of Viettel (case study 2) highlights the role of 
informality in rent creation and allocation – the Ministry of Defence (MoD) provided 
military resources to Viettel as rents—and in motivating Viettel leaders to measure up to 
VNPT. Third, while market competition by itself could not help operators overcome 
market failures in land, infrastructure, and capital that constrained the development of 
the industry, especially in its early stages, it was value-enhancing in that it pressurised 
capability-building and upgrading among the operators (all three case studies). Finally, 
pressure of liberalisation of the telecom market was an effective time horizon factor for 
Viettel and VNPT to concentrate on learning and enhancing their competitiveness while 
the Vietnamese market was still relatively free from foreign competition (case studies 1 
and 2).  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
telecom industry’s background and historical development. Section 4.3 identifies a 
number of constraints in the sector and how some operators overcame them during the 
initial phase of their development. Section 4.4 illustrates case study 1, which analyses 
VNPT’s monopoly and the opening of market competition among SOEs after the 
monopoly was ended. Section 4.5 consists of case study 2. It assesses Viettel and its 
success in building industrial capability. In section 4.6, case study 3 examines the 
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adoption of 3G technology into the Vietnamese market, while section 4.7 reviews the 
changes that took place in stage 3 of the industry’s development. Lastly, section 4.8 
offers implications for the developmental rents management strategy, as well as options 
for the industry to move forward in its current phase of development. 
 
4.2. Background of the Telecommunications Industry 
	  
Until the late 1980s, the telecommunications sector in Vietnam was characterised 
by strict state regulations and a state-run monopolistic market, leading to tight control of 
all telecom services. Mobile phone service was non-existent. The year 1986 marked the 
start of the Doi Moi reform programs, the gradual privatisation (locally called 
equitisation) of some SOEs, the corporatisation of other SOEs, and gradual liberalisation 
in the telecom sector.  
The state-run Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications was the sole 
public telecommunications provider in Vietnam. In 1992, Decree 115/HDBT changed 
the Directorate General into the General Company of Posts and Telecommunications 
(VNPT), an SOE that was given the state monopoly for operating the national 
telecommunications network. Also in 1992, Decree 03/1992/ND-CP established the 
Directorate Department of Posts, which oversaw both the posts and the 
telecommunication sector. The Directorate Department of Posts was made the strategic, 
regulatory, and development agency directly under the direction of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication. In 1993, as the result of the country’s first attempt to 
speed up development, the national information technology (IT) policy was developed, 
which reflected the plans for gradually liberalising the entire economy (Boymall, Martin, 
& Lam, 2007). This IT plan was codified in the landmark 1993 Resolution 49/1993/ND-
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CP on the Development of Information Technology. The law aimed at building the 
foundation for information infrastructure to meet the increased demand for information 
in state management and socioeconomic activities (Boymall, et al., 2007). In 1995, the 
prime minister issued Decision 249/TTg, which made VNPT a general corporation – a 
term which refers to a state-owned conglomerate in Vietnam. VNPT continues to offer 
all types of telecommunications services, and is active in nearly every province and city 
in Vietnam. 
In 1995, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and witnessed the normalisation of trade relations with the United States. This eventually 
led Vietnam to sign a bilateral trade agreement with the United States in 2001. The US–
Vietnam BTA had an important telecommunications provision, which set out the agenda 
to liberalise the Vietnamese telecommunication industry. Also in 1995, Sweden’s 
Comvik Group, with its powerful financial and technological capabilities, signed a 
business cooperation contract (BCC)26 with VNPT, forming MobiFone, the first mobile 
phone provider in Vietnam. This cooperation marked a milestone, as foreign investors 
and foreign mobile phone providers made their official presence in Vietnam’s telecom 
industry (Thuy-Nga, 2010). MobiFone has been the leader in Vietnamese mobile phone 
service since its inception.  
In 1997, VinaPhone, a second mobile network also owned by VNPT, was 
established with 100 per cent state capital. Though VinaPhone did not cooperate with 
any foreign partners, VNPT used the experience learned from Comvik to model 
VinaPhone’s operation after MobiFone’s. In 2004, Vietnam’s first Strategy of ICT 
                                                
26 A BCC is a written agreement between a foreign investor and a Vietnamese partner in 
which the parties agree to cooperate to undertake certain business activities in Vietnam 
and to share the revenue or profits arising from such activities. No separate legal entity 
or company is established, and there is no limitation on liability for participants (Allens, 
Arthur, & Robinson, 2010). 
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Development, approved by Prime Minister Khai Van Phan, stated a targeted yearly 
growth rate for the ICT sector of 25–30 per cent. Although the Vietnamese ICT market 
could not keep the up the growth rate of 33 per cent achieved in 2004, it still reached 
20.9 per cent growth rate in 2005, as compared to 9 per cent in Asia and 7.1 per cent in 
the rest of the world (Danish Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises & Axis 
Research, 2006).  
In 2002, Decree 90/2002/ND-CP renamed the Directorate General of Posts and 
Telecommunications to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and established 
its responsibility. The decree structured the ministry such that it was to manage all 
activities related to posts, telecommunications, ICT, electronics, Internet, radio 
transmissions, electronic frequencies, and the nation’s information infrastructure. In 
2003, as a part of Vietnam’s compliance with the US–Vietnam BTA, the Vietnamese 
government officially abolished VNPT’s monopoly by opening the sector to competition 
in all telecom services. In 2007, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was 
again renamed, this time becoming the Ministry of Information and Communications, 
though only the name changed, as it retained all of its previous responsibilities and 
authority. In addition, the MIC became responsible for the management of television 
broadcasting, newspapers, and publications, which used to be the function of the 
Ministry of Culture and Information. The creation of the MIC reflected the Vietnamese 
government’s new rationale and direction for its ministries, moving from managing 
multiple sectors and areas of the economy into one industry in order to simplify the 
government’s structure of administrative management.  
In 2006, the National Assembly passed an ICT law, which governs information 
technology and telecommunications business activities. In 2009, the National Assembly 
passed a revised ICT law, this time to govern radio frequency and electronic satellites. In 
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2007, a major producer of semiconductor systems for mobile phones and automobiles, 
Japan’s Renesas Electronics, opened a research centre in Tan Thuan Export Processing 
Zone in Ho Chi Minh City; the centre was, and continues to be, dedicated to developing 
sophisticated multifunction system-on-chips (Runckel & Associates, 2010). In 2009, the 
first 3G phone service was launched by VinaPhone, followed by MobiFone two months 
later. In November 2009, the Telecommunications Law and the Radio Frequency Law 
were passed by the XII National Assembly, and each took effect in July 2010. In 2010, 
the number of mobile phone subscribers in Vietnam was five times higher than landline 
phone owners, and Vietnam became one of the countries with the highest growth rate in 
mobile phone usage (Runckel & Associates, 2010). By 2012, there were four major 3G 
providers – VinaPhone, MobiFone (both under VNPT), Viettel, and Vietnamobile (under 
Hanoi Telecom) – and Vietnam’s telecommunications sector continued to expand, even 
though the mobile phone market had become saturated and started to cool down at the 
end of 2011. 
	  
4.2.1. Profiles of the Telecom Providers 
	  
In 2012, the landscape of the telecom industry in Vietnam faced incredible 
transformation. Three out of four foreign investors left the Vietnamese market. These 
included Russia’s Vimpel Communications Group (VimpelCom), a joint-owner of 
Beeline Network, which left Vietnam in April 2012. Before Vimpelcom, Comvik (of 
MobiFone) and South Korea’s SK Telecom (of S-Fone) also left the market. Of these 
three, only Comvik made a profit from its investment in Vietnam. An equally important 
event that changed the industry’s structure was Viettel’s acquisition of EVN, which 
reduced the number of mobile phone providers in the telecom industry from nine to eight 
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in early 2012. This number decreased again to seven at the end of 2012, and it may be 
down to six by the end of 2013 because of the possible departure of Saigon Postel. 
However, in the middle of 2011 there were nine telecommunications operators in 
Vietnam. Of these, Saigon Postel and Hanoi Telecom were regional with some 
geographical restrictions 27  on their operations; Indochina Telecom and Vietnam 
Television Corporation were each mobile virtual network operators; and Vishipel only 
provided maritime communication services. Nearly every Vietnamese 
telecommunication company was a state-owned enterprise with one exception, which 
was Hanoi Telecom. There was also cross-ownership among carriers, such as Saigon 
Postel with VNPT. In early 2012, EVN merged with Viettel, and Indochina Telecom had 
its license revoked, leaving the industry with seven operators. A quick overview of these 
seven is provided below. Both VNPT’s and Vettel’s profiles are discussed in much 
greater depth later in the case studies.   
	  
1. Vietnam Post and Telematics (VNPT) was the first major SOE operating in 
nearly every telecommunications field except maritime telecommunication. Until 
early 2000, VNPT enjoyed a monopoly in the industry. This situation, however, 
has evolved over the past 10 years; in 2012, there were eight landline operators, 
seven licensed mobile phone operators, and a number of Internet service 
providers. VNPT’s profile is detailed in the first cases study below. 
2. In 1995, Military Electronics Telecommunications Corporation (Viettel) 
received its license to enter the telecom market, breaking VNPT’s monopoly. It is 
100 per cent owned and operated under the MoD, and it provides landline, long 
                                                
27 The restrictions only apply to landline phone service. These two providers could 
provide mobile phone service nationwide. 
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distance, and IP-based telecommunications; lease lines; Internet services; and 
mobile communications. Currently Viettel is the second largest telecom provider 
in Vietnam, after VNPT. Viettel’s profile is detailed in the second case study 
below. 
3. Also in 1995, Saigon Posts and Telecommunications Service Corporation 
(Saigon Postel) obtained a license to become the first enterprise to be equitized 
with a number of large shareholders. VNPT holds 18 per cent of the total shares 
of Saigon Postel. S-Fone, a subsidy of Saigon Postel, ventured with a South 
Korean consortium, SK Telecom, in a BCC to provide Vietnam’s first code 
division multiple access (CDMA) mobile phone service. The venture was largely 
unsuccessful with limited subscribers because of the high cost of CMDA mobile 
phones and its limited model variation.  
After 10 years of investing in the Vietnamese telecom market, in 2010, 
SK Telecom withdrew from S-Fone. On 9 August 2011, the Vietnam government 
allowed S-Fone to divert from a BCC to a joint venture. However, S-Fone was 
unsuccessful in both finding a joint-venture partner and changing its technology 
from poorly performing CDMA technology to Global System for Mobile 
Communication (GSM) technology (TalkVietnam, 2012b). According to 
Intellasia (2012), in 2012, S-Fone faced capital distress from three consecutive 
years of profit loss (2008-2010). By late 2012, S-Fone was highly indebted and 
was unable to pay its workers’ salaries in its Hanoi branch for several months 
(Theo NLĐ, 2012). 
4. Electricity of Vietnam Telecom (EVN) is wholly owned by the state-run 
Electricity of Vietnam Group. It provides landline, long distance and IP-based 
telecommunications services, lease lines, and mobile communications. In 2006, 
 133 
EVN launched the second CDMA service; it had a modest market share of 
several hundred thousand subscribers, though by 2010, EVN was riddled with 
debt. Its revenues from sales and service provision saw a steady decline from a 
profit of VND 93.8 billion (USD 4.4 million) in 2008 to VND 8.3 billion (USD 
390,000) in 2009 (Tuoitrenews, 2011a). In 2010, EVN reportedly incurred a total 
loss of VND 1.026 trillion (USD 48.27 million) (Tuoitrenews, 2011a). In 2011, 
the government approved a merger between EVN and Viettel, despite an offer 
from Hanoi Telecom (once in a consortium with EVN) of a cash buyout 
(Tuoitrenews, 2011a). The merger was completed on 1 January 2012. 
5. Hanoi Telecommunications Company (Hanoi Telecom) is the first telecom 
carrier with private investors. It provides services for landlines, but is limited 
only to areas in Hanoi, and to long distance and IP-based telecommunications, 
lease lines, and mobile communications. In July 2004, Hutchison Telecom – a 
Hong Kong-based telecom company – entered into a BCC with Hanoi Telecom. 
In February 2005, Hanoi Telecom was granted an investment license by the 
government for the project, and in January 2007, it launched CDMA service 
under the brand name HT Mobile. While it offered a superior network, the 
market uptake was greatly hampered by both the lack of affordable CDMA 
handsets, in particular those with the Vietnamese language option, and the trend 
of leading manufacturers to scale back handset development for this market.  
In March 2008, it received government approval to convert from CDMA 
technology to GSM technology. After the successful conversion, it launched 
GSM services in April 2009 under the new brand, Vietnamobile (Nguyen, 2009). 
Hutchison invested VND 20.6 trillion (USD 1 billion) in this new mobile phone 
network. Vietnamobile surpassed the one-millionth-customer mark within six 
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months of launch, mostly in the prepaid segment. In December 2011, 
Vietnamobile became the last of the four operators to offer 3G service in 
Vietnam (Thu-Hien, 2011). In 2012, it became the fourth largest mobile phone 
operator, with 8 per cent market share. 
6. Founded in 2007, GTel Mobile Joint Stock Company (Gtel Mobile) is under 
the Ministry of Public Security. It established a joint venture with Russia’s 
VimpelCom in July 2008, which gave birth to Beeline Network in July 2008. In 
targeting the low-income and student populations, this company not only offered 
cheaper rates, but also free calls within its Beeline Network. On April 2012, 
VimpelCom unexpectedly announced its withdrawal from Vietnam, immediately 
selling its 49 per cent share for VND 929 billion (USD 45 million). Although the 
actual amount of loss was not announced, VimpelCom had thus far invested 
VND 9.56 trillion (USD 463 million) into the Beeline Network (TalkVietnam, 
2012a). Due to VimpelCom’s departure, GTel renamed the Beeline Network to 
Gmobile to reflect the change in ownership. In 2012, GTel Mobile had a modest 
market share of 3.21 per cent, making it the fifth largest mobile phone operator in 
Vietnam. 
7. Indochina Telecom (Dong Duong Telecom) was granted a license in August 
2009. Unlike the other mobile networks, Indochina Telecom set up its network 
and mobile services without being granted a wireless frequency, making it a 
mobile virtual network operator. Indochina was supposed to share 3G network 
facilities with military-owned Viettel and to roam using local mobile networks 
that employ GSM technology. In 2012, however, the MIC revoked Indochina 
Telecom’s license because of its sluggish implementation of services. 
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8. In June 2010, the MIC gave Vietnam Television Corporation (VTC) a license 
to operate as a mobile virtual network operator. VTC provides mobile phone 
services but does not have its own licensed frequency allocation of radio 
spectrum, nor does it have the infrastructure required to provide mobile telephone 
service. VTC is the newest telecom operator in the industry, though in 2012, the 
MIC signalled that if it does not launch it services within the prescribed time 
limit (which so far has not been made public), its license might be revoked. 
9. Vietnam Maritime Communications and Electronics Company (Vishipel), a 
100 per cent owned subsidiary of Vietnam Maritime Corporation, provides only 
marine communications services.   
 
4.2.2. Market Structure 
 
The market structure of the telecommunication industry has transformed rapidly 
over the last decade, considering that in 1993 VNPT held a market monopoly. While the 
nine providers were actively competing and operating in mobile phone and landline 
service in the late 2000s, in 2013, the industry formed a duopoly with VNPT and Viettel 
taking over 90 per cent of the market. In 2012, VinaPhone, together with its sister 
company MobiFone – both owned by VNPT – had a subscription base that accounted for 
nearly 48 per cent of the market share (approximately 70 million subscriptions). In 2012, 
Viettel reached 58.9 million subscriptions, and accounted for 40.76 per cent of the 
market share measured in revenue. GTel Mobile and Vietnamobile together have a little 
more 10 million subscriptions (Anh-Quan, 2013). Figure 4.4 illustrates the market shares 
of major telecom providers in all of the telecom segments 
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Figure 4.4: Market Share of Operators in all Telecom Segments 
	  
Source: MIC (2012). CMC is CMC Telecom. EVN is Electricity of Vietnam 
Telecom. FPT is FPT Corporation. GTEL is GTel Mobile Joint Stock Company. 
SPT is Saigon Postel. VNPT is Vietnam Post and Telematics. VTC is Vietnam 
Television Corporation. 
	  
Starting in the late 2000s, mobile phone service became the fastest growing and 
most profitable segment of the telecom industry in Vietnam. Figure 4.5 shows each 
operator’s market share in the mobile phone market, with the duopoly of VNPT and 
Viettel assuming the largest market shares (a total of 88.64 per cent). At its inception, it 
was anticipated that the consortium of EVN and Hanoi Telecom would bring a greater 
breadth to Vietnam’s telecommunications market, but it failed, forcing EVN to merge 
with Viettel in early 2012.  
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Figure 4.5: Market Share of Mobile Phone Operators in 2012, Measured in 
Revenue 
	  
Source: MIC (2012). VinaPhone and MobiFone are subsidiaries of VNPT. GTel 
Mobile runs Gmobile. S-Fone is owned by Saigon Posts and 
Telecommunications Service Corporation. Vietnamobile is under Hanoi Telecom. 
 
The trend in 2012 of consolidating unprofitable operators with successful larger 
ones means that the mobile phone market will eventually be scaled down to three or four 
operators. The merger between EVN and Viettel has led the way, with more 
restructuring planned over the next few years, according to an official at the MIC 
(interview, 2011). 
 
4.2.3. Competition among the Providers 
	  
When the government broke VNPT’s monopoly, competition among mobile 
phone operators quickly escalated. Operators reduced tariffs and offered cheap mobile 
phone packages to capture subscribers who could easily switch to a different network 
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since, in the prepaid market, mobile phone users do not have contract with a carrier for a 
specified period. Low mobile rates and wide network coverage were key factors to 
attract subscribers. For instance, in mid-2009, Beeline Network offered the lowest call 
charge with VND 1,199  (USD 5 cents) per minute for out-of-network calls and free 20 
minutes for in-network calls per month (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). As soon as 
Beeline made this promotional debut, other mobile operators took action to remain 
competitive. Starting on 1 August 2009, Viettel and MobiFone offered promotional 
programs for prepaid subscribers in which they received an additional 20 per cent of the 
purchased credit value to their account (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). Meanwhile, 
VinaPhone subscribers were exempted from charges when making in-network calls 
lasting up to 20 minutes, and for 50 short text messages. In addition, the four market 
leaders – Viettel, Vinaphone, MobiFone, and Hanoi Telecom – each offered prepaid 
subscribers free-of-charge call periods within any given day, and sent gifts and held 
lotteries for subscribers (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). Given the fierce price 
competition in the first half of 2010, Viettel was forced to focus on promotions because 
it saw its market share decrease by 2 per cent. At the same time, VinaPhone and 
MobiFone, not wanting to miss the chance to gain more market share or worried that 
they would lose the customers they already had, again reduced their mobile tariffs.  
Prices in the telecommunications sector have continuously declined by more than 
11 per cent per year based on a report issued by the General Statistic Office in August 
2009 (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). In 2011, an interviewee who worked at the 
MIC told me that mobile charges in Vietnam were at below-average levels as compared 
to other countries in the region. It is predicted that based on the current trend, mobile 
charges in Vietnam could be among the lowest in the world by 2015 (Vietnam Financial 
Review, 2009). Within this relentless competition, Vietnamese mobile phone users 
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benefit from low-cost minutes, upgraded services, and advanced (3G) technology at a 
low price. However, this aggressive price competition also raises questions of whether 
telecom providers will subsequently divert profits away from technological upgrading 
that could be used to boost service quality and build new competitive advantages, such 
as vertical integration with the ICT sector. Evidence from my fieldwork suggests that 
this scepticism is well grounded. For instance, a low profit margin was the reason for the 
withdrawal of foreign investors, who had been the source of advanced technology and 
expertise for the sector (interview, 2011).  
	  
4.2.4. Structure of Ownership 
	  
When it comes to private and foreign investment in the telecommunications 
sector, Vietnam has a restrictive climate. While the country’s Law on Investment, 
implemented in 2005, permits both joint ventures and 100 per cent foreign-owned 
enterprises, neither were allowed in the telecommunications sector during the 1990s and 
2000s. Since the opening of the industry, most telecom providers are SOEs, except for 
Hanoi Telecom. These SOEs, owned by different branches of the government, entered 
the telecom market as they became aware of profit potentials. Meanwhile, private 
investments, especially foreign, were channelled through the SOEs (Toulmin & Smith, 
2007). This was done by offering licenses only when there was a BCC between 
Vietnamese and foreign providers. It was not until 2008 that a foreign telecom operator – 
Russia’s VimpelCom – was permitted to enter into a joint venture with GTel Mobile. 
Coming into the Vietnamese market in the form of business corporation partners, foreign 
investors had strong incentives to bring modern technology and, more importantly, tacit 
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knowledge in order to develop successful business ventures in Vietnam. Indeed, they 
helped to substantially improve technological and servicing capability of the industry.  
For instance, in the late 1990s, the telecom infrastructure in Vietnam was out-
dated, functioned poorly, and in urgent need of renovation. Foreign investors were much 
needed for capital, network development, and modernisation. Through the first BCC, 
VNPT – the sole state-owned provider at the time – worked with Sweden’s Comvik to 
revamp Vietnam’s telecom infrastructure. Initially, Comvik brought VND 4.17 trillion 
(USD 200 million) in investment capital, market expertise, technology, managerial skills, 
and new business practices that developed MobiFone, the first mobile phone network in 
Vietnam (VietnamNet, 2012). The venture marked a turning point in industrial 
upgrading and capability-building of the sector and was the necessary first step for the 
country to move towards industrialisation and modernisation.  
Nonetheless, the BCC model has a few shortcomings, especially to foreign 
investors, as compared with a joint venture or a 100 per cent foreign-owned model. First, 
many BCCs do not permit foreign investors to regain long-term asset value from their 
investments. Second, BCCs require separate management approval for each of the 
partners, thus raising transaction costs. Third, the short duration of the contract – no 
longer than 10 years initially – and the uncertainty of renewals together limit the time 
that foreign investors can recoup their investment. Finally, the high rate of depreciation 
drives costs of services higher in the short term (Nguyen, Pham, & Gullish, 2005). Given 
the high risk in investment, most foreign investors	   initially tend to do business with 
SOEs that have land, as well as political and financial supports from the government. By 
June 2005, of the nine BCCs entered into with Vietnamese counterparts in the sector, 
only one was signed with a non-VNPT company, as reported by Nguyen and colleagues 
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(2005).28 In Comvik’s case, because VNPT was a monopolist at the time and Vietnam 
was a large potential market, Comvik was confident of retaining high profit margins to 
make up for its investment risk.  
In essence, the Vietnamese government’s restriction of foreign investment 
through BCCs successfully allowed the Vietnamese telecom providers to attract foreign 
capital, technology, and expertise while not fully relinquishing the sector to foreign 
competition. A BCC not only prevents foreign providers from competing directly with 
local firms, but it also forces direct foreign transfer of technology, expertise, and capital 
to state-owned providers. As a consequence, the model provides large learning rents to 
SOEs to acquire learning and upgrading. Indeed, a great deal of learning has taken place 
since 1995, when VNPT signed the first BCC with Comvik, which brought mobile 
phone service and, later, Internet service to Vietnam. Similarly, GTel, S-Fone, and Hanoi 
Telecom all received substantial foreign investments and technology transfers from their 
foreign counterparts.  
	  
4.2.5. Changes in the Structure of Foreign Ownership  
	  
In compliance with its WTO commitments, the Vietnamese government 
gradually opened up its telecom industry to foreign investors by increasing the 
percentage of foreign ownership in BCCs and in joint ventures. By July 2010, a single 
foreign investor was allowed to hold a maximum of 49 per cent of the chartered capital 
in a telecom service. The rule was part of the decree drafted to guide the execution of the 
Telecom Law, which went into force in 2010 (Vietnam Business News, 2010). In fact, 
the 2010 law was overdue in adherence to Vietnam’s commitment to the WTO, as it was 
                                                
28 For a complete description of the BCC model, as well as its pros and cons, see H. T. 
Nguyen et al. (2005). 
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supposed to be in effect in 2007. Hai Hong Pham, Director General of the MIC’s 
Telecommunication Department, clarified that Vietnam’s Telecom Law did not prohibit 
a telecom operator from selling its network to its peers, provided the total foreign stake 
did not exceed the 49 per cent (Vietnam Business News, 2010). In 2012, under its WTO 
commitments, Vietnam fully opened its telecommunications market to foreign operators, 
who, by this time, could enter the Vietnamese market as 100 per cent foreign-owned 
businesses, meaning that they were allowed to provide telecom services in Vietnam 
without having a Vietnamese business counterpart. Nevertheless, as of March 2013, the 
MIC had yet to grant any licenses to a 100 per cent foreign-owned telecom operator.  
	  
4.3. Constraints in the Telecommunications Industry 
	  
In section 4.2, this thesis provided an overview of the telecom industry, including 
the chronology of the industry’s development, structure of the market, and current events 
that shaped the development of the sector. These events included competition among the 
local and foreign players and the changing structure of ownership, which induced 
transfers of international technology and expertise to major SOEs in Vietnam. This 
section provided a review of the outstanding market failures that constrained the industry. 
Given the government’s strong support to the sector and its policies that promote 
learning and upgrading, a few operators, notably VNPT and Viettel, were able to 
overcome these constraints to become major players in the market. However, as the 
industry emerges from what has been a short period of successful development and 
moves towards convergence with the ICT sector, many of these constraints have 
resurfaced and now impose new challenges to Vietnam’s telecommunication providers.  
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4.3.1. A Capital-Intensive Industry in an Underdeveloped Credit Market 
	  
The first major investment issue in the telecom industry is the extremely high 
initial fixed costs to set up an infrastructure, such as transmission stations, trunk lines,29 
and backbone30 networks. This is because setting up the stations, lines, and networks 
requires a substantial amount of equipment and land, which is often hard, if not 
impossible, to acquire in Vietnam. In addition, telecom equipment is much more capital-
intensive than equipment in other sectors, such as in the garment manufacturing sector. 
Therefore, the cost to set up the infrastructure across the coverage areas and to buy 
telecom technology from foreign providers requires considerable capital investment. 
Even in developed countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, 
there are a small number of telecom providers, partly because of the high investment 
costs in infrastructure and technology.  
The second major issue is the underdevelopment of the Vietnamese credit market, 
which limits private investors’ access to credit for major investment projects. As the 
credit market is inadequate in Vietnam, lending for big investment projects often 
requires the government’s guarantee for loans. This type of guarantee has traditionally 
only been offered to a few SOEs, and is mostly unavailable to private businesses. 
Consequently, the lesson on how Vietnamese telecom providers overcame market 
                                                
29 A trunk is a line or link designed to handle many signals simultaneously and that 
connects major switching centers in a communications system. The transmitted data can 
be voice (as in the conventional telephone system) data, computer programs, images, 
video, or control signals. 
30 A backbone is a larger transmission line that carries data gathered from smaller lines 
that interconnect with it. At the local level, a backbone is a line or set of lines that local 
area networks connect to for a wide area network connection, or within a local area 
network to span distances efficiently (for example, between buildings). On the Internet 
or other wide area	  networks,	  a	  backbone is a set of paths that local or regional networks 
connect to for long-distance interconnection.  
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imperfections in the credit market is particularly instructive. VNPT solved the problem 
by signing the first BCC with Comvick, in which the Swedish partner provided the SOE 
with capital, technology, and know-how to set up the first mobile phone network in 
Vietnam, through the legal entity MobiFone. Later, other SOEs followed in VNPT’s 
footsteps to set up BCCs with foreign partners; for example, S-Fone partnered with 
South Korea’s SK Telecom; Hanoi Telecom signed up with Hong Kong’s Hutchinson 
Telecom; and GTel Telecom joined with Russia’s VimpelCom.  
Viettel is the exception to this, as it used a flexible and dynamic approach in 
tackling the issue of capital shortage. First, instead of acquiring a foreign partner, Viettel 
used both support from the government and MoD to obtain credit from state banks, 
especially from the Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank. Second, it leveraged its 
supports from the government and the MoD to arrange delayed payments to foreign 
vendors for procuring equipment and service packages. Viettel also took advantage of 
the military telecom infrastructure to set up its commercial telecom service and, 
therefore, to reduce its costs.	  
 The Vietnamese government also played an important role in addressing 
industry constraints. During the early years, when Viettel and S-Fone first entered the 
market, the Vietnamese government rectified the infrastructure shortage by enforcing 
infrastructure lending. Under Decision 58/2005/QD-TTg, issued by the prime minister in 
March 2005, the government instructed VNPT, the monopoly at the time, to lend these 
two newcomers its comprehensive infrastructure and network so that they could launch 
their own services. The decision specified that the lending rate must be reasonable and 
affordable. This was an attempt by the government to correct the SOEs’ bottleneck of 
insufficient capital and infrastructure.  
In addition, the Vietnamese government corrected constraints involving the 
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imperfect credit market through the two most important policies that devised rents to the 
telecom operators. First, the government permitted the BCCs to acquire foreign capital 
and technology via its foreign partners. Second, it backed the SOEs’ long-term loans, 
especially with state banks. These rent policies in the initial period were sufficient to 
remove some of the constraints in capital so that carriers could start developing new 
capabilities.  
 
4.3.2. Lack of Skilled Labour, Especially at the Managerial Level 
	  
The issue of a labour shortage has been the focal point of Vietnamese 
government policy over the past ten years, which has been implemented by universities 
and technical training schools. In addition, the Vietnamese labour force has been eager to 
undertake training programs in telecom technology, as it is often perceived as a growing 
industry with good job potential and high salaries. According to the MIC (2010a), the 
number of universities that offer degrees in telecommunications and information and 
communications technology grew from 42 in 2001 to 206 in 2010. Similarly, by 2010, 
education and training programs offered at two-year colleges increased from 36 to 205 
colleges. Technical schools, of which there were none in 2001, number 220 in 2010. The 
number of students enrolled in training courses increased from 30,350 in 2006 to 50,500 
in 2010. This is a 66 per cent increase in enrolment within this four-year period (Ministry 
of Information and Communications, 2010a). 
Despite that Vietnamese workers are reputed to be fast learning, newly graduated 
workers still lack tacit knowledge and hands-on training. A report from the Danish 
Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Axis Research (2006) points out, 
“With 10,000 university graduates every year, and another 10,000 junior college 
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graduates, the labour force supply for ICT is sufficient in quantity, but the quality of 
training still needs substantial improvement especially in regards to application of 
technical skills, professional working attitudes, teamwork and English competencies”. In 
my interview with managers who work for major telecom providers or in supporting 
businesses, they remarked that both private and public businesses frequently have to 
train technicians and engineers on the job, as their formal education was insufficient to 
meet the job requirements. As discussed in Chapter 3, training to acquire tacit knowledge 
takes time and considerable effort. Oftentimes, employers incur a loss during training 
periods because of the workers’ inability to engage in productive activities. This issue 
has become more complex in recent years as labour costs continue to rise rapidly in 
Vietnam.  
Another consequence of the quick expansion of the telecom industry is that 
salaries for technical labour have gone up speedily, thus putting pressure on operation 
costs. In 2006, IT professionals were in high demand, and the salary levels were 
relatively high by Vietnamese standards, at VND 5.2–6.2 million (USD 250–300) per 
month for entry level positions; VND 8.3–10.4 million (USD 400–500) for junior 
managers; and VND 11.5–18.8 million (USD 550–900) for senior managers (Danish 
Federation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises & Axis Research, 2006). In 2013, 
Viettel is expected to raise salaries even higher than the industry standard by paying its 
senior engineers with five years’ experience approximately VND 32 million (USD 
1,500) per month (Van-Oanh, 2013). This wage rate would be more than double the 
average offered by VNPT and FPT – one of the largest information technology 
companies in Vietnam (Van-Oanh, 2013). As wages rise, profits are squeezed, so smaller 
telecom enterprises will struggle to stay in business.	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An interviewee, an upper-level manager at Viettel, explained that to overcome 
the labour shortage, Viettel’s first approach was to pay higher salaries to recruit the best 
and most experienced engineers, either from within Vietnam or abroad, who can perform 
the technical tasks without additional on-the-job training. For technical and 
administrative employees, Viettel still provides on-the-job training to its employees. This 
is accomplished most often with senior staff coaching junior staff for one to three months, 
depending on the position. This approach offers a shorter training period because 
technicians and administrative staff can get up to speed relatively quickly. Viettel also 
organises training programs for its engineers and managers, so that they can gradually 
take on more complex tasks and assume higher levels of responsibility. Other telecom 
operators use similar on-the-job training approaches, although with less rigour and on a 
smaller scale. By using a number of practical approaches, Viettel has managed to 
temporarily overcome its skilled labour constraints.  
This issue of human resources, however, will continue to be critical because the 
telecom industry is heading towards a convergence trend: combining information 
technology with services by providing more mobile content 31  in mobile phones. 
Deepening the linkage between the ICT and telecom sectors is vital because the mobile 
phone market has reached its saturation point due to price competition. As a result, the 
shortage of experienced workers in software and hardware engineering is holding back 
the development of the sector. My interviewee told me that despite paying a higher 
salary than most operators, Viettel continues to experience a shortage of senior engineers 
and mid-level managers, which is affecting the company’s expansion plan.  
	  
                                                
31 Mobile content is any type of electronic media, which can be viewed or used on 
mobile phones, such as ringtones, graphics, discount offers, games, movies, and GPS 
navigation. 
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4.3.3. Dependence on Foreign Machinery and Slow Technical Upgrading 
	  
Over the past two decades, telecom technology and machinery are often imported 
from Chinese or American telecom device companies, such as Hutchinson, Nokia, 
Huawei, or ZTE. At the moment, to some extent all operators in Vietnam use imported 
technology and components from foreign vendors, though Viettel and VNPT do 
manufacture basic telecom equipment on a small scale. From my fieldwork, it does not 
appear as if learning to use foreign technology or components is a problem, as foreign 
vendors often set up the equipment and provide training to their Vietnamese buyers. 
Table 4.3 demonstrates that Vietnam continues to import roughly two-third of its 
telecommunications equipment, although it has become slightly less dependent in recent 
years. 
 
Table 4.3: Vietnam Import-Export of Telecommunication Equipment (in USD 
millions) 
Telecommunications 
Equipment  
 
2010 2011 2012 (estimates) 
Total Market Size 3,348 3,850 4,620 
Total Local Production 1,196 1,375 1,650 
Total Exports 49 56 67 
Total Imports 2,194 2,523 3,027 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (2012) 
 
Nonetheless, as the industry expands, there have been concerns that Vietnamese 
telecom providers are becoming dependent on imported equipment, as well as advanced 
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handset components (interview, 2013). This reliance on imported equipment limits 
vertical linkages and confines the sector to service providence. It also reduces business 
profits and value addition in service packages that the providers offer to Vietnamese 
consumers. In 2008, Viettel strategically took on this issue so as to steer the company 
towards developing a new competitive advantage. It established its own R&D institute to 
develop and produce operating software and simple components for its handsets and 
other telecom devices. In early 2010, Viettel introduced the first Vietnamese-made 
USB32 dongle to promote its service in 3G technology. Two years later, in 2012, Viettel 
produced its own low-cost mobile phones and smart phones. Previously, Viettel’s mobile 
phones had been produced by China-based Huawei but sold with Viettel’s mobile 
packages (Van-Oanh, 2012a).  
Following Viettel’s lead, VNPT established it first R&D centre, VNPT–
Technologies, in 2011 with an initial capital investment of VND 500 billion (USD 25 
million). Unlike Viettel, which owns 100 per cent of its R&D institute, VNPT only holds 
51 per cent of VNPT–Technology (VNPT, 2011). VNPT-Technologies specializes in 
electrical and telecom equipment R&D; IT and communications; digital content 
development; telecom and medical equipment imports and exports; landline services, 
and more (VNPT, 2011). All together, by 2012, only Viettel, VNPT, and FPT (which 
launched F-Mobile) invested in R&D manufacturing, leaving these three players to lead 
the industry in information and telecommunication technology. 
 
4.3.4. Final Remarks on the Constraints  
	  
This section reviewed some of the major constraints in the telecom industry and 
                                                
32 USB stands for Universal Serial Bus. 
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how the Vietnamese government and providers, notably VNPT and Viettel, addressed 
them to improve their capability. In addition to the operators’ efforts in fixing market 
constraints, the Vietnamese government also provided important rents through a number 
of policy measures. First, the Vietnamese government provided guarantees of credit so 
that Viettel and S-Fone had access to state capital via state banks. Second, the 
government leased out VNPT’s backbone network to Viettel and S-Fone so that they 
each could set up their mobile phone service. Third, the government also boosted 
technical training at technical schools, colleges, and universities, which successfully 
provided more technicians and engineers specialising in telecom technology. 
Nevertheless, as the telecom industry moves towards vertical integration and 
convergence with the ICT sector, constraint in skilled workers and mid-level managers 
have again resurfaced and new measures are needed to remedy them (interview, 2011).  
In the next three sections, the successful development of the telecom industry is 
analysed in three case studies. The cases illustrate the rent management mechanisms, as 
well as their impact on the process of technical upgrading and capability-building in the 
sector. In the first case, the break-up of the VNPT monopoly and opening up of the 
telecom market are shown to have created effective incentives and pressures for 
tremendous effort towards learning and upgrading. In the second case study, this thesis 
takes a snapshot of the sector, looking at the smaller learning and upgrading dynamics 
that took place inside Viettel. This case analyses where the rents came from and how 
they were used to build Viettel’s industrial capability and competitive advantage. This 
thesis then reviews the third case study, the “beauty contest” for licenses of 3G 
technology. It observes the MIC’s rent management capabilities and assesses the 
challenges and outcomes of the providers’ adoption of 3G technology. 
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4.4. Case Study 1: VNPT – Monopoly Failure Led to Coerced Upgrading 
 
 VNPT was the first telecom service provider in Vietnam, and remains the 
dominant state-owned operator in all telecom segments except marine-based services. In 
2010, VNPT, with chartered capital of VND 72,237 billion (USD 13.4 billion), operated 
largely in mobile phone, landline phone, Internet services, and IT services. VNPT 
maintains a complicated organisational structure that includes 63 municipal and 
provincial telecom companies, a number of local postal telephone and telegraph systems, 
joint stock companies, joint venture companies, and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Figure 
4.6 illustrates VNPT’s operational structure, its BCCs, and its participation in both the 
telecom industry and in other lines of business. 
As mentioned above, VNPT owns the two dominant cellular companies: 
MobiFone and VinaPhone. Furthermore, it has several paging companies (ABC, MCC, 
Phonelink, Polink, and SEPRO) and pay phones (GPC, supplied by Sapura). The 
conglomerate also runs survey, consultation, design, and installation and maintenance 
services for telecom subscribers and providers. It provides IT services, as well as 
production of selected telecom and IT equipment. VNPT has several unrelated lines of 
business, including financial, credit, banking, advertisement services, event organisation, 
real estate, and office rental.  
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Figure 4.6: VNPT Operational Structure and Select Affiliated Companies 
 
 Source: Toulmin & Smith (2007) 
	  
In the next sections, the transformation of VNPT’s monopoly rent is analysed 
using the DRMA framework throughout two periods. In the first period (stage 1), 
monopoly rent was largely ineffective and thus there was minimal technical upgrading in 
the industry. In the second period, (stage 2), when VNPT’s monopoly was broken, 
effective rent management factors forced VNPT to acquire new learning and upgrading. 
 
4.4.1. Monopoly Period (Stage 1): Failure of Monopoly Rent 
	  
Up until 1995, VNPT inherited substantial monopoly rent from the government. 
This was largely due to VNPT being a part of the Vietnamese government during its 
central planning period and, for security purposes, there was considerable political 
acceptance to retain the telecom sector under state ownership. As a result, there was no 
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political pressure or institutional mechanisms that compelled industrial effort from 
VNPT to industrialise. Within this context, VNPT exercised tremendous monopolistic 
power and reaped large profits from a lucrative market without competition. Meanwhile, 
it only slowly upgraded its infrastructure and management abilities, since it had little 
incentive to do either (interview, 2011).  
An example of the underdeveloped telecom infrastructure and service is that in 
the late 1990s, on average, it took VNPT up to one month to install a fixed phone line for 
a business or household in large Vietnamese cities such as Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi 
(interview, 2011). In addition, the tariff rates were very high, making phone service 
inaccessible for the majority of the population. In the late 1990s, while average national 
income was less than VND 2.08 million (USD 100) per year, a mobile phone handset 
could cost more than that. Furthermore, the cost per minute of mobile phone service was 
approximately VND 3,000 – 4,000 (USD 15 – 20 cents). Because of this pricing, VNPT 
failed to turn monopoly rents into learning rents to acquire industrial upgrading. Table 
4.4 summarises the monopoly rent period during the post-war period using the DRMA 
framework. 
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Table 4.4: DRMA Summary of the Monopoly Period 
Player Type of rents Incentives 
created  
Factors affecting 
the rent 
management 
mechanism 
Rent outcomes 
VNPT - Monopoly rent 
based on the 
industry’s 
historical 
context 
- Government 
subsidized loss-
making period 
until 1995 
- Unproductive 
capture of 
monopoly rents  
- Limited 
incentives to 
improve 
infrastructure and 
capability 
 
 
 
First level: Political 
protection of the 
monopoly 
Second level: no 
clear institutional 
mechanism to 
monitor VNPT’s 
progress 
Third level: No 
competition in the 
market  
 
- High cost and 
slow speed 
service 
- Slow 
infrastructure 
and technology 
upgrading 
 
	  
During this period, the industry and market were structured such that VNPT was 
the only player. In addition, VNPT was under insufficient political and institutional 
pressure from the government to upgrade its telecom network, and there was no value-
enhancing rent management mechanism to pressure capability-building for the industry 
as a whole. Indeed, technical upgrading did not take place until 1995, when VNPT 
signed its first contract with Comvick, which created the first mobile phone service 
network in Vietnam. The next section reviews the post-monopoly progress. 
	  
4.4.2. Post-Monopoly Period (Stage 2): Reshuffling of the Telecom Industry and 
New Industrial Upgrading  
 
In 1995, the Vietnamese government broke up the monopoly by giving business 
licenses to S-Fone and Viettel. From a rent management perspective, the ending of 
VNPT’s monopoly was an important hallmark for the development of the telecom sector, 
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as it opened up competition and opportunities for technological transfer and capability-
building in the industry.  During this post-monopoly period, step 1 and 2 of DRMA 
analysis identified that while there was no major rent given by the government, there 
were incentives to develop the industry with participation of other SOEs. The rent 
management analysis (step 3 of DRMA) is provided in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7: Rent Management Mechanism in the Post-Monopoly Period 
 
 
In this figure, the rent management mechanism (RMM) is divided into three 
levels of analysis: the political context of rent management; the institutional structure 
relevant for understanding rent allocation; and the organization of the industry. Together 
these levels create the “rent management context” that influenced the incentives and 
pressures for upgrading and learning. 
 
• Political will to remove monopoly and maintain  
competition among state-owned operators 
• MoD’s support of Viettel and confrontation with VNPT  
via the prime minister office and local authorities 
Political Context of 
Rent Management  
• New anticompetitive regulations to 
support Viettel and S-Fone in 2002 
(Ordinance and Decree 160) 
Rent Allocation 
and 
Implementation  
• High profit margin from the market 
• Market competition among state-owned 
operators. 
Industry 
Organisation 
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4.4.2.1. RMM level 1 – Political context of rent management in the post-
monopoly period 
 
The political context of rent management can be seen through two series of 
events involving VNPT post-monopolistic behaviours. First, the Vietnamese government 
largely succeeded in managing the dispute involving VNPT’s anticompetitive actions. 
The second event concerned the MoD’s confrontation of VNPT through the prime 
minister’s office.  
In the first series of event, as soon as the VNPT monopoly was broken up with 
the entry of S-Fone and Viettel, Viettel quickly succeed in making a considerable profit 
in international phone service and mobile phone service. This success raised concerns for 
VNPT, as it saw its market share shrink. Given the advantages in owning the backbone 
network, VNPT was able to engage in various anticompetitive activities. According to 
Nguyen and colleages (2005), allegations of such anticompetitive practices included 
delaying interconnections and unfair allocation of network facilities33 and local access. 
VNPT also allegedly charged unreasonable prices for use of its network facilities, which 
competitors had no option but to purchase from them (Nguyen, et al., 2005). 
Additionally, there is evidence that VNPT frequently cross-subsidised its subsidiaries’ 
services to keep prices artificially lower than market prices (Nguyen, et al., 2005). This 
practice expressly contradicted government regulations, as Decision 217/2003 QD-
TTG34, passed in 2003, specified that VNPT could not differentiate between members of 
its company with other telecom companies (Nguyen et al., 2005).  
                                                
33 Competitive operators had to interconnect with VNPT to offer a variety of services 
used for long-haul traffic, also known as backbone or trunk services. 
34 This regulation required that the dominant operator must provide every available 
service in its network to customers of the interconnecting new operators (Nguyen et al., 
2005). 
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In the second series of events, there were many cases reported that VNPT refused 
to provide services to its competitors, notably Viettel and S-Fone. For example, Viettel 
claimed that there were a number of times when VNPT refused to provide value-added 
services, toll free numbers (1-800), or paid toll numbers (1-900) to Viettel subscribers 
(Nguyen, et al., 2005). The provincial telecom companies also engaged in practices 
known as “turnoff the trunk side,” which blocked telephone calls through the VoIP 
networks of Viettel and S-Fone. In such cases, customers could only make calls through 
VNPT’s VoIP network, which incurred higher costs for Viettel and S-Fone customers 
(Nguyen, et al., 2005). 
Starting in the early 2000s, a number of disputes erupted between VNPT, Viettel, 
and S-Fone. Viettel was a part of the MoD – and the MoD offered considerable political 
clout and power. The MoD confronted VNPT via the prime minister’s office, as well as 
through local authorities (which is detailed below). From the perspective of DRMA, the 
MoD’s political power was a significant rent managment factor that created the 
monitoring of VNPT’s anticompetitive activities. An example of a complaint regarding 
interconnection between Viettel and VNPT occurred in June 2005, when Viettel reported 
that 50 per cent of the phone calls from Viettel could not connect to VNPT’s networks. 
This caused Viettel’s subcriptions to drastically fall from 160,000 in May 2005 to 90,000 
in June 2005, a 44 per cent decrease (Vietnam Business Forum, 2005). VNPT defended 
that its switchboards were operating at full capacity and it was facing difficulty in 
expanding capability. In reality, VNPT only needed to invest VND 41.7 billion (USD 2 
million), or 0.5 per cent of its annual investment, to upgrade its switchboards. 
Meanwhile, Viettel had paid VND 625.51 billion (USD 30 million) to VNPT in 2004 to 
connect to its networks – an amount more than sufficient for VNPT to upgrade its 
switchboards so as to accomodate Viettel’s network. Not only that, but Viettel had 
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offered to upgrade VNPT’s switchboards, but VNPT turned down the offer (Vietnam 
Business Forum, 2005). 	  
After Viettel unsuccessfully sent a number of complaint letters to both VNPT and 
the MIC, the MoD sent a letter directly to the prime minister’s office.35 It contained 
complaints about VNPT’s monopolistic activities that was causing loss of business to 
Viettel, and it pointed out that if this problem persisted, Viettel would face bankrupcy 
and the loss of VND 2.64 trillion (USD 126.6 million) of investment in the network’s 
infrastructure (Vietnam Business Forum, 2005). In July 2005, after a weeklong 
negotiation facilitated by the Vietnamese government, VNPT agreed to upgrade its 
switching centres to widen the connection gate for Viettel (VNExpress, 2005).36  
To summarise, the political context that made up a successful rent management 
mechanism seen in this case study includes two important events. First, the Vietnamese 
government succeeded in managing some of the disputes surrounding VNPT’s 
continuing monopolistic activities. The successful handling of these disputes 
demonstrated the government’s clear political will in maintaining fair competition 
between the state-owned operators. The second event involved a confrontation between 
the MoD and VNPT, which reflected the MoD’s political clout and influence to fix 
VNPT’s monopolistic distortions. Together, these two series of events ensured effective 
rent management in this context. These events are considered as rent management 
factors that effectively regulated VNPT’s activities and provided the business 
environment and incentives for Viettel and other operators to focus on strengthening 
their businesses. 
                                                
35 Khai Van Phan was the prime minister at the time. 
36 It should be noted that similar disputes occurred between VNPT and S-Fone, and later 
EVN, despite the fact that Decree 160 clearly lays out the law on anticompetitive 
behaviours in the telecommunications sector. In most cases, disputes were resolved 
through mediation between parties, with the MIC facilitating the negotiations. 
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4.4.2.2. RMM level 2 – Institutional structure that managed VNPT 
monopolistic activities 
 
At the second level of rent management analysis, the institutional structure that 
supported industrial upgrading for the telecom industry was established via the creation 
of a number of new government regulations. First, in 1997,  the government announced 
Decree 109, which stated that it was going to liberalise the telecom market and would 
issue more licenses. Decree 109 was a national program with the objective to establish a 
modern ICT.  
In addition, to resolve the disputes between Viettel and VNPT, the Vietnamese 
government was forced to establish a clearer regulatory framework for competitive 
activities in the sector. In this vein, the Vienamese government issued various decrees to 
force VNPT to cooperate with other telecom companies. The Ordiance on Post and 
Telecommunication #43-2002-PL-UBTVQH10 (Ordinance 20), issued in May 200237; 
Decision 217/2003 QD-TTG passed in 2003; and Decree 160, issued in September 2004, 
together formed the legal basis for the MIC to regulate the sector. Decision 217/2003 
QD-TTG specifies that where the “interconnection fee of telecom companies is 
determined, VNPT cannot differentiate between members of its company with other 
telecom companies” (Nguyen et al., 2005). In addition, Decree 160 defines the rate of 
market dominance38 at 30 per cent and stressed fair leasing practices of interconnection 
for other providers. It “reiterates that interconnection charges shall be based on cost and 
are reasonably broken down according to network components or service processes, 
                                                
37  A complete script of Ordinance 20 can be found at http://vietnamembassy-
usa.org/news/2002/10/ordinance-25-may-2002-posts-and-telecommunications 
38 The rate of market dominance is a benchmark that determines monopolistic power in 
the industry. 
 160 
without dicrimination between different types of serices” (Nguyen, et al., 2005). It also 
elaborates that the interconnection must ensure that users are free to select any service 
provider they want and that charges related to universal services must be clearly defined 
(Nguyen, et al., 2005).  
At the institutional level of rent managment, Decree 109, Decision 217, 
Ordinance 20, and Decree 160 are the crucial rent management factors that established 
the institutional structure for the industry’s success. For instance, when Viettel was 
desputing VNPT’s monopolistic activities, these regulations were brought up to prove 
that VNPT was violating the law. These regulations were reenforced during the deputes 
between Viettel and VNPT. The outcomes were that VNPT was forced to compete fairly 
with Viettel and the other operators, which allowed the industry to rapidly gain 
technological and organisational capability to advance its development.  
 
4.4.2.3. RMM level 3 - Industry organisation in the post-monopoly period 
 
At the third level of our rent management analysis – industry organization – there 
are two important rent management factors that provide the incentives and pressures for 
technological adoption and capability-building in the industry. First, market competition 
among VNPT, Viettel, and S-Fone created enormous pressure for Viettel and S-Fone to 
quickly acquire the capability and necessary technology to organise their telecom 
operations. In addition, when the increase in market competition, especially from Viettel, 
appeared to threaten VNPT’s market power, VNPT was forced to improve its network 
and services to retain its market power and subscribers.  
Second, despite the fact that the government did not provide direct subsidies to 
any of these new providers, the telecom market possessed substantial potential for high 
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profit margins, which created effective incentives for Viettel and S-Fone to give their 
best efforts to earn these high profits. In reality, both Viettel and S-Fone rapidly gained 
market share in the low-income market segment and generated large revenues from their 
investments. A manager who has worked at Viettel from its early days explained to me 
that the high return of profit from its international call service in the 2001–2005 period 
allowed Viettel to recover its initial costs and to expand its telecom service and 
manufacture of its mobile phone and components. The growth of the telecom industry, 
grounded in these two important rent management factors allowed for new industrial 
capability and upgrading in the industry. 
 
4.4.2.4. Critical industrial transformation  
 
When the Vietnamese government ended VNPT’s monopoly, major 
technological developments occurred in the telecom industry, ranging from the extension 
of the backbone network connecting the north and south, to the development of 
Vietnamese-manufactured mobile phones (Viettel Mobile), to the opening of high-tech 
production plants and research centres around the country. Vietnam Business News 
(2011) reported that Viettel invested 270 billion dong (USD 13.3 million) to build a 
smart card production plant in Hoa Lac High Tech Park. This production plant produces 
all types of SIM cards, such as smart cards for authentication, software products for 
telecommunication SIM, and smart technology integration solutions (functions such as 
auto-control and other smart key services), all of which require technical skill and 
software development. Similarly, VNPT-Technology built an R&D and production 
facility in Hoa Lac High Tech Park to research, develop, and manufacture electrical, 
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medical, and telecom equipment. The facility also focuses on developing digital content, 
IT, and communications (VNPT, 2011). 
In the handheld market, Vietnamese producers aggressively pursued making 
Vietnamese-made handheld items, moving from a simple software design for mobile 
phones to producing completely made-in-Vietnam mobile phones and tablet computers. 
In 2008, An Binh Telecom Company broke into the handset market when it released its 
Q-Mobile. In that same year, FPT launched F-Mobile, and introduced a new model again 
in 2009. By 2012, the mobile phone market had dozens of Vietnamese brand-name 
mobile phones, including i6 and i9 by Viettel, Avio by VNPT, Hanel Mobile by Hanel, 
Bluefone by CMC Telecom, and Hi-Mobile by HiPT (these last three are IT providers) 
(Vietnam Investment Review, 2011). These mobile phones are assembled in either China 
or Vietnam. To tailor phones for the Vietnamese market, mobile phone producers 
initially designed software that automatically changed the user’s language to Vietnamese. 
F-Mobile, produced by FPT, also integrated and provided consumers with apps such as 
Vi-Talk, Vi-map, and an English–Vietnamese dictionary for free (FPT, 2009). Similarly, 
Viettel launched a number of products, such as the 3G USB dongle in 2010, and the 
tablet computer and i6 and i9 mobile phones in 2012. The least-expensive smart phone 
model made by Viettel was priced at VND 1.5 million (USD 70) (TK, 2012). 
 
4.4.3. Final Discussion of the VNPT Case Study 
 
In this first stage of this case study, the telecom industry was largely inefficient 
because there was one provider and no effective rent management factor (see section 
4.4.1). However, with VNPT’s monopoly broken and market competition introduced, in 
the second stage, a number of effective rent management factors led to important and 
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productive transformations in the industry (see section 4.4.2.4), despite VNPT’s on-
going anticompetitive activities (see section 4.4.2.1). These rent management factors are 
listed on Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.5: DRMA Summary, Post-monopoly Period: Effects of Government’s 
Antimonoply Actions 
Players Type of 
rents 
Incentives 
created by 
the rent 
Factors affecting the rent 
management mechanism 
Outcome 
VNPT, 
Viettel, 
S-Fone 
No new 
rent from 
the 
Vietnamese 
government 
but 
possibility 
of 
capturing 
part of the 
monopoly 
rents of 
incumbents 
Rapid 
upgrading of 
technical and 
organisational 
capabilities to 
capture 
market share. 
 
 
First level: (1) Political 
will to remove monopoly 
and increase competition 
among state-owned 
telecom operators. 
(2) MoD’s support of 
Viettel and confrontation 
with VNPT via the prime 
minister’s office and local 
authorities. 
 
Second level: New 
antimonopoly regulations to 
support Viettel and S-Fone. 
 
Third level: (1) High profit 
margins in the market. 
(2) Market competition 
among state-owned 
operators. 
- A more level 
playing field for 
competition, 
especially 
between Viettel 
and VNPT. 
- Beginning of 
industrial 
upgrading in 
both telecom 
service and 
mobile phone 
markets. 
 
 
In summary, during the post-monopoly period, developmental rent management 
mechanism first derived from the political will that introduced and managed market 
competition among state-owned operators. Second, the MoD played an important role in 
keeping VNPT in check. In using the MoD’s political and military power to lobby 
against VNPT, Viettel successfully forced VNPT to play fair, allowing Viettel and other 
newcomers a chance to succeed in the market. From an institutional perspective, there 
were also important policy instruments, such as Decree 109, Decision 217, Ordinance 20, 
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and Decree 160, which set out the legal framework that bound telecom operators to 
cooperate and compete fairly. Finally, at the industry level, high profit margins and 
intense market competition among the operators created effective incentives and 
pressures that ensured significant effort in learning and upgrading. 
	  
4.5. Case Study 2: Viettel – The Rise of a Giant 
	  
The forerunner of Viettel was Sigelco, which was established in 1989 as an 
electronics information and equipment company under the MoD. Sigelco provided 
services to the military via the military’s own dedicated telecommunication network. In 
1993, Sigelco became Military Electronics Telecommunications Corporation under the 
trademark Viettel. In 1995, as detailed above, the government ended VNPT’s monopoly 
status and called for more operators in the telecommunication sector. In that same year, 
Viettel was granted a license to provide local and long distance landline service, as well 
as mobile and Internet services based on its experience supporting the military (Cheshier, 
2010).  
Viettel officially joined Vietnam’s telecom market in 2000 with VoIP long-
distance service, and with VoIP international service in 2001 (Cheshier, 2010). In 2002, 
Viettel became an Internet service provider; in 2003 it offered landline telephone service; 
and it launched its mobile network in September 2004 (Cheshier, 2010). Although 
Saigon Postel launched its S-Fone mobile network in 2003, VNPT’s monopoly in the 
mobile service market was only really broken when Viettel created its network39, making 
mobile phone usage popular across Vietnam (Business in Asia, 2010). In 2009, Viettel 
became a state-owned economic group – a state conglomerate – under Decision 
                                                
39 VNPT owns a portion of S-Fone. 
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2097/2009/QĐ-TTg. During this year, its name was changed to Viettel Group. In 2013, 
Viettel became one of the largest and most powerful state-owned business groups in 
Vietnam and is the only telecom provider that is run by the MoD (Thayer, 2012). Figure 
4.8 demonstrates Viettel’s revenue growth rate from 2000 to 2012.	  
 
Figure 4.8: Viettel Revenue 2000-2012 (in trillion VND) 
	  
 Source: Vietnam Financial Review (2010) 
 
Viettel’s revenue report for 2011 shows that the company reached VND 20 
trillion (roughly USD 1 billion) in pre-tax profit (Van-Oanh, 2012b). In 2012, Viettel 
earned VND 27 trillion (USD 1.3 billion) in pre-tax profits, which is an increase of 
nearly 15 per cent over 2011. Among the 21 largest state-owned business groups and 
corporations in 2010, the military-run telecommunications operator contributed 21.9 per 
cent of the total pre-tax profit to state’s revenue (Intellasia, 2011b). 	  
In 2009, Viettel reportedly had more than 300 showrooms to display their 
products and 20,000 retail agents, and more than 6,800 employees and 25 million 
subscribers (Cheshier, 2010). Its mobile phone subsidiary, Viettel Telecom, was ranked 
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83 out of 100 of the largest telecom companies in the world and ranked one of the four 
leading telecom companies in a developing country in terms of subscribers (Cheshier, 
2010). In 2010, Viettel was the second-fastest growing operator in terms of growth and 
profit rate in the telecommunications sector, with revenue of VND 91.134 trillion (USD 
4.13 billion), up 50 per cent year-on-year (see Table 4.6). In 2012, Viettel surpassed 
VNPT for the first time in both revenue and profit. It earned VND 141.4 trillion (USD 
6.4 billion), up 21 per cent from 2011 (Telegeography, 2013), and saw a profit of VND 
27 trillion (USD 1.3 billion), which was three times VNPT’s profit in 2012 (Trong-Cam, 
2012). Additionally, Viettel’s equity increased from VND 18.36 trillion (USD 875 
million) in 2009 to VND 29.766 trillion (USD 1.4 billion) in 2010, which is a staggering 
62.1 per cent increase.  
 
Table 4.6: Viettel Growth Rate Based on Revenue 2005–2012 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Revenue 
(in trillion 
VND) 
2.5 7.1 16.3 33 60.6 91.134 116.6 141.4 
Growth by %  78.50 184 129.50 102 83.60 50 28 21 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data provided on Viettel.com 
 
Starting in 2006, Viettel successfully expanded its service abroad to: Cambodia 
(2006), Laos (2008), Republic of Haiti (2010), Mozambique (2012), and Peru (2013). In 
2012, Viettel also signed contracts to provide mobile phone service to East Timor, 
Cameroon, and Tanzania. That same year Viettel earned VND 12.51 trillion (USD 600 
million) revenue from all of its foreign markets, which is a profit of VND 1.58 trillion 
(USD 76 million). 	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The success of Viettel from a technology importer to an international telecom 
service provider raises a question as to how this SOE, in less than two decades, 
transformed from a relatively small military telecom provider to become one of the two 
largest conglomerates in Vietnam’s telecom industry. What is remarkable is that Viettel 
did not require a foreign partner via a BCC to help with its successful development, 
unlike other SOEs. Today, Viettel remains 100 per cent state-owned under the MoD. In 
other words, there exists a more telling rent-seeking and rent management story among 
Viettel, VNPT, and the state, which could shed light on Viettel’s learning and upgrading 
success. In this context, this second case study seeks to explain how the three factors of 
rent management – its political context, rent allocation mechanism, and organisation of 
industry – effected the structure of incentives and pressure that ensured Viettel’s efforts 
for learning, upgrading, and innovation. Figure 4.9 outlines three levels of rent 
management mechanism that underlies Viettel’s success.  
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Figure 4.9: Viettel’s Successful Development under DRMA Framework	  
	  
	  
In essence, Viettel’s success was based on a combination of three rent 
management factors. First, the political context allowed rent creation while imposing 
effective incentives and pressures on Viettel to rapidly raise its productivity and 
competitiveness. Second, there was some implicit rent allocation through mechanisms 
such as land allocation, labour policies, and the provision of finance, infrastructure, and 
credit guarantees. Given the poorly working land, labour, and credit markets in Vietnam, 
these measures arguably removed a number of potentially critical market failures and 
enhanced Viettel’s rapid upgrading processes. Lastly, the telecom industry’s organisation 
generated a number of important embedded factors: the opening up of significant rents 
accruing to the first mover that is incumbent to market competition, Viettel’s initial 
capability, the relatively easy availability of telecom technology, and international 
pressure from the liberalisation that generated the incentives and compulsions for high-
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effort learning. The next three sections provide a thorough discussion of the rent 
management factors and how they each affected the structure of incentives and pressures 
that helps to explain Viettel’s success. 
	  
4.5.1. RMM Level 1 - The Government and the MoD Support for Viettel 
	  
As discussed in the previous section, the political order underpinning Viettel’s 
success is largely derived from the MoD’s unreserved support of Viettel and its political 
clout in the CPV, the ruling party.40 In return, the profits and revenues from Viettel 
provided a most important source of income for the military. For example, Viettel 
increased its revenue 1,500 times within 10 years, from VND 43.78 billion (USD 2.1 
million) in 1999 to VND 66.71 billion (USD 3.2 billion) in 2009 (Thayer, 2012). More 
specifically, the distribution of power that underpinned the support for Viettel was based 
on two formal institutional arrangements. First, the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) – 
Viettel’s boss – held, and continues to hold, significant political influence within the 
CPV. The VPA, for instance, permanently occupies one of the 14 seats on the Politburo, 
which is the highest body of the CPV. In addition, since 2006, the VPA has had 10.6 per 
cent representation (17 members) in the Central Committee. These numbers highlight the 
importance of the CPV–VPA relationship, as military personnel occupy important 
positions on the Central Committee, such as chief of the general staff, director and vice 
director of the General Political Department, deputy ministers, and the commander of the 
navy (Thayer, 2012). 
Second, the MoD is an autonomous ministry that is largely independent from the 
Vietnamese government’s monitoring and supervision, so it can create and allocate a 
                                                
40 Thayer (2012) deduced that Vietnam’s People’s Army’s key military leaders are 
actively involved in internal factional politics within the CPV. 
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number of types of rents without interference or necessary authorisation from the 
government. For example, at its inception, Viettel was free to use the MoD’s land and 
telecom infrastructure to develop its mobile phone network and international phone 
service. The prime minister would not interfere with Viettel as the VPA has the right to 
maintain full control over enterprises which operate to serve and protect national security 
(Thayer, 2012). In essence, being both politically powerful and autonomous enhanced 
the MoD’s support for Viettel, especially in countering VNPT’s monopolistic activities 
(see section 4.4.2.1). This political power created a stable and dependable macro-
political context that could support Viettel’s successful technology adoption and business 
development strategies. 
Finally, the political context also describes Viettel’s ideological and historical 
mission as a unit of the army that had successfully liberated the country during the 
Vietnam War. My interviewees who work at Viettel each said the military’s socialist 
ideology was imprinted on the minds of Viettel’s leaders: “to serve the people and the 
country.” Furthermore, one of my interviewees asserted that it is part of Viettel’s 
corporate and military culture that “Viettel must continually assert itself to be a part of 
the industrial power that takes Vietnam’s industrialisation forward” (interview, 2011). If 
this is the case, this sense of mission is also a crucial component defining the overall 
“rent management” system that motivated Viettel leaders to strive for success in their 
business venture. 
	  
4.5.2. RMM Level 2 – The Mechanism of Rent Allocation to Viettel 
	  
This section looks at the second level of the DRMA analytical structure, namely 
the formal and informal institutional and policy-based rent allocation structures that 
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allocated rents to Viettel. As mentioned above, the MoD provided Viettel with a number 
of implicit rents in the form of land allocation, labour policies, access to finance and 
infrastructure, and indirect financial support in the form of a liability guarantee. Some of 
these rents were associated with policies that indirectly helped Viettel avoid market 
failures, some of which were possibly severe. From an institutional perspective, many of 
these rents emerged and were allocated through informal mechanisms rather than via 
official government policies. In this context, an important semi-formal institutional 
arrangement was asset transfer and permission to use assets granted by the MoD to 
Viettel. 
 
4.5.2.1. Land, infrastructure, and labour  
	  
As explained in section 4.3.1, telecom infrastructure has large fixed costs, 
because in order to build transmission stations and trunk and backbone networks, the 
provider must either buy or lease land, hire labour to build the infrastructure, and import 
technology. This is why many mobile phone providers initially rented VNPT’s 
infrastructure; the fixed costs to build their own would have been prohibitively expensive. 
Viettel’s potential advantage was access to the MoD’s land, which are the “military 
zones” that spread across the country and are readily available for uses authorised by the 
MoD. In addition, the military already had transmission stations and backbone and trunk 
networks covering many cities and provinces to serve its security needs. Viettel could 
take advantage of these resources as well.  
Viettel could also save on labour costs in building infrastructure as the MoD 
deployed the army to build the fibre cables, transmission stations, and other necessary 
infrastructures for Viettel’s new networks. Thanks to the army’s labour input, Viettel 
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incurred substantially lower labour costs, as there was no need to hire civilians to build 
the infrastructure. Additionally, as the Vietnamese army is highly disciplined, Viettel 
benefited from a trained and hardworking labour force. This saved the provider 
considerable training time in comparison to hiring civilians. Consequently, Viettel’s 
infrastructure was built at a much faster pace and at higher quality as compared to its 
competitors. Clearly, an important part of Viettel’s success was due to the informal rents 
it received as a result of the MoD’s allocations of labour, infrastructure, and land. 
Without these available resources, it is questionable whether Viettel would have been 
able to develop so rapidly over the last two decades. Again, it should be noted that given 
the MoD’s political power and autonomy, no other operator could object to the rents that 
helped Viettel address important market constraints throughout the early stages of its 
business development. 
	  
4.5.2.2. The financial strategy for upgrading and capability-building 
	  
From the perspective of rents and rent-seeking, Viettel also received substantial 
learning rents from the MoD by accessing the MoD’s capital, access to bank loans, and 
credit guarantees. These rents helped Viettel to address financing problems that may 
have been serious given the imperfections in the credit market. When Viettel was 
campaigning for a business license to enter the market, its most convincing argument 
was that it would develop its own network and capability without the government’s 
financial support. What it really meant was that it would not draw from the treasury 
because the MoD would finance Viettel out of its own budget.  
One of my interviewees, a top manager in Viettel, said that in the company’s 
early operation, the MoD provided only a small amount of initial capital (not including 
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the military labour and land) of about VND 20.85 billion–41.7 billion (USD 1 to 2 
million). What then helped Viettel overcome the difficulties in the financing that face 
investors in Vietnam’s underdeveloped credit markets? The same interviewee said that 
Viettel’s first successful strategy to raise capital was in 2001 when it entered the 
overseas phone market using VoIP. At the time, VNPT charged a very high tariff for 
international calls.41 When Viettel entered the market, it immediately offered services at 
about half of VNPT’s tariffs. Viettel’s newer technology and reduced pricing strategy 
enabled it to quickly gain market share and earn strong profits. The same interviewee 
explained that the cost to set up a VoIP network from scratch was not too high, and the 
profit margin was such that Viettel broke even after its first month of operation. It was 
this successful operation that let Viettel raise substantial capital for other investment 
projects, especially in the mobile phone market. 
 In addition to giving Viettel its start-up capital, the MoD also supplied loans 
through its own state bank – the Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank. Thayer (2012) 
pointed out that in 2003 the bank raised its charter capital42, which enabled the bank to 
pledge more credit for Viettel’s large projects. The access to finance provided lower cost 
financing to Viettel as compared to the price it may have had to pay if it had to raise its 
financing based on its available collateral and business model. This financing was a 
result of the MoD’s implicit credit guarantee. Lower financing cost of this type is also a 
form of rent, since it assisted Viettel’s investments in telecom projects. Finally, perhaps 
the most effective financing strategy was that Viettel could delay payments to creditors’ 
and vendors’. Based on the MoD’s reputation and implicit guarantee (and perhaps the 
                                                
41 This interviewee also told me that the main reason why VNPT charged a much higher 
tariff was because it used old technology that made phone calls over a virtual network. 
42 Charter capital is the amount of capital that all shareholders or members of a company 
or bank are willing to contribute within a prescribed time limit, as stated in the 
company’s or the bank’s charter. 
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implicit suggestion that playing ball may negatively affect long-term business 
relationships with the MoD), Viettel convinced vendors that they should permit delayed 
payments and accept payments in small instalments. The top manager mentioned above 
explained that because the MoD provided a credit guarantee, foreign vendors allowed 
Viettel to delay its payments for equipment for up to two years after procurement. This 
delay was a privilege that other operators, obviously, did not have. Thus, Viettel received 
substantial rents from the MoD to overcome imperfections in credit, land, and labour 
markets, and some of these rents also assisted its learning and capability development.  
	  
4.5.3. RMM Level 3 – The Organisation of the Telecom Industry  
	  
In section 4.5.2, we saw that Viettel had access to different informal learning 
rents within a rent allocation mechanism that helped it address possible market failures. 
The main role of the rents was to accelerate investments and to create incentives and 
compulsions for rapid technology acquisition and high learning effort. In this context, the 
rent management mechanism was within the allocation structure that provided both 
incentives and capacities to overcome the constraints in land, labour, infrastructure, and 
capital (see sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.2). In this section, we look at the third level of 
DRMA. The focus here is how the organisation of the telecom industry affected rent 
management and helped or hindered in the creation of appropriate incentives and 
pressures for high-effort learning. We have identified a number of important factors 
affecting rent outcomes for Viettel: (1) its initial management capability; (2) its access to 
different types of implicit rents as a result of its association with political power; (3) its 
high profit margins and the availability of affordable technology that assisted with 
competitiveness; (4) its competition with VNPT; and (5) the credible pressures of market 
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entry by international competitors. 
	  
4.5.3.1.  Managers’ capability 
	  
Viettel’s technological and managerial capability had three important 
foundations: (1) knowledgeable and adaptable leaders, (2) its selection of an appropriate 
technology, the Global System for Mobile (GSM) communications, and (3) 
management’s effective business practices. To explain the first factor, Viettel’s two 
leaders are highly trained in telecom technology and possess an outstanding vision of 
market orientation. Viettel’s general manager Xuan Anh Hoang and deputy general 
manager Hung Manh Nguyen were both trained in telecommunications engineering in 
Russia. Nguyen, in addition, earned two masters degrees: one in Business Management 
at the University of Sydney, Australia, and the other in Economics at the National 
Economic University in Hanoi. It is generally agreed among Viettel’s managers and 
business partners whom I interviewed that Xuan’s skills in business operations and 
management are well-balanced with Hung’s ability to create successful strategies, 
including entering the overseas phone service market, targeting low-income subscribers, 
and later using its 3G dongle to promote its 3G service. These two leaders are dynamic, 
and together with a group of highly qualified high-level managers, they are able to adjust 
quickly to changes in the telecom market and technology. 
With reference to the second factor, Viettel’s management capability is 
demonstrated by its strategic vision of market demand coupled with the complementary 
choice of technology. This proved to be one of the most important factors for the 
company’s early success. When it entered the mobile phone service business, Viettel 
chose GSM and VoIP technology, while S-Fone chose CDMA technology. GSM 
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technology uses SIM chips, which is now the most widely used technology in Vietnam 
and in the world. This technology allows subscribers to switch to different types of 
phones and phone providers and it enhances user-friendly data transfer. More 
importantly, VNPT also uses GSM technology. Viettel’s strategic selection of this same 
technology allows VNPT subscribers to smoothly switch to the Viettel network without 
having to buy another mobile phone. This choice of technology gave Viettel an 
immediate and overall advantage over S-Fone in the mobile phone market.  
For the third factor, when discussing Viettel leaders’ capabilities, all of my 
interviewees agreed that their leaders employ effective business practices. First, Viettel 
leaders boost capacity through ensuring efforts from its employees and by maintaining a 
high-level of corporate culture. Being an SOE many times smaller than VNPT in the 
beginning, Viettel is known for its ability to operate like a private enterprise. It maintains 
high expectations of its employees and often imposes discipline in cases of non-
performance. A Viettel employee pointed out to me that Viettel employed, and continues 
to employ a corporate culture that stresses loyalty, teamwork, discipline, and integrity in 
performance. For example, one interviewee told me that he often works until midnight to 
get the job done and so as not slow down the progress of a project. He does not mind 
because he feels that he is making a difference to the team and the company. In return for 
this discipline, Viettel offers at least 20 per cent higher salaries than other enterprises 
(Van-Oanh, 2013) and provides training to improve expertise and technical skills for 
select employees. The distinction here is that Viettel offers incentives (higher salaries 
and training) but it also has a discipline mechanism to ensure that its employees perform 
at their highest levels. These business practices are rare and not seen at other SOEs.	  
Another characteristic of Viettel’s particular business management style 
continues to be its ability to reduce costs to the absolute minimum. In fact, cost reduction 
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is one of Viettel’s most successful business strategies. For Viettel leaders, lower costs 
are directly related to higher profits, and this strategy can be seen in its use of the 
military’s existing telecom infrastructure and human resources. Viettel leaders also 
selectively picked the service options that they need from foreign vendors while cutting 
out redundant options. A manager at Viettel told me that, on average, Viettel spent half 
of what VNPT paid to build a transmitting station. This is because while VNPT procured 
complete packages with all of the special features from foreign vendors, Viettel 
managers hand-picked what they consider to be the most important features for its 
customers and negotiated with its foreign vendors for reduced prices based on these 
customised packages. In doing this, Viettel managers avoided extra costs by eliminating 
features that they do not consider important. The same interviewee told me that this 
procurement strategy fits well with Viettel’s business model because it targeted 
subscribers who are largely low- or middle-income workers who own simple mobile 
phones. These users only require inexpensive, basic features. Furthermore, this strategy 
of targeting a different market segment from VNPT allowed Viettel to successfully 
expand its market share without competing head-to-head with VNPT. 
In essence, Viettel’s highly capable leaders are a direct factor in its success. This 
factor is important for understanding the rent outcomes, especially when combined with 
other factors, such as political support from the MoD that provides informal rent 
allocations, as discussed in earlier sections. Without the management quality, given the 
other rent allocation and management mechanisms, it is possible that Viettel would still 
have succeeded in becoming an important player in the market, but most likely not as 
rapidly.  
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4.5.3.2. Financial rewards and reinforcement of political support 
	  
Financial rewards and political support are two important sources of incentives 
and compulsions – and hence they are important components of the overall rent 
management mechanism that motivated Viettel to achieve quick successes. A number of 
firm-level institutional factors are also important for describing the institutional 
incentives. First, despite the fact that Viettel is an SOE, its compensation structure is not 
similar to other SOEs. According to an interviewee who is a high-level Viettel manager, 
the MoD gives Viettel great autonomy to manage its finances and allows it to keep a 
large part of its profits to reinvest in more projects. I asked the same interviewee whether 
Viettel leaders are offered financial incentives to make a profit. The reason for this 
question is that, as a state-owned company, most SOE managers have a fixed salary 
regardless of the performance of the enterprise. Additionally, SOE salaries are small in 
comparison to private sector salaries. This pay structure has been criticised because SOE 
managers do not have financial incentive to perform, and, worse, it can lead to corrupt 
behaviour in order to make more money.  
Is there a financial incentive mechanism for Viettel managers to drive harder for 
profits?  My interviewee said, “Certainly!” He would not reveal how much top managers 
of Viettel make on a monthly or annual basis, but he explained that all Viettel employees 
earn a base salary that is high in comparison to other enterprises. In addition, they also 
receive considerable bonuses for good performance. These arrangements are clearly well 
known within the firm, but the lack of public access to this information means that we 
can consider these to be semiformal arrangements. Van-Oanh (2013) reported that to 
retain high-quality people, Viettel offers its employees numerous benefits such as higher 
and rising salaries, bonuses, cars, and even houses, as well as promotions in terms of 
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official military rank.43 Van-Oanh (2013) also suggested that Viettel pays the highest 
salaries in the industry to its top leaders (including Xuan and Hung) and its technical 
experts. At the middle- and upper-management levels, Viettel pays its managers and 
experts a few hundred million VND (approximately USD 10,000 or more) per month 
(Van-Oanh, 2013). Similarly, my interviewee hinted that upper management receives 
generous bonuses that give them strong incentive to continue earning large profits. 
Equally important is that to maintain its financial flows, Viettel has to maintain 
the MoD’s support. So far, Viettel has been very successful in doing this. Being one of 
the largest revenue generators for both the MoD and the Vietnamese government, Viettel 
has garnered MoD’s political support in many of its strategic expansions in both 
domestic and foreign markets. This political support provides Viettel with more 
negotiation power with the MIC, and the government in general, for policies that suit 
Viettel’s interests. For instance, in late 2012, Viettel requested the MIC to increase tariffs 
for incoming international calls, to extend the first number in a mobile phone by one 
digit (from 1 to 11 in order to offer more phone numbers), and to give Viettel a license to 
broadcast television services (Trong-Cam, 2012). Some of these requests (for example 
the license to broadcast television services) were granted. In the international market, 
Viettel was the first SOE to receive approval for a license to expand operations abroad. 
In essence, Viettel’s desire to maintain the MoD’s political support through high 
performance is an important factor as it motivates Viettel towards exceptional business 
performance. This same desire allows the MoD to discipline Viettel (by threatening to 
withdraw support) when needed. 
In summary, there are two important factors that ensure growth-enhancing rent 
management and significant incentives and pressures for industrial success for Viettel: 
                                                
43 Upgrade in ranking in the military is a high honor and an important source for 
receiving additional perks. 
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an institutional structure that ensures considerable financial rewards, and a formal and 
informal institutional environment. This environment maintains political support from 
both the MoD and the Vietnamese government, including the managing ministry (the 
MIC), as long as performance remains acceptable. 
	  
4.5.3.3. Market incentives 
	  
In the late 1990s, the telecom market in Vietnam experienced two important 
factors that further motivated learning and upgrading: high profit margins and the boom 
of mobile phone manufacturing that caused handset prices to drop drastically. When 
Viettel entered the telecom market in 1997, there was limited competition (just VNPT) 
and high tariffs for telecom service, so the market offered extremely high profit margins. 
In addition, costs of technology were relatively low given the military infrastructures. 
Consequently, Viettel earned substantial profits from its operation. High profits allowed 
Viettel to make small business mistakes, such as purchasing unnecessary machines and 
equipment or miscalculating its investment projects, and to learn from them because it 
could financially recover from such mistakes quickly. In addition, the high rate of return 
also gave the corporation plenty of room to attempt different strategies and to learn from 
them without jeopardising the company’s growth. Finally, the high profit margin 
permitted Viettel to quickly regain investment expenditures, to accumulate capital, and, 
subsequently, to aggressively expand its operation.44 My interviewees from within both 
the MIC and Viettel observed that this learning opportunity is no longer available for 
new operators because market competition is now so stiff that investment mistakes, such 
as S-Fone using CDMA technology, could be fatal.   
                                                
44 Viettel had to pay dividends to the MoD and taxes to the government, but it was 
allowed to retain much of it profits for reinvestment. 
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The second characteristic of the market structure was the reduced cost of mobile 
phones in the early 2000s. When Viettel started to offer cheaper mobile phone services 
in 2004, there was a major boom in mobile phone manufacturing, and handsets became 
much more affordable, especially those imported from China. During this period, for 
VND 1 million (USD 50), a Vietnamese person could buy a simple mobile phone made 
in China or South Korea. As mobile phones became substantially cheaper, more 
functional, and lower in price, a major increase in demand occurred in Viettel’s targeted 
market segment: low-income subscribers. Three interviewees, who each work for the 
MIC, Viettel, and VNPT, confirmed this observation by asserting that as prices for 
mobile phones fell, the Vietnamese demand and consumption for mobile phone service 
rose, thus expanding the telecom market for operators. 
In short, high profit margins allowed Viettel to make mistakes, to experiment 
with different strategies, and to learn from them. Moreover, the availability of less 
expensive handsets enabled Viettel to target the low-income market segment and expand 
its market share. These were important factors that affected rent management and 
ensured Viettel’s success. One may argue that Viettel was lucky because when it entered 
the industry, the market structure was favourable, but to Viettel’s credit, it was also 
quick to take advantage of favourable conditions. 
	  
4.5.3.4. Military pride 
	  
In Chapter 3, it was argued that informal rent management factors could be as 
important as formal ones. Evidence suggests that informal incentives for learning were at 
work during Viettel’s early days. In this case, the effects of military pride in motivating 
Viettel leaders to end their subordinate position to VNPT played an important informal 
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role. In a series of interviews, insiders who work at Viettel told me that in the late 1990s 
Viettel leaders were eager to become the equal of VNPT. One interviewee explained that 
in the beginning, VNPT leaders and the MIC disregarded Viettel because it was a small 
company with fairly limited financial resources, while VNPT was a powerful 
conglomerate with strong finances. This bothered Viettel leaders a great deal, and so 
they were determined to develop and rise as quickly as possible. Fortunately, the market 
conditions, political support, and the internal support of the MoD (via a number of 
informal mechanisms) allowed Viettel to quickly develop new capabilities and to grow 
rapidly. In essence, informal incentives that induced motivation to succeed were 
important rent management factors in Viettel’s business growth. 
	  
4.5.3.5. International pressure for competition 
	  
A final important factor at this third level of rent management analysis was the 
liberalisation of the telecom market, which allowed access to international investors 
within an effective time horizon. This created further pressure on Viettel to focus on 
continuous learning and to enhance their competitiveness. A Viettel high-level manager 
who works directly under Hung told me that Viettel leaders always bear in mind that 
Viettel is overdue to have to compete with powerful foreign operators. Viettel managers 
recognise that, in perspective, first, it is a small telecom provider in the region and the 
world. Second, as a member of ASEAN and the WTO, Vietnam continues to receive 
more international investors to its domestic market. Third, as the manager mentioned to 
me, Vietnam is overdue in opening its telecom market completely to international 
telecom providers in accordance with its commitment to the WTO and the United States. 
Therefore, Viettel anticipated that it would be competing with much more advanced and 
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financially resourceful telecom operators worldwide in the near future.  
In confronting this pressure, Viettel strategically focused on boosting its 
capability in order to have a chance of competing in the global market. The same 
interviewee told me that Viettel leaders felt that they had no choice but to build 
advantage by improving competitive capability and market presence both in Vietnam 
and abroad. Pressure from international competition was one of the main reasons why 
Viettel engaged: in vertical linkages (to be more independent of input suppliers); in 
expanding its international presence, especially in other developing countries; in gaining 
more international recognition; and in building more international expertise. Section 
4.5.4 explains these strategies in greater depth. It should be noted that it is unusual in 
Vietnam for an SOE, which is heavily protected by the government and one ministry to 
possess such a realistic and practical market-oriented mentality. The emergence of such a 
vision may have been helped by Viettel leaders’ recognition of the limited time horizon 
of protection before the inevitable forces of globalisation and integration obliged 
Vietnam to open up in 2012. Consequently, Viettel leaders have continually focused on 
technical and industrial upgrading in order to sustain the company’s competitive 
advantage and growth. 
	  
4.5.4. DRMA Step 4 – Viettel’s Transformation and Rent Outcomes 
	  
In sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3, we looked at the rents relevant in this industry and the 
associated incentives and conditions. A number of factors that affected the operation of 
the overall rent management mechanism were analysed thoroughly. These factors 
positively influenced the structure of incentives and pressures that ensured Viettel’s 
efforts in learning and upgrading. As the final step of DRMA’s four-step approach, this 
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section reviews Viettel’s industrial transformation and, therefore, the rent outcomes, 
especially of the technological dimension. In this context, Viettel’s successful industrial 
upgrading was demonstrated by its achievement of a capability to produce a variety of 
telecom equipment, notably the 3G dongle and mobile phones, as well as its successful 
expansion into other developing markets.  
	  
4.5.4.1. Technological upgrading for strategic growth 
	  
The first important breakthrough in Viettel’s technological upgrading was its 
production of the first Vietnamese-made 3G dongle. This USB device uses 3G 
technology to provide data access for a computer. The production of the 3G dongle was a 
vital part of Viettel’s attempt to integrate vertically within the telecom industry. This 
vertical integration has not been matched by any of its rivals – for example, VNPT sells 
imported Chinese 3G dongles to its subscribers. The production model allowed Viettel to 
develop new market demand by introducing new technology and services to stimulate 
new consumer habits. The 3G USB dongle is a prime example of this strategy.45  
In learning how to make the 3G dongle, Viettel gained new technical and 
innovative capabilities; hence, new competitive advantages over its competitors. Within 
eight months, the Viettel R&D Institute both designed the dongle using a Qualcomm46 
chipset and manufactured it at its own Vietnamese plant. Thus, the dongle is 100 per cent 
                                                
45 Viettel entered the bid for 3G technology because it did not want to lose the 3G market. 
After investing a huge amount of money into the network, it realized that it needed to 
boost demand for 3G in order to recover the costs of setting up the 3G network. Thus, it 
developed the dongle to provide service at cheaper prices and to boost demand for 
Viettel’s 3G services. 
46 Qualcomm Incorporated is an American global semiconductor company that designs, 
manufactures, and markets digital wireless telecommunications products and services. 
The company has 157 worldwide locations. 
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Vietnamese-made using Viettel hardware. I asked an interviewee, the team leader of the 
3G dongle project, “How did Viettel learn how to make the dongle?” He said that Viettel 
first had to buy the right to use Qualcomm technology to produce the chip set at its 
Vietnamese plant. With the license, Qualcomm transferred its technology by providing 
instruction and technical assistance to help Viettel design the chipset for the dongle, and 
later it modified the chipset in accordance with Viettel’s needs. During the research and 
design phase, Qualcomm also provided technical advice and support to Viettel engineers 
to ensure the product development’s success (ICTNews, 2012). Based on the instructions, 
Viettel developed each component of the 3G device step-by-step. According to the same 
interviewee, the most difficult learning curve was the software: the operating system of 
the dongle. This operating system could not be copied from prior producers or purchased 
elsewhere, so Viettel had to develop its own software. This entire process included 
receiving the technology, adapting it to Viettel’s needs, and manufacturing the final 3G 
dongle. He said that there were roughly 50 engineers in the R&D team working on this 
particular project. Figure 4.10 shows the final product. 
 
Figure 4.10: 3G Dongle Made by Viettel 
	  
Source: Photo by ICT News (2012) 
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My interviewee explained that generic dongles sold by other providers do not 
have customised features. However, Viettel customises its dongle such that some of the 
functions are only available to Viettel customers. These functions add more value to their 
service and help distinguish the Viettel package from other competitors. It also prevents 
Viettel customers from using their propriety dongle on MobiFone or VinaPhone 3G 
networks. At the time of my second fieldwork in 2011, this same manager told me that 
Viettel’s production costs of making their dongle was equivalent to the cost of buying a 
similar dongle from Chinese manufacturers. Viettel is looking to break even from its 
investment on the dongle in the next two to three years.	  	  
Second, focusing on R&D has allowed Viettel to prepare a long-term strategy of 
gradually becoming both a telecom service provider and a telecom device supplier in 
domestic and international markets. A Viettel technical expert explained to me that, as a 
supplier, Viettel concentrated on specialised individual products in small quantities to 
target niche markets instead of competing head-to-head with well-known foreign 
producers such as Nokia or Samsung, or imitating the low-cost models that Chinese 
mobile phone makers have successfully produced. 
In pursuit of this strategy, Viettel established its R&D institute and a 
manufacturing plant. The R&D institute was established in 2009. In 2010, Viettel 
invested VND 195.95 trillion (USD 9.5 million) to build its first manufacturing plant to 
produce telecom equipment and other hardware devices. Viettel claims that it is one of 
the most modern production plants in Southeast Asia. In 2011, this plant produced many 
types of telecom devices, including mobile phones, smart phones, tablet computers, and 
all-in-one computers, as well as network infrastructure devices and military information 
equipment (Tuoitrenews, 2011b). In addition, Viettel reported that this plant can produce 
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up to 5 million 3G dongles, 3 million mobile phones, and 900,000 computers per year47 
(Vietnam Business Forum, 2012). To continue with this success, the corporation pours 
capital into R&D; in 2012, it allocated VND 2.98 trillion (USD 100 million) to expand 
its R&D institute (Van-Oanh, 2012b). An interviewee who is a manager at the institute 
explained that one reason for Viettel’s strong focus on R&D and technology production 
is that by manufacturing its own upstream supplies, Viettel is in greater control of its 
operations and, thus, has added value to its service and reduced transaction costs. 
Another reason is that the R&D strategy fits well with Viettel’s planned expansion into 
other developing countries. By using economies of scale, Viettel can produce its 
products at lower costs, increase value addition while, at the same time, expand the 
market for both telecom devices and services, thus becoming a one-stop-shop for its 
subscribers worldwide.  
In early 2011, Viettel had roughly 300 engineers, technicians, and experts 
working at its R&D institute, which was expanding rapidly; Viettel’s hiring 
advertisements were constantly running in the local newspapers for all levels of software 
and hardware engineers. Also in 2011, Chien Dinh Nguyen, the director of the institute, 
reported that it had “succeeded in designing and manufacturing 16 sample products for 
military and civil purposes among 22 products that the Institute has been developing” 
(Van-Oanh, 2012b).  
As one of the Vietnamese government strategies is using targeted learning and 
Schumpeterian rents to promote productive capability-building, the government allows 
businesses to invest 10 per cent of its pre-tax profit into R&D activity. To take advantage 
of this policy, in 2012, Viettel allocated VND 2.06 trillion (USD 100 million) to its R&D 
institute, with an ambitious plan to earn VND 20.6 trillion (USD 1 billion) revenue from 
                                                
47 Viettel introduced its tablet computer to the public in 2012; as of early 2013 it had not 
yet officially sold it in the Vietnamese market. 
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its R&D and manufacturing activities by 2015. According to Chien, to meet the new 
expansion plans, the corporation is looking to increase the number of employees by as 
many as 10,000–15,000 workers by 2015 (Van-Oanh, 2012b). Viettel’s strategic plan is 
to deploy all related processes – research, design, and production – in line with the 
present global trend, which is expected to save the telecom provider costs from 
equipment imports. Thus, in addition to its dongle, Viettel is producing its own branded 
smart phone, tablet computer, all-in-one computers, customised cell phones, network 
infrastructure devices, and military information devices. Viettel will also focus on 
producing telecom components and devices to establish its presence as a telecom device 
supplier. 
This forward-thinking business strategy is unprecedented in the Vietnamese 
telecom sector, especially for an SOE. Viettel’s acquisition of new technological and 
industrial capabilities is the foremost contribution to the rapid development of the 
telecom sector as a whole. Its strategic focus on technical learning to institute its vertical 
integration strategy provides instructive lessons for policy makers and other players in 
the market. 
	  
4.5.4.2. Expansion into the international market 
	  
Industry observers were unsure that Viettel would succeed with its investment 
project in Cambodia. Before Viettel set foot there, the country already had seven service 
providers. However, Cambodia’s telecom industry developed very slowly because of 
high tariffs and limited service options (Intellasia, 2011c). In 2006, Viettel began its 
international expansion by supplying telecom and Internet services in Cambodia. After 
that initial success, in 2008, it entered a joint venture with Lao-Asia Telecom in Laos. To 
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penetrate these markets, Viettel offered different service packages to suit different 
societal classes, and call charges were 30 per cent lower than those offered by the other 
service providers. Due to this low-pricing strategy, after only one year of operation, 
mobile phone subscribers in Cambodia increased from 15 to 40 per cent of the market 
year-on-year. Similarly, land line phones increased from 1 to 6 per cent; and broadband 
Internet went from 0.5 per cent to 2 per cent year-on-year (Intellasia, 2011c).  
In 2010, Viettel’s revenue in the Cambodian market was VND 3.33 trillion (USD 
161 million), which was 2.8 times more than in 2009. Viettel earned VND 1.26 trillion 
(USD 61 million) in the Laotian market, a rise of 4.5 times over 2009 (Intellasia, 2011c). 
Altogether, Viettel’s revenue reached VND 4.59 trillion (USD 222 million) in Laotian 
and Cambodian markets by the end of 2010, and its total profit in these two markets in 
2010 was VND 181 billion (USD 8.75 million). In 2011, Viettel profit increased to VND 
1.45 trillion (USD 40 million) in these two markets. Table 4.7 illustrates Viettel rapid 
growth in the foreign markets. 
 
Table 4.7: Viettel in Foreign Markets 2010-2012 (in USD million) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
Total Revenue 222 500 600 
Profits 8.75 40 76 
Growth in profit (%) Base year	   358	   90	  
Source: Author’s compilations and calculations based on local news reports. 
 
From this success, Viettel now operates mobile phone networks in the Republic 
of Haiti (in 2010), Mozambique (in 2012), and Peru (in 2013). In 2012, Viettel also 
signed contracts to operate mobile phone service in East Timor, Cameroon, and Tanzania. 
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Consistent with its business strategy in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Viettel’s success 
is largely attributable to its low-cost mobile phone services, often offering tariff rates that 
are at least 30 per cent cheaper than the local price. In 2012, Viettel reported it earned 
VND 12.4 trillion (USD 600 million) in revenue, and VND 1.57 trillion (USD 76 
million) in profit from all of its foreign markets, with a 90 per cent growth rate in profit 
(Trong-Cam, 2012) (see Table 4.7). 
 
4.5.5. The Industrial Transformation of Viettel 
	  
Within a decade, Viettel grew from a small unit inside the MoD into a 
conglomerate with both a domestic and an international presence, and with a strong 
focus on technology adoption and production. In explaining this successful 
transformation, DRMA provides a framework for looking at the mostly informal rents 
and the factors that contributed to a successful rent management mechanism that drove 
Viettel’s success. Table 4.8 summarises Viettel’s industrial development using our four-
step approach.  
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Table 4.8: DRMA Summary – Viettel’s Successful Industrial Development	  
Players Type of 
rents 
Incentives 
created by 
the rent 
Factors affecting the rent 
management mechanism 
Outcomes 
 
Viettel  Privileged 
access to 
land,  
labour, 
infrastruct
ure, 
finance, 
and credit 
guarantees  
- 
Compensatio
n for market 
failures in 
relevant 
markets  
- Opportunity 
to focus on 
technical 
learning  
- Opportunity 
to 
concentrate 
on R&D for 
strategic 
growth 
 
First level: Conditional political 
support for Viettel from the 
MoD and ultimately the 
Vietnamese government 
 
Second level: Effective 
institutional arrangements for rent 
allocation from the MoD 
including informal mechanisms 
for allocating land, infrastructure, 
labour, capital and credit 
guarantees 
 
Third level: (1) Capable human 
resources and leadership  
(2) Financial rewards and 
reinforcement of political 
support  
(3) High profit margins achieved 
rapidly  
(4) Availability of cheap 
handsets 
(5) Military culture and pride 
driving competition with VNPT  
(6) Pressure from international 
competition due to the opening 
of the Vietnamese market 
- Manufacture 
of 3G dongle 
achieved  
- Numerous 
Viettel-made 
handsets and 
telecom 
devices  
- Successful 
expansion to 
foreign 
markets 
	  
Many interviewees who work for Viettel or the MIC are of the opinion that the 
Viettel experience cannot be repeated because the combination of favourable factors that 
allowed Viettel to achieve rapid success cannot be replicated. Nonetheless, Viettel serves 
as a successful role model for developing other global technology players. Therefore, 
although this combination of factors may not repeat in the same manner, policy-makers 
can surely learn from the ways in which Viettel resolved specific market failures and was 
offered opportunities, incentives, and compulsions to raise competitiveness as a result of 
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rents within the context of a specific rent management structure. Section 4.8 discusses 
the lessons and its application to a developmental rent management strategy in greater 
details. The next case study examines the 2009 “beauty contest” among the telecom 
providers for four valuable 3G licenses.  
	  
4.6. Case Study 3: 3G Licensing – A Rent Management Debate 
	  
On 13 August 2009, the MIC granted four 3G licenses to Viettel, MobiFone, 
VinaPhone, and a joint venture between EVN Telecom and Vietnamobile, based on six 
applications submitted as part of what was informally called the “beauty contest” for the 
3G licenses. The four licenses, which each took effect on 15 September 2009, permitted 
these four operators to introduce 3G technology: high-speed data access via mobile 
phone, and features such as videophone, online video streaming, and music downloads. 
During my fieldwork in early 2011, the beauty contest to grant these 3G licenses among 
seven48 commercial telecom providers repeatedly appeared in interviews as an example 
of the adverse effects of rents and rent-seeking.  
To enter the beauty contest, applicants had to submit detailed business plans of 
how much they planned to spend on developing their 3G networks at different stages of 
the process. Once selected, the licensees had to deposit their committed capital for the 
project into a state-owned bank to secure their commitment to implement 3G technology. 
If these operators did not fulfil their commitments, a significant fine would be deducted 
from their deposits. From a DRMA perspective, a 3G license is a form of rent because 
the allocation price was lower than the price the licensee would have been willing to bid 
                                                
48 EVN and Hanoi Telecom created a consortium to jointly apply for one license, which 
they would share between the two of them. Therefore, there were six applications among 
the seven telecom providers. 
 193 
in the marketplace, and it offered the licensees an advantage to establish their presence 
and services for 3G technology. In addition, the 3G technology will be required for 4G 
service in the future. Therefore, if an operator plans to upgrade to the next stage of 
telecom technology, owning a 3G license is a must.  
The allocation of the 3G licenses produced two important effects or incentives. 
First, applicants to the beauty contest were provided with implicit opportunities and 
incentives to take advantage of the benefits offered by the rent to boost their 
competitiveness and increase profits as well as the equity value of the enterprise. Second, 
the licenses opened the door for 3G foreign vendors to seek some of these rents by 
entering the market; they could inflate their service charges given the sudden demand to 
establish four different 3G networks in a period of three to five years. One of the 
analytical questions that I raised with my interviewees was whether the rents associated 
with the allocation of the 3G licenses were truly intended as a value-enhancing rent or 
was it a political redistributive rent offered to domestic providers to enhance their profits. 
In other words, what was the formal rationale for this rent? Moreover, regardless of the 
MIC’s intentions behind the allocation of these rents, it was also relevant to investigate 
whether the rent produced a value-enhancing outcome and, if it did, what was the 
structure of the rent management mechanism at work? In this case study, the DRMA 
framework was used to examine the political and institutional context that gave rise to 
the rent and affected the outcomes. 
	  
4.6.1. RMM Level 1 – Conflicting Accounts of the Political Context 
	  
There is conflicting evidence about the political factors that drove the creation 
and allocation of these particular rents. On the one hand, some interviewees asserted that 
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the licenses should have been auctioned instead of effectively being given away. On the 
other hand, other interviewees said that the MIC believed that the 3G licenses should 
have been allocated through the beauty contest so as to deliberately grant rents to the 
industry and to create opportunities for attracting and developing new technology. These 
two arguments are considered in greater detail in the next two sections 
	  
4.6.1.1. The rent distribution argument 
	  
A number of industry insiders argue that the beauty contest allocation process 
(the co che xin cho, or application-granting mechanism) was a form of inefficient rent 
distribution, and that the MIC thereby created and allocated value-reducing rents. One of 
my interviewees, a director of a research institute at the MIC, argued that the process of 
granting licenses through a beauty contest instead of bidding and auctioning was an 
example of politically connected Vietnamese SOEs capturing national resources for 
corporate profits. His argument was that because the 3G licenses would inflate the 
market value of the providers when they were equitized, the government should have 
charged market prices for granting these valuable commercial licenses. Many developing 
countries indeed have auctioned their spectrum.49  
For example, the U.S. government, in the 700Mhz spectrum auction in 2008, 
earned USD 16 billion, when Verizon paid USD 9.4 billion and AT&T paid USD 6.6 
billion for sections of spectrum (Gardiner, 2008). In another example, Free Telecom 
obtained the fourth and final 20-year 3G license in France for EUR 619 million (USD 
                                                
49 ‘A spectrum auction is a process whereby a government uses an auction system to sell 
the rights (licenses) to transmit signals over specific bands of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and to assign scarce spectrum resources. With a well-designed auction, 
resources are allocated efficiently to the parties that value them the most, and the 
government securing revenue in the process 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectrum_auction). 
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798.99 million). These licensees not only paid substantial prices, but they had to make 
all payments to their respective governments within the first year of the license (Nguyen, 
2007). In Vietnam, by using a “beauty contest,” the government collected only a small 
fraction of the tangible and intangible benefits that each telecom provider would receive 
(Nguyen, 2007). Although the cost of the licenses was not published, it was reported that 
the MIC expected to collect a total of VND 2.06–3.1 trillion (USD 100–150 million) 
from all four operators (about 12 to 19 per cent of the cost as compared to France) over 
the 15-year life of the licenses (Nguyen, 2007; Thai-Khang, 2008)50. 
When I asked an interviewee who was critical of the beauty contest to explain the 
mechanism and rationale behind the contest, he explained that the Vietnamese 
government has a tendency to grant licenses to SOEs without realising that it needs to 
treat commercial licenses as profit-making opportunities for the country, and that these 
licenses must be charged at the market price. He said that this habit is derived from 
Vietnam’s socialist history and that the government tends to manage various interest 
groups by dividing rents – in this case, the commercial opportunity – to maintain social 
coherence and political stability. In other words, rent distribution is used as a means to 
reduce conflicts among interest groups. Similarly, when it came to telecom licenses, as 
long as the grantee was a government enterprise, the government granted licenses 
without taking into account the viability of the business’s success. This interviewee 
argued that the government is perhaps more concerned with taming conflicts than with 
actual commercial or development outcomes of rent. By offering business opportunities 
to various interest groups inside the government, benefits trickled down only to the 
extent that the interest groups behind the enterprises did not hold objections or resistance 
                                                
50 From these sources, this author calculates that the cost of each of the four licenses, 
based on the Vietnamese government charge for frequency posted on the MIC website, 
was 1/69 of the fee France charged its telecom providers. 
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against the government. This is effectively a system of benefit sharing that reinforces 
political legitimacy and stability. 
The interviewee argued that charging an appropriate fee for these rents, including 
the 3G licenses, would have provided the government with financial resources that could 
have been used to enhance the institutional capability of the MIC in monitoring and 
supervising the sector’s activity more efficiently. In his opinion, the Vietnamese 
government must change its approach in managing commercial licenses, especially in 
highly profitable industries, because “national resources should not be given for such 
low prices”. The MIC’s failure to properly auction its four 3G licenses highlights the 
government’s preference to redistribute rents in return for social and political stability. 
This, however, means that it overlooks the considerable benefits that the rents could 
generate for the government if it were to charge fair market price for licenses. 
	  
4.6.1.2. The MIC’s argument for creating license rents 
	  
An interview with the MIC official who was the mastermind behind the contest 
offers a contradictory analysis. The official pointed out that most major telecom 
providers in Vietnam are SOEs. They are small and thus do not have capital readily 
available for investment in new technologies such as 3G. This particular technology 
requires considerable initial capital to build new infrastructure and a network. Therefore, 
it would have been risky to hold an auction for the 3G licenses. A high license fee would 
have negatively affected the investment speed and effectiveness of the providers to 
implement the technology. This is the reason why, one of the criteria of the contest was 
the providers’ commitment to invest in developing the 3G network (Thai-Khang, 2008). 
Similarly, Thang Nam Le, the MIC’s acting deputy minister, asserted in the media that if 
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the MIC used the auction method, then the government was effectively collecting fees 
from state-owned enterprises, and hence itself.	  
Hai Hong Pham, director general of the MIC’s Authority of Telecommunications, 
also pointed out in the media that the MIC had learned from other countries’ experiences 
that many mobile phone providers came close to bankruptcy after successfully bidding 
for a 3G license because of the cost of the license and the slow increase in consumer 
demand for 3G services. Therefore, paying a high license fee might be a burden to 
businesses and slow down their technological adoption and success (Thai-Khang, 2008). 
Using a similar argument, the same MIC official who designed the beauty contest 
explained to me that these foreign lessons proved that auctioning 3G licenses could 
cause telecom providers to bid aggressively so as to gain a license, as they would not 
want to lose the opportunity to be in the market. As a result, many foreign companies 
overbid each other, subsequently stretching themselves too thin. Even if they won the bid, 
due to shortage of capital, they could fail to develop adequate 3G technology, and 
subsequently fail to attract subscribers or go bankrupt.51  
This same interviewee maintained that under the beauty contest model designed 
by the MIC, the telecom providers who won the licenses could use their financial 
resources to invest in new networks and to develop new services, rather than spending 
money in auctioning for a license. Hence, consumers could benefit from the upgraded 
service, not just the operators. From a rent management perspective, this is the argument 
for the creation of a value-enhancing rent. In essence, the granting of 3G licenses at low 
prices was a form of learning rent, with which the Vietnamese government aimed to 
encourage the rapid adoption of 3G technology.	  
                                                
51 This is what ultimately happened to EVN Telecom (interview, 2012). 
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My MIC interviewee argued that, along with the considerable investment 
required, there were significant concerns because 3G technology is not always readily 
successful. First, to use 3G services, customers have to buy 3G-enabled mobile phones, 
which are expensive. At the time, only a small number of customers owned 3G phones in 
Vietnam. Second, even for those with 3G phones, value-added technologies are still a 
luxury to most given the added cost of the service. According to MobiFone, in order to 
break even, earnings from 3G services must be around VND 4.13 trillion (USD 200 
million) per year for ten years, which means MobiFone will need one million 3G 
subscribers by the end of 10 years. However, MobiFone estimated that only 5 per cent of 
their current subscribers, or approximately 100,000 subscribers, will use their 3G 
services (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). In other words, given the market condition 
in 2009, MobiFone was estimated to gain roughly 100,000 subscribers for its 3G service, 
which was far below the target of one million. 
My interviewee who designed (and managed) the beauty contest at the MIC 
pointed out that the Vietnamese government did not necessarily need the income from 
the auction. What was more important, from the point of view of the MIC, was to ensure 
that the telecom providers succeeded in building new capacity and providing the best 
service to consumers. This is a plausible argument, but only if the institutional, political, 
and market conditions were sufficient so that the providers could deliver the fastest 
technological and productivity improvements to consumers.  
 The arguments from both sides are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They each 
illustrate the rationale and approach to rent management at the state level and highlight 
the political context of rent management in Vietnam. Before going further, it is worth 
reviewing the MIC’s policy structure for the beauty contest and the factors affecting rent 
management mechanism.  
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4.6.2. RMM Level 2 – Structure of the Beauty Contest and Implementation 
	  
The second level of rent management analysis involves the policy structure of the 
beauty contest and the rules for allocating the rents in question. To enter the beauty 
contest, the MIC asked applicants to submit detailed business plans of how much they 
planned to spend on developing their 3G networks at different stages of the process and 
the specifics of how they would implement the plan step-by-step. Additionally, the 
entrants had to make a commitment to develop and bring the new 3G technology to 
market, and had to deposit that committed capital into a state-owned bank. The deposits 
of the four winning providers totalled approximately VND 8.1 trillion (nearly USD 455 
million). Of this amount, Viettel Mobile accounted for VND 4.5 trillion (USD 252.69 
million) – more than 50 per cent of the total deposit (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). 
This capital not only secured the providers’ commitment to implement 3G technology, 
but it also prevented them from changing the amount of capital investment in the future. 
If these operators could not fulfil their commitments in developing 3G technology, they 
would have to pay a significant fine, which would be deducted from their deposits to the 
state bank (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009).  
 Thang Nam Le, the deputy minister of Information and Communication, was cited 
in the media as saying that, after granting the licenses to the telecom providers, the 
ministry would issue regulations to supervise 3G deployment, including penalties against 
those providers failing to implement what they had committed to do. If any of the five 
telecoms enterprises failed during this first competition phase, they would most likely be 
allowed to supply 3G service at a different frequency band, or they may be allowed to 
join forces with other 3G license winners to provide services via roaming or sharing 
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network infrastructure (IHS Global Insight, 2009). 
 From a DRMA perspective, and compared to other examples of value-enhancing 
rents in other Vietnamese industries, the policy structure was relatively transparent. The 
MIC clearly set up the legal and policy frameworks for the allocation of 3G licenses and 
the subsequent monitoring of conditions, and these were implemented relatively 
smoothly. Although the Vietnamese industrial experience usually has little transparency 
in the relationships among SOEs, and the business groups and its managing ministries, 
the policy framework and the implementation of the 3G technology was considered 
successful (interview, 2011). One of the reasons for this is perhaps due to the severe 
competition among the operators. This does not imply that mismanagement and 
favouritism did not take place during this period. However, the overall structure of rent 
allocation and monitoring in this particular case largely achieved the MIC’s goals and 
expectations. 
	  
4.6.3. RMM Level 3 – The Industry Organisation Relevant for 3G Adoption  
	  
At the lowest level of rent management analysis, incentives and pressure largely 
stemmed from market competition and each operator’s desire to quickly capture market 
share. This is the market structure that emerged after the VNPT monopoly ended, and 
which was analysed earlier in this chapter. What is notable is the clear market structure 
in the mobile phone market towards the end of 2000s. By the middle of 2009, both 
Viettel and VNPT had established their dominant roles in the mobile phone market and 
there was no doubt of their ability to implement new technology in the Vietnamese 
market. Small operators, such as EVN and Vietnamobile, were under great pressure to 
compete with them. Meanwhile, the competition between VNPT and Viettel effectively 
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pressured both of these conglomerates to follow through with their commitment to the 
MIC to strategically employ 3G technology. In addition, Viettel’s development of its 3G 
dongle is an example of its development strategy to gain a competitive advantage 
through vertical linkage by way of manufacturing. To summarize, Figure 4.11 outlines 
different factors affecting the rent management mechanism relevant for the 3G license 
allocation at the three levels of analysis. 
 
Figure 4.11: RMM Summary of the Adoption of 3G Technology 
	  
	  
4.6.4. DRMA Step 4 – Industrial Transformation and Outcomes of 3G License 
Allocation 
 
 As discussed above, when the four licenses were granted, each of the telecom 
providers made certain commitments to bring the new technology to the market. 
VinaPhone committed to supplying 3G service only one month after its 3G license took 
• Political will creates and allocates rents specifically to 
accelerate adoption of 3G technology 
• Possible parallel interest in allocating redistributive  
rents to competing groups associated with the telecom  
SOEs to maintain political stability 
Political Context of Rent 
Management  
• Institutional rules for allocating rents 
through the beauty contest  
• Policy structure of monitoring and 
enforcing conditions for roll-out of 
3G technology 
Rent Allocation 
and 
Implementation  
• Intense competition among licensees 
creating pressures for rapid 
implementation 
Industry 
Organisation 
 
 202 
effect, and it launched that service in October 2009. This occurred initially in key metro 
areas, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. In 2012, VinaPhone reported building more than 
10,000 3G base transceiver stations	   (BTS) (Ha-Van, 2013). Meanwhile, MobiFone 
finished the installation of its 2,400 BTS by December 2009 and launched its 3G service 
in the same month. Between 2010 and 2013, MobiFone expanded its network by 
installing approximately 7,700 BTS.  
 Viettel committed to provide 3G services by April 2010, but was able to launch its 
network a month sooner. It committed to invest up to VND 12.8 trillion (USD 710.5 
million) in its 3G network within three years, and the other competitors invested about 
half of this amount. By the end of 2012, Viettel took the lead in terms of infrastructure 
with 25,000 BTS for 3G (Ha-Van, 2013). Finally, the consortium between EVN Telecom 
and Vietnamobile claimed to have invested VND 6 trillion (USD 336.93 million) to 
construct 5,000 BTS throughout Vietnam. This joint venture launched its 3G service in 
June 2010 (Vietnam Financial Review, 2009). The MIC reported that between 2009 and 
2012, 3G providers invested nearly VND 28 trillion (USD 1.3 billion) in building 3G 
networks, and reached 90 per cent of the population in early 2013 (Ha-Van, 2013). 
In the first three years of launching 3G service networks, between 2009 and 2011, 
consumer adoption of 3G technology was relatively slow in Vietnam (see Figure 4.12) 
and 3G service was slow-moving with occasional interruptions (interview with 3G 
subscribers, 2011). Data collected from the Nielsen Company shows that six months 
after 3G launched, just under half (48 per cent) of Vietnamese mobile users were even 
aware of it, and only 3 per cent had subscribed. The latter number rose to 11 per cent in 
2010 (Panganiban, 2010).  
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Figure 4.12: Slow Rate of Subscription to 3G Service in Vietnam	  
	  
Source: Panganiban (2010). The high penetration rate of 126 per cent in the Vietnamese 
mobile phone market was due to mobile phone operators’ excessive sales of prepaid 
phone cards as a marketing tool to attract new users. Consequently, there was a high rate 
of multiple SIM ownership in Vietnam. 
 
In 2011, close to three years after VinaPhone launched the first 3G service in 
Vietnam, the growth of 3G service was still modest, and none of licensees had recovered 
their investment. My fieldwork data in 2012 suggests that EVN’s high-profile 
bankruptcy and merger with Viettel was arguably due to its aggressive investment in its 
3G network, with little business success to show for it. By the middle of 2011, the four 
operators had built more than 30,000 3G base stations nationwide, which provided 
network coverage to most of the country’s towns and cities, according to figures from 
the MIC (Dewar, 2012). However, the quality of the networks was said to be poor, and 
the regulator observed that a lack of awareness of 3G services remained a major 
challenge for the uptake of the technology (interview, 2011).  
The latter issue is partly due to an absence of third-party content providers and 
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partly due to the high cost of smart phones, which discourages 3G usage. Because 
revenue in 2011 from 3G data services was minimal among smart phone owners, who 
typically restricted it to web browsing, operators offered data at increasingly lower tariffs 
so as to build up a 3G customer base. For example, in 2011, VinaPhone’s Golden Days 
promotion encouraged smart phone owners on 2G networks to try 3G service at no extra 
cost. Meanwhile, weak economic conditions meant that prepaid customers continued to 
make up the overwhelming majority of the country’s subscriber base, providing a further 
barrier to mass 3G adoption. Indeed, aggressively priced 2G offerings proved more 
popular than 3G services (Dewar, 2012). Figure 4.13 shows the 3G market share of the 
four licensees as of 2011. 
	  
Figure 4.13: 3G Market Share by Subscribers in 2011	  
	  
Source: MIC (2012) 
 
However, in 2012, revenue for 3G technology started to pick up. Viettel reported 
that 3G services contributed to more than 50 per cent of the company revenues in 2012, 
while VinaPhone said that its 3G service had a 60 per cent growth in revenue in the same 
year (Ha-Van, 2013). This growth was, and continues to be, largely due to the providers’ 
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aggressive promotions to attract new subscribers. For instance, in 2013, VinaPhone 
joined with MobiFone to launch a promotion of 3G services for VND 15,000 (less than 
USD 1) per month. Generally speaking, Vietnam now offers some of the cheapest 3G 
service in the world (Buu-Dien, 2013). The growth in demand for 3G service was helped 
by a sharp drop in prices of cell phones with 3G technology. For instance, in late 2012, 
Viettel launched a low-cost smart phone priced at only VND 1.5 million (USD 70), 
which made it easier for people to start using Viettel’s 3G service. 
	  
4.6.5. 3G Licensing and Outcomes  
 
 Table 4.9 summarises the analysis so far.  
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Table 4.9: DRMA Summary – Adoption of 3G Technology and the Beauty 
Contest  
Players Type of 
rents 
Incentives 
created by the 
rent 
Factors affecting rent 
management 
mechanism 
Outcome 
 
VinaPhone 
 
MobiFone 
 
Viettel 
 
EVN and 
Vietna-
mobile 
 
Learning 
rents 
allocated 
by 3G 
licenses 
-Investments in 
3G technology to 
enhance 
competitiveness, 
profits and 
equity value. 
- Attracting 
foreign 
technology 
providers  
 
First level: (1) political 
will creates the rent 
specifically to 
accelerate adoption of 
3G technology; (2) 
Possible political 
motives to allocate 
licenses among SOEs 
to maintain stability 
across interests 
 
Second level: (1) 
formal institutional 
rules allocating rents 
according to the beauty 
contest structure; (2) 
formal monitoring and 
enforcement of 
investment conditions 
3G technology 
 
Third level: Severe 
competition among 
licensees creating 
major pressure for 
implementation 
 - Rapid 
investments and 
implementation 
of the technology 
- Below average 
service, with 
interruptions 
- Slow recovery 
of investments 
due to slower 
than predicted 
growth in 
demand 
- Competitive 
tariffs for 3G 
service 
- Possibility of 
over-investment 
 
	  
Despite the fact that the arguments for and against the 3G license contest seem 
contradictory, the political economy of Vietnam suggests that these arguments may 
actually be complementary. Both sets of concerns may have motivated the government 
in its rent allocation rules. On the one hand, the efficiency view is credible in that, while 
3G licenses provided a long-term boost to the equity value of the licensees, MobiFone, 
VinaPhone, and Viettel are all 100 per cent state-owned; therefore, much of the upgraded 
value benefited the state, not individual corporations. Furthermore, as the data suggests, 
none of the providers broke even in the first three years of their investment, and despite 
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increased usage of 3G technology in 2012, it is questionable if they will recover their 
investment within the next few years. This supports the MIC’s assessment that making a 
profit from this new technology would not be as easy as many people had predicted and 
that the high cost of an auctioned license might lead providers to go bankrupt.  
On the other hand, it is no coincidence that three of the four contest winners are 
state-owned (two being under VNPT), making them appear as favoured businesses by 
the government. The rents created through the 3G license allocations no doubt supported 
and reinforced VNPT’s and Viettel’s economic and market power in the industry. Thus, 
the argument of rent seeking and rent redistribution among powerful state-owned 
conglomerates for the sake of political stability is also plausible. 
The literature and my fieldwork suggest that perhaps the biggest and most direct 
beneficiaries of the 3G licenses were the foreign telecom suppliers, such as ZTE, 
Motorola, Qualcomm, and Huawei. Because of the licensees’ commitment to the MIC to 
provide 3G service within three to nine months upon receipt their licenses, in 2009, 
MobiFone, VinaPhone, and Viettel rushed to sign lucrative contracts with their foreign 
suppliers to install base stations, networks, and the infrastructure for 3G service in 
Vietnam. It is likely that these contracts are a channel of rent distribution as state capital 
from the SOEs trickled down to individuals and businesses involved in setting up 3G 
infrastructure. Additionally, given the rushed nature of the contracts, foreign technology 
providers knew that they could inflate their prices to capture higher rents.  
In conclusion, the handling of the 3G licenses demonstrates the MIC’s practical 
approach to the development of the industry because it focused on technology adoption 
and improving providers’ services through the development of new technologies. It 
chose the beauty contest route, which spared the licensees’ capital for investment in the 
development of their 3G networks, instead of collecting a large license fee. From a 
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DRMA perspective, there were a number of factors affecting the rent management 
mechanism that resulted in a moderately value-enhancing outcome. These factors 
included a clear government rationale for creating the rent; and second, a corresponding 
policy framework to enforce the requisite investment conditions. Nevertheless, the 
factors that made this rent policy work were more than just the political context and the 
government capability to monitor and enforce the conditions associated with the 
allocation of the rents. Here, the relevant factors also included the initial capability of the 
operators to adopt the technology; and the market incentives (gaining more market 
power) and pressure (competition among the licensees) that together ensured high levels 
of investment and competitive pricing. The outcomes of the rent have been largely 
positive. While business for all the providers and service quality will continue to 
improve as demands rise, the MIC’s rent policy enhanced the technological level and 
infrastructure of VNPT, Viettel and Vietnamobile. In addition, the outcome has been 
beneficial for users given the competition and falling prices of 3G services.  
 
4.7. Industry Restructuring and the Emergence of a Duopoly 
 
In 2012, the Vietnamese telecom industry entered its third phase of development 
(see Figure 4.3), which involved a major restructuring in the organisation of the industry. 
Between 2012 and 2013, there have been three major events that have partly shaped the 
current market structure. The first event, in January 2012, was that EVN successfully 
merged with Viettel, after considerable losses and heavy debts on the part of EVN. The 
prime minster’s decision for the EVN–Viettel merger was considered political, and 
reflected Viettel strong influence on the government and its close relationship with 
political leaders. During the run up to the merger, Hanoi Telecom (owner of 
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Vietnamobile Network) had also wanted to buy EVN and its 3G license, as it had been 
renting EVN’s infrastructure and sharing its 3G license. In addition, Hanoi Telecom also 
feared that if Viettel and EVN merged, it would drive up rental prices and force it out of 
the market. Despite Hanoi Telecom’s numerous inquiries and letters to the MIC and the 
prime minister, the merger was allowed. Even though Hanoi Telecom was able to retain 
EVN’s 3G license, its concerns were well founded. In March 2012, three months after 
the merger, Viettel (and VNPT) raised its network rental price by more than 200 per cent 
(Tran, 2012b). 	  
The second event was the departure of VimpelCom. The Russian telecom 
company abandoned its co-owned Beeline Network in Vietnam in April 2012. 
VimpelCom suffered an investment loss of more than VND 8.26 trillion (USD 400 
million) in its venture with GTel. VimpelCom’s departure forced GTel to stand-alone 
and to rename its network Gmobile. VimpelCom was the third foreign venture in 
Vietnam’s telecom market to leave (out of four ventures): Sweden’s Comvik left in 2005, 
and South Korea’s SK Telecom left in 2010. Hutchinson Telecom is the last foreign 
company still operating in Vietnam (associated with Hanoi Telecom). Why did these 
foreign companies leave Vietnam's telecom market? My fieldwork data, and secondary 
literature, suggest that it was due to market competition, in which tariff rates were too 
low to make a profit. In other words, foreign firms could not compete with Viettel and 
VNPT, and thus could not make a profit in the mobile phone market. Additionally, SK 
Telecom and VimpelCom each lost large parts of their investments. The price war was 
said to have discouraged FDI from entering the Vietnamese market (interviews with the 
MIC officials and a Viettel’s manager, 2011). 
The third event firstly involved S-Fone, which went out of business in early 2013, 
as it failed to find another interested foreign partner in the three years after SK Telecom 
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left Vietnam in 2010. In addition, in 2012, Indochina Telecom had its license revoked 
due to its slow implementation of mobile services. In the same year, the MIC signalled to 
VTC Telecom that if it did not launch its service within the prescribed time limit (which 
was not publicly known), its business license might be revoked as well.  
As a consequence, in 2013, the mobile phone market was left with only four 
players: VNPT, Viettel, GTel Mobile, and Vietnamobile. Together, VNPT and Viettel 
cover 90 per cent of the market share. What is unknown is the fate of MobiFone and 
VinaPhone, which may end with a merger of the two companies into one entity under 
VNPT.  
	  
4.8. Next Challenges and Implications for A Developmental Rent Management 
Strategy 
	  
In this chapter, we looked at three case studies to illustrate the industrial 
development of the telecom industry using the DRMA framework. The success of the 
telecom industry is based on a number of rent management factors that allowed effective 
incentives and pressures for domestic providers to rapidly upgrade investments and 
capabilities. While market competition by itself could not help operators overcome 
market failures in land, infrastructure, and capital that constrained the development of 
the industry, especially in its early stages, competition was value-enhancing in that it 
increased competitiveness. The case study of Viettel also highlights the role of 
informality in rent creation and allocation – the MoD provided military resources to 
Viettel as rents – and informal motivations were important in driving Viettel leaders to 
catch up with VNPT. Furthermore, the pressure of liberalisation in the telecom market 
set an effective time horizon for Viettel and VNPT to achieve global competitiveness.  
 211 
More generally, our analysis identified the three factors that affected rent 
management: (1) the political context of rent creation and management, (2) the 
institutional structure of rent allocation and implementation, and (3) the organisation of 
the industry, including the structure of the market and of firms. Together, these factors 
affected the incentives and pressures that led to the outcomes discussed in this chapter. 
This understanding allows us to offer four observations for a developmental rent 
management strategy for the industry. 
	  
4.8.1. Managing the Duopoly 
	  
Given the current structure of the industry, it does not appear that the government 
will create any new rents, as the telecom industry is now developed and established. The 
MIC is trying to maintain a level playing field, although this is increasingly difficult 
because Viettel and VNPT, as business groups, are under the prime minister and, thus, 
the MIC has less power to supervise and monitor them. At the same time, VNPT and 
Viettel have been reported to engage in some monopolistic practices. For example, in 
June 2012, both operators raised the cost of telecom infrastructure for smaller providers 
by more than 200 per cent by increasing their network rental prices (Tran, 2012b). 
Because they are the only two providers with backbone networks and large coverage of 
BTSs, which are the main infrastructure for mobile phone services, small operators such 
as GTel and Vietnamobile have struggled not only to keep up with rising infrastructure 
costs but to stay in business at all. As analysed in the case studies, competition among 
the providers has helped to ensure the highest learning effort, not least among the SOEs. 
At the moment this is becoming increasingly more difficult given the market structure, in 
which VNPT and Viettel together hold the majority of market share. The challenge for 
 212 
the MIC and the Vietnamese government is to maintain a competitive environment and 
not allow these two conglomerates to form a cartel against consumers and smaller 
operators.  
Will foreign entry offer pressure for effort, as in the past? As of early 2013, the 
MIC had not yet signalled that it would give out licenses to 100 per cent foreign-owned 
enterprises. Given Vietnam’s commitment to the WTO, the MIC is extremely mindful of 
its obligation to allow foreign entry into the telecom market. However, when a British 
telecom provider inquired about entering the Vietnamese market in early 2013, Deputy 
Minister of Information and Communications Thang Nam Le responded that “foreign 
investors can cooperate with Vietnamese telecom groups, such as VNPT and Viettel 
through the mode of direct investment, or they can contribute capital to joint ventures” 
(see VietnamNet, 2013). This reply signals that the MIC will continue to restrict the 
telecom market. My interviewees from the MIC and Viettel observed that it is no longer 
easy to make a profit as the mobile phone market has reached saturation and the landline 
business is declining. The Internet market is expanding rapidly, but there are already a 
number of providers in the market charging relatively low Internet tariffs. Therefore, 
unless foreign providers have a clear strategy to either cooperate or compete with VNPT 
and Viettel, new ventures in Vietnam will face severe difficulties. From a rent 
management perspective, foreign entry is potentially a competitive constraint on local 
operators, but not as much as it might be provided that the MIC continues to resist 
offering licenses to 100 per cent foreign-owned operators.  
In the industry’s current third phase of development, the focal point for a 
developmental rent management strategy must be to monitor the duopoly for 
anticompetitive activities. This benefits both the consumers and the development of the 
industry as a whole. While the role of the MIC was relatively blurry during the second 
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phase of the industry’s development, it is critical that its role is enhanced to effectively 
regulate VNPT and Viettel. This cannot happen without the political will of the 
Vietnamese leadership, in particular the prime minister, and without a clear 
understanding of the potential consequences if damaging rent-capture strategies of the 
duopoly are not effectively constrained.  
 
4.8.2. Maintaining the Speed of Industrial Upgrading and R&D 
	  
The future of the Vietnamese telecom industry depends on success in research 
and development. In his speech to the Government Submit for ICT in 2010, Viettel’s 
Deputy General Manager Hung Manh Nguyen said that in the past 20 years, the world 
revolved around the personal computer; and that the next 10 to 20 years the world will 
revolve around the smart phone (Ministry of Information and Communications, 2010b). 
Nguyen envisioned that the next opportunity for Vietnamese telecom operators will be to 
design and produce all-in-one smart phones and mobile phone applications, and to 
transform themselves from network providers to information content providers (Ministry 
of Information and Communications, 2010b).  
Since both Viettel and VNPT are investing heavily into R&D, an important point 
to consider is whether these R&D investments will be effective. Viettel offers a 
successful example. As mentioned above, it is known to hire engineers at higher salaries 
but who work around the clock on projects. Viettel has also upgraded and produced a 
number of components (such as the 3G dongle discussed in section 4.5.4.1) that were 
traditionally imported from China and other Southeast Asian countries, and it is also 
selling these components in the domestic and international markets. This is becoming a 
larger source of income for Viettel, and will be more so as it grows its international 
expansion. This suggests that Viettel has strong incentives to keep boosting its 
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technological upgrading. It will be interesting to see if its tablet, smart phones, and other 
handsets will be successful in the Vietnamese market. My interviewee at Viettel 
explained that Viettel only intends to compete in the low-cost niche market in Vietnam 
for smartphones. These markets have good potential for success as most low-income 
subscribers in this segment are still using 2G mobile phones, hence the need for low-cost 
3G smart phones. So far, the Viettel smart phone has been well received in this market. It 
will come down to whether Viettel can compete with Chinese phone makers in terms of 
price and quality. 
In the next phase of its development, the role of the telecommunication industry 
will be to increase value-added to other services, especially in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. The industry is no longer limited to connecting people via telephone, as 
it used to be. The MIC must provide strategic guidance and legal frameworks to direct 
the sector towards focusing on R&D and expansion of both vertical and horizontal 
linkages, which will create added value and higher profits. This will require the MIC to 
address some of the issues facing the industry, such as the high rate of multiple SIM 
ownership due to excessive sales of prepaid phone cards. This would avoid wasting radio 
frequency. Vietnam’s large prepaid customer base accounts for nearly 90 per cent of 
total connections in the country. The MIC could also be more proactive in advocating 
technology and R&D, so that operators expand into other areas to develop linkages, such 
as manufacturing devices and developing new software applications for handsets.  
 
4.8.3. Merging with ICT to Boost Value Addition 
  
Given the rapid development of digital media through telecom devices, the future 
of the sector lies in combining telecommunications with ICT services to create added 
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values for users who have access to media via mobile content on their smart phone. 
Currently, with VNPT and Viettel each moving into the ICT sector, the structure of the 
ICT industry may be substantially changed. Traditionally, this industry has played a 
crucial role in the transfer of foreign expertise and technology by the participation of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), including foreign ones. From my interviews, 
SMEs in this sector have raised serious and urgent concerns that Viettel and VNPT have 
unfairly leveraged their financial strength and political support to compete ruthlessly 
with the SMEs, effectively driving them out of development in the ICT sector. One of 
my interviewees, who owns an IT company, said that Viettel tricked him and his team to 
reveal his company’s innovative ideas for IT development in telecommunication services, 
and then stole these ideas instead of collaborating with his company, as Viettel had led 
them to believe.  
Once again, the assurance that all players will compete fairly is critical to ensure 
sustainable growth for both the telecommunications and the ICT industries. Therefore, 
the next challenge for a developmental rent management strategy is to regulate the 
possible anticompetitive patterns of Viettel and VNPT in the ICT industry. Additionally, 
creating a well-functioning credit market or providing rents with appropriate conditions 
to compensate for credit market failures may also be important for building new 
capabilities of the SMEs, which currently include developing and designing media 
content and applications for handsets and computer devices. These SMEs can help 
expanding market demand for data services, especially those that use 3G and 4G 
technologies.  
 
4.8.4. Matching Development Strategies with Enforcement Conditions 
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Finally, we have seen that the relative bargaining power within and between the 
CPV, state bodies, and SOEs can influence the types of rents created and the terms under 
which they are managed. Viettel’s experience, and the political dynamics analysed in the 
case studies underline the validity of this hypothesis. When Viettel was given permission 
to break VNPT’s monopoly, political support was provided in exchange for Viettel’s 
commitment to build a successful telecom company without any direct subsidy or 
financial support from the government. From the point of view of the Vietnamese 
government, this bargain was highly advantageous, even though it required the 
government, especially Prime Minister Kiet Van Vo and the MIC, to override VNPT’s 
opposition in order to promote competition within the state sector for the development of 
the industry and the economy.  
Evidence and fieldwork observations suggest that Vietnamese policy makers and 
business leaders understand the nature of the bargaining that is going on among various 
interest groups. However, they lack an understanding of the available policy options that 
could satisfy the interests of these groups while ensuring that vital rent allocation and 
rent management decisions are not left to the arbitrariness of internal forces (interview, 
2012). It is important that rents are used for developmental purposes. If some of these 
rents can be created, allocated, and managed on growth-enhancing criteria, given the 
context of Vietnam’s institutional and political realities, development policies could, in 
principle, be consistent with the internal politics of the country, and promote growth and 
development. The telecom industry provides an example of how political bargaining and 
institutional and market conditions can, if the combination is appropriate, achieve high 
levels of investment, technology adoption, learning, and R&D. This successful 
development story offers valuable lessons for the development of other industries in 
Vietnam and in the developing world.  
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 Textile and Garment Industry: Rent-Seeking and Chapter 5.
Capability Building 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The textile and garment (T&G) industry52 in Vietnam offers a unique case of 
industrial development because it has a number of interesting characteristics. First, it was 
one of the first industries to be liberalised based on the Vietnamese government’s reform 
agenda, in which trade and foreign direct investment in both the public and private 
sectors comprised a distinct configuration for rent management. Second, the industry is 
an example of a low value-added industry where trade liberalisation brought in enormous 
trade volume, even though the actual profits earned have been limited. This result is due 
to a number of reasons. 
One the one hand, exports in the garment sector have grown nearly 21 per cent 
per year between 2000 and 2012, and Vietnam is now one of the ten largest garment 
exporters in the world. On the other hand, Schaumburg-Muller (2009) points out that 
export growth has only been in volume expansion, but not profits, because the 
Vietnamese suppliers have failed to pursue upgrading strategies to move up the value 
chain. For instance, the industry’s average profitability rate was only between 5 and 8 
per cent in 2010, according to Barrie (2010); up from about 3 per cent in 2006, based on 
data from to the Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) (2006). A more 
optimistic report published by the European Union (IBM Belgium, DMI, Ticon & TAC, 
2009) adds that the rate of value-addition (measured by revenue less outside purchases of 
                                                
52 In this thesis, the textile sector refers to weaving, spinning, dyeing and finishing 
(upstream sector), while the garment sector refers to clothing and apparel manufacturing 
(downstream sector).  
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materials and services) in the Vietnamese garment industry was, at most, 20 per cent 
over the total revenue. The report points out that such low value-added in the garment 
export industry is largely due to the sector’s heavy dependence on imported materials 
(IBM Belgium, DMI, Ticon, & TAC, 2009). Finally, local abilities in design, branding, 
and product differentiation are still very limited (Barrie, 2010). Figure 5.1 illustrates that, 
in 2006, the industry saw a small profit of 3 per cent. In addition, materials account for 
by far the largest share of the total cost of garment production.  
 
Figure 5.1: Structure of Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF) Prices 
	  
Source: VITAS (2006, p. 34) 
	  
The third characteristic is that there are differences in development rates within 
the industry. While the garment sector (downstream) took off after receiving an influx of 
foreign investment and increased market expansion, the textile sector (upstream), 
dominated largely by SOEs, stayed sluggish until recently. Vietnamese production of 
cotton—a primary source of natural fibre—shrank from 32,267 hectares (79,733 acres) 
in 2003 to 3,000 hectares (7,413 acres) in 2009 (Ha, 2012). Because of an inadequate 
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domestic textile sector which could not keep up with textile demand for garment exports, 
the garment sector has to import 70 to 90 per cent of its materials from abroad (VITAS, 
2006). In 2013, there has been a slight improvement as local textile content has risen 
somewhat to between 30 and 40 per cent in 2013. The contrast in development of the 
garment sector to the textile sector has led to Vietnam’s heavy reliance on textile 
imports—especially from China—while facing low value-added production and 
relatively low profits throughout the industry.  
Nevertheless, over the last 10 years, the textile and garment sectors have played 
important roles in Vietnam’s economic development. This industry has been the largest 
formal employer in Vietnam, providing jobs for more than 3 million workers, of which 
more than 1.3 million are industrial workers. These industrial workers account for more 
than 10 per cent of the national employment in the industrial sector. In 2010, The T&G 
industry also had the second largest export value (after oil). In 2011, textiles and 
garments earned VND 330.66 trillion (USD 15.83 billion) and were Vietnam’s largest 
manufacturing industry, accounting for 16 per cent of total export earnings (Ha, 2012). 
Table 5.1 illustrates the rapid growth rate of the industry between 2001 and 2012. The 
fastest growth rate was in 2011, with 41 per cent growth, but it immediately slowed 
down again in 2012. Between 2001 and 2012, the industry grew 21 per cent on average 
each year. 
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Table 5.1: Annual Growth Between 2001-2012 for the T&G Industry (year on 
year, in million USD) 
Year 200
1 
200
2 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total 
Revenue 
1,96
2 
2,75
2 
3,654 4,368 4,838 5,92
7 
7,780 9,130 9,084 11,21
0 
15,83
0 
17,2
00 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
3.60 40 33 20 11 23 31 17 -0.50 23 41 8.60 
Source: Author's compilation and computation based on Ha (2012) 
	  
This chapter analyses Vietnam’s textile and garment industry using our analytical 
framework of rents and rent management. The purpose is to identify key areas of 
industrial upgrading and capability-building and how different rent management factors 
contributed to learning efforts. As argued in Chapter 3, the effects of different rent 
management mechanisms on the pace of learning could be identified by looking at a 
country’s configuration of politics, institutions, and industry organization. Therefore, this 
chapter examines three factors of rent management: the political context of rent creation 
and management; the institutional structure of rent allocation and implementation; and 
the structure of the market and the organization of firms to explain technology 
acquisition and learning efforts since 1986. 
Our analysis provides the following observations. First of all, while there has 
been political will to boost growth in the T&G industry, market failures have affected the 
acquisition of land and capital, and constrained business coordination, management, and 
learning. In addition, the weakness of the upstream textile sector creates significant 
bottlenecks for industrial capability-building in the integrated industry. The government 
attempted to address some externalities responsible for market failures by creating 
quotas to support export promotion (case study 1 below) and by implementing Decision 
55 to accelerate the development of the textile sector, but neither measure was successful.  
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Second, due to the government’s weak implementation capabilities in preventing 
illegal imports of garments and textiles through the China-Vietnam border (case study 2), 
few SOEs and private enterprises achieved some success in technical learning and 
upgrading (case study 3). This was most likely thanked to market expansion into 
Japanese, European, and, especially, U.S. markets. This thesis argues that this success, 
albeit limited, took place in an ad-hoc and spontaneous manner, and is related to the 
management capacity of specific firms, especially SOEs. They were able to utilise 
rents—which are largely unavailable in the private sector—to raise their productivity and 
competitiveness. 
Finally, while foreign direct investment has been an important source of capital 
and technology transfer in a number of sectors, in the textile sector, foreign investors had 
offered limited technology transfer and training beyond factory assembly and low-skill 
technical training (see section 5.3.4). After the recent global financial crisis, a more 
difficult problem in the sector is that while the industry continues to experience 
significant constraints that are difficult to overcome due to market failures, rent 
opportunities that were initially available to Vietnam to address these problems are no 
longer available. This problem makes it more challenging for the government to 
implement industrial policies for the purpose of upgrading and capability-building. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 offers an overview of the 
T&G industry, including its historical development structure and its foreign markets. 
Next, Section 5.3 provides a review of the externalities faced by the industry. In sections 
5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, rents, rents-seeking activities, and rent management factors are 
identified and analysed using the DRMA framework in three case studies. Section 5.7 
offers observations for policy options and possible directions to develop strategic plans 
that can strengthen the industry. 
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5.2. Background of the Textile and Garment Industry 
 
The textile and garment industry started in the 1980s in the framework of 
cooperative agreements with other Communist countries. The industry's main advantage 
was cheap labour. During this period, guaranteed market shares removed any incentive 
for innovation, industrial upgrading, or marketing development. In the wake of 
government economic reform in the 1990s, the communist-style economic cooperation 
was replaced by low value-added operations set up by foreign investors, especially from 
Taiwan and South Korea. These foreign investors built manufacturing facilities in 
Vietnam but exported the goods back to their home countries and, subsequently, to 
international buyers. Throughout this procedural linkage, Vietnamese private and public 
T&G enterprises had limited success at direct exporting to foreign buyers, as the large 
export shares were organised and controlled through foreign trading houses (IBM 
Belgium, et al., 2009). Compared to the major apparel producers in Bangladesh, China, 
India, and Sri Lanka, the industry in Vietnam is a late developer, having only achieved 
critical and world competitive mass starting in 2000. The sector’s relative immaturity is 
reflected in the limitations of skilled labour, technology, and technical and management 
skills (IBM Belgium, et al., 2009). 
	  
5.2.1. Chronology of Vietnam Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Agreements 
	  
There have been a number of important developments between Vietnam and its 
key partners since 1992. These developments are listed in chronological order. 
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1992  Vietnam signs bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the European Union (Vo, 
Trinh, & Dinh, 2004). 
1995 United States lifts trade embargo; normalises its relationship with Vietnam. 
1995 Vietnam joins ASEAN and commits to fulfilling agreements under the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area by 2006 (Vo, et al., 2004). 
1998 Vietnam becomes a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
2000  Vietnam signs Vietnam-United States BTA, to become effective December 2001 
(Vo, et al., 2004). 
2001  United States grants Vietnam normal trade relations status.  
2002  Vietnam signs free trade agreement creating the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 
with China and nine other members of the ASEAN.53 The agreement gives 
poorer nations like Vietnam until 2015 to open up to Chinese goods (Arnold, 
2010).  
2003 The Vietnam-United States Garment and Textile Agreement signed, to be 
renewed on a yearly basis unless renegotiated. Vietnamese export quotas were 
implemented and were broken into 25 categories, each of which is subject to 7 
per cent growth per year (except wool products, which grow at 2 per cent per 
year) (Martin, 2008). 
2006  U.S. Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) ends. Vietnam pledges to end all World 
Trade Organization (WTO)-prohibited subsidies in its textile and garment 
industry, as part of its WTO accession agreement. 
2007 Vietnam gains access to the WTO. 
                                                
53 “According to tax exemption plans under the framework of the ASEAN–China Free 
Trade Area, half of all tax lines were at 0–5 per cent in 2009. Furthermore, there will be 
zero tax on 40 percent of all tax lines in 2013, 100 per cent in 2015, and a flexible rate 
for 250 tax lines by 2018” (Voice of Vietnam, 2010). 
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2009 Vietnam–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement leads to the abolition of tariffs 
from Japan, starting in October 2009. 
2009  Duties on trade between Vietnam and ASEAN reduced from 5 per cent (under 
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff scheme) to 0 per cent, which 
effectively created a duty-free block. Flexibility, however, will allow import 
duties on some sensitive products to be eliminated by 1 January 2018. 
Consequently, Vietnam gained tariff-free access to two major Asian markets, 
Japan and ASEAN, in the same year.54 
2009 U.S. monitoring of Vietnam’s dumping in the textile sector expires in January, 
although there is some U.S. Congressional lobbying for a renewal.  
2010 The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area comes into effect. China and six ASEAN 
nations55 agree to trade more than 7,880 product categories, and 90 per cent of 
imported goods are to be freely exchanged with zero tariffs.56 
	  
5.2.2. Industry Organisation 
	  
There are diverse ownership structures within the T&G industry, including state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), private enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises with up to 
100 per cent foreign capital and joint ventures. The T&G industry is structured such that 
a large portion of state-owned firms are grouped under the Vietnam National Textile and 
Garment Group (Vinatex), a state-owned general corporation. Until recently, centrally 
                                                
54 Details for the trade agreement may be found at 
http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/annexes/ASEAN%20protocol%20AFTA.pdf 
55 These countries are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. 
56 Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are expected to participate by 2015. 
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controlled SOEs57 accounted for a large bulk of product output and were much better 
capitalised than smaller, locally controlled SOEs. However, the number of the former 
SOEs is decreasing due to equitization as part of the government’s commitment to the 
WTO. At the moment, Vinatex is the largest share-holding company58 in the sector.  
There are two active associations in the T&G industry: the Vietnam Textile and 
Apparel Association (VITAS) and the Association for Garment Textile Embroidery 
Knitting (AGTEK). These two organizations are somewhat disconnected from each other. 
VITAS was originally established by the government to act as the industry’s watchdog. 
It has 15 branches and 635 members, who account for 70 per cent of the total production 
capacity of the industry (Embassy of Denmark in Vietnam, 2010). VITAS represents its 
members and consults with state and government bodies, advising on policies and 
mechanisms relating to the development of the industry. In addition, VITAS acts for the 
industry in dealing with international buyers and facilitates contracts between domestic 
enterprises and foreign investors (Buisman & Wielenga, 2008). Because of VITAS’s 
close connection with the state and SOEs, an interviewee whose firm is a member of 
VITAS told me that it was largely a lobbyist for the SOEs, not for private or foreign 
enterprises.  
In contrast, AGTEK largely represents SMEs within the industry in the south, or 
approximately 62 per cent of the total businesses in the sector. It has fewer connections 
with the central government than VITAS; instead, it is heavily active in promoting 
business and trade opportunities among its members and buyers. Table 5.2 shows the 
diversity of the market structure in 2009, with the SOEs comprising 1 per cent of the 
                                                
57 There are two types of SOE in Vietnam. One type is controlled by the central 
government and the corresponding ministry to the industry, and the other type are 
provincial SOEs that are managed by local city or province governments. 
58  In Vietnam, a state-owned share-holding company represents the state and is 
responsible for managing the state’s funds in the industry. 
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total number of enterprises. The most common types of firms in the industry are joint 
stock, private companies, and limited companies, which constitute 76 per cent, while 
state owned firms constitute up to 1 per cent. In addition, foreign owned firms make up 
18 per cent of total enterprises. 
 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Enterprises in 2009 by Capital 
Type of ownership Total share (in per cent) 
State-owned Company 1 
Joint stock and limited company with state-
owned capital over 50% 
1 
Joint Stock and Limited Company with state-
owned capital less than 50% and private 
76 
FDI 18 
Cooperatives 4 
Source: Le (2011) 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates the industry structure by subsector. Of the five different 
subsectors in the T&G industry, weaving comprised 17 per cent of the sector’s 
enterprises in 2010 and it is perceived as an area where Vietnam may have a competitive 
advantage (Hill, 1998). 
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Table 5.3: Percentage of Garment Enterprises within T&G Industry in 2010 
Sector Subsectors Total share  
(in per cent) 
Garment    70 
Textile     
  Weaving 17 
  Spinning 6 
  Dyeing 4 
Supporting Industry   3 
Source: Le (2011), based on VITAS data. VITAS does not specify whether the 
percentages are based on total revenue, number of employees, or number of enterprises.	   
	  
Vietnam has relatively small spinning and dyeing subsectors because, as a senior 
representative of VITAS explained, these two require more skilled labour, which is 
limited in Vietnam. In addition, to be competitive, these subsectors require more 
sophisticated technology, while a significant proportion of the machines used in Vietnam 
are out-dated. My interviewees in the garment sector explained that the garment sector is 
more labour-intensive but requires less capital investment as compared with the textile 
sector. It also requires simpler technology and a shorter learning period. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the percentage of enterprise by location in 2009. 
Geographically, a little more than 60 per cent of T&G businesses are located in the 
southern part of the country, including the Mekong River Delta and provinces near Ho 
Chi Minh City. The Red River Delta is the second largest geographical area, after the 
southeast region. 27 per cent of T&G enterprises are in this region. A senior manager of 
a mid-sized firm told me that, in general, SOEs in Ho Chi Minh City and within its 
proximity were more business-oriented and market-driven, as well as having greater 
managerial autonomy than those around Hanoi. 
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Table 5.4: Percentage of T&G Enterprises by Location in 2009	  
Area Total share 
(in per cent) 
Southeast Area 58 
Red River Delta 27 
Northern Central Area and Central Coastal Area 7 
Mekong River Delta 4 
Northern Midland and Mountainous Area 3 
Highland 1 
Source: Le (2011) 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates Vietnam’s textile and garment exports by category in 2009. 
Among all categories, pants, shorts, jackets and coats, and knitted shirts together make 
up more than 60 per cent of all T&G exports. 
	  
Figure 5.2: Textile and Garment Export by Categories in 2009	  
	  
 Source: Le (2011)	  
	  
5.2.3. The Structure of Foreign Markets 
	  
Knitted Shirts 
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BY CATEGORIES IN 2009 
 229 
After the introduction of Doi Moi economic reforms in Vietnam in 1986, 
international markets started to open slowly for Vietnamese T&G exports. While there 
was a U.S. embargo between 1975 and 1995, during the late 1980s Vietnam’s major 
exporting market was the Soviet trade block, though that collapsed in 1991. After 1991, 
Vietnamese producers focused on the quota-free Asian and European markets (Thomsen, 
2007). Vietnam signed a trade agreement with the European Union in 1992, and became 
a member of the ASEAN trading block in 1995. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the impressive 
growth in export value between 2000–2011 following these agreements. 
	  
Figure 5.3: Vietnam T&G Exports 2001–2012 (in USD millions)	  
	  
Source: Author’s compilation based on Ha (2012) 
	  
 Figure 5.4 captures the total share of Vietnam’s exports to international markets: 
the United States (post-embargo), the European Union, Japan, and others in 2011. Today, 
Vietnam is the second largest T&G exporter to the United States, after China. It is the 
third biggest T&G exporter to Japan, and the fifth largest T&G exporter to the European 
Union (Le, 2012).  
	  
in million USD, 
17,200 
0 
2,000 
4,000 
6,000 
8,000 
10,000 
12,000 
14,000 
16,000 
18,000 
20,000 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
E
xp
or
t r
ev
eu
e 
 
 230 
Figure 5.4:  Vietnam’s Major Foreign Markets for T&G in 2011	  
	  
Source: Ha (2012) 
	  
5.2.3.1. The U.S. market 
	  
The first attempt to normalise trade relations between the United States and 
Vietnam was in 1993 when the embargo on Vietnam was lifted, though market entry 
barriers in the form of extremely high tariffs (in accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930) 
were imposed on Vietnamese products entering the United States. These tariffs were 
implemented because Vietnam was denied normal trade relations on the basis that it was 
a “non-market economy” (Thomsen, 2007). The U.S. decision to grant Vietnam normal 
trade relations status in December 2001 led to a shift in the structure of Vietnam’s 
clothing exports. In 2001, Vietnam’s combined clothing exports to Japan and member 
states of the EU amounted to more than two-thirds of its clothing exports. Prior to 
normal trade relations status, Vietnam shipped only 2.6 per cent of its clothing exports to 
the United States in the same year (Martin, 2008). 
	   After receiving normal trade relations status, Vietnam’s clothing exports to the 
United States jumped to nearly VND 20.65 trillion (USD 1 billion) in 2002, easily 
surpassing exports to both Japan and the EU-27 and making the United States the largest 
US, 43% 
EU, 16% Japan, 11% 
South 
Korea, 6% 
ASEAN, 2% 
Others, 
22% 
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clothing export market in 2002 (Martin, 2008). The sharp rise continued into 2003, when 
more than half of Vietnam’s clothing exports were sent to the United States (Martin, 
2008). This rapid export expansion happened because there were no imposed quotas on 
Vietnamese products headed for the U.S. market between 2001 and mid-2003. 	  
In 2004 and 2005, growth in clothing exports to the United States slightly 
decreased, in part due to an imposition of quotas by the United States (Martin, 2008). 
Overall, the export rate steadily rose between 2001 and 2003, decreased a little between 
2003 and 2005, and rose again between 2006 and 2007. In 2006 and 2007, Vietnamese 
exporters shifted their exports from the United States towards Japan and the EU-27 
based on Vietnam’s concerns about the possible continuation of protective measures by 
the United States. In addition, the continued weakening of the U.S. dollar and the 
slowdown in the U.S. economy made Japan and the EU-27 more attractive markets 
(Martin, 2008). After another brief decline in 2009, the market recovered in 2010 and 
experienced a major jump in 2011. Figure 5.5 illustrates the rate of export growth from 
Vietnam to the United States since 1996. 
	  
Figure 5.5:  Vietnam T&G Export to the United States (USD million) 	  
 
Source: Doan (2012b)	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5.2.3.2. The European market 
 
In 1992, the EU–Vietnam Textile and Clothing Agreement was signed, and by 
the late 1990s, 43.3 per cent of Vietnam’s clothing exports were going to the EU market 
(Hill, 2000). A later version of the EU–Vietnam Textile and Clothing Agreement was 
ratified in 2003. Beginning in 2005, WTO members were not allowed to place quotas on 
imports of textiles and garments from other members, but this did not affect Vietnam, as 
it did not become a WTO member until 2007. Nevertheless, the country was allowed to 
continue to export without quotas to the EU under a further revision of the bilateral trade 
agreement (Thomsen, 2007). Even so, Vietnam faces increasing competition from 
Eastern Europe as these countries have no import tax within the EU, have strong design 
capabilities, fast delivery times, and lower transportation costs (Agriculture Industry 
Marine Survey & Inspection Group, 2008). Figure 5.6 shows the Vietnam T&G export 
growth to Europe.  
 
Figure 5.6: Vietnam Textile and Apparel Export to the European Union Markets 
(USD million)	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Source: Author’s compilation of years 2001–2011 based on (Doan, 2012b); 
author’s compilation of year 2012 based on (Tran, 2013b). 
 
In terms of tariffs, imports from Vietnam to the European Union are subject to a 
9.6 per cent Generalised System of Preferences Tariff. While this rate is better than the 
12 per cent Most Favoured Nation tariff, it is less advantageous than the Least 
Developed Country tariff-free access that Bangladesh, one of Vietnam’s biggest 
competitors, enjoys (IBM Belgium, et al., 2009).  
	  
5.2.3.3. The Japanese market 
	  
Figure 5.7: Vietnam T&G Export to Japan (USD million) 
	  
Source: Authors compilation of years 2001-2011 based on Doan (2012b); author’s 
compilation of 2012 based on Tran (2013b). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.7, Vietnam’s T&G exports to Japan experienced a sharp 
increase between 1998 and 2000. Exports did slow down, however, between 2000 and 
2004 after the opening of the U.S. market, but increased after 2004 because of the U.S. 
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quota restrictions. Before 2009, Vietnamese exports were subject to a 10 per cent 
Japanese tariff, which ended that year when a bilateral trade agreement between the two 
countries was signed. The tariff-free access to Japan provided a major boost and 
continues to strengthen Vietnam’s position vis-a-vis other ASEAN exporters, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, all of whom already had duty-free 
access to Japan (IBM Belgium, et al., 2009). One result of this has been that Vietnam’s 
T&G exports to Japan saw a sharp rise between 2009 and 2012, with an increase of 46 
per cent in 2011 and 18 per cent in 2012 (Tran, 2013b). In addition to the tariff 
incentives from bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between the two countries, 
Japanese companies are also shifting their investments from China to Southeast Asian 
countries, including Vietnam, due to the increase in labour costs in China (Tran, 2013b). 
 
5.2.4. Vietnam’s Textile and Garment Industry in the Value Chain 
 
A major shortcoming of Vietnam’s T&G industry is that garment production has 
small value-added and profit margins despite its large exports volume. This is largely 
due to the country’s heavy dependence on imported raw materials and inability to move 
beyond garment manufacturing to fully integrate into the value chain. Without vertical 
integration, Vietnam cannot take advantage of the value in each step of the process. 
Table 5.5 features the estimated local content ratio in the T&G industry between 2005 
and 2012. 
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Table 5.5: Local Content Ratio between 2005–2012 (in USD million)	  
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Export Revenue 4,838 5,927 7,780 9,130 9,084 11,210 15,830 15,090
* 
Imports of Raw 
Materials 
4,365 4,992 6,356 7,064 6,422 8,912 12,000** 11,000 
Import of Fabric 2,399 2,980 3,980 4,454 4,226 5,378 6,750 7,045 
Local Content Ratio 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.27 
 
Source: Author’s compilation and calculation. *The General Customs Department 
claims the actual export value was VND 311.68 trillion (USD 15.09 billion) (Viet Bao, 
2013), although estimates by VITAS shows export revenue to be VND 355.26 trillion 
(USD 17.2 billion).59 If the earlier data is used, the local content ratio is 27 per cent. ** 
Estimate is based on interview with Le Tien Truong (2012), Deputy Director of Vinatex, 
who estimated that materials imported in the first nine months was VND 185.89 trillion 
(USD 9 billion). 
 
To create extra value-added, Vietnamese producers have two options: (1) create 
their own brands or (2) develop a larger base for textile production. Selling brand 
products in export markets is extremely difficult because Vietnamese producers have 
neither the experience nor the customer base to explore this option. Accordingly, the 
second option is more viable since Vietnam does have a tradition of textile production 
dating back to the postcolonial period, and thus the sector has	   the basic capability for 
                                                
59 The newspaper Vietbao (2013) reported that official data and export revenue appear to 
be higher than reality. During a field interview with a representative at AGTEK, I was 
told that a large number of materials entered Vietnam through the Vietnam–China border 
without being recorded.  
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upgrading and capacity-building. Furthermore, Vietnam has a large reserve of crude oil, 
which could be used to produce polyester fibre. In other words, for Vietnam to boost its 
value-added and profit margins, the development strategy must include reducing its 
dependence on raw materials and expand its textile production.  
Based on my interview with VITAS’s senior advisor, this strategy was identified 
by the government and the association in the late 1990s, when a number of important 
policies, for example, Decision 5560 and quota criteria, focused on building the textile 
sector. Unfortunately, these policies were largely unsuccessful. Vinatex’s investment in 
Dinh Vu Polyester Fibre Project (PVTEX)61 with state-owned Petro Vietnam starting 
2008 was another example of this effort. This joint investment project created one of the 
largest polyester fibre plants in Vietnam producing textile materials from petrochemical 
products. Dinh Vu Polyester Fibre Project once again affirms that to strengthen the 
development of the T&G industry, Vietnam must focus on reducing its dependence on 
imported materials, especially from China, and expand its textile production. Table 5.6 
explains the production chain in the textile and garment industry.  
	  
                                                
60 Decision 55/2001/QD-TTG (“Decision 55”) is the first industrial policy that was 
clearly formulated by the Vietnamese government to turn the T&G industry into an 
export-oriented industry. It was set out to boost investment and industrialization of the 
textile and garment industry by providing 35 trillion dong (approximately USD 2.2 
billion) between 2001 and 2005 in various projects (Martin, 2008). Decision 55 was 
revoked half way through implementation. 
61 For more information on PVTEX, see http://www.pvtex-dv.vn/en/Foundation-and-
development_77.aspx 
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Table 5.6: Stages of the T&G Value Chain 
Stages  
1. Raw 
Material 
Suppliers 
2. Textile 
Companies 
3. Clothing 
Manufacturers 
4. 
Wholesalers 
and 
Exporters 
5. 
Retailers 
Natural 
Fibres 
Cotton, 
Wool, Silk, 
Hemp 
Thread, Yarn, 
Fabric 
Cutting 
Assembly 
Finishing 
Labelling, 
Packaging, 
Shipping 
Marketing, 
Sale 
Synthetic 
Fibres 
Oil, 
Natural Gas 
Polymers 
Synthetic, 
Fibres, Cloth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
  Source: Martin (2008) 
	  
Based on this production chain, Vietnam’s trade and competitive advantage has 
been largely based on Stage 3, which uses low-cost labour, even while production in 
Stages 1 and 2 has shrunk drastically in the last two decades. The T&G industry became 
an importer of cotton and wool (Stage 1) in the first decade of the 2000s as domestic 
production of both types of material decreased dramatically, from 32,267 hectares 
(79,733 acres) in 2003 to 3,000 hectares (7,413 acres) in 2009 (Ha, 2012). In particular, 
cotton prices in international markets have fluctuated greatly in the last few years, 
causing problems for Vietnamese textile manufacturers. A former vice president of 
Thanh Cong T&G Company confirmed for me in an interview that Vietnam does not 
have a competitive advantage in cotton production and thus it must focus on producing 
textiles either from natural fibre or polyester fibre.  
The T&G industry also has not developed a broad textiles supply base (Stage 2). 
While Vietnam is an exporter of fibre – up to VND 28.91 trillion (USD 1.4 billion) in 
2012 (Thu-Ha, 2013) – it is an importer of fabric because the textile sector is especially 
weak in dyeing and finishing, and thus cannot produce high-quality textiles. The 
disparity in development between the textile and garment sectors is arguably due to the 
historical and technical make-up of the two sectors.  
 For example, before Doi Moi in 1986, the textile sector was larger and more 
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productive than the garment sector. During the 1990s, however, the textile sector fell 
behind and it continues to shrink. In 2011, it was down to approximately 27 per cent of 
the overall T&G industry (Le, 2011). Hill (1998) provides two possible explanations for 
the ailing of the textile sector. First, the collapse of Russian and Eastern European 
markets disrupted the sector’s major export markets, causing a considerable decline in 
output. Second, Doi Moi led to a major “shake out” of the industry, especially for SOEs. 
The government’s gradual withdrawal of subsidies caused state-owned textile factories 
to scramble to compete with both foreign and private entrants, especially with China 
(Hill, 1998). Hill’s observation was confirmed in my fieldwork in 2011 when a number 
of my interviewees expressed similar opinions. Subsequently, Vietnam’s low-quality 
textiles have lost ground to higher-quality foreign products, and now only supplies goods 
to the domestic market. 
Another reason is that, by its nature, the textile sector is capital-intensive and 
dependent on both economies of scale and experience in technology management. 
Vietnamese producers are weak on both criteria. For instance, an interviewee at VITAS 
explained that it requires, on average, VND 310.56 billion (USD 15 million) in 
investment capital to establish a dyeing factory that could produce 10 million meters of 
fabric. The Vietnamese textile sector also suffers from limited skilled workers (Nghi, 
2011). The garment sector, on the other hand, is a consumer-oriented industry with 
“mature” technology and significant capital investment is not required. What is more 
important in this sector is knowledge of international marketing channels, attention to 
quality control, management of stocks, and capacity to reliably deliver outputs. In 
addition, as an interviewee who is an expert and representative at AGTEK explained, 
because learning requires less time and effort, it is easier to hire and train new workers, 
so there is no labour shortage in the garment sector. In essence, the textile sector’s 
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history (removal of subsidies and market) and its structure (being both capital- and 
technology-intensive) hurt the development of the textile sector after the liberalisation of 
the industry. Table 5.7 captures the difference between the textile and the garment 
sectors. 
	  
Table 5.7: Key Distinctions Between the Textile and Garment Sectors in 
Vietnam	  
 Characteristics Textile Garment 
Intensity Capital-intensive Labour-intensive 
Scale of Economies Important Less important 
Ownership  SOEs, foreign firms More diverse: SOEs, foreign and private firms 
Vertical Integration 
Common to have 
integration into spinning 
and weaving 
Some integration during the 
planning period but less common 
as garment exports increase 
Size Mostly large firms Mostly small- to medium- sized firms 
Market Mostly domestic (except for unfinished fibre) 
Mostly foreign (esp. the EU, 
Japan, and US) 
Source: Adapted from Hill (1998) 
	  
Finally, Vietnamese exporters have not gained capability in either global 
wholesale or retail markets (Stages 4 and 5). To move along to these stages, Vietnamese 
T&G firms must move from	  relying on buyer’s inputs to finding independently sourced 
inputs. Tran (2012a) points out that because 70 per cent of inputs are still provided by 
suppliers or brand holders, it is difficult for Vietnamese T&G producers to break into the 
established relationships between brand holders and their suppliers.62 Data from my 
fieldwork in 2011 confirmed this assertion. A high-ranking VITAS representative 
                                                
62 Local content in 2012 was also roughly 27 per cent based on VND 309.82 trillion 
(USD 15 billion) in revenue, and roughly VND 227.2 (USD 11 billion) in imported 
materials. 
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informed me that up to 70 per cent of Vietnamese producers still do not have access to 
independent source of inputs. In 2012, the local content ratio was at roughly 27 per cent 
(see Table 5.5). Between 2007 and 2012, Vietnamese producers were active in marketing 
and sales (Stage 5) largely in the domestic market, especially in promoting medium- to 
high-end apparels.63 This is a stepping-stone to eventually penetrating the international 
market. 
	  
5.3. Constraints in the Textile and Garment Industry 
	  
In the previous section, this thesis asserted that, so far, the T&G industry has 
been largely trapped in the low-skill segment of the value chain in garment production. 
While Vietnam shows some comparative advantage in natural and polyester fibre 
production, supplies for finished cloth and fabric are lacking. In addition, the industry 
shows no signs of entering the global value chain as wholesalers or retailers. Finally, 
only a limited number of producers—approximately 30 per cent—have been able to sign 
Free on Board (FOB)64 contracts with foreign buyers.	  
This section assesses the constraints that inhibit the industry’s development and 
explains the industry’s failure to upgrade and to move up the value chain. There are four 
identifiable constraints.  
                                                
63 The low-end market is largely occupied by cheap Chinese apparel that is imported 
illegally across the border. 
64 “Producing garments on FOB (Free On Board) terms requires the producer to deliver 
goods on board a vessel designated by the buyer. The seller fulfils its obligations to 
deliver when the goods have passed over the ship's rail. Producing garments for FOB 
business generates significantly higher margins since the manufacturer sources the fabric 
him/herself and, in some cases, contributes to the pattern design. However, due to the 
skills and capital required, FOB business is still too risky for most private and state‐
owned Vietnamese producers” (Buisman & Wielenga, 2008, pp. 39-40). 
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a) A lack of skilled labour, especially in the textile sector, although a labour 
shortage has been a major issue across the board.  
b) A shortage of land and capital, especially in subsectors such as weaving, 
dyeing, and finishing (which are capital- and technology-intensive).  
c) Weak coordination and management capacity at both state and firm levels, 
which discourages the industry to orient itself for strategic growth. 
d) A lack of modern machinery and equipment, so technical learning and 
upgrading has been slow. 
These constraints are now discussed individually. 
 
5.3.1. A Lack of Skilled Labour 
	  
The significance of skilled labour shortages is disputed by researchers in the field. 
Some investigators maintain that Vietnam has certain competitive advantages over China, 
including that Vietnamese textile workers have proficient embroidery and needlework 
skills (Nieuwoudt, 2009). Since manufacturers need these special skills, the Vietnamese 
textile labour force ought be in a good position. However, if the T&G sector is split into 
downstream (Stage 3) and upstream production (Stage 2), a larger workforce is in the 
garment sector, where jobs require a shorter learning curve (approximately three months 
according to two producers that I interviewed), and it is customary for garment factories 
to provide training.  
Conversely, the textile sector faces a substantial shortage of technicians and 
engineers, especially in the fields of spinning, weaving, dyeing, and finishing. 
Interviewees at both VITAS and AGTEK pointed out to me that labour shortages have 
been an important inhibitor to the T&G industry, but especially in the textile sector for 
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two reasons. First, engineering students tend to study for high-tech industries, such as 
computer science and electronics, rather than for the textile sector. This negative image 
is most likely carried over from when textile producers were only state-owned and 
perceived as bureaucratic and inefficient. The second reason is low wages. In my 
fieldwork in 2011, an engineer who works for a state-owned textile producer in Ho Chi 
Minh City told me that his salary is approximately VND 3.09 million (USD 150) per 
month. In the telecommunications industry, engineers with similar years of experience  
(2–5 years) make between VND 5.18–10.3 million (USD 250–500) per month. The same 
engineer explained that the only reason he has not switched to another field is because he 
likes his job and is reluctant to take the risk of changing career.  
The problem of skilled labour shortage is not unknown to the Vietnamese 
government. In the past two decades, Vinatex was assigned by the government to open 
training campuses in both the north and the south to address these shortages. The state 
owned corporation now has five colleges that specialise in technical training for the 
textile sector, including associate degrees in mechanical engineering, sewing technology, 
and fashion design. As of 2013, three campuses operate bachelor degree programs in 
engineering. Despite this effort, businesses in this industry, especially in the textile 
sector, continue to struggle to find workers who are genuinely interested in working in 
textile production. Workers reportedly demand higher pay and, in general, tend to switch 
jobs to foreign producers after being trained locally. 
	  
5.3.2. A Shortage of Capital and Land 
	  
It has been well documented that throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s 
loans at low interest rates from the major Vietnam state-owned banks were extremely 
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difficult to obtain, especially for private enterprises (Hill, 1998; Thomsen, 2007). During 
this period, according to Corte and Berggren, credit was largely available to SOEs, 
though the official credit system lacks transparency and information to confirm this (see 
Thomsen, 2007). However, “Since private enterprise owners generally lack ownership 
rights65 over land and buildings, they have few possibilities to offer collateral against 
loans from the official banking system” (Thomsen, 2007, pp. 761-762). In essence, 
market constraints related to capital and land shortage were less severe in the state sector 
because SOEs were privileged to have easier access to credit through the state-owned 
banks and historically, they occupied large area of land given by the government during 
the centrally planed period. By comparison, access to capital and land were much more 
constrained for private, especially domestic enterprises such that it hindered the 
development of these enterprises. 
The lack of capital and access to credit is particularly an obstacle for Vietnamese 
producers achieve higher value addition products, especially for the EU market. First, 
working capital is needed to order and pay for stock, fabric, and components, and then to 
produce on what are usually 90-day payment terms. Second, EU buyers are increasingly 
reluctant to accept contracts that are based on Letters of Credit66. Third, capital is 
required for wages and salaries between orders because if there is a gap of time between 
orders, investors must continue to pay wages while workers are waiting for work. Thus, 
                                                
65 In Vietnam, land is not considered private property, and hence enterprise owners either 
rent land or obtain land-use rights (so-called red books) for it. Renting is relatively 
expensive and also insecure. Red books can be obtained in two ways: either through 
transfer or through leasing from the government. Obtaining land-use rights through 
leasing is a very lengthy and costly process. As a result, an estimated 70 per cent of all 
transactions in red books take place in the vibrant, yet unofficial, market through which 
private businesses mainly lease plots of land from SOEs or farmers (Buisman & 
Wielenga, 2008, p. 39). 
66 The seller discounts the Letter of Credit at local bank or uses it as collateral for loans. 
A bank Letter of Credit guarantees that a shipment from the seller to the buyer will be 
delivered on time and for the correct amount.  
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capital must remain readily available to cover for this period (Thomsen, 2007). In recent 
years, changes have been made to allow private enterprises to have more access domestic 
capital through bank loans. However, at 16.94 per cent in 2011 (World Bank, 2013), the 
lending rate remains exceptionally high and unaffordable for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
Shortage of capital and credit also explains why private and domestic SMEs 
prefer to participate in this sector instead of in textile manufacturing. As a consequence, 
the textile sector is largely dominated by either SOEs with state financing or foreign 
investors. As SOEs are gradually equitized, more FDI is invested in the textile sector, 
although almost all of their production is used either for direct or indirect exporting67 and 
thus textiles produced by foreign investors in Vietnam are largely not available in the 
domestic market. Consequently, capital investment from FDI has failed so far to supply 
textile materials for garment producers in the domestic market. In essence, the bottleneck 
in textile materials for garment production continues to be a major shortfall, much of it 
caused by private businesses’ shortage of capital and lack of access to land and credit. 
 
5.3.3. Weak Coordination and Management Structure 
	  	  
The textile and garment industry has weak coordination and management 
structures, which inhibit its development. At the state level, there are nearly no close 
exchanges between the state and T&G firms. Hill (1998), during fieldwork in the late 
1990s for UNIDO, reported that “channels of communication between the industry and 
the government do not appear to be well developed” (p. 54). At the ministry level “senior 
                                                
67 Indirect exporting occurs where foreign investors use their own textiles manufactured 
in Vietnam as materials for their garment production also in Vietnam. This process 
reduces transaction costs. 
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government officials have great background knowledge of the industry and its historical 
development,” however, private firms feel the opposite, in that the government knows 
little about this sector, is not interested in their problems, and offers an unfriendly 
regulatory environment (Hill, 1998, p. 53). More than a decade later, Hill’s observation 
was confirmed through my interviews with garment producers in Ho Chi Minh City 
during my 2011 fieldwork. Small business owners felt largely detached or were unaware 
of the policy agenda in Hanoi and did not think that the government played a role in 
supporting their businesses (interview, 2011). Small garment producers, in particular, felt 
no connection with either VITAS or AGTEK to explore business relationships with 
foreign investors. A small domestic garment producer in Ho Chi Minh City told me in 
2011 that, on the whole, she prefers that the government should not interfere with her 
business activities, stop administrative and tax harassments, and “leave her alone to run 
the business.”  
Of the two associations representing textile and garment firms, VITAS represents 
state enterprises while AGTEK represents private firms mostly based in the south68. It 
appears that these two associations are neither in close contact with one other nor do they 
function in expected ways to channel information and facilitate business opportunities 
with foreign buyers. The lack of communication may be due to the fact that these 
associations serve two different types of enterprises. VITAS was created by the 
Vietnamese government, is always headed by the chairman of Vinatex and is known to 
have close contacts with SOEs and is supportive of them. AGTEK was originally created 
by businessmen of Chinese-Vietnamese descent in the south to promote business 
opportunities and trade among medium-sized southern producers, is mostly self-
governed by its members, is said to have only loose contacts with the Ministry of 
                                                
68 There does not seem to be representation for private firms in the north. 
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Industry and Trade (MoIT), with weak lobbying capability. AGTEK functions largely to 
share information and business opportunities among its members.  
Among the state enterprises, there are only a few research institutions, which 
have limited capacity and mostly operate under Vinatex. None of these institutions can 
support producers, especially SMEs, with updated market information, technologies, or 
strategies to attract global buyers. With a lack of coordination at the industry level, 
businesses often have to find their own source of supplies and business contracts. As a 
result, the SMEs in the industry have limited competitiveness, except for the ability to 
lower prices and squeeze wages, and are slow in acquiring new capacity through 
upgrading their technical and management capacities. In Table 5.8, VITAS provides an 
overall rating of the supporting organisations for Vietnam’s garment and textile industry, 
ranking them from 1 (no support) to 5 (very strong support). While VITAS has the 
highest scores, it nonetheless remains disconnected with non-members and SMEs in the 
south. These supporting institutions’ poor service quality and lack of coordination 
between the state, buyers, and producers explain the industry’s limited capacity to move 
up the value chain and to increase value addition for their exports. 
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Table 5.8: Summary of Vietnam’s Trade Support Organisations in the T&G 
Sector	  
 Training Trade Info. 
Design 
Research 
Technical 
Research 
Policy 
Advocacy Remarks 
VITAS 3 4 0 0 4 Plays important role in 
policy advocacy; good 
source of information 
but needs better 
dissemination 
AGTEK  3.5 3.5 0 0 2.5 Quite active in  
training and trade 
information 
Research 
institutes 
and 
universitie
s  
2 0 2 2 1 Education and research 
loosely connected to 
enterprises 
Vietnam 
Fashion 
Design 
Institute 
(FADIN) 
2 0 3.5 0 2 Good at design research 
for fashion purpose; 
loosely associated with 
enterprises’ requirement 
Vocationa
l schools 
2.5 0 1 1 0 Sewing training offered 
is quite basic; backward 
facilities 
Source: VITAS (2006). 1 = no support; 2 = weak or poor support; 3 = average 
support; 4 = strong support; 5= very strong support. 
 
At the firm level, except for those that have FDI investment, local businesses 
remain passive in its management, especially regarding industrial upgrading, developing 
global marketing strategies, and confronting competition from abroad. Hill (1998) points 
out that senior management of SOEs lack significant commercial experience, which is a 
customary prerequisite for running a large corporation, and often operate “as a little more 
than production units” (p. 46). In addition, “the management of SOEs seems to lack any 
real international marketing expertise, and appear content to wait for overseas buyers to 
approach them with orders” (Hill, 1998, p. 46). These observations no longer hold for 
some of Vinatex largest producers, such as Phong Phu, Viet Tien, or May 10, and 
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especially for joint-stock companies, such as Nha Be and An Phuoc. However, a VITAS 
representative who used to work as a high-level manager for Vinatex told me that he 
observed that smaller and provincial SOEs continue to maintain weak management 
capacity, though VITAS has been active in providing management training for its 
members.  
Similarly, Schaumburg-Muller (2009) describes that when firms were asked 
about their strategies for product upgrading, obtaining new customers and markets, and 
strengthening their design and marketing capability, firm owners “seem to be passive 
price takers with no intention or possibility of using the price as a parameter in relation 
to their buyers, and there was no clear sign of a changing strategy with respect to 
sourcing of materials” (p. 169). The widespread lack of management skills and limited 
market knowledge, especially among the SOEs, is causing dependency on inputs from 
buyers. Overall, there is a gridlock in coordination and management skills at various 
levels, from state to private, within the industry. 
 
5.3.4. Machinery, Equipment, and Technical Upgrading 
	  
In his fieldwork, Hill (1998) found that in the late 1990s, the stock of equipment 
in many of the businesses was antiquated and that “most firms appear to have an 
unusually wide range of machinery, some of which has reportedly been delivered on an 
ad hoc basis to firms as part of aid programs and without any integrated production 
operating plan” (p. 46). The situation is slightly more positive with foreign investment. 
SOEs in joint ventures with foreign partners can take advantage of foreign technology, 
management, and marketing skills, but even here there are mixed results. As several 
interviewees said to me, while some SOEs managed to upgrade and became more 
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competitive such as Nha Be Corporation Joint Stock Company and An Phuoc Company, 
others lagged behind from management’s poor incentives to upgrade. 
	  
[Some] SOEs see these joint ventures as a means of covering their basic 
operating costs, rather than as a dynamic business calculation in which local 
partners can absorb, emulate and then ultimately innovate on the basis of the 
foreign firm's superior technological, managerial and marketing skills. The 
literature on foreign investment and 'spillovers' suggests that this is the major 
potential benefit for local partners, and that in the right environment these 
dynamic benefits can be substantial. Surprisingly, Vietnamese SOEs interviewed 
did not appear to attach much importance to the possibility that joint ventures 
could provide a means of increasing their own levels of efficiency and 
productivity (Hill, 1998, p. 46).  
	  
Despite this grim outlook, in the past decade the T&G industry has attracted a 
substantial amount of foreign investment. Between 2007 and 2012, there have been 485 
FDI projects in the T&G industry with a total registered capital of more than VND 41.31 
trillion (USD 2 billion). In 2012, the largest foreign investor in the Vietnamese textile 
and clothing industry was Japan, followed by South Korea and Hong Kong. According 
to an interview with an expert and representative at AGTEK, firms with joint ventures 
with foreign investors have outperformed domestic firms in technological adoption. 
However, spillovers to from foreign investment to domestic labour force and firms have 
been limited, and foreign investors actively hide trade secrets and technical expertise 
(such as dyeing technique) from local employees and partners.  
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For domestic producers, even though additional investments have been made to 
improve machinery throughout the industry, it has been too little and does not satisfy the 
demand for rapid expansion and aggressive upgrading so as to increase production and 
quality (IBM Belgium, et al., 2009). Specific data on technology investment is limited 
for this sector, although starting in the early 2000s, there is some evidence of investment 
in modern machinery. In 2006 the sector added 171,720 new spindles and 5,840 open-
end rotors. This followed a period of expansion between 1997 and 2006, when 840,132 
spindles and 19,784 open-end rotors were obtained (Buisman & Wielenga, 2008). In the 
weaving sector, Buisman and Wielenga (2008) reported that the sector added 6,012 
shuttle-less looms between 1997 and 2006. All this data indicates a degree of rapid 
growth and perhaps even technological upgrading in the industry. These figures are 
summarised in Table 5.9, which shows that Vietnam is slowly moving towards modern 
manufacturing technology (Buisman & Wielenga, 2008). 
	  
Table 5.9: Investment in Machinery between 1997 and 2006 
Investment/Year 1997-2006 2005 2006 
Spindles 840,132 __ 171,720 
Open-end rotors 19,784 __ 5,840 
Shuttle-less looms 6,012 476 1,357 
Source: Buisman & Wielenga (2008) 
 
Although it appears that technology adoption and the value of technical training 
remains limited, during my fieldwork in 2011, representatives at VITAS and AGTEK 
each pointed out that it would be misleading to think that Vietnamese producers do not 
have advanced machinery in both sectors. They explained that the real problem lies in 
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learning how to use these machines to improve production and output quality, to which 
Vietnamese producers do not give due attention. The VITAS representative told me that 
SOEs would often spend large capital investments to buy the hardware (equipment) but 
would skip buying the software (know-how) that shows how to operate the machines. 
These managers thought that the firms could learn how to use the machine on their own 
on the basis of learning by doing instead of receiving training either from foreign sellers 
or the software that comes with the machines. However, as engineers are afraid of 
damaging the new machines, they often avoid operating and, thus learning, them. When 
they did, they would use them only to produce their traditional low-quality products. 
This short-sightedness caused these producers to lose advantage of the new technology 
to maximise their production capacity. “When it comes to technological upgrading, 
textile managers are slow in learning and integrating new technology to their productive 
operation,” said my interviewee from VITAS. 
In summary, the T&G industry faces a number of difficulties in advancing 
technological adoption to boost productivity, especially among domestic producers. A 
major constraint for domestic (mostly state-owned) textile producers in acquiring new 
equipment and updated technology is that they are capital-intensive and require a great 
deal of effort in learning the new equipment and technology. And, as mentioned above, 
when new machinery is purchased, there is a failure to acquire the knowledge of how to 
use them. In particular, the financing of the learning process is subject to important 
market failures (Khan, 2009b). This constraint will become more urgent as domestic 
firms look to move up the value chain. 
 
5.3.5. Introduction to the Case Studies 
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In sections 5.2, this chapter outlined the preconditions of the T&G industry by 
discussing its historical context, chronology of trade agreements with major countries, 
and the structure of firms. So far this chapter has argued that the industry’s low value-
added and profit margins in exports and its failure to move up the value chain has largely 
been due to a weak upstream sector, especially in textile production. Section 5.3 
identifies four market constraints that have held back the industry’s industrial 
development: (1) lack of skilled labour, (2) shortage of capital and land, (3) weak 
coordination and management structure, and (4) ineffective machinery and technical 
upgrading. 
The following sections present three case studies that together offer a detailed 
picture of the rent-seeking and rent management factors within the T&G industry and 
how they influenced the development of the industry as a whole. The purpose of these 
case studies is to assess the mixture of political, institutional, market, and firm factors 
(the DRMA framework) to explain why there are high or low levels of effort put forth to 
raise productivity. The three case studies consist of (1) an examination of the quota 
period, (2) an investigation of the “China factor,” and (3) the mixed role of Vinatex as 
rent-seeker, policymaker, and industry facilitator in the state sector. This chapter ends 
with some observations in the generation of a developmental rent management strategy 
as the industry moves forward.  
	  	  
5.4. Case Study 1: The Quota Period (2001–2006) 
 
MFA quota restrictions for Vietnamese textiles and garments started in 1992 
based on a bilateral agreement with the European Union (Thoburn, 2007).69 In 2001, 
Vietnam officially gained access to the U.S. market with the signing of the US–Vietnam 
                                                
69 Japan did not impose MFA quotas or prohibitive tariffs on Vietnamese T&G exports. 
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BTA. This agreement effectively made Viet Nam eligible for American MFA quota. The 
agreement gave Vietnam a short grace (or quota-free) period from 2001 to 2002 
(Thoburn, 2007). Starting in January 2003, the United States imposed an MFA quota to 
restrict trade volume under the US–Vietnam Textile and Garment Agreement.70 The 
American MFA quota officially ended in 2006, preceding Vietnam’s membership to the 
WTO in January 2007.71 This case study largely details quota distribution for exports to 
the United States between 2001 and 2006, focusing on 2003 and 2004 where 
mismanagement of quota distribution reached is height. This is an important case study 
because the quota period presents a missed opportunity for industrial upgrading in the 
T&G industry. It also provides an example of a rent intended for learning that turned into 
a redistributive rent. 
When the United States assigned the MFA quota to Vietnam in 2003, the 
government passed the responsibility for the allocation of the quota to individual plants 
to the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Industry,72 which were the ministries in 
charge of the T&G industry at the time. Subsequently, quota distribution was reassigned 
to the Inter-ministerial Managing Group (hereafter, the managing group), comprising 
representatives from the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Industry (MoI), and VITAS. 
This group was led by Khu Xuan Bui and Dau Van Mai, both deputy ministers of the 
Ministry of Commerce, and by Thang Van Le, deputy director general of the Import–
Export Department of the Ministry of Trade. 
                                                
70  Details of the US–Vietnam Textile and Garment Agreement can be found at 
http://vietnamese.vietnam.usembassy.gov/textile_agreement.html. 
71 MFA quota restriction ended in January 1, 2005 for all WTO members. Because 
Vietnam did not join the WTO until 2007, the US MFA quota applied to Vietnamese 
exporters until 2006. 
72 The Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry were the predecessors to the 
MoIT. 
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At the height of this rent seeking period between 2003 and 2004, there were 
significant rent seeking activities associated with getting a quota allocation and this 
resulted in firms bribing to obtain quotas. As a result of these rent-seeking activities, 
much of the rent that could potentially have been used to upgrade firm capabilities were 
transferred to the agencies making the allocations. Our case study assesses how this rent-
seeking experience affected the learning effort in the industry and examines the rent 
management mechanism that produced the negative rent outcome.   
It should be noted that Vietnam’s access to the U.S. market and subsequently the 
U.S. MFA quotas had positive effects on the initial setup of the industry leading to its 
rapid expansion – revenue growth jumped 40 per cent in 2002, 33 per cent in 2003, and 
20 per cent in 2004 (see Table 5.1). Without having access to the American market, the 
T&G industry would not have expanded this much – doubling the size of revenue growth 
in 3 years is a significant increase. Nonetheless, this case study only assesses the 
secondary effects of the MFA quota period asserting that the quotas were not allocated 
efficiently to further enhanced technology acquisition and vertical linkages between the 
textile and garment sectors. In this context, this author does not dismiss the relevance 
and importance of the U.S. MFA to the T&G industry’s development. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this case study to trace how the U.S. MFA had such primary effects. 
Rather, this case study aims to analyse the secondary effects. That is, once the garment 
industry had already grown to certain extent (up until 2002), the allocation of quotas 
could have been managed more effectively than it was to promote value addition and 
industrial upgrading for the industry as a whole. 
	  
5.4.1. DRMA Step 1 - Learning Rents 
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Although quotas are often viewed as a restriction to trade, it was considered a 
benefit by Vietnamese garment producers because it came with the opening of the large 
U.S. export market that these producers could not access prior to 2001. A quota imposed 
by an external actor like the United States on its overall garments imports, with quotas 
for individual countries, for instance the ones granted through the United States–Vietnam 
Textile and Garment Agreement, creates rents for the Vietnamese producers who can 
export using their quota allocations. This is because the market price is raised in the U.S. 
as a result of the quotas to a level that is higher than it would have been, and indeed this 
is the intention to protect domestic U.S. garments predictors. Despite the fact that the 
Vietnamese government did not create the quota rents, it managed its allocation to 
individual Vietnamese producers through its institutional mechanisms of quota allocation. 
The rent management factor therefore involved the policies and institutions that 
determined quota allocation. According to the VietnamNet (2004), quota allocation was 
primarily based on the following criteria.  
 
1. The prior year’s performance or previous production capacity; 
2. New investment in machinery; 
3. Percentage of local content, especially local textiles in garment exports; 
4. Export relationship with large U.S. importers and distributors; 
5. Location: priority was to be given to garment producers in poor provinces. 
 
Procedurally, a garment manufacturer must submit an application for quota 
together with documentations proving that he or she had met the criteria for quota 
allocation including advanced contracts with foreign buyers. The managing group 
subsequently reviewed the application. If it was approved for meeting all the criteria, a 
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quota was then granted to the firm with a small administrative fee called gia cong in 
Vietnamese (or official price). 
The official criteria for quota allocation were thus aligned to reward investment, 
success in exporting and production and also to address regional inequalities. Elements 
of the formal rent allocation mechanism could therefore be interpreted as providing 
‘learning rents’ for both the garment and the textile sectors. First of all, the criterion— 
enterprise performance in the prior year—targeted technical and organisational 
capability building. That is, the more an enterprise improved its industrial capability 
based on the previous year’s performance, the more likely that enterprise received a 
quota the following year. Second, the local content criterion was intended to promote the 
use of local materials (textiles and accessories) in garment exports, thus providing a 
market for the textile sector to expand production and potentially to upgrade their price 
and quality under pressure from the garments exporters. Finally, the criterion of 
rewarding new investment in machinery and facilities should have encouraged T&G 
producers to update their technical capability and equipment to boost productivity. 
 
5.4.2. DRMA Step 2 – Redistributive Incentives of the Rents 
 
The incentives potentially created by the rents and the formal allocation rules 
could induce higher investments, support learning, raise domestic content, and reduce 
regional inequalities, or they may just be captured by powerful groups and resulted in 
redistributive rents. In this case, there are two potential incentives created by learning 
rents from the American MFA quota. First, there were incentives and potential pressures 
for expanding production, technology acquisition and linkages given quota allocation’s 
criteria and export potentials to the U.S. market. This is because the allocation of the 
 257 
quota did give the quota recipients a rent and there were conditions on the quota 
allocation that should have produced incentives and compulsions to upgrade if the 
conditions were properly monitored and enforced.  
Second, rents could also be captured by connected firms willing to bribe to obtain 
additional quotas from the managing group. In 2003, the co che xin cho (application-
granting mechanism) set up by the managing group not only did not create real pressure 
for productive outcomes, but also actually encouraged rent-seeking activities that simply 
resulted in the redistribution or transfer of the rents to other agencies. For example, in 
2004, Truong Dinh Tuyen, then Minister of Commerce, admitted to the Party Congress 
that the stakes were too high, so rent seeking to obtain quotas was unavoidable. “Where 
there is a distribution mechanism, there will be wrongdoings,” he said (see Phuoc-Vinh, 
2004). He also acknowledged that the allocation mechanism, which was arranged by the 
managing group through a granting structure, was largely flawed because it lacked 
independent monitoring and supervision from a higher authority or agency (VietnamNet, 
2004). 
In my fieldwork in 2011, one interviewee, who worked in the management of a 
T&G SOE in 2004, asserted that the management group was not interested in boosting 
industrial capability, improving local content, or developing upstream industries for 
garment exports. In his opinion, despite these formal criteria for quota application, 
government officials in charge of the allocation were engaged in the capture of financial 
benefits by allocating quotas. 
	  
5.4.3. The Scandal 
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The scandal was first exposed in late 2004 when the deputy director general in 
the Import–Export Department, Le Van Thang, reportedly received money under the 
table from A Chau, a Vietnamese garment manufacturer, on a number of occasions and 
yet did not provide the quota that he promised. The company reported the case to the law 
enforcement authorities, which led to the discovery of a large-scale exchange of quotas 
on the black market at both the ministry and the firm level.  
A Vietnamese newspaper, VNExpress (2004) reported that a common scenario 
was that Company A would apply and receive a promise that it had a quota allocation 
from the managing group  (for example, 20,000 dozen garment pieces). However, by the 
time the garments were ready to be sent to a U.S. buyer, Company A would have only 
received one-third of its requested quota despite having proof of meeting all of the 
criteria. Another scenario was that officials in the managing group would receive bribes 
to sign quota allocations for garment producers who did not meet the criteria for quotas. 
For instance, Company B did not have a factory, workers, or equipment, and was only 
specialised in import–export (not manufacturing), yet it received a quota for 1 million 
dozen garment pieces (VNExpress, 2004). Similarly, although some state-connected 
enterprises in Hanoi were relatively small, they often obtained large quotas, which they 
then either were not able to deliver on time or had to subcontract to other enterprises.  
An interviewee in my fieldwork, who was a “quota broker” at the time, said that 
companies obtained fake contracts with textile firms to falsely report local content 
percentage, as well as providing false reports of previous performance in order to justify 
large quota allocations. In 2004, the Vietnamese newspaper Vietbao pointed out that 
there was a business that falsely reported that they bought textiles from local producers 
and that Le Van Thang signed quota authorisations, knowing that the claim was false 
(Tung-Duy, 2004). It eventually was learned that Thang had received multiple bribes 
 259 
from quota brokers and, in the end, 17 government officials and businessmen was sent to 
jail for bribery, corruption, and abuse of authority for personal enrichment (Tung-Duy, 
2004). 
 
5.4.4. Dynamics of Rent-seeking  
 
The rent-seeking activities during the quota period took two forms. In the first, as 
just described, firms bribed government officials to receive quotas from the managing 
group, despite their weak productive capacity or false claims of meeting other criteria.  
The second form involved quota exchanges in the black market. Initially, the 
government announced that quota exchange among enterprises was illegal. The law 
made clear that an enterprise that could not fulfil its quota must return the quota to the 
managing group for reallocation. However, between 2003 and 2004, the deputy minister 
of the Ministry of Commerce Dau Van Mai, signed three official documents that 
permitted enterprises to chuyen nhuong (freely exchange) their quota allocations among 
themselves (Cong-Minh, 2006). Consequently, these official documents allowed 
enterprises to buy and sell quotas that they had illegally obtained from the managing 
group, thus creating a market for quota exchange. This development immediately caused 
quotas to become overvalued, and even led to speculative trading. The same interviewee, 
the “quota broker”, told me that at one time in early 2004, the unofficial sale price of 
quotas in the black market was many times higher than its initial purchase price of 
quotas (including the cost of bribery).73 In this context, the second form of rent-seeking 
took place. For example, there might be two garment producers—one who received 
quotas from the government but either was unwilling or unable to produce (GP1) and 
                                                
73 VNExpress (2004) reported that quota price in the black market was possibly 20 times 
higher than the official fee in some categories that were in high demand such as t-shirt. 
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one who did not receive the quota but could produce (GP2). GP2 would likely buy the 
quota from GP1 in order to produce and sell their garment to U.S. buyers.  
Under these rent-seeking systems, all parties made a profit from quota exchange. 
The government official (GO) received bribes; GP1 received rents from the difference 
between the bribe that it paid out to GO1 and the payment that it received from GP2; and 
GP2 received a profit from selling garments to American buyers. However, GP2’s profits 
were much less if it had to buy its quota from GP1 instead of being allocated its quota 
through the legal system, which only requires a small administrative fee. According to 
research done by VnExpress (2004), the unofficial costs of payment for the quota often 
took approximately one-third of the total value of the contract signed between 
Vietnamese producers and American buyers. For instance, while the contractual price 
with foreign buyers for the jacket category was approximately 4 USD per piece, in the 
black market, illegal quota price for jackets fluctuated between 1–1.5 USD per piece 
(VNExpress, 2004). VNExpress also reported that in order to maintain its 
competitiveness a (GP2) firm might make up for the cost by squeezing worker salaries 
instead of transferring the cost of its rent seeking to American customers via increased 
prices (it could not do the latter simply because there are other sellers from other 
countries) (VNExpress, 2004).  
If quotas had been properly managed, rents would have been realised in the form 
of large profits for successful exporting firms that were engaged in investment and 
upgrading, which could then have been reinvested to further increase their capacity. That 
new capacity would have allowed such firms to gain even more quotas from the official 
system relative to less successful firms. Furthermore, garments exporters would have the 
incentive to pay a little more for locally produced textiles to boost their local content. 
This could have created incentives for expansion and pressures for price and quality 
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improvement in the textile sector, since the quota system was not going to be a 
permanent one. This is a probable scenario particularly since a large number of SOEs 
engaged in both textile and garments production at the time. 
 
5.4.5. DRMA Step 3 – The Quota Period: a Rent Management Analysis  
	  
The rent management processes during the quota period can be analytically 
assessed in terms of the political, institutional, and industry factors that are relevant. 
Figure 5.8 outlines the analysis. 
 
Figure 5.8: Rent Management Mechanism in the Quota Period 
	  
	  
5.4.5.1. RMM Level 1 – Political context determining rules of quota 
distribution 
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Officially, the Vietnamese government was concerned with the potential 
corruption and rent-seeking associated with quota allocation. When the government 
assigned the quota allocation responsibility to the Ministry of Commerce, Deputy Prime 
Minister Khoan Vu issued official document #669/CP-KTTH (Document 669) on 21 
May 2003, which stated, “There must be a mechanism to ensure that there will not be 
any selling, buying, or transferring of quotas. Under no circumstances should the 
managing group grant quotas to enterprises that do not have a production line. 
Investigate thoroughly any commercial fraudulence. Those who violate the law should 
not receive any further quotas”74 (Hai, 2004). This document makes it clear that the 
government was aware of the potential for corruption and that the managing group was 
instructed to closely monitor the allocation process. More importantly, it shows the top 
political leaders were at least formally committed to make learning rents work for the 
development of the industry.	  
I queried my interviewees on what they thought the informal political intentions 
were behind the system set up to allocate the rent, but this yielded little information, as I 
suspect those who knew the answer were involved in some of these activities themselves. 
Overall, my data is inconclusive in terms of determining what ministers, deputy prime 
ministers, the prime minster, or any officials beyond former Deputy Trade Minister Dau 
Van Mai gained from the misallocation of the quotas. For example, it is unclear whether 
Tuyen Dinh Truong, the former Minister of Commerce, privately benefited from the 
quota allocation process. He put Dau in charge of the quota allocation process, and Dau 
later officially allowed transfers of quotas that effectively created the black market for 
quota exchange and transfer. It should be noted that Dau was the highest official 
prosecuted. Realistically, it was impossible that Tuyen knew nothing about the 
                                                
74 This author translated the text from the Vietnamese document in verbatim. 
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misallocation of quotas. It was his job to supervise Dau and the activities of the ministry. 
Furthermore, the T&G industry was one of the most important export industries at the 
time as it produced significant business opportunities and profits. 
One of my interviewees who was actively involved in quota trading said that he 
is sure (although he didn’t offer any evidence) that the top officials must have benefited 
from this scheme, saying, “Perhaps not directly, but the family and relatives of those 
officials may be in the trade and they could informally give Dau orders to allocate quotas 
to their close connections.” The persistent failure to monitor the allocation process 
suggests that the lack of monitoring and supervision was intentional or informally agreed 
upon by the state – that is, until the scandal became public.  
	  
5.4.5.2. RMM Level 2 – Policy and institutional structure of quota 
allocation  
	  
The second level of DRMA analysis assesses the policy and institutional 
structure of the quota allocation and its implementation. The criteria and procedure under 
which quotas were to be formally allocated were discussed in section 5.4.1. In this 
section, we assess two important factors that made up the second set of factors affecting 
rent-management: the institutional framework for quota applications and distribution, 
which failed at the implementation phase; and the law enforcement that put an end to the 
corruption scandal of illegal quota buying and trading.  
Regarding the first factor, despite the fact that formally the criteria clearly set out 
to promote industrialisation across the industry, quota allocation was neither monitored 
nor supervised by higher levels of the government—the Minister and the Prime 
Minister—nor by an independent agency. During this period, there was not an 
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independent agency that was in charge of supervising the managing group, and VITAS 
neither monitored nor complained about illegal quota trading and bribery for quota 
allocation. In addition, garment manufacturers did not have the benefit of a procedural 
appeal on quota decisions, if the managing group wrongly gave quotas to firms.  
In responding to questions raised by the Party Congress about the corruption 
scandal, then–Minister of Commerce Tuyen, whose position was above Dau and the 
managing group, said that he only knew of the scandal after it broke out in the media and 
an investigation was taking place (Phuoc-Vinh, 2004). He said that before then he had 
only heard rumours about corrupt activities, but without evidence he was not in the 
position to discipline anyone. This testimony was contradictory to Tuyen’s role as a 
Minister because formally the Minister supervises his deputy and the activities within the 
ministry. Clearly, there was little supervision of the quota allocation, despite Document 
669 and despite the institutional structure of ministerial control being clearly set up to 
implement and monitor policies.  
As for the second factor, the failures in the rent management mechanism in this 
case were only addressed and corrected through the law enforcement process that 
brought the corruption scandal to court based on A Chau’s report of the illegal trading 
and bribery. In all, Dau, his son, Thang, and 14 others were found guilty of committing 
bribery and abusing power and were sent to prison. Implicitly, the enforcement of the 
rule of law in this case only punished the corruption, but did not help enforcing the 
quotas in the developmental manner – it did not create incentives and pressures for 
effective management of the quotas. Nonetheless, it was important that the legal process 
was able to stop some of the damaging rent-seeking. However, from the perspective of 
industrial upgrading and creating incentives and pressures for learning, there was no 
developmental rent management during this period. 
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5.4.5.3. RMM Level 3 – Industry organisation during the quota period 
 
The third factor affected the operation of a rent management system is the 
organisation of the industry. In this case, the industry organization did not generate any 
particular processes that helped productive rent management. In this particular industry, 
the political and organizational weakness of trade associations explained for firms’ lack 
of power over the government. As asserted in the previous section, VITAS was largely 
created as a government watchdog and a de facto think-tank for the ministry, rather than 
the actual representative for the interest of T&G manufactures. Consequently, the 
Vietnamese T&G firms had no control over the allocation of quotas. In essence, although 
the quota rents were not created by the Vietnamese state, their allocation was entirely 
state-led and Vietnamese firms could not prevent the government from extracting much 
of the rents from the industry in the form of bribes.  
There was only one thing that firms could do, and that was to report the 
corruption to law enforcement agencies and to bring the case to the public’s attention. 
This is what A Chau did. However, A Chau only did so as a last resort, when it had paid 
for a quota that it did not receive.75 Clearly, the enforcement of rules that would make 
the industry as a whole productive over time was not something individual firms were 
willing to fight for given that the benefit was a public good. This is evidenced by the fact 
that competitive firms were willing to simply pay for the quota at the going rates, 
because there was still some profit left for them as long as they got the quota that they 
paid for. In this context, the use of the law enforcement (as A Chau did) could not be 
accounted as a rent management factor that could help sustaining value-enhancing rents. 
                                                
75 The owner of Dong A was also prosecuted for bribery. 
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5.4.6. DRMA Step 4 – Rent Outcomes from the Quota Period 
 
 The rents created and allocated during the quota period failed to bring about 
incentives or pressures for enhanced investment, and capability building. The quota 
allocation mechanism resulted instead in a diversion of resources away from capable 
firms. Schaumburg-Muller (2009) reports that after the quota period, little industrial 
upgrading took place. There was an impressive increase in exports, but it was largely due 
to Vietnamese enterprises’ flexibility in dealing with multiple international buyers for 
different lines of production. This flexibility could be explained by the fact that 
Vietnamese enterprises had the capacity to produce at a lower cost than most of their 
competitors in low value garments production.  
During the quota period, productive firms that could not obtain quotas changed 
their business strategy. For example, Knutsen and Nguyen (2004) point out that firms 
which could not compete for quotas in the U.S. market obtained contracts with buyers in 
other markets. Similarly, Thomsen (2007) also points out that many businesses that did 
not have a connection with the state tried to access the European and Japanese markets 
instead of the U.S. market. As a consequence, those firms struggled to stay in business, 
especially in the off-season, so again, expanding capability and upgrading was 
impossible (Thomsen, 2007). Because most of the quotas were given to firms (state 
owned or not) that are connected to the state, it explains the greater political clout and 
connections of these firms. Consequently, quota rent became a redistributive rent that 
was shared between connected firms and the government at the expense of the 
productive but excluded firms. 
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5.4.7. Observations of the Quota Period 
 
What is truly unfortunate about the failed allocation mechanism for quotas during 
the early 2000s is that the allocation of quota rents could have been a valuable 
instrument for supporting technological upgrading and learning in Vietnamese 
enterprises, especially in the textile sector. If the quotas had been allocated appropriately, 
that is, based on proof of capacity (especially in increasing local content and industrial 
upgrading), the textile and garment industry would have had a chance to deepen its 
technology and move up the value chain. Even though the redistributive period only 
lasted for two years (2003 and 2004), it set the wrong foundation for the second half of 
the quota period. This is because two of the criteria were that allocations would be based 
on a producer's performance in the previous year and connections with large U.S. buyers. 
Therefore, firms that benefited in the early quota period ended up getting more quotas in 
the following two years, whether through bribery or first mover advantages. The main 
point is that since a large part of the potential rent was partially redistributed through 
bribes and quota trading in the first half of the quota period, productive textile and 
garment producers did not have enough capital or the time to improve their competitive 
advantage before the Vietnamese economy opened up in 2007 with its entry into the 
WTO. 
There was thus only one component of the political, institutional, and 
organizational factors that had any corrective effect on the rent allocation and that was 
the law enforcement process that brought a few corrupt individuals to court. This 
mechanism, though, was not developmental in the sense that while it addressed some of 
the wasteful features of the rent allocation process, it did not and could not recast the rent 
allocation process to achieve the potential developmental outcomes. Consequently, there 
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was no developmental rent management factor that could ensure that the quota rents had 
growth-enhancing effects. 
The quota period, which ended with a major corruption scandal, increased the 
underlying political distrust among the Vietnamese and saw the imprisonment of high-
ranking government officials. The case illustrates the complex and unregulated rent-
seeking activities that were occurring at both the state and business levels. It highlights 
the (possibly deliberate) inability of the state to monitor these rents and questions 
whether, from the point of view of the state, there was ever a real incentive to boost 
industrial upgrading in the T&G industry. This case partly explains the industry’s 
continued dependence on low-cost labour and foreign inputs. Vietnam’s textile 
producers failed to expand production capability and its garment producers failed to 
move rapidly up the value chain. Table 5.10 provides a summary of analysis under 
DRMA framework.  
 
Table 5.10: DRMA Summary of the Quota Period 
Players Type of rent 
Incentives 
created by 
the rent 
Factors affecting the rent 
management mechanism 
Outcomes 
 
All 
enterprises  
- Quota 
rents on 
exports to 
the U.S. 
- Incentives and 
potentially 
pressures for 
expanding 
production, 
technology 
acquisition and 
linkages  
 
- Rents could 
also be captured 
by connected 
firms that were 
willing to bribe  
First level: Unclear political 
will to allocate rents for 
developmental outcomes  
 
Second level: (1) Formal 
quota allocation mechanism 
failed, and (2) Rule of law 
enforced against bribery 
 
Third level: (1) Rent seeking 
competition among 
exporters (2) Firm reports 
bribery to law enforcement 
agencies only when quota 
paid for fails to be allocated 
- Missed 
opportunities of 
using quota rents 
to (1) enhance 
investments and 
capacity, (2) 
upgrade 
technology, and 
(3) enhance 
domestic linkages 
between garments 
and textiles  
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5.5. Case Study 2: The “China Factor” 
 
China and Vietnam have long had a complex trading relationship. The Sino–
Vietnamese bilateral relation started to improve in 1991 with the normalisation of their 
political relation. Since that time, the two governments have signed various bilateral 
trade agreements and established trade zone areas to promote a cross-border trading 
relationship. In the last decade, the value of exports from China to Vietnam increased 15 
times, while the value of Vietnamese exports to China increased only 5 times (Cao & 
Wang, 2011). In 2011, trade volume between the two countries reached VND 743.58 
trillion (USD 36 billion), of which Vietnam’s exports account for VND 227.2 trillion 
(USD 11 billion) while the country imported VND 156.38 trillion (USD 25 billion) of 
Chinese goods (Bland, 2012) and thus incurred a VND 289.85 trillion (USD 14 billion) 
trade deficit.76 In reality, China has been Vietnam’s biggest trading partner and creditor, 
accounting for 90 per cent of Vietnam’s total trade deficit (Cao & Wang, 2011).  
Figure 5.9 illustrates the increase in the volume of trade and the widening deficit 
that Vietnam has been incurring with China since 2002, and especially after Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO, which reduced Chinese import tariffs to Vietnam and vice versa.  
	  
                                                
76 Bland (2012) also adds: “These figures do not take into account the large quantities of 
smuggled goods, for which no reliable estimates exist.” 
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Figure 5.9: Vietnam Trade with China (in USD billion)	  
	  
Source: Cao & Wang (2011, p. 27)	  
	  
Table 5.11 shows the large volume of exports from China to Vietnam, especially 
in the T&G industry (rows 5, 6, and 7), as well as its rapid growth rate in imports. When 
rows 5, 6 and 7 are added together, it shows that Chinese imports into Vietnam for the 
T&G industry make up the top 3 imports, only after electronic equipment and machinery. 
The growth rate in 2010 was 28.6 per cent for cotton, 27.4 per cent for textiles, and 26.3 
per cent for garments. This import growth rate ranks them 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of 
the top 10 categories. 
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Table 5.11: Top Ten Export Commodities from China to Vietnam (in USD 
billion)	  
 
Source: Cao and Wang (2011, p. 32). Average growth rate and share are in percentage. 
 
Traditionally, there are three trading options through which Chinese textiles can 
enter Vietnam.77 The first option is trading through the ASEAN block. The official 
import tariff for Chinese textiles, as it is for most other ASEAN country, is 15–18 per 
cent, depending on the category. The second option is for textiles to be imported directly 
from China. Officially, imports across the border are subject to only a 5 per cent tariff 
rate. The third option is smuggling. Ben Bland (2012) reports from the Mong Cai border 
(the busiest trading point between the two countries): “As many as 1,500 vehicles traffic 
goods every day through the busiest unofficial crossings in Mong Cai, each paying 
border officials $10-$20 in bribes for right of passage”. Official statistics show that 
direct exports via the borders (option 2) account for one-third of the trade value between 
                                                
77 Materials imported from abroad that are used for garment exports are tax-free in 
Vietnam. For example, if suppliers provide Vietnamese garment makers any materials to 
be used to manufacture garments for export purposes, these materials have no tariff. 
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Vietnam and China (Thanh Nien News, 2011), although this figure does not account for 
illegal trading and smuggling (option 3). That is, if option 3 were included in the 
calculation, option 2 would be even less than one third. 
As Vietnamese garment exporters depend heavily on Chinese textiles, there has 
been considerable concern that Chinese imports are competing with the Vietnamese 
textile sector and inhibiting its development. The problem is aggravated with the large 
volume of cross-border smuggling because it further lowers prices for Chinese textiles 
and materials in the Vietnamese market. According to Hill (1998), “smuggling of 
Chinese textile products into Vietnam is reportedly widespread and has been the subject 
of several unsuccessful campaigns to eradicate it.”  
This observation was confirmed during my fieldwork in 2011. An interviewee 
from AGTEK, who also owns a medium-sized garment factory, confirmed that the 
majority of textiles used for manufacturing in Vietnam are provided by buyers who often 
source their materials from China, South Korea, or Taiwan. Even for the Vietnamese 
firms that source their own supplies locally, they often use materials and accessories 
from China, and a large portion of them was smuggled materials across the border. My 
interviewee told me, “We know that there is a large volume of smuggled materials but 
there is really no way to know the exact amount and cost. They are very cheap, and 
Chinese textiles are of better quality and variety than Vietnam’s.”  
 
5.5.1. DRMA Step 1 and 2 – Rents and Incentives Based on the Unsecured Sino-
Vietnamese Border  
 
The loosely controlled border between China and Vietnam permits cheap Chinese 
textiles and materials to enter the Vietnamese market, which can prematurely destroy 
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rents of Vietnamese producers or even drive them out of business. This rent destruction 
is due to the political and institutional failures of the Vietnamese government to manage 
its borders and halt the penetration of illegal Chinese imports into the Vietnamese market.  
Smuggled Chinese textiles and materials affect prices in the Vietnamese market 
and compete with local producers. From the industry perspective, this failure in 
controlling the border appears to benefit two groups—the garment producers in Vietnam 
and the Chinese exporters—as they both benefit from the trade. If Vietnamese textile 
producers could rapidly enhance their competitiveness, the effect may be argued to be 
good for the Vietnamese textile sector, as we would expect to see a rapid increase in its 
value addition and competitiveness. If, on the other hand, building competitiveness takes 
time with conditional rents, then a rapid destruction of rents through a failure to control 
the border can have very negative effects for the textile sector while temporarily helping 
the garments sector.  
For garment producers in Vietnam, cheap Chinese textiles arguably permit 
foreign and domestic manufacturers in Vietnam to earn higher profits. However, this 
short-term benefit comes at the cost of inhibiting the development of the Vietnamese 
textile sector. The results are a faltering domestic textile sector and a garment sector that 
is dependent on foreign supplies.  
As for the second group of beneficiaries, Chinese textile exporters have clearly 
had an incentive and interest in expanding sales to Vietnam’s domestic market. These 
exporters sought to increase their profits by avoiding the tariffs on textile imports, and 
thus found a way to penetrate the Vietnamese market through their porous border. 
Chinese exporters continue to benefit from apparel production taking place in Vietnam, 
despite losing foreign buyers in their country, as part of buyers’ strategy to diversity their 
supplier network and as a result of rising wages in the Chinese garments industry. The 
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China factor, therefore, has been a barrier to the development of Vietnam’s textile sector, 
as part of the benefits of Vietnamese garment manufacturing are going to Chinese textile 
exporters at the cost of the Vietnamese textile sector. 
 
5.5.2. DRMA Step 3 – Rent Management Analysis of the China Factor 
 
There are a number of important issues concerning the China factor affecting the 
Vietnamese garments and textile industry. At the highest level of analysis, the China 
factor is not simply an economic issue, but also a political matter as the Sino–
Vietnamese relationship is politically sensitive. The Vietnamese government has 
traditionally hesitated to confront its northern neighbour on issues like smuggling. An 
expert in the T&G industry explained to me that because China is Vietnamese biggest 
creditor, retaliation from the Chinese government either through trade or administrative 
measures could substantially affect the Vietnamese economy. 
 At the second level of rent management analysis, monitoring illegal trading 
along the border requires the Vietnamese government to overcome the resistance of its 
Local Customs Departments, over which the government appears to maintain weak—
intentional or not— monitoring and supervision (interview with AGTEK representative, 
2011).78 In addition there are organised criminal groups that are active in major trading 
posts, and which are said to possibly collude with local governments (Bland, 2012). 
Furthermore, the Vietnamese legal and administrative frameworks are inadequate to 
counter the interest of smugglers and their contacts in local authorities. I asked the same 
interviewee why it is the case, and he explained that “historically it has always been like 
this” and the Vietnamese government’s attempts to crack down on smuggling had failed 
                                                
78 Local Customs Departments are under direct control of the General Department of 
Vietnam Customs. More information regarding the General Department of Vietnam 
Customs, see http://www.customs.gov.vn/english/lists/vietnamcustoms/Default.aspx. 
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on numerous occasions. Perhaps, this institutional deficiency reflects the weak political 
will of the state to adequately address the border problem. Thus, there are significant 
institutional failures due to the central government’s weak monitoring capability over the 
Local Customs Departments and an ineffective formal institutional framework to 
monitor the border. 
Finally, there is also a rent management problem at the industry level. Since the 
textile sector is not yet sufficiently developed to support the demand of the garments 
industry, without Chinese textiles imports there would be bottlenecks in the supply of 
materials for garment production. Garments producers have therefore no interest in 
supporting border protection. This problem is becoming moot because, beginning in 
2015, nearly all goods traded between China and Vietnam will eventually become tax-
free (see section 5.2.1). Therefore, borders and tariffs will soon become irrelevant as 
instruments for supporting capability development in the domestic economy.  
 
5.5.3. DRMA Step 4 – Rent Outcomes Due to the China Factor 
 
As analysed in section 5.2.4 the development of the textile sector is critical for 
the development of the T&G industry because this would be a feasible strategy for 
improving value added in the integrated industry. A former vice president of Thanh 
Cong Textile Garment Company told me that despite Thanh Cong being known as a 
successful textile producer, the company actually incurred losses in its textile production. 
As a result, the company used garment production to cover its financial losses from 
textile production. He explained that the company had to continue its textile production 
to retain jobs for its workers and to keep the reputation of the company among 
international buyers that Thanh Cong could source its own materials. Our analysis 
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provides that the China factor has impeded the development of the industry by 
intensifying competition within the Vietnamese market for domestic textile producers. 
The limited rents they earned as a result of the protected domestic market were competed 
away. Here, the negative rent outcomes include many local textile producers giving up 
on upgrading their competitiveness, and either closing down their business or refocusing 
on garment production (interview, 2013). 
	  
5.5.4. The “China Factor” Concluding Thoughts 
	  
The China factor is an example of an external factor that impacts the organisation 
of the industry, especially the domestic market, and the industrialisation of the sector. 
The unsecured border between China and Vietnam destroyed the rents of import-
competing industries like textiles almost overnight. The outcome was value-reducing and 
growth-reducing. The rent destruction benefited both Chinese exporters and Vietnamese 
garment producers. However, these rents have had a direct negative impact on the 
Vietnamese textile sector and removed firms’ incentives and financial capabilities for 
upgrading. In this case, the failure to protect tariff-based rents for domestic textile 
producers was a failure of the rent management mechanism due to: (1) the weak political 
will to confront Chinese smugglers, (2) insufficient institutional capabilities to monitor 
the border, (3) the central government’s weak monitoring capability over the Local 
Customs Departments, (4) the inability of textile producers to meet market demands for 
inputs, and (6) the garment producers’ continuous dependency on Chinese imports for its 
production and exports.	   Table 5.12 summarises the China factor and the rent 
management mechanism that failed to protect the Vietnamese T&G industry.  
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Table 5.12: DRMA Summary: The Case of the China Factor  
Players Type of rents 
Incentives 
created by 
the rent 
Factors affecting the 
rent management 
mechanism 
Outcomes 
 
All 
enterprises 
in the 
garments 
and 
textiles 
sectors 
- 
Destruction 
of tariff-
based rents 
of textile 
producers  
- Vietnamese 
garment 
producers: 
Support the 
destruction of 
these rents as 
they could 
buy their 
inputs at 
lower cost 
from China 
 
- Chinese 
textile 
producers 
supported 
illegal trading 
through the 
border.   
First level: Inadequate 
political will to address 
border problems 
 
Second level: (1) the 
formal institutional 
framework for enforcing 
border controls failed, and 
(2) the government’s 
monitoring capacity over 
the Local Customs 
Departments was weak  
 
Third level: (1) Illegal 
Chinese imports were 
demanded and therefore 
encouraged by the 
garments industry (2) 
weak textile sector 
cannot provide all inputs 
for domestic garment 
industry  
- Missed 
opportunity to 
(1) focus on 
upgrading the 
textile sector, 
and  
(2) further 
integrate 
garments and 
textile sectors to 
enhance value 
added in the 
joint sector  
 
	  
5.6. Case Study 3: The State Sector and Vinatex 
 
The single largest corporation within VITAS is Vinatex, a general corporation 
that represents and manages state capital among its subsidiaries. Vinatex was created by 
the prime minister in 1995 with nearly 200 subsidiaries (Tran, 2012a). Due to a major 
restructuring in 2006, Vinatex became a privately owned corporation, though the 
government still owns 20–30 per cent. The balance is made of domestic and Korean and 
Taiwanese foreign investment funds (IBM Belgium, et al., 2009). In principle, under 
Vinatex, there are four types of state ownership in the T&G industry: 100 per cent state-
owned companies, joint stock, joint venture, and one-member companies with limited 
liabilities in which the state maintains 100 per cent ownership (Tran, 2012a). In 2013, 
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the Vinatex website cites that the corporation comprises 51 joint–stock companies, 40 
joint venture companies, 5 training colleges, 3 research institutes, 2 magazines, and a 
research centre. The 91 companies under Vinatex cover all activities in the T&G industry, 
including spinning, knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing. The state maintained 
control over some of the largest T&G factories, such as Phong Phu (at 52 per cent), and 
Viet Tien (at 60 per cent), as well as smaller factories (Tran, 2012a). 
Figure 5.10 illustrates the parallel export growth between the T&G industry and 
Vinatex. It outlines Vinatex’s share of exports over both textile and garment sectors 
(approximately 15.1 per cent in 2011). In the domestic market, Vinatex has a large 
presence given its active campaign to use the local market to build brand image and 
marketing. 
	  
Figure 5.10: T&G Exports between 2005 and 2011, Industry versus Vinatex	  
	  
Source: Le (2012) 
 
5.6.1. The Restructuring of Vinatex in 2006 and 2013 
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Prior to 2006, Vinatex’s authority over its subsidiaries was limited, especially 
when it came to the distribution of profits. According to An Quoc Le, who was the 
chairman of Vinatex at that time, “Before [2006] our state companies acted 
independently, if they made a profit, they kept it” (see Martin, 2008, p. 8). This is 
because as SOEs, these enterprises are managed by a number of different state bodies – 
either by the central government via the managing ministries or the provincial state 
bodies. However, a major change in Vinatex’s role was implemented in 2006. With the 
help of PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Vietnamese government restructured Vinatex and 
transformed it into a profit-oriented holding company. Following the instruction of the 
Ministry of Industry, Vinatex began its equitisation in 2007 with the goal of completing 
its transformation into a joint stock holding company by the end of 2008. As planned, the 
equitisation would not reduce the value of the government’s capital holding in Vinatex, 
but instead would issue new shares for sale to private investors to attract new capital. As 
a result, Vinatex would collect profits and closely manage its subsidiaries, much more so 
than in the pre-2006 period. In the words of An, “[N]ow we act as a real owner” (see 
Martin, 2008, p. 9).  
As a profit-driven corporation, the restructured Vinatex was to focus its efforts in 
five major areas. First, it would invest, produce, supply, distribute and import and export 
textiles and garments. Second, it would set up joint ventures with domestic and foreign 
investors. Third, it would develop and expand both domestic and overseas markets, as 
well as assign member companies to penetrate into potential markets. Fourth, it would 
conduct research and improve technological applications in Vietnam’s garment and 
textile industries. Fifth, it would provide technical training for the workers and 
management in Vietnam’s T&G industry (Martin, 2008). The transformation of Vinatex 
into a holding company with state ownership in a number of Vietnam’s largest clothing 
 280 
companies in 2006 suggests that the government intended for Vinatex be a conglomerate 
to lead the industry and to implement its social programs. 
In 2013, Vinatex’s structure of ownership shifted once again as Vinatex was at 
the centre of the government’s public sector reform. Prime Minister Dung Tan Nguyen 
signed a restructuring plan for Vinatex to take place between 2013 and 2015. The plan 
sets out that the mother corporation will retain 100 per cent stake in four of its 
subsidiaries (instead of seven, as in 2006), will reduce its stake to between 50–65 per 
cent in six companies, and to less than 50 per cent in 20 others (KTD, 2013).79 In 
addition, Vinatex will be required to complete its divestment in 37 noncore subsidiaries 
(KTD, 2013). This restructuring plan implies that the state is withdrawing its capital 
from Vinatex, and forcing the corporation to concentrate on its core businesses. This is a 
move that is long overdue, according to the former president of the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (interview, 2011).  
	  
5.6.2. DRMA Step 1 and 2 – Rents and the Incentives of the Rents Given to 
Vinatex and the State Sector 
 
Through Vinatex and the MoIT, the Vietnamese government had provided the 
public sector with a number of rents that could potentially support investment and 
learning. First, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the government’s implicit guarantee of 
SOEs' debt, as well as their access to credit via state banks, enabled SOEs with 
reasonable business plans to access easier, and possibly cheaper, credit than private 
enterprises (Khan, 2009a; Knutsen & Nguyen, 2004; Thomsen, 2007). Second, the SOEs 
                                                
79 It is still unknown how many companies Vinatex will own after the restructuring, but 
the state is planning to withdraw its capital from Vinatex by selling its shares to private 
investors. 
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that already possessed critical assets, such as land and equipment, had significant 
advantage over new entrants from the private sector or foreign firms. Third, SOEs 
organised under Vinatex (1) received financial cross-subsidisation if Vinatex 
management felt that particular plants required short-term support to raise their 
competitiveness, (2) received management expertise from more successful plants under 
the Vinatex umbrella if this was required, and (3) shared learning experiences, as well as 
trade information to identify buyers in foreign markets (interview, 2011). All these 
channels provided the subsidiaries with implicit rents to develop their industrial 
capabilities. 
Vinatex also used its market position to pass on business opportunities to its 
subsidiaries. There is literature that documents Vinatex’s role in facilitating business 
opportunities between SOEs and foreign buyers. For example, data collected from 
Thomsen (2007) during his 2000 and 2001 fieldwork found that state institutions such as 
VITAS, Vinatex, and the MoIT commonly mediated contacts between foreign buyers 
and Vietnamese suppliers, and those that obtained orders through the state system were 
more likely to be SOEs, or, if private companies, to be state-connected. Buyers found it 
easier to go through the official system, in which they were also provided assistance in 
finding suppliers and in administrative procedures (Thomsen, 2007). 
The second step of DRMA assesses the incentives created by the rents that 
Vinatex and SOEs received. Here, my fieldwork data points to both positive and 
negative incentives. A senior economist and former government official, who in the early 
2000s oversaw the garment sector, explained to me that Vinatex had the incentive to not 
only maintain its rents and its rent-seeking power, but to also seek more rents from the 
state. One effective way to gain more rents is for the corporation to show its ability to 
fulfil its social and economic responsibilities, namely retain and create new employment 
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(especially in the poor regions of the country) and to generate revenue for the state. 
Given the new structure, Vinatex could effectively seek rents and internalise them 
through implementation of various social programs, such as expansion of cotton farms 
and production in the mountainous areas. The more profitable the subsidiaries, the more 
leverage Vinatex would have with the state. Therefore, Vinatex had an incentive to boost 
the capabilities of its subsidiaries. 
Despite this possible positive incentive, there is also practical negative incentive 
induced by the rents. Rents channelled to the state sector generated unfair competition 
among firms. By having access to land, credit and government support, by controlling 
some of the largest T&G producers in the industry, and by occupying a large share of 
production in the upstream segment of the value chain (cotton and textiles), Vinatex 
could unfairly challenge the survival of smaller firms and capture their market shares. As 
this would also be a potentially profitable strategy, a negative effect of the rents would 
be to encourage the state sector to engage in rent seeking to retain its market power. 
Although the restructuring of Vinatex permits the Vietnamese government to indirectly 
control the T&G industry, market power via rents could breed inefficiency within the 
SOEs by crowding out the private sector, especially SMEs. During my fieldwork, 
interviewees frequently complained that a number of SOEs under this corporation lacked 
incentives to take advantage of business opportunities in the international and domestic 
markets to move up the value chain and to raise the value-added in its outputs. My 
interviewees who are experts in the industry agree that SOEs that are in joint ventures 
with foreign investors were doing much better than those controlled by Vinatex. 
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5.6.3. DRMA Step 3 – Rent Management Mechanism in the State Sector and 
Vinatex 
 
What were the rent management factors that motivated or deterred Vinatex to 
upgrade, and that explain the mixed outcomes in SOE upgrading? Figure 5.11 outlines 
the three levels of rent management mechanism using the DRMA framework. At the first 
level, the political context included the Communist Party’s interest in utilizing the state 
sector to maintain and create jobs for low-skilled workers, especially those in the 
mountainous and rural regions of the country, and to generate revenues for the state. At 
the second level, the institutional mechanism for rent management involved the 
managing role of Vinatex and the MoIT to distribute and manage rents between Vinatex 
and its subsidiaries. The third, the industry organisation level, has a number of relevant 
aspects. First, market competition in the international and domestic markets created 
pressure on Vinatex to ensure that plants under its management put in the effort to 
maintain production capability and competitiveness. Second, competition among the 
general corporations for rents—especially in terms of access to land and credit created 
further pressures on Vinatex to demonstrate its performance by maintaining profitability. 
Each of these layers of rent management is discussed in greater detail in the following 
sections. 
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Figure 5.11: Rent Management Mechanism in the T&G Public Sector	  
	  
	  
5.6.3.1. RMM Level 1 – Political context of rent creation and management 
for the state sector 
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party’s support for the T&G industry was largely 
based on the political imperative of retaining and creating jobs, ensuring social stability, 
and raising state revenues. Since Doi Moi, the textile sector served as an engine for job 
creation (approximately 3 million). This ensured that the sector was important for the 
party for maintaining social and political stability. It is in this context that Vinatex 
emerged as an instrument of policy. In 2011, Vinatex had a total labour force of more 
than 130,000 employees, with roughly 35,000 employees working in joint-ventures with 
foreign and local partners (Bao Moi, 2011). A former manager at Vinatex explained to 
me that Vinatex carried both social and economic responsibilities. The social 
responsibility included that of job creation and retention, but also poverty reduction and 
•   Credible state 
commitment to 
support labour-
intensive sector 
Political Context of Rent Creation 
•  MoIT 
•  Vinatex Rent Allocation and 
Implementation  
•  Intense market competition 
•  Competition among the general 
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skills training. It also involved bailing out failing SOEs if needed, and using cross-
subsidization across plants to maintain employment and growth. For instance, in July 
2011, the media reported that Vinatex succeed in saving Dai Cat Tuong Garment 
Company, a failing garment company in Da Nang with 1,300 workers. This was in 
accordance with the government’s instruction to support provinces that experienced 
economic difficulties and to ensure basic incomes for people (Phuoc-Vinh, 2004). A 
former manager of Vinatex explained to me that Vinatex could not perform better 
because the corporation’s social responsibility (i.e. offering financial support for failing 
SOEs) often conflicted with its economic responsibility of maintaining competitiveness 
and generating profits in the marketplace. 
 
5.6.3.2. RMM Level 2 – Institutional and policy structure of rent creation 
for Vinatex and the SOEs 
 
The Vietnamese T&G industry displays a particularly complex institutional 
structure of rent creation and allocation through two institutions, Vinatex and MoIT. As 
an institutional instrument for the government, Vinatex performed two primary roles: it 
was an instrument for social and economic policy (see section 5.6.3.1), as well as an 
organization that managed state assets. Given these roles, Vinatex could muster 
substantial influence over the government’s policy agenda. What makes this institutional 
rent management factor more complex is the fact that, as a market player within the 
industry, Vinatex also sought rents to maintain high profits as well as market and 
political power. Indeed, one could argue that Vinatex was one of the most influential 
rent-seekers in the industry, taking into account the fact that it was one of the largest 
investors for the state. One example of Vinatex’s political power is the fact that among 
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the 12 Vietnamese conglomerates—the general corporations80— under the supervision 
of the prime minister, Vinatex is said to be the most powerful, followed by Petro 
Vietnam (interview with VITAS representative, 2011).  
What is the institutional process through which rents were created and allocated 
to Vinatex? As designed by the government, the chairman and vice chairman of Vinatex 
is also the chairman and vice chairman of VITAS. VITAS is perceived as the 
government think-tank and policy advisor for MoIT as it frequently acts as the medium 
that connect T&G firms with the government. In other words, VITAS especially 
represents the voice and interest of Vinatext in its consultation with the government for 
development policy and strategy. The MoIT regularly holds meetings with VITAS and 
Vinatex to obtain industry’s updates and consultations. Based on Vinatex or VITAS 
policy recommendations, MoIT would adjust policy accordingly with the primary aim of 
implementing social programs, making profits and maintaining state control over the 
industry using Vinatex and VITAS as instruments. 
As a state-owned profit-oriented holding company, Vinatex has actively lobbied 
the government for rents. For instance, in early 2009, industry representatives of VITAS 
and Vinatex lobbied the government for financial support in response to the decrease in 
the international market demand for T&G exports. The former chairman of both Vinatex 
and VITAS An Quoc Le was then quoted in the local media, suggesting the adoption of 
three main emergency measures. The first measure was that the government should fund 
VND 5 trillion (USD 295 million) to support bank credit for the T&G industry and to 
reduce interest rates, which were still considered to be too high. The second measure was 
that VITAS asked the government to allocate 1 per cent of total export earnings to assist 
those companies and their workers facing falling orders and considering lay-offs. Finally, 
                                                
80 Some of these general corporations have now transformed to become state economic 
groups such as Viettel. 
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the third measure was that VITAS also asked the government to spend VND 50 billion 
(USD 2.9 million) in support of international sales and marketing promotions (Business 
Monitor International, 2009). 
In response to these requests, the government introduced new tax measures in 
April 2009 that were intended to stimulate domestic consumption with some measures to 
support the textile and garment sectors. Under the Ministry of Finance, the value-added 
tax (VAT) rate was reduced by half for textiles and garments enterprises, as well as on a 
number of other selected products. VAT payment deadlines were also extended on 
certain types of imports. In addition, garment companies were exempted from some 
categories of income tax liabilities (Business Monitor International, 2009). In essence, 
preferential treatment by the government in the form of credit access, land, and 
expertise- and information-sharing helped address a number of business challenges and 
market failures by providing Vinatex and the SOEs with a range of rents.  
The second institutional mechanism through which rents were created and 
allocated is the MoIT, which is responsible for monitoring Vinatex, the SOEs, and the 
industry as a whole. According my interviewee, who is an industry expert, the managing 
role of MoIT has been largely described as passive and reactive. The quota period attests 
to this observation. It illustrates the MoIT’s inability to monitor damaging rent-seeking 
activities by lower agencies and in the T&G market. Furthermore, according to a senior 
representative of VITAS, the ministry lacks expertise about the sector and thus is 
dependent on Vinatex’s (and VITAS’s) knowledge for strategy and policy 
recommendations. As a consequence of MoIT’s muted role in regulating the industry and 
thereby controlling the deployment of rents, the only de facto regulators of rents and 
rent-seeking were Vinatex, and the market. The efficacy of these two de facto regulators 
is discussed in the next two sections. 
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5.6.3.3. RMM Level 3 – Effects of the industry organisation on rent 
management  
	  
At the industry organisation level, there were two factors that created pressure on 
Vinatex and its subsidiaries to invest in learning and upgrading. The first was market 
competition in international and domestic markets that created pressure for Vinatex to 
maintain good relationships with international buyers. Globally, there has been severe 
competition among T&G manufacturers in a number of developing countries. Deputy 
General Director of Vinatex Truong Tien Le said on the news that, “the Vietnamese 
apparel and textile exporters are seeing difficulties because major importers are shifting 
their orders from Vietnam to Cambodia, Laos and Bangladesh in order to avoid [the] 10 
per cent import duty since these countries are entitled to the Most Favoured Nation status 
with zero import duty” (Thu-Ha, 2013). Domestically, foreign investors that came into 
Vietnam since the late 1990s are capable and have good expertise, and they frequently 
compete with domestic producers in the Vietnamese market. As a consequence, 
competition in the global and domestic markets compelled Vinatex to put in effort to 
improve production capability and competitiveness. 
The second factor is that, among the state conglomerates (the so called state 
business groups or general corporations), Vinatex actively competed for rents and 
political support, which ensured that it had to maintain competitive performance through 
investments and the development of capabilities. My interviewees stated that Vinatex is 
always under pressure to perform in order to continue receiving government rents for its 
various social and training programs. Recently, there has been public pressure to stop 
SOEs from investing outside their primary line of business, and Vinatex received severe 
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criticism for its investments in a number of service industries, including beverages, 
restaurants, and hotel industries. The 2013–2015 restructuring programme for Vinatex 
will create further pressure on the organization to focus on updating its capability to earn 
more profits. 
	  
5.6.4. DRMA Step 4 – the Rent Outcomes 
 
Finally, we investigate whether Vinatex used its rents to acquire new technology, 
enhance learning, or increase upstream production of textiles. An interviewee who 
worked for Vinatex contended that there were a number of coordination and 
management failures at the level of the management board of Vinatex, largely due to 
inexperience and poor planning, which constrained Vinatex’s ability to use rents 
productively once the general corporation obtained them. He also said that corruption 
and the use of power for personal profits were not unknown. To be fair, though, this 
behaviour is widespread among all SOEs in Vietnam.  
However, my other interviewee, an economist and industry expert at the National 
Economics University in Vietnam who researches the role of Vinatex and SOEs in the 
industry, pointed out that, on the whole, Vinatex is relatively more productive and 
capable than many other (the provincial) SOEs in Vietnam. In addition, this interviewee 
maintains that comparing Vinatex to other SOEs or the general corporations in other 
industries, Vinatex seems to be more effective in managing its subsidiaries, as well as 
boosting their capabilities. This is evidenced by facts such as the growing number of 
garment superstores owned by Vinatex that promote local brands of Vinatex subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, the corporation has recently refocused on textile manufacturing. 
Subsequently, Dinh Vu Fibre Manufacturing Plant was built and is now in operation with 
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a production capability of 2,500 tons of polyester fibre in the first phase. Production will 
go up to 170,000 tons annually when the plant is in full capacity (Dinh Vu Industrial 
Zone, 2011; Ngo, 2011). This is expected to raise local content in Vinatex’s garment 
production by 40 per cent in a few years’ time (Intellasia, 2011a). 
Another approach to assess Vinatex’s ability to manage rents is to compare the 
SOEs efficiency with that of the private sector. In earlier research, Tran (1999) revealed 
evidence that some SOEs under Vinatex were efficient in acquiring new technologies for 
industrial upgrading. The author attributes the positive outcome to management’s ability 
to take advantage of market opportunities and to devise business strategies that are 
suitable for learning.81 Using a survey of 96 textile and garment enterprises, Nguyen and 
Le (2005) gathered empirical evidence that shows that “there is no operating profitability 
difference between state and private enterprise after adjusting the land rent and export 
quota rent difference” (p. 309). The study also found that total productivity of state 
enterprises is higher than that of private enterprises, but lower than that of foreign 
enterprises (Nguyen & Le, 2005).  
Empirical evidence from Knutsen and Nguyen (2004) uncovers that, in regards to 
operating profit to capital, survey data showed that “state enterprises are more profitable 
than private Vietnamese enterprise [in terms of the ratio of operating profit to capital] … 
both before and after adjustments are made for preferential treatment of state enterprise 
in term of export quota fees and land rent” (p. 131). Knutsen and Nguyen (2004) also 
pointed out that large and small foreign buyers tend to prefer collaboration with state 
enterprises. Buyers in their interview reported that Vietnamese state enterprises are fairly 
attractive business partners. “According to buyers, state enterprises also have more 
                                                
81 It remains difficult to quantify Vinatex and its subsidiaries’ level of effort in raising 
productivity in the presence of rents, although fieldwork interviewees admitted that the 
apparent success of some T&G producers was partly thanks to the rents these SOEs 
received. 
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advanced technology in place” and foreign buyers prefer to work with SOEs due to their 
close relationship with the government and their ability to reduce administrative hassles 
(Knutsen & Nguyen, 2004, p. 132). 
To sum up, preferential treatment of the T&G sector by the government in the 
form of privileged access to land, credit and quotas, helped SOEs to invest and upgrade. 
Indeed Vinatex became more productive and profitable than private firms. Despite the 
MoIT’s weak rent management capability, Vinatex has been a positive factor in moving 
the SOEs toward upgrading. We explain this outcome in terms of competition within the 
market and among the general corporations creating effective pressure on Vinatex and its 
SOEs to put in the effort to make profits not only for its own sake but also to retain their 
rents and their rent-seeking power within the state. 
	  
5.6.5. The State Sector Concluding Thoughts 
 
On the whole, the development experience in the public sector illustrates how 
some SOEs took advantage of rents to engage in technical upgrading and learning. As a 
consequence, they boosted competitiveness in the T&G industry. This is not to reject 
inefficiencies and negative incentives that the rents induced. Indeed, the DRMA suggests 
that a combination of various rent management factors produced mixed results in the 
development of the T&G industry.  
First, there was clearly a political will to provide rents for the state sector in order 
to support the Party’s social and economic agendas, including job creation, 
reinforcement of social stability, and earning profits. Second, at the institutional level, 
despite the MoIT’s weak management, Vinatex, and to some extent VITAS, helped 
provide incentives and pressures for other state-owned subsidiaries to perform and to 
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upgrade. However, because the rents were largely channelled to the state sector, Vinatex 
and its subsidiaries have been unfairly competing with private and foreign enterprises 
and thus potentially undermining the private sector’s ability to achieve capability 
building. Third, competition within the market and among the general corporations at the 
firm level provided incentives for Vinatex and its SOEs to use rents to achieve higher 
industrial capability and thereby earning more profits. Table 5.13 summarises the rent 
management mechanism in the industrial development of the state sector in the T&G 
industry. 
 
Table 5.13: DRMA Summary for Case Study on the State Sector and Vinatex 
Players Type of rents 
Incentives 
created by the 
rent 
Factors affecting the rent 
management mechanism 
Outcomes 
 
Vinatex 
and its 
SOEs  
- Land, credit 
access, quota 
and 
equipment 
provided by 
the state as a 
form of 
value-
enhancing 
rents 
 
- Cross-
subsidisation 
among 
subsidiaries 
- Potential 
support for 
investment 
 
- Successful 
investment and 
capability 
development 
could reinforce 
rents and 
maintain rent-
seeking power 
  
- 
Anticompetitive 
behaviour and 
some 
inefficiency 
First level: Political will to 
maintain social programs 
and political stability, and to 
retain economic profits 
 
Second level: MoIT and 
Vinatex as institutional 
instruments to manage the 
sector 
 
Third level: (1) 
Competition among firms 
for market profits led to 
incentives and pressures 
for effort; 
(2) Vinatex’s competition 
with other GCs led to 
pressure and effort to 
maintain rents and rent 
seeking power through 
capability development  
- Mixed 
outcomes: 
some 
inefficiency 
and negative 
rent-seeking, 
but also 
some new 
capability, 
especially in 
garment 
production 
and domestic 
design and 
marketing 
 
	  
5.7. Final Observations on the T&G Industry and Implications for DRMS 
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For developing countries, the heart of a viable industrial policy is to develop 
globally competitive, technologically competent, large domestic firms, and to address 
any market failures that constrain the development of domestic firms (Khan, 2009a). 
This chapter assesses the factors that affected the learning experience in Vietnam’s 
textile and garment industry and how that experience led to industrial development and 
capability building of the domestic firms. The chapter analysed the mixture of political, 
institutional, and industry organisational factors to explain the high and low levels of 
effort put into raising competitiveness in the presence of rents and rent-seeking activities 
since Doi Moi.  
The case of the textile and garment industry in Vietnam is unique because the 
configuration of rent management is such that there have been mixed outcomes in the 
development of the industry. From technical learning and upgrading perspectives, 
industrial upgrading within the sector has largely been limited to low-skilled 
manufacturing in the garment sector. Unlike the telecom industry, the T&G industry was 
quickly opened up to private investment, especially FDI. However, so far T&G 
producers have failed to move up the value chain, to create more value-added to their 
production, or to engage in vertical integration, as seen in the telecom industry. In 
addition, since the industry was opened up early on, the market structure features a deep 
involvement of the state and private sectors competing for economic profits. As a 
consequence, there has been a great deal of competition among players in both the local 
and international markets. Given the relatively limited scale economies in this sector, the 
intense market competition has produced an effective rent management factor for effort 
in learning and upgrading; although, there have been notable constraints and 
mismanagement that have held back greater development of the industry (see the quota 
period). On the whole, the DRMA framework provides five important observations with 
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regard to the process of technical upgrading and capability-building for the textile and 
garment industry. 
First, the industry has achieved some level of learning and upgrading, though the 
factors that allowed this to happen—namely market expansion and foreign capital—are 
no longer readily available because of changes in the international market. Cambodia, 
Laos and Bangladesh are aggressively competing with Vietnam in the international 
market. These countries have quickly developed competitiveness and have the advantage 
of the Most Favoured Nation status that gives them zero import duty access to important 
foreign markets. 
Second, the literature highlights the strong support of the state in the 
development of the SOEs and Vinatex. The government’s intention to maintain social 
development through job creation and retention, as well as addressing poverty in certain 
rural and mountainous areas, explains the state’s provision of rents and political support 
to the SOEs to carry out both social and economic missions. Therefore, there is a clear 
political will to fully support Vinatex and its subsidiaries to expand and upgrade, 
provided that the support does not violate WTO rules. 
Third, the government’s body, namely the MoIT, which is in charge of the sector, 
has primarily favoured SOEs and state-connected enterprises and discriminated against 
private firms. As seen in the quota period, the MoIT lacked discipline to minimise 
damaging rent-seeking activities. Since most SOEs have been equitized, the role of the 
MoIT has been broadening to support the private sector and to oversee the industry’s 
performance as a whole. However, MoIT has limited management and political 
capabilities to discipline and enforce its lower agencies and the firms linked to them. As 
a consequence, it depends on VITAS and Vinatex to advise and devise strategy plans for 
the industry (interview, 2011). 
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Fourth, Vinatex remains a dominant industry player and a rent-seeker, and yet is 
often seen as capable and competent. Our analysis sheds light on this paradox. After 
being restructured to become one of the 12 general corporations in 2006, the role of 
Vinatex in the industrial development of the sector became particularly crucial. So far it 
has used its close connections to the government to access important rents that it then 
deployed effectively to improve its overall performance. Under Vinatex, some learning, 
industrial upgrading, and expansion of the textile industry took place. Given Vinatex’s 
multiple roles in the sector—as manager of state assets, provider of some social benefits, 
industry advisor for MoIT, market player, and rent-seeker—an important policy question 
is how to sustain its productive effort to boost technical upgrading and capability-
building.  
Finally, since Vietnam’s accession to the WTO, the textile and garment industry 
has expanded quickly by volume but has struggled to move up the value chain. Khan 
(2009a) argues that free trade agreement could create favourable rents for a country 
oonly if other developing country exporters did not have free market access. But by the 
time Vietnam became a member of the WTO, many of its major competitors, such as 
China and India, were also members, and thus membership did not create any further 
rents for the Vietnamese textile garment industry.  
Over time, the road to industrialisation has become even more challenging 
because Vietnam, as a member of the WTO, cannot use industrial policy or direct 
subsidies in the ways that the Asian Tigers did during their development. In my 
interview with a VITAS senior advisor in 2011, he asserted that given Vietnam’s 
commitment to the WTO, the state has largely left the sector to the market. In the next 
few years, it will be even more challenging for Vietnam to maintain its export 
performance as fierce competition for orders in the international market and the 
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emergence of other developing countries that compete for similar jobs. Unless 
Vietnamese garment producers move further up the value chain, they will be under 
pressure to reduce prices and to improve quality.  
In the absence of trade-based rents, the government’s first priority should be to 
devise institutional and financial strategies that encourage learning. This is certainly not 
just about buying new machinery, but also about the transfer of “know how” of the 
technology to create competitive advantage through learning-by-doing. Next, there must 
be more targeted research, which focuses on identifying market demands that fit the 
industrial capability of the industry so that textile and garment producers can target niche 
markets. The third priority should be to help private firms address land, capital, 
information and coordination market failures. Finally, the government should identify 
critical priorities for reform based on the existing market failures and the industry rent 
management dynamics Some of the policy conclusions suggested by the DRMS 
framework are discussed in the next four sections (sections 5.7.1 through 5.7.4). 
 
5.7.1. Strengthening Upstream Linkage and Addressing the “China Factor” 
 
Vietnam has missed opportunities to boost competitiveness in the textile sector 
by allowing large quantities of cheap Chinese materials to be imported into Vietnam 
during the crucial period of the industry’s development (see case study 2). However, the 
country cannot afford to write off the textile sector, and should adopt strategic policies to 
raise its competitiveness. The DRMA suggests that a comprehensive approach to the 
China factor should be sought that involves increasing local textile production and 
improving its competitiveness. This would support the economy and expand the market 
for textile production. The textile sector could also benefit from market research to find 
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niche markets for particular types of textiles. Targeting specific niche markets may allow 
Vietnamese firms to develop capabilities through learning without an immediate 
competition with more competitive countries like China.  
 
5.7.2. Restructuring SOEs to Ensure Meaningful Upgrading 
 
For the state sector, the SOEs continue to have privileged access to land and 
capital. Given the existence of these rents, there must be specific mechanisms to enforce 
meaningful upgrading of technologies and enhancing value-added. The government, via 
Vinatex and VITAS, has to adopt strategies to upgrade inefficient or failing SOEs by 
either equitizing them or merging them with more capable firms so that state resources 
can be put into efficient enterprises to promote new learning and upgrading. While 
creating a more friendly business environment for all enterprises, the government should 
utilize the state sector to carry out programs that address market failures or to implement 
solutions that require large-scale capital and technology investments such as Dinh Vu 
Polyester Fibre Project. This project could help reduce Vietnam’s heavy dependence on 
imported materials. Vinatex especially should focus on improving the capability of its 
subsidiaries in the textile sector, and on enhancing new learning, technological 
upgrading, and technology management, especially in the second (textile), fourth 
(packaging and shipping), and last (marketing and sales) stages of the value chain. This 
last point does not imply channelling more rents into Vinatex, but it does require 
improving the institutional monitoring and control of the conditions associated with 
these rents to put pressure on Vinatex and other SOEs to enhance their learning and 
upgrading efforts. 
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5.7.3. Governing Vinatex 
 
  As discussed in the previous section, Vinatex’s effort in learning was motivated 
by competition in the market and with other general corporations. In addition, the 
corporation has been influenced by the desire to reinforce its political and economic 
power. Both of these competitive pressures will continue pushing Vinatex towards 
industrial development in the next decade, though there is no guarantee of Vinatex’s 
success. However, if rents are to be used more aggressively for upgrading then additional 
institutional mechanisms are required to link rent allocation to the achievement of 
particular investment and technology acquisition goals.   
While the MoIT could continue in its role of monitoring and supporting the 
industry, there is a strong need for a more neutral, even-handed, and capable association 
than VITAS to act as the intermediary between government bodies and firms. This 
institution could also be a watchdog to challenge the utilisation of rents by Vinatex and 
to ensure that it carries out its responsibility as the primary driver of the sector’s 
upgrading. At the same time, the association could be the voice of the SMEs to 
communicate the bottlenecks that prevent them from achieving new industrial capability 
and development. By doing this, many of the problems in relation to coordination failure 
between firms and the state could be addressed. Vietnam could learn from the successful 
model used in the highly impressive Taiwan Textile Federation (Weiss, 1995). For now, 
both VITAS and AGTEK have failed to achieve these objectives.  
 
5.7.4. Supporting the Private Sector 
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As for the private sector, incentives must be provided to support and encourage 
investment in learning and innovation. This involves encouraging and negotiating 
technology transfers and training through FDI, as well as removing or compensating for 
the market failures that prevent them from making a profit, namely access to land and 
credit. The impact of foreign investments so far has been positive, although it is limited 
to job creation and low-skill training in the garments sector. My fieldwork data suggests 
that there has been limited training at the management level and insufficient technology 
transfer from FDIs, especially in the dyeing and finishing subsectors, which require high 
level of technical training and technology management.  
To address this problem, Ohno (2006) argues that, at the very least, the Vietnamese 
government must have an on-going dialogue with foreign investors to find out what 
types of policy changes and rent allocations are needed in order to make longer-term 
investments in Vietnam more attractive for foreign investors. More importantly, the 
Vietnamese government must have a clear strategy that promotes learning and 
technology transfers so as to develop local enterprises and their capability-building. It 
may be difficult today to use local content requirements, but it is possible to achieve this 
outcome by having an integrated strategy in which incentives are created for foreign 
firms to allow domestic firms to enter as subcontractors. The incentives and rents created 
would have to be managed carefully to ensure that moral hazard and damaging rent-
seeking do not derail these specific strategies (Khan, 2009b). 
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 Motorcycle Industry: the Triangular Rent-Seeking Chapter 6.
Relationship between Vietnam, Japan, and China  
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
	  
The motorcycle industry provides another case of industrial upgrading that was 
largely driven by foreign direct investment, especially by multinational corporations 
(MNCs). In the late 1990s, Vietnam’s economy was growing rapidly, which added 
demand for motorcycles as a means of transportation. This broadening demand attracted 
foreign investors to explore the Vietnamese domestic market and for local suppliers to 
participate in component manufacturing in the industry. Over time, Vietnamese firms 
participated in the supply chain by becoming lower-tier suppliers for foreign lead firms82 
such as Honda and Yamaha. Nevertheless, this process took time, and it did not truly 
begin until 2001 when spontaneous learning and upgrading took place due to China-
Vietnam collaboration to assemble and produce parts for Chinese motorcycles. 
From an institutional perspective, this attempt at industrial upgrading was a 
notable example of the Vietnamese government’s failure to effectively use learning rents 
in the initial phase of its development. Nevertheless, because of a number of accidents, 
notably the penetration of Chinese motorcycles in the Vietnamese market, which created 
a “China shock” in the domestic market, a number of upgrading opportunities emerged 
that provided more effective learning incentives for local firms. This chapter assesses 
these dynamics and the triangular rent-seeking relationships between Vietnam, China 
and Japan in the motorcycle industry in Vietnam. It examines the exchanges between 
                                                
82 Major brand motorcycle assemblers and manufacturers include Honda, Yamaha, and 
Suzuki. A lead firm is a brand-name company that manufactures and assembles its own 
brand of motorcycles. They also source components from first-tier suppliers. 
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lead firms and their suppliers, between MNCs and local enterprises, and between the 
state and local enterprises in the context of the global value chain for motorcycle 
production. Based on these insights, this chapter analyses how the three elements 
affecting rent management—the political, institutional, and industry organisation 
characteristics—affected the effort for learning, upgrading, and innovation in local firms.  
The analyses suggest that since the beginning of its industrial transformation in 
the mid 1990s, the motorcycle industry in Vietnam successfully attracted FDI from 
abroad and achieved some important technological upgrading. This experience can be 
understood through the lens of the three levels of factors affecting rent management. At 
the highest level, we observe a clear political will to use FDI as an instrument to achieve 
learning by adopting foreign expertise and technology for local producers. This political 
will, however, was diluted at the implementation stage (the second level of analysis) 
partly because the government appeared to be uncoordinated and not well-informed 
about market activities. It also did not seem to accurately assess the progress some local 
producers were achieving. As a result of a failure to support local producers in time, 
foreign brands occupy the majority of the motorcycle market today.  
At the third level of analysis, the DRMA framework suggests that the China 
shock resulted in market competition between foreign firms, notably the Chinese and 
Japanese, and resulted in price reductions that allowed local suppliers to join the 
production value chain. In addition, the availability of Chinese technology was helpful 
for local firms to upgrade their technical capability as these technologies were easier to 
assimilate compared to Japanese technologies. These factors added up to a 
developmental rent management mechanism that enhanced learning effort and upgrading 
for local enterprises. Consequently, despite policy failures at the state level, upgrading 
could take place at the firm level given the combination of available incentives, the 
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pressures from market competition and the ability of workers to learn the new 
technologies. 
 It should be noted that the motorcycle industry is an important part of the 
supporting industries in Vietnam. Thus, secondary data often refer to either or both of 
these industries. Traditionally, supporting industries imply mechanic and electronic 
industries. However, in Decision No. 12/2001/TD-TTg (Decision 12), the Vietnamese 
government includes five industries to make up the Vietnamese supporting industries: 
(1) textile and garment, (2) leather and footwear, (3) electronics, (4) automobile and 
motorcycle production, and (5) mechanical manufacturing. In Vietnam, many suppliers 
for the motorcycle industry also supply components for other industries. This is because 
the Vietnamese motorcycle industry pioneered supplier networks for mechanical, 
electronic, and other supporting components. In this thesis, the industrial development of 
the motorcycle industry in Vietnam is the focus of the analysis, although reference to the 
supporting industries is included. 
The following sections of this chapter are organised as followed. Section 6.2 
provides the background to the motorcycle industry, the stages of localisation in the 
value chain, and the three phases of the industry’s development in Viet Nam. Section 6.3 
reviews the industry’s constraints including in technology learning and upgrading, in the 
capital and credit markets, in coordination, and other factors. Sections 6.4, and 6.5 
provide case studies using the DRMA framework. Section 6.6 discusses the current 
standing of the industry’s development, especially after the China shock. Finally, section 
6.7 provides concluding remarks, observations, and policies implication. 
	  
6.2. Background of the Motorcycle Industry in Vietnam 
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Since the mid-1990s, the motorcycle industry in Vietnam has achieved a number 
of important milestones. In the years leading up to 2005, the industry accounted for 3.1 
per cent of the total industrial production value of the country (Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, 2007), and this value grew to 23.9 per cent by 2007 (Vietpartners, 2007). 
Revenue per annum was between VND 24.99 trillion to 29.15 trillion (USD 1.2 to 1.4 
billion), of which 10 per cent went to the government (Vietpartners, 2007). Export value 
in 2005 was VND 1.45 trillion (USD 70 million), which is 30 times higher than in 2001 
(Vietpartners, 2007). 
In 2010, Vietnam was the fourth largest market for motorcycle sales worldwide, 
after China, India, and Indonesia, respectively (Quoc-Hung, 2012b). In 2011, the 
Vietnamese motorcycle market sold 3.7 million83 units and grew 22 per cent from 2010. 
In 2011, the five largest motorcycle manufacturers in Vietnam—Honda84, Yamaha, 
Suzuki, SYM, and Piaggio85—are estimated to have sold approximately 3.32 million 
motorcycles combined in Vietnam (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). If this estimate is correct, the 
five largest motorcycle manufacturers in Vietnam took roughly 90 per cent of the market 
share, leaving Lifan (China), Kymco (Taiwan), and Sufat (Vietnam) to split the 
remaining 10 per cent of the market. 
In 2012, sales in the Vietnamese market slowed down to 3.11 million units, of 
which Honda sold 1.95 million units (dtinews, 2013), taking 62.7 per cent of the total 
Vietnamese market share. Second to Honda, Yamaha sold 800,000 units (dtinews, 2013), 
                                                
83 This figure has had differing volumes. For example, the report from dtinews (2013) 
showed that total units sold in 2011 was 3.31 million units. 
84 Honda’s 2012 market share in Vietnam was more than 61 per cent. It sold more than 2 
million units in 2011, and more than 2.3 million units in 2012 (Quoc Hung, 2012a). 
85 Piaggio has sold approximately 180,000 units in Vietnam since it officially entered the 
Vietnamese market in 2009. In 2012 Piaggio produced four different models at its 
maximum capacity in Vietnam: 100,000 units with a 70 per cent local content ratio. 
Piaggio aims to increase productivity in Vietnam to 300,000 units per year with 90 per 
cent local content ratio. It also plans to build both a manufacturing firm to produce 
engines and an R&D center in Vietnam (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
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or 25.7 per cent of the total market. Thus, two of the five FDI companies in the sector 
shared roughly 88.4 per cent of the total market share in the Vietnamese market. In 2012, 
motorcycle production as an assembly industry was estimated to employ about 20,000 
workers, as well as tens of thousands of workers in support industries and related 
services. The localisation ratio (percentage of parts of each unit to be made by the lead 
firms) is between 70 and 95 per cent, depending on the firm. Honda’s local content ratio 
reached nearly 95 per cent on some of its models (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
Starting in 2010, the major foreign motorcycle makers in Vietnam started to 
export their production surplus to other markets. In 2011, Honda exported 300,000 
motorcycles to the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan (Tran, 2012d). 
Yamaha and Piaggio have also exported their Vietnamese-built motorcycles, though in 
smaller quantities. All of these manufacturers plan to expand production in Vietnam and 
to increase their exports abroad. In 2013, motorcycle makers in Vietnam expect to reach 
full production capacity of 5 million vehicles, though the domestic market only 
consumes 3 to 3.5 million units per year (dtinews, 2013). This means there is a potential 
excess of 1.5 to 2 million units that could be exported. 
Given the industry’s rapid success, it is often forgotten that the industry did not 
start to develop until the mid-1990s, when the Vietnamese government launched an 
import substitution policy by erecting trade barriers while providing incentives for 
foreign investors. By the late 1990s, major motorcycle companies had established 
investments in Vietnam, including transnational corporations (TNCs): Taiwan’s VMEP 
and Japan’s Suzuki, Honda, and Yamaha (see Table 6.1) Some Taiwanese and Japanese 
parts manufacturers followed the lead of the motorcycle companies (the lead firms) and 
built plants in Vietnam to produce parts such as tires, batteries, electric and plastic parts, 
and breaks. Fujita (2007) contended that by the late 1990s, the Vietnamese motorcycle 
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industry was dominated by foreign manufacturers that created an oligopolistic market. 
Foreign motorcycle firms were able to set high prices that exceeded the high costs of 
operation, which enabled them to enjoy substantial rents.  
	  
Table 6.1: Major Foreign Motorcycle Firms in Vietnam, 1992–2013 
Name of Company Year of License Ownership Structure 
Vietnam Manufacture & 
Export Processing Co., Ltd. 
(VMEP) 
1992 − Chinfon Group, producer of SYM 
motorcycles (Taiwan, 100%) 
Vietnam Suzuki Corp. 1995 
− Suzuki Corp. (Japan, 35%) 
− Sojitz (Japan, 35%) 
− Vikyno: Southern Agricultural Machinery 
Corp. (Vietnam, 30%) 
*SuFat Vietnam 
Corporation  
1996 − Sufat (Vietnam, 100%) 
Honda Vietnam Co., Ltd. 1996 
− Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (Japan, 42%), 
− Asian Honda Motors (Thailand, 28%),  
− Vietnam Engine & Agricultural Machinery 
Corp. (Vietnam, 30%) 
Yamaha Vietnam Co., Ltd 1998 
− Yamaha Motors (Japan, 46%),  
− Hong Leong Industries (Malaysia, 24%), 
− Vietnam Forestry Corporation (30%) 
Lifan Motorcycle 
Manufacturing JV Co. 
2002 
− Chonqing Lifan (China, 70%), Vietnam 
Import-Export Technology Development 
Co. (30%) 
*Kymco Vietnam 2005 
− Kymco (Taiwan),  
− Hoa Lam (Vietnam) 
*Piaggio Vietnam 2009 − The Piaggio Group (Italy, 100%) 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Fujita (2008). *Author’s own data. 
	  
In an effort to speed up negotiations for the country’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the Vietnamese government abolished a series of regulations that 
had previously restricted sales of motorcycles and the expansion of production by 
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foreign motorcycle manufacturers. This move significantly boosted domestic sales of 
foreign-brand motorcycles and stimulated a new wave of FDI in the expansion of 
production and component production. It also set the industry on a more market-oriented 
path of development. However, local firms did not fared well during this period, as 
discussed throughout this chapter. 
	  
6.2.1. Summary of Government Policies (1995 to 2011) 
 
This section provides a chronological summary of the government policies from 
1995 to 2011. It highlights the swift changes the Vietnamese government’s policy 
agenda had in forcing the development of the local firms through participation of FDI in 
the Vietnamese market. 
 
 Mid-1990s: The Vietnamese government introduces import subsidy policies as trade 
barriers but also provides incentives to attract FDI to the industry (Fujita, 2007). 
 1998: Prohibition of completely built units (CBUs) 86 and localisation requirements 
introduced. The local content policies means that MNC firms have to pay high 
import tariffs if the proportional local content ratio is low, and vice versa (Fujita, 
2007). 
 February 2000: New policy enacted requiring all countries exporting motorcycle 
parts to Vietnam to submit quality certificates from their respective countries to 
prevent inferior quality motorcycle part imports into Vietnam. The policy was 
implemented in response to pressure from Japanese investors to restrict smuggled 
                                                
86 Completely built units or CBUs are motorcycles fully assembled abroad and are 
imported to Vietnam as a complete unit. 
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motorcycles and parts from China and because of quality issues with 
Chinese/Vietnamese co-manufactured motorcycles (Jalaluddin, 2002). 
 2001: The Vietnamese government starts to implement local content policies and to 
audit the records of Vietnamese and Chinese firms looking for tax evasion. Existing 
firms expected to maintain at least 60 per cent local parts in their production. In 
addition, the government bans imports of 20 identifiable motorcycle parts to protect 
its domestic industries, arguing that these parts can be made locally (Jalaluddin, 
2002). 
 September 2002: The Vietnamese government introduces further controls on 
motorcycle parts by imposing import quotas for components. These policies 
announced without any notice. Since the allocated quotas were not sufficient for 
Honda and Yamaha, they suspend production temporarily until additional quotas are 
granted. This policy came under strong criticism among FDI investors. 
 2003: Import quotas abolished but the Vietnamese government enacts a policy 
requiring FDI motorcycle manufacturers to operate according to the projections in 
their business plans, which they submitted to the authorities when their projects were 
licensed. Obviously rapid market growth in the early 2000s was not envisaged in the 
late 1990s. This policy constrains various Japanese companies from expanding their 
investment and it comes under severe criticism by the Japanese business community. 
The policy was abolished in April 2005 as the result of intergovernmental negotiation. 
 January 2003: The Vietnamese government abandons local content rules. This 
decision primarily due to its effort to gain accession to the WTO (Fujita, 2007). 
 2003–2005: The Vietnamese government abandons restrictions on motorcycle 
registration, specifically rules that require that a resident can register only one 
motorcycle and it has to be registered under the home address of the motorcycle 
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owner.87 Additionally, the rule that bans registration of new motorcycles in the inner 
districts of Hanoi is revoked. 
 2007: “Master Plan for the Development of Vietnam’s Motorcycle Industry in the 
Period of 2006-2015, with a Vision to 2020” is issued by the Ministry of Industry. 
 2007: The Ministry of Industry issues Decision 34/2007/QD-BCN “Master Plan for 
Development of Supporting Industries until 2010, Vision until 2020.” The decision 
specifies that policies will focus on boosting five industries: (1) textile and garment, 
(2) footwear and leather, (3) electronics and informatics, (4) manufacturing and 
assembly of automobiles, and (5) manufacturing mechanical engineering with the 
express purpose of creating new breakthroughs in the development of other primary 
industries in Vietnam. The decision has general terms that specify areas where 
government subsidies will be generated.  
 2011: The prime minister signs Decision 12/2011/QT-TTg (Decision 12), which is 
designed to encourage and create conditions for domestic and foreign organisations, 
as well as individuals, to develop the supporting industries. Several different types of 
subsidies are proposed by Decision 12, including promotions for market 
development, infrastructure, human resource training in science and technology, and 
finance (Dezan, Shira, & Associates, 2011).  
	  
6.2.2. Stages of Localisation  
 
Localisation played a vital role in the acquisition of technology in Vietnam’s 
motorcycle industry and supporting industries. Mishima (2005b) describes the five 
stages of localisation that were a channel for technological transfer from FDI 
manufacturers. Table 6.2 provides examples of value chains in Thailand and Indonesia. 
                                                
87 Each Vietnamese citizen could be resident only under one address.  
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It illustrates how these countries went through five stages of development using 
localisation ratio as a measurement. This value chain framework is employed in the case 
studies and referred to throughout the chapter. 
	  
Table 6.2: Value Chain in Stages of Localisation  
Stages Description 
Thailand and Indonesia’s 
rate of localisation 
1 
Assemble complete knockdown units (except for engines and 
electrical parts) 
50% or less 
2 Move to localisation (in-house production; labour-intensive) 70% 
3 Arrival of key parts suppliers for foreign lead firms 80% 
4 
Broad agglomeration of supporting industries (capital-
intensive) 
90% 
5 R&D and exports 90% or more 
Source: Mishima (2005a) 
	  
Generally, in the first stage of the value chain of motorcycle production, local 
enterprises assemble complete knockdown motorcycles (CKD motorcycle)88 built with 
imported engines and electrical parts. At this stage, a small number of domestic suppliers 
are used for under-body parts such as tires, batteries, and harnesses to save on high 
transportation costs. In the second stage, lead firms switch from imported parts to in-
house production of those parts, which, in turn, increases the localisation ratio. Even at 
this relatively early stage, lead firms begin to produce engines in-house and often invite 
engine and electrical part suppliers to supply smaller parts to the lead firms (Mishima, 
2005b).  
                                                
88 A complete knockdown (CKD) motorcycle is a complete kit of pre-manufactured parts 
needed to assemble a motorcycle. Motorcycle makers (the lead firms) sell knockdown 
kits to their foreign affiliates or licensees for various reasons, including to avoid import 
taxes or to receive tax preferences for providing local assembling and manufacturing 
jobs. 
 
 310 
By the third stage, lead firms which previously manufactured important parts, 
such as engines in-house, begin to invest in the local country (Vietnam in this case) and 
to outsource key parts, including engines, carburettors, brakes, and so on to local 
suppliers. The volume of complete knockdown motorcycles made with 100 per cent 
imported parts decrease significantly. Mishima (2005b) observed that Vietnam 
transitioned into the third stage in 2005.  
In the fourth stage, nearly every needed supplier—mostly foreign but also 
domestic—has been set up in business so that parts can be purchased locally. First-tier 
and even second-tier suppliers also do heavy industrial manufacturing such as metal 
pressing and sheet processing locally. At this stage, the local subcontracting network is 
extensive, so local suppliers are more engaged in the manufacturing process. In addition, 
the number of suppliers for each component begins to increase, which leads to stiff 
competition among suppliers. Suppliers with sufficient capacity to met the manufacturers’ 
requirements for quality, cost, and delivery (QCD) compete by offering their products at 
lower cost while promising to maintain high QCD standards. In 2013, Vietnam 
completed the fourth stage. The motorcycle industry involves local suppliers’ actively 
participate in the complex production chains as first- and second-tier suppliers for 
foreign MNCs. In Vietnam, Honda’s local content ratio ranges from 70 to 95 per cent in 
some of its low-cost models (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
In the fifth and final stage, foreign producers begin to transfer their research and 
development (R&D) to the country of manufacture, and a full-scale export strategy from 
the production base of that country begins to be implemented. In 2013, Vietnam began to 
enter this final stage. Currently, Honda, Piaggio, and locally owned Sufat Vietnam have 
R&D centres located in Vietnam. In addition, Honda, Yamaha, and Piaggio have started 
to export some of its surplus production to neighbouring markets, although it is predicted 
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to be difficult, given the slow growth in global demand for motorcycles and competition 
from abroad (Tran, 2013a). Table 6.3 illustrates the Vietnamese experience adapted from 
Mishima’s framework and the approximate corresponding period, which the industry 
developed through each of the stage. 
 
Table 6.3: Stages of Localisation in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry 
Stages Description Proximate Year 
Vietnam’s 
rate of 
localisation 
1 Assembled complete knockdown units 1995-2000 40% or less 
2 
Moved to localisation by ways of in-house 
production and use of foreign and local 
suppliers for basic components (labour-
intensive) 
1998-2005 60% 
3 
Arrival of key parts suppliers for foreign lead 
firms and increase in number of lower-tier 
local suppliers that produced more diversified 
components. 
2001-2009 70% 
4 Broad agglomeration of supporting industries (capital-intensive) 2005-2013 90% 
5 R&D and exports 2013  90% or more 
 
In the remaining part of the chapter, rents and rent-seeking relationships are 
analysed in reference to these five stages as a point of comparison in assessing the 
industry’s industrial progress. 
 
6.2.3. The Industry’s Transformation  
 
Contextually, this author divides the development of Vietnam’s motorcycle 
industry in three periods: 1995-2000, 2001-2004, and post-2004. Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the periods, which correspond with the case studies in this chapter.	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Figure 6.1: Three Periods of Industrial Development  
 
	  
	  
The first period of the industrial development of the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry started in the mid-1990s. In the spirit of Doi Moi, the government enacted 
industrial programmes in the motorcycle industry. One of the first measures was a series 
of import substitution policies that erected trade barriers while providing incentives to 
attract FDI in the industry. The intention was to provide various rents to local enterprises 
and to foreign investors to encourage foreign transfer of technology by establishing 
manufacturing lines and employing local suppliers. This series of policies, however, 
created an unintended oligopolistic market for Japanese and some Taiwanese producers. 
These foreign producers imported CBUs or CKD units from abroad, which kept market 
prices extremely high. Given the lack of competition, foreign investors were able to see 
tremendous profits in Vietnam until Chinese motorcycles flooded the market during the 
second period, known also as the “China shock” period.  
The second period of the industry’s development started with this large-scale 
penetration of Chinese motorcycles. The “China shock” experience marked an industrial 
transformation of the domestic firms. During this period, local Vietnamese firms acted 
Period 1: FDI oligopolistic 
maket (1995-2000) 
 
Period 2: "China 
shock" (2001–2004 ) 
Period 3: FDI-driven market 
(post–2004)  
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both as assemblers and later as parts suppliers for Chinese lead firms as they sought 
profits in the low-cost market, which had remained unexploited by Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers. The Vietnamese firms achieved notable industrial upgrading during this 
period (Fujita, 2010).  
Also in the beginning of 2001, the Vietnamese government imposed proportional 
import tariff on motorcycle parts based on local content ratio and new quality standard 
requirements. The policy effectively transferred rents to Japanese manufacturers, who 
could easily meet the requirements to capture additional subsidies, though they 
demanded better policy mechanisms to protect and enforce their trademarks and 
intellectual property rights. After 2002, Japanese manufacturers successfully recaptured 
substantial market shares from Chinese–Vietnamese producers. As a consequence, a 
number of local assemblers89 and suppliers went out of business. 
In the third period (post–2004), the industry took a major turn. Starting in 2005, 
the industry was once again largely occupied by major foreign motorcycle manufacturers, 
with local firms participating lower down in the production chain. The Vietnamese 
government removed its administrative and trade barriers to attract more FDI, especially 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but this left local firms competing directly with 
FDI businesses. Consequently, nearly half the local businesses went under due to their 
inability to compete: of the 51 Vietnamese firms surveyed by Fujita (2007), 35 left the 
industry. Nevertheless, motorcycle production continues at a high growth rate due to 
expansion in market demand. 
Although Vietnam has regarded its motorcycle industry as a key industry since 
the mid-1990s, a comprehensive government strategy for developing it was not created 
                                                
89 Local firms started out as assemblers for foreign lead firms doing only assembling 
work. Later, they became suppliers for the higher tier supplier or for the lead firms. 
Being supplier is the next level of technical capability because, at this level, they would 
manufacture components instead of assembling them. 
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until 2007, after the industry entered a new phase in 2005. This delayed policy agenda 
meant that there were limited capital accumulation and technical learning possibilities 
for local producers in the earlier period. The result was a restricted success of the 
domestic motorcycle manufacturing over the past two decades and the absence of a 
major breakthrough in Vietnamese production. This can be seen as a missed opportunity 
for Vietnam to develop its domestic motorcycle industry with its own brands. 	  
	  
6.3. Industry Constraints 
 
A survey on the capability of local suppliers in the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry was conducted by the Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy in 2008, and it 
revealed that the supporting industries were experiencing major constraints for a number 
of reasons. First, a large number of relatively “easy” parts and components made of cast 
iron, steel, or plastic continued to be imported because no local company could supply 
them. Second, the engineering and technical capability of domestic suppliers was 
generally low and they could not perform at an appropriate QCD level. Third, the ability 
to supply large quantities of quality parts was low. Fourth, attention was largely placed 
on the cost of materials, with far less attention on the costs associated with waste, 
defective parts, limited inventories, and uneven quality of inputs. Finally, local producers 
were unable to invest in the necessary human and physical capital to become viable part 
manufacturers (Vietnam Development Forum, 2011). The validation of this survey is 
confirmed in my fieldwork as a number of my interviewees made similar observations. 
This section focuses on the three most important constraints found within the motorcycle 
industry: technical learning and upgrading, capital and credit markets, and coordination 
failures. 
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6.3.1. Technological Learning and Upgrading 
	  
Since the opening of the industry, learning has taken two forms: collaborating 
with foreign enterprises and upgrading by domestic firms using alternative financing 
opportunities. An example of the former is the Ha Noi Plastic Company. It started as 
Honda Vietnam’s suppliers, but the company increasingly developed linkages with other 
foreign motorcycle firms, and now it also supplies large precision plastic parts for home 
appliances, such as washing machines and air conditioners. In 2010 the company 
purchased a 1,500-ton injection moulding machine to expand its customer base (Vietnam 
Development Forum, 2011). 
Examples of the latter include local firms’ efforts to invest in available, often 
second-hand equipment and technology to reduce costs and to boost the technical skills 
of engineers and workers. These self-initiated efforts often take more time and a number 
of attempts before a firm succeeds in acquiring new capabilities. However, some 
Vietnamese firms have developed skills that made them globally competitive, such as the 
Hoang Phat Company and Tan Hoa Mechanical Company. Both of these enterprises 
started out using second-hand imported equipment from Taiwan and slowly improved 
their technical capabilities to produce parts that satisfied the standards required by 
Japanese and Taiwanese lead firms, eventually becoming their suppliers (Vietnam 
Development Forum, 2011). An interview with an expert at a research think-tank in Ha 
Noi suggests that this type of self-effort upgrading takes place at a much slower pace, 
and enterprises are often held back due to lack of capital and technical skills.  
However, the transfer of technology from FDI lead firms to local suppliers can 
also be slow and is often incomplete. In my interview with a manager of a Japanese–
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Vietnamese joint venture and first-tier supplier to Honda Vietnam, he explained that 
there was technology that his company mastered years ago, and yet when this same 
technology was transferred to a local second-tier supplier, they simply could not perfect 
it despite the fact that Honda provided them with technical assistance for a few years. 
For example, in 2008, the first-tier supplier (GTL) had agreed to transfer technology that 
used robots to run and monitor production of few select components to one of GTL’s 
second-tier suppliers (TLM), a local SOE located in Hanoi. After three years of technical 
support from GTL, TLM continued to encounter multiple errors in its production using 
this technology. My interviewee told me that this was puzzling since GTL had produced 
components using this robotic technology with nearly 100 per cent accuracy for years. I 
asked why this happened and he pointed out that TLM (and other similar local suppliers) 
did not respect certain important procedures in the use of this technology, causing 
failures in operation. He explained that, for example, TLM would fail to maintain the 
robot by skipping steps in the maintenance and operation procedures. 
 Additionally, several interviewees pointed out that formal training or education 
does little to supply skilled resources to local firms, and that most of the learning takes 
place at the workplace (cam tay chi viec). This is another reason why the upgrading and 
learning at local suppliers occurs at a much slower pace. Two of the local firms that I 
visited (one assembler and one supplier) confirmed that the majority of their investment 
in training and technical upgrading was based on either hiring experts, learning by doing 
or asking advice from colleagues who work for other foreign firms.  
 Managers of firms that I interviewed told me that they could overcome certain 
impediments through learning and collaborating with foreign suppliers for transfer of 
technology, but that many foreign firms, especially Japanese ones, often require strict 
QCD and management standards before they are willing to sign a contract with local 
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firms for any type of technology or skills training. Achieving these strict standards can 
take as little as six months or as long as a few years depending on the initial capability of 
the local firm. Figure 6.2 shows that among the eight areas of support listed in the figure, 
local suppliers received the most help in production and quality management, new 
product development, and technical support from their foreign lead-firms and higher-
ranked suppliers. 
	  
Figure 6.2: Activities Supported by Buyers in 2011  
	  
Source: Data provided by Centre for Supporting Industries and Enterprise Development, 
MoIT. N = 18. 
	  
 According to Figure 6.2, of the 18 suppliers who responded to the Centre for 
Supporting Industries and Enterprise Development’s survey, 12 received support in the 
areas of new product development (denoted as ‘Yes’ in the figure) and production and 
quality management. It should be noted that none of the suppliers received any support 
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in exporting (denoted as ‘No’ in the figure), only two received support in the area of 
human development including technical training and four received assistance for 
importing equipment. However, as mentioned above, it is often overlooked that to obtain 
a component supply contract with a foreign firm, a local firm must initially satisfy a 
strict set of criteria that requires a learning period on its own.  
In addition to the lack of technical learning and upgrading, there is a shortage of 
investment capital and there are problems related to obtaining state loans for investment. 
Section 6.3.2 discusses these constraints in detail. 
	  
6.3.2. Capital and Credit Markets 
	  
A major constraint facing private local SMEs in Vietnam is the shortage of 
investment capital due to a weak credit market. Throughout the industry’s development, 
these suppliers have lacked access to long-term loans or an equity-based financing 
system. The issue is exacerbated because on the one hand, state-owned commercial 
banks have strict collateral requirements, difficult administrative processes, and limited 
incentives to lend to private SMEs. On the other hand, SMEs are unwilling to tangle with 
state-owned commercial banks given the low chance of success in meeting their 
requirements. This generates a vicious circle that prevents many SMEs from entering the 
formal credit sector, forcing them to rely on informal credit, which then slows down the 
learning and upgrading processes (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2012).   
One of my interviewees, an owner of a local supplier, reported that as of 2011 
(the time of the interview), Honda and other foreign lead-suppliers were willing to 
provide training with the caveat of meeting their standards. This owner did not have the 
immediate capital to upgrade the equipment, which he had purchased in the early 2000s; 
 319 
his technology was simply too old to meet Honda’s requirements. At the time of this 
interview, it had taken him eight months to build a production chain to produce the 
components that he thought was nearly of the quality that Honda (and others) required. 
He said it would have taken him less time if he were to have extra finance to invest. He 
also revealed that he was in the process of negotiating with Honda Vietnam to be their 
supplier. However, this opportunity would be put on hold once again if Honda requires 
new equipment, which he could not afford to buy, as his finance had been exhausted.  
 According to this same interviewee, in 2011, as a part of Honda’s plan to expand 
production in Vietnam, it actively sought new suppliers, but local suppliers could not 
meet its standards criteria, partly because they did not have the capital to invest in 
production machinery to take advantage of the opportunity. This created a bottleneck as 
local suppliers lost this chance to sign a contract with a lead supplier, and Honda could 
not get all the components that they needed locally for expansion in Vietnam. 
Aiming to address these financial bottlenecks, the Vietnamese government 
instituted banking reforms. The Private Sector Promotion Action Plan, the so-called 
Miyazawa Plan, agreed upon between Japan and Vietnam in 1999, included the 
promulgation of the Decree on Lending Guarantees; the Circular related to the Auction 
System; the Decree Liberalizing Transactions involving Land Use Rights; and the 
establishment of the Stock Exchange Centre (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2012). 
Another key milestone for further improving the financial environment for SMEs was 
the creation of a two-step loan fund90 and a credit guarantee fund91 (Richards, Harvie, 
                                                
90 An agreement for a two-step loan fund was signed between the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation and the government of Vietnam in 1999. It provided long-term 
credit to Vietnamese SMEs through participating select financial institutions, such as 
joint-stock commercial banks. It was expected that 70 per cent of the beneficiaries from 
this fund would be private SMEs.  
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Nguyen, & Nguyen, 2002). In early 2010s, the government also proposed to improve the 
regulatory framework on lending, mortgaging, and leasing, and the pending banking 
sector reform that would provide SMEs with greater access to credit (interview with 
MoIT official, 2011). 
Overall, the Vietnamese government’s use of private financial institutions rather 
than state-owned commercial banks to provide investment capital for domestic suppliers 
has had several major shortcomings as detailed by Richards, et al. (2002). First, the 
coverage of the two-step loans and credit guarantee fund are not sufficiently targeted to 
have meaningful effects on parts suppliers. Second, the broad coverage encourages rent-
seeking activities by enterprises seeking to access these funds even though their business 
operations have little relation to the development of the motorcycle industry and 
supporting industries. Third, SMEs faces a number of difficulties related to insufficient 
corporate financial information, insufficient evaluation capacities of banks, and high 
collateral requirements. Finally, the impact of these reforms on the domestic private 
sector remains limited because private firms often times could not secure access to land-
use rights, which would be their most valuable source of collateral. By contrast, most 
SOEs, given their relationship with the government, can lease public lands from the 
government. This gives them a significant advantage over the private domestic sector in 
securing loans for investment (Richards, et al., 2002). As a result, continuous 
institutional invention and adjustment is needed to overcome these problems. In essence, 
the capital and credit markets are a major constraint for the motorcycle industry because 
private SMEs continue to face enormous difficulties in gaining access to capital and land.  
	  
                                                                                                                                           
91 The credit guarantee fund for SMEs aimed to encourage financial institutions to lend 
to SMEs by absorbing a part of the credit risk, thereby alleviating borrowing constraints 
as a result of their insufficient collateral.  
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6.3.3. Coordination Failures 
 
In the case of the motorcycle industry, government faced a number of 
coordination failures in their policies for infant industry protection. Consequently, 
supports for industrial learning and capability-building turned out to be inadequate. 
There are three instances between 2001 and 2004 (the China shock period) that illustrate 
this failure. 
In 2001, the government started to implement new local content policies: firms 
were expected to use at least 60 per cent local parts in their production. The new policies 
introduced new standards for products and assembly plants (Nguyen, 2005) while 
banning imports of 20 identifiable motorcycle parts to protect domestic industries, 
arguing that these parts could be locally produced (Jalaluddin, 2002). In reality, however, 
these locally made parts did not meet foreign firms’ quality standards. The local content 
policy created a problem, as it forced foreign firms to buy local products from local 
suppliers that were largely incapable of meeting quality standards. As a consequence, 
this policy created bottlenecks for both foreign firms and local suppliers. Chinese and 
Vietnamese lead firms went so far as to import CKD units, and CBUs from China, which 
were banned in Vietnam, and simply assembled them in Vietnam. In addition, they 
falsely claimed Chinese-made components to be Vietnamese-made in order to meet the 
localisation ratio. Thus, there were motorcycles assembled in Vietnam with Chinese-
produced parts while others were flat-out Chinese motorbikes from kits. In either case, 
the Vietnamese market was selling motorcycles with virtually no locally made 
components, despite the claim that they met the 60 per cent local ratio policy (Jalaluddin, 
2002). The government was either “unaware” of these actions (or accepted bribes to look 
away) or took no action against them. 
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The second example occurred when the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
introduced additional controls on motorcycle parts by imposing import quotas without 
notice. Beginning immediately on September 4, 2002, the ministry slashed the number of 
sets (one set makes one motorcycle) that firms could import during the year from 2.5 
million to 1.5 million sets. Furthermore, of the reduced quotas, 600,000 sets were 
allocated to the seven foreign manufacturers, with the remaining 900,000 sets divided 
among 55 Vietnamese manufacturers (Fujita, 2007). The move prompted a storm of 
protest from three of the foreign manufacturers—Honda, Suzuki, and Yamaha—which 
had based their annual production targets for their joint-venture operations in Vietnam on 
the larger original quotas. Assembly lines at Honda's plant in the Vinh Phuc province, 
northwest of Hanoi, ground to a halt on September 18, while Yamaha stopped 
production at its plant on the outskirts of the capital a month later because it ran out of 
parts (Agence France Presse, 2002). In addition, interviews from my fieldwork 
confirmed that also during this period, domestic firms were audited for possible tax fraud 
in their claims of localisation ratios. Those that were under investigation by the tax 
authority were not permitted to obtain import quotas to continue production, leading to 
production being halted for local assemblers for a sustained period in 2002. In this case, 
both foreign and local firms suffered from lower production output because of the 
MoIT’s quota policy and consumers suffered price increases as a result of supply 
shortage. The government backtracked by lifting import quotas at the beginning of 2003. 
The coordination and policy failures seen in the localisation requirement and the 
import quota policy suggest that the MoIT was disconnected with the reality of the 
industry, so their policies did not reflect the actual capability or needs of foreign or local 
firms. These local suppliers could not possibly produce enough parts, let alone quality 
parts, for the manufacturers without an appropriate period of learning and upgrading. 
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One outcome of the inappropriate policies was that the prices for motorcycles rose for a 
period of time.  
In the third example, in 2003, the Vietnamese government enacted a policy 
requiring foreign motorcycle manufacturers to operate within the projections in their 
original business plans. However, in early 2000s, the rapid market growth had been 
unexpected and thus foreign assemblers exhausted their permitted production before the 
year ended. With this new policy, production was again affected because market demand 
increased but companies were constrained from production. This policy too came under 
severe criticism by the foreign business community. As with the preceding policy 
examples, this policy too was abolished in April 2005 as the result of intergovernmental 
negotiations (Agence France Presse, 2002). 
The events that took place between the late 1990s and early 2000s illustrate the 
severe coordination failure at the state level that created bottlenecks and setbacks for 
both foreign and domestic enterprises. In all three examples, the government devised a 
number of rent policies and structures to implement them. However, it failed to make 
sure that the rents produced value-enhancing outcomes instead of constraining the 
development of the industry. This is partly due to the fact that these policies were 
devised and introduced at very short notice. Hence, domestic suppliers and foreign lead 
firms did not have enough time to adjust their operations accordingly nor was the policy 
designed to provide adequate resources and incentives to domestic firms to engage in the 
necessary investment and learning. In consequence, not only did domestic suppliers fail 
to learn and to upgrade their capability, the government also frustrated foreign investors. 
Table 6.4 briefly outlines the policies from 1990 to 2005. 
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Table 6.4: History of Rent Policies pre-1990 to 2005 
Year Content 
Before 1990 Import restrictions on CBUs 
1997 Ban on CBUs; Local content requirements introduced 
January 2011 Imposed proportional import tariff on motorcycle parts based on 
local content ratio 
2002 Raised import tariff 
September 2002 Set quotas on imports of component sets; relaxed quota 
requirement in November 2002 
2003 
(1) Abolished quotas on CBUs 
(2) Imposed administrative restrictions on imports in accordance 
with previously approved business plans. 
2004 Normalised import tariff on components 
2005 Removed administrative restrictions on imports based on business 
plans 
Source: Adapted from Nguyen (2006)  
	  
6.3.4. Other Challenges  
 
The opening of the Vietnamese market to foreign investors starting in 2005 
imposed critical challenges for domestic Vietnamese firms, which saw their market share 
shrink drastically. By 2007, many foreign manufacturers had achieved phenomenal 
growth rates in the Vietnamese market, while the market share of 100 per cent 
Vietnamese-owned firms had shrunk to roughly a negligible 2 per cent (Fujita, 2007). Of 
the 3.7 million motorcycles sold in Vietnam in 2011, only around 380,000 were 
manufactured by either Vietnamese or Chinese lead-firms (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). This 
means that the top five foreign manufacturers (three Japanese, one Taiwanese, and one 
Italian) sold more than 90 per cent of the market or 3.66 million units. Of this staggering 
amount, Honda was the dominant seller, occupying approximately 62 per cent of the 
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market. By 2012, many Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers were on the verge of going 
out of business (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
During my fieldwork in 2011, one local assembler told me that the local business 
in motorcycle assembly is like a car that is running out of fuel. He was pessimistic about 
both his business and the overall business environment for local firms because the 
market for Vietnamese low-cost motorcycles is nearly non-existent when foreign 
manufacturers continuously introduce low-cost models to compete in the low-end market 
segment. Quoc Hung (2012a) reported that the number of local firms and suppliers had 
shrunk from 56 firms in early 2000s to less than 30 in 2012, of which there was only one 
100 per cent Vietnamese-owned plant. One of the firms that closed down, the Hoa Lam 
Company, had once been well-respected and had a well-known brand—Halim—but it 
largely left the market after selling most of its stakes to Kymko Vietnam, a Taiwanese-
based motorcycle maker (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). Similarly, in her fieldwork, Fujita (2010) 
demonstrated that the number of assemblers decreased from 51 in 2002 to 28 in 2006. 
Between 2002 and 2006, 28 manufactures left the motorcycle industry though 12 new 
ones entered the market in that period (Fujita, 2010).  
The challenge became even more severe when the Vietnamese government could 
no longer use the import-substitution strategy employed in periods 1 and 2 because of its 
commitments to various trade agreements, especially to the WTO and with the 
ASEAN92+3 countries. In particular, protections against the ASEAN–China trade block 
must be completely removed by 2015 because of the creation of the ASEAN–China Free 
Trade Area (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.). This translates to mean that 7,881 product 
categories, or 90 per cent of imported goods, are to be freely exchanged within this area 
                                                
92 ASEAN countries include: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. ASEAN +3 includes all members of 
ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 
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with zero tariffs. Ohno (2008), asserts that “this is a great concern for Vietnam since 
ASEAN is the strong production base of Japanese products such as automobiles and 
electronics” (p. 1) so Vietnam will be forced to switch from producing and assembling 
their own products to importing similar products from neighbouring countries. Such a 
phenomenon would create considerable negative pressure on the country’s trade balance, 
as Vietnam would likely experience a larger trade deficit (Ohno, 2008).  
	  
6.3.5. Introduction to the Case Studies 
 
Thus far, this chapter has provided an overview of the motorcycle industry in 
Vietnam and the constraints that are holding back the process of industrial upgrading and 
capability-building of the industry. In the next several sections this chapter examines two 
case studies of the Vietnamese government’s efforts to generate technological catch-up 
and to allocate learning rents that decisively changed the dynamic of the motorcycle 
industry over the past decade. The first case study assesses the emergence and the failure 
of learning rents in the first period of the industry’s development. The second case study 
reviews the transformation of the industry since Chinese motorcycles penetrated the 
Vietnamese market. It looks at the learning effects of this transformation and how 
Vietnamese enterprises went from being local assemblers to parts suppliers for foreign 
firms. The objective is to assess how the three factors of rent management—political, 
institutional, and industry organisation—impacted the structure of incentives and 
pressure to ensure effort for learning, upgrading, and innovation in the motorcycle 
industry. 
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6.4. Case Study 1: The Failure of Learning Rents (1995–2000) 
 
6.4.1. DRMA Step 1 – Rents and Incentives Created by Rents 
	  
In the mid-1990s, in the course of efforts to enhance industrialisation, the 
Vietnamese government chose the motorcycle industry as its champion for Vietnam’s 
industrial development. It launched an import substitution policy that erected trade 
barriers and provided incentives to attract FDI, in particular Japanese and Taiwanese 
TNCs in the motorcycle industry (Fujita, 2007). The major purpose of this policy was to 
enhance learning-by-doing as well as transfer technology in assembly and parts 
manufacturing into Vietnam’s infant industry. The Vietnamese government used, among 
other actions, tax breaks, the provision of subsidized land, the protection of intellectual 
property rights, tariff protection against imports of fully assembled motorcycles to create 
rents for foreign investors who invested in Vietnam (interviews with MoIT officials and 
industry experts).93 This policy, in effect, allocated a variety of learning rents because 
the intention was to use these rents to increase skills, training, and technology in the 
domestic motorcycle industry.  
Attracted by the large and growing market, several foreign motorcycle 
manufacturers, particularly Japanese companies, began importing CBUs, CKD 
motorcycles and incomplete knockdown motorcycles, new and used—from their 
countries, Thailand, or Indonesia. The incentive created by the rents was to enter the 
Vietnamese market so as to extract profits in the absence of domestic competition. By 
1999, 63.1 per cent of motorcycles sold in Vietnam were made by Honda, and 43.6 per 
cent were Honda’s imported motorcycles (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2007). That is, 
                                                
93 Official data for these subsidies is not available. 
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69 per cent94 of motorcycles sold by Honda in Vietnam in 1999 were imported from 
abroad.95 As an additional illustration, Table 6.5 provides the percentage of import 
values between 2000 and 2005 from CBUs made outside of Vietnam. In 2000, 95.45 per 
cent of the total imported value was from CBUs, while separate parts accounted for only 
4.45 per cent of imported value. This table illustrates that the highest number of imported 
items prior to 2001 were largely new and used CKD motorcycles. 
	  
Table 6.5: Import Value of CBU and Parts (by per cent), 2000 to 2005	  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CBU 95.45 88.16 64.17 27.98 0 0.23 
Separate parts 4.45 6.76 31.63 55.54 87.9 86.5 
Source: MoIT (2007). CBUs means motorcycles fully assembled abroad and are 
imported as a complete unit. However, in the context that Vietnam prohibited imports of 
CBUs between from 1998 to 2003 (Intarakumnerd & Fujita, 2008) and from my 
interviews, it is highly likely that MoIT data implies both CKD units and CBUs. 
 
The foreign manufacturers (the lead-firms) could produce their own parts or 
source parts from domestic or foreign suppliers (Nguyen, 2005). With the number of 
reputable foreign lead firms in Vietnam, a number of foreign part suppliers followed the 
lead firms to Vietnam so as to provide high quality parts. Because of this, foreign 
investors were able to overcome the Vietnamese government’s requirement for 
localisation yet did not have to collaborate with local suppliers for parts. Despite high 
tariffs imposed on foreign motorcycles, new and second-hand motorcycles, Japanese 
                                                
94 43.6 / 63.1 = 69 per cent 
95 MoIT (2007) data did not specify whether these motorcycles were imported as CBUs 
or CKD units.  
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brands in particular, were imported into Vietnam throughout this five-year period 
(Intarakumnerd & Fujita, 2008). In an oligopolistic market occupied solely by foreign 
firms and suppliers, foreign motorcycle producers were able to set high prices despite the 
import tariffs, which enabled them to enjoy substantial profits (Mishima, 2005b).  
 
6.4.2. RMM Level 1 – The Political Context of Rent Creation and Management 
(1995–2000) 
 
Step 3 of the DRMA framework assesses the configuration of rent management 
of this case study based on three levels of rent management analysis. Figure 6.3 briefly 
summarizes the discussions in section 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4. 
 
Figure 6.3: Rent Management Mechanism during the 1995-2000 Period 
 
 
• Political will to use FDI for 
industrial upgrading 
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The highest level of rent management analysis—the political context, in this 
case—had two relevant characteristics. First, the Vietnamese government was interested 
in attracting FDI so as to take advantage of foreign capital, expertise and technology as 
explained above. Second, Japanese manufacturers (particularly Honda, Suzuki, and 
Yamaha) were successful in lobbying the Vietnamese government—the prime minister 
and the MoIT—to implement policies that served their economic interests, including the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. An interviewee who worked inside the MoIT 
confirmed that between 2000 and 2005, Japanese investors had significant leverage to 
negotiate the terms of their investment in Vietnam,96 and were also skilfully supported 
by the Japanese government through agencies such as the embassy and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, as well as their own manufacturing association. To 
prevent local firms from imitating, adopting and adapting Japanese motorcycle models 
and technologies, Japanese investors requested that the Vietnamese government 
implement tighter controls over intellectual property rights. These investors argued that 
the Vietnamese government’s commitment to the protection of property rights would 
encourage more Japanese investors into Vietnam. The Vietnamese government obliged. 
In essence, the political context, which set the policy agenda, was driven by two 
parallel though somewhat contradictory forces: to upgrade the domestic industry using 
FDI, and meeting Japanese investors’ demands as conditions for their investment in the 
Vietnamese market. Perhaps the coordination failure seen in this period (see section 
6.3.3) was partly due to the Vietnamese government’s attempts to compromise in order 
to achieve both of these goals. 
 
                                                
96 My interviewee explained that Taiwanese investors did not have as much negotiating 
power given the smaller size of their manufacturing investments. In addition, Japanese 
brands were much more popular in Vietnam and thus the market demand for Japanese-
made motorcycles was considerable. 
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6.4.3. RMM Level 2 – Policy Mechanisms for Rent Implementation in the First 
Period 
 
At the institutional level, a major problem lay in the processes used to negotiate 
licenses with Japanese investors. The delivery of significant technology transfer was not 
a part of the negotiation for a license, in spite of the Vietnamese government’s intention 
of using FDI for the industrial development of the industry. I asked two interviewees 
who each worked at the MoIT about this failure. One pointed out that in the late 1990s, 
Vietnamese government officials were inexperienced in negotiating with foreign 
investors, including not understanding how to negotiate specific conditions for 
technology transfers. Instead, as they looked to the Asian Tigers for lessons, they thought 
the local content policy and import restrictions on motorcycle parts would be sufficient 
to enforce technical spillovers from FDI. However, the Vietnamese context was different 
from the Asian Tigers as, after the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese investors were much more 
cautious in sharing their expertise in production operation and management (interview, 
2011 and 2012).97 Therefore, the rent management mechanism at the institutional level—
MoIT’s direct negotiation with FDI for technology transfer—failed to create either 
pressures or incentives for technology diffusion, as intended by the rent-creating policies. 
The second institutional failure was the Vietnamese government’s inability to 
coordinate its rent policies in line with its development agenda, as discussed in section 
6.3.3. In essence, at the institutional level, government policies and policy mechanisms 
failed to create either pressures or incentives for foreign lead firms and suppliers to 
diffuse technology by collaborating with local suppliers. 
 
                                                
97 As an alternative to using local suppliers, they used Japanese suppliers and partners or 
set up in-house production in Vietnam. 
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6.4.4. RMM Level 3 – Organisation of the Motorcycle Industry (1995–2000) 
 
Three aspects of the organization of the industry had damaging consequences for 
the structure of incentives and pressures for learning efforts. The first was that the 
market competition was such that foreign firms had a financial incentive to exploit 
market profits but lacked the motivation and pressure to collaborate with local suppliers. 
In the late 1990s, there were no Vietnamese-brand motorcycles, and Japanese 
motorcycles were in great demand among Vietnamese consumers given their reputation 
for quality and durability. As the Vietnamese population and economy grew, the demand 
for motorcycles increased, so foreign manufacturers, particularly the Japanese, benefited 
from a substantial market with high potential profits. Honda, Suzuki, and Yamaha did 
not engage in price competition in the Vietnamese market, and the market was large 
enough so that competition with the Taiwanese SYM had negligible effects on price. The 
absence of domestic competition meant there was insufficient pressure on foreign 
investors to reduce costs or to source components from local suppliers. 
The second failure in rent management within the industry was the failure to 
renegotiate Japanese investors’ strict criteria for collaboration with local suppliers and 
the local supplier’s weak initial capability to match the required Japanese standards. In 
the late 1990s, there were a number of local small-scale firms and even households 
engaged in the production of replacement parts, such as pistons, piston rings, cylinders, 
gaskets, crankshafts, valves and sprockets. Some of these producers had been making 
machinery parts since the government’s central planning period (before 1986), and 
others had entered in the late 1980s as the demand for motorcycle parts increased (Fujita, 
2007). However, a Japanese senior expert from a research think-tank in Hanoi was quite 
vocal in an interview that Vietnamese firms were not sufficiently competent to learn and 
 333 
adapt to sophisticated Japanese technology or to meet foreign lead firms and suppliers’ 
strict operations and quality standards. He said that Vietnamese workers were not 
disciplined or organised enough to understand the high-level technical training from 
Japanese firms, and until Vietnamese suppliers could meet the standards of production, it 
would be difficult to gain collaboration with Japanese lead firms and suppliers based in 
Vietnam. The expert also pointed to unstable market conditions caused by policy failures 
of the Vietnamese government in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see section 6.3.3). He 
asserted that the unstable policy environment during this period deterred Japanese 
investors from deepening their investment in Vietnam.98 
This argument, however, is flawed in that Japanese investors failed to 
acknowledge that the rents provided to them through various protections and incentives 
were, in fact, instruments to encourage the very transfer of this technology and expertise. 
In reality, these rents were not intended to guarantee high profits for Japanese investors 
in Vietnam, but to give them the necessary subsidies for transferring technology and 
providing in-house training to local suppliers of parts. Without this motivation on the 
part of the Vietnamese government, Japanese investors would not have obtained business 
licenses in Vietnam to make substantial profits from the mid- to late 1990s and again 
from 2005 onward. However, Japanese manufacturers did not perceive the need for any 
systematic technology transfer to local suppliers. Nguyen (2006) pointed out that, for 
example, Honda did not develop any specific business model in the Vietnamese market 
in the first period. It simply started out as a plant assembling imported CKD units and 
manufacturing some in-house components to take advantage of high Vietnamese demand 
for Japanese motorcycles before gradually adding more value-added activities.  
                                                
98 This observation only applies to this period. In the third phase, Honda has been more 
assertive in its investment and training of suppliers in Vietnam. 
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Thus, the organisation of the industry and the conditions of policy interaction 
with the government were such that there was insufficient market competition or policy 
pressure on foreign investors to collaborate with local suppliers and to transfer 
technology and expertise to local firms. A more significant pace of technology transfer 
would have required that foreign investor’s were put under greater and more credible 
pressure from government to either lower their initial standards requirements or, higher 
initial capabilities of local firms to ensure greater use of Vietnamese suppliers based on 
cost considerations. In reality, the rent management factors failed to be value enhancing 
for the motorcycle industry in the first period. 
 
6.4.5. DRMA Step 4 – Rent Outcomes from the 1995 – 2000 Period 
 
From 1995 to 2000, Vietnam failed to achieve significant technology transfers 
from Japanese investors to local suppliers. Although there were numerous local firms 
engaged in the production of “aftermarket,” otherwise known as replacement parts, these 
firms were largely outside the procurement networks of foreign lead firms. In 1998, 
Japanese manufacturers took nearly 75 per cent of the market in Vietnam (Intarakumnerd 
& Fujita, 2008) but little if any technology diffusion and learning took place. As a result, 
only a few local suppliers, mostly SOEs, became Japanese part suppliers for simple, low 
technology components.  
Table 6.6 presents the percentage of local suppliers that participated in the 
procurement chain for Japanese manufacturers. As recently as 2006 local suppliers 
played only a minimal role in complex component manufacturing for foreign lead firms, 
even though the required localisation ratio was extremely high, 60 per cent in 2001. For 
example, Vietnamese firms provided only 5.4 per cent of engine parts, 9 per cent of 
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electrical parts, 10.7 per cent of body parts, and zero per cent of exhaust systems. The 
table illustrates that although the localisation ratio was high, the diffusion of technology 
remained limited. 
 
Table 6.6: Part Procurement Structure of Japanese Motorcycle Firms, 2006	  
Parts  In- 
house 
% 
Domestic purchase % Imports % 
JP TW VN Other JP TH Indo Mal TW Other 
  Engine 6.3 14.3 16.1 5.4 0.0 2.7 47.3 4.5 1.8 0.9 0.9 
  Exhaust 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Body 0.8 32.0 44.3 9.0 9.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 
  Electric 0.0 75.0 7.1 10.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Others 0.0 15.2 24.2 36.4 0.0 12.1 6.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade (2007). Abbreviations: JP = Japan, TW = Taiwan, 
VN = Vietnam, TH = Thailand, Indo = Indonesia, Mal: Malaysia. The MoIT does not 
specify what ‘Other’ means. 
	  
6.4.6. Concluding Thoughts on the 1995 – 2000 Period 
 
In the first period of the motorbike industry’s development (1995–2000), the 
Vietnamese government created learning opportunities for Vietnamese firms by 
attracting MNCs, mostly via tax breaks, the provision of subsidized land, the protection 
of intellectual property rights, tariff protection against imports of fully assembled 
motorcycles and other subsidies. In doing so, the government hoped to encourage the 
MNCs to provide technology and expertise to Vietnamese suppliers. But this did not 
happen, since foreign firms either used imported components, in-house parts production, 
or parts from other foreign suppliers located in Vietnam. This was especially true of the 
Japanese manufacturers, who were the major players in the industry. The absence of 
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technology transfer not only defeated the initial purpose of the rents given to MNCs, but 
also allowed Japanese TNCs to capture Vietnamese market shares without integrating 
local firms into their supplier networks. The Vietnamese government’s rent strategy, 
therefore, was largely unsuccessful. Table 6.7 provides a summary of the first case study. 
	  
Table 6.7: DRMA Summary of the Motorcycle Industry’s First Period and 
Failure of Learning Rents 
Players Type of rents 
Incentives 
created by the 
rent 
Factors affecting rent 
management mechanism 
Outcome 
 
Foreign 
investors, 
Local 
firms 
 
- Rents for 
foreign firms 
producing in 
Vietnam, tax 
breaks, 
subsidized 
land and 
protection of 
intellectual 
property  
- Intention was 
to create 
incentives to 
transfer 
technology the 
local suppliers 
but foreign 
investors’ 
dominant 
incentive was 
simply to 
expand 
production in 
the  
Vietnamese 
market to 
capture high 
profits in the 
absence of local 
competition 
 
First level: (1) political will 
to bring in FDI to introduce 
new technology, (2) 
Pressure to meet Japanese 
investors' demands, 
especially concerning 
protection of intellectual 
property rights 
 
Second level: (1) failure to 
negotiate with and pressure 
foreign investors to transfer 
technology and “know-
how”, (2) uncoordinated 
rent policies 
 
Third level: (1) large 
market but without local 
competition, 
(2) Low initial capabilities 
of local firms could not 
meet Japanese standards 
-Rapid 
growth in 
domestic 
production 
by foreign 
producers  
-Slow 
local 
upgrading 
and 
learning 
 
	  
In analysing this phenomenon, the DRMA points out that at each level of rent 
management—from the political context of rent management, to the policy structure of 
implementation, to the organisation of the industry—there were a number of factors that 
contributed to the unsatisfactory outcomes. At the political level, there was strong and 
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clear political will to promote FDI and technical learning for local firms through a 
number of policy measures. However, influential Japanese firms were able to effectively 
lobby to define conditions for their entry to the Vietnamese market that undermined 
pressures for technology transfer. At the institutional level, the government failed to 
negotiate specific conditions of technology transfer and technical training as the rent 
policy intended, and there were also a number of coordination failures in implementing 
the rent policies. Lastly, insufficient market competition and strict Japanese quality 
criteria for collaborating with local suppliers created little incentive and pressure for 
foreign–local partnership and cooperation. The outcome was a period of rent extraction 
where foreign motorcycle makers successfully reaped large profits and gained nearly all 
of the Vietnamese market. 
	  
6.5. Case Study 2: The China Shock (2001–2004) 
	  
In the late 1990s, given the large potential market in Vietnam and the stockpile of 
cheap motorcycles in the Chinese market, private business interests in China and 
Vietnam found an enormous opportunity to make considerable profits in the low-cost 
motorcycle segment in Vietnam. Starting in 1998, Chinese-made CKD motorcycles were 
legally and illegally imported into Vietnam. The illegal imports were done through 
borders between the two countries. Chinese and Vietnamese assemblers falsely claimed 
to have the correct percentage of local content so as to evade the taxes imposed by the 
Vietnamese government’s local content requirement (Intarakumnerd & Fujita, 2008). 
Because Chinese motorcycles were sold at a much cheaper price than others in the 
Vietnamese market, Chinese and Vietnamese assemblers quickly captured a large share 
of the Vietnamese market. At the same time, there was surge in the number of local 
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firms—up to 51 local firms—to assemble motorcycles for imported Chinese CKD units 
and to provide parts for Chinese lead firms (Mishima, 2005b).  
The impact of these Chinese motorcycles was enormous. They lowered the price 
of motorcycles from VND 28 million (USD 1,321) in the period before 2000 to around 
VND 10 million (USD 472) in 2000, and then to VND 6.3 million (USD 297) in 2001 
(Fujita, 2007). As a result, by 2001 Chinese–Vietnamese motorcycle firms had captured 
80.5 per cent of the market. Fujita (2007) refers to this phenomenon as the “China shock.” 
Additionally, in 2000, Vietnam had come to the end of the first stage of localisation, as 
described by Mishima (2005b) (see Table 6.3) by assembling knockdown vehicles from 
abroad. It entered the second stage, in which more parts began to be produced in-house99 
by foreign investors. At this stage, any technological transfer was still relatively limited 
and largely consisted of assembling imported motorcycles and manufacturing basic low-
value added components. 
In Table 6.8, the market share of Chinese–Vietnamese enterprises are grouped 
together in “Chinese & local firms” categories.100 According to the data, the market 
share for this group jumped from 23.8 per cent to 75.2 per cent in 2000, and to 80.5 per 
cent in 2001. This tripling clearly shows the effect of market penetration by Chinese 
imported motorbikes, which transformed the learning processes of local firms. It should 
be noted, however, that the market share for this group dropped to 35.7 per cent in 2005. 
At the time of my fieldwork in 2011, Chinese and Vietnamese motorcycle firms shrank 
to roughly 10 per cent of the market share (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
 
                                                
99 Most components were imported in the pre 2000 period. 
100 This is due to most Chinese companies refusing to take part in a government survey 
and interviews. 
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Table 6.8: Market Share by Assembler 	  
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total sales  
(In thousand) 
302 475 1,686 1,983 2,058 1,280 1,437 1,641 
Market Share (in per cent) 
 Honda*  67.2 63.1 19.4 11.9 19.4 33.3 35.7 36.9 
 Chinese &   
 local firms 
  13.5 23.8 75.2 80.5 65.1 37.8 29.6 35.7 
 Suzuki 7.2 3.6 1.0 1.4 2.2 4.0 4.9 4.1 
 VMEP (SYM) 11.7 4.2 2.3 3.3 7.4 13.6 15.6 7.5 
 Scooter CBU 0.4 2.5 1.1 1.7 3.4 3.7 1.0 2.7 
Source: Adapted from Ministry of Industry and Trade (2007). *Market share includes 
sales of motorcycles from both Honda Vietnam and imported Honda brand from abroad.  
	  
The penetration of Chinese manufacturers into Vietnam’s motorcycle industry 
established the Chinese suppliers’ network in Vietnam and disturbed the established 
rent-seeking relationships between Japanese MNCs and the Vietnamese government. 
The new suppliers’ network, led by newly emergent local firms, provided the needed 
learning and production capacity for Vietnamese firms and parts suppliers. This 
phenomenon marked Vietnamese suppliers’ entry into the second stage of localisation 
described by Mishima (2005b). Chinese motorcycles used simpler technologies than 
Japanese ones and Chinese lead firms were less demanding about the quality standards 
of Vietnamese parts suppliers. Using the developmental rent management analysis, this 
case study assesses some important transformations in the industrial organisation and in 
the Japanese value chain during the China shock period. It explains how learning and 
know-how was transferred to local suppliers via Chinese firms, which enhanced the 
industrial capabilities of local firms.  
 
6.5.1. DRMA Step 1 and 2 – Rent and Incentives Created by the Rents 
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Starting in 1998, the government maintained three types of policy interventions 
that provided potential learning rents for local firms: the imposition of local content 
requirements, tariffs for imported components and prohibitions on the import of CBUs. 
These policies were distinguishable from policies in the previous period, which largely 
aimed to attract for foreign investors to invest in Vietnam. One effect of prohibiting 
CBUs was an increase of imports of CKD units later assembled by local firms in 
Vietnam. These policies were meant to pressure foreign suppliers and firms to use local 
materials and parts and to collaborate with local suppliers. However, the Vietnamese 
government had weak analytical and enforcement capacities so the policies were not 
optimally designed or implemented. Given this context, Chinese and Vietnamese firms 
were provided with the incentive to capture the low-cost market segment. Due to the 
high cost of foreign motorcycles at the time, this market segment was largely unexplored 
by Japanese and Taiwanese firms. The policies also put pressure on Japanese firms to 
increase their local content ratio in Vietnam.   
 
6.5.2. RMM Level 1 and 2 – Political Context of Rent Creation and the 
Institutional Structure of Rent Implementation 
 
At the first level of rent management analysis (see Figure 6.4), the rent policies 
discussed in step 1 of the DRMA framework reflected the Vietnamese government’s 
political will to create learning rents for local firms in order to boost technical learning 
and industrial upgrading in the industry. However, at the institutional level of rent 
management analysis, the rent policies failed due to the lack of enforcement (Fujita, 
2007). This failure allowed local and Chinese assemblers to lie about the percentage of 
local content in Chinese motorcycles and captured the benefits of rents not meant for 
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them. In essence, the China Shock was an accidence because it was unintended by the 
Vietnamese government. Nonetheless, it resulted in rent capture by Chinese and 
Vietnamese assemblers, as well as unintended and important technology transfers that 
boosted competition in the market and technical learning among local suppliers and 
firms.  
 
Figure 6.4: Rent Management Mechanism during the China Shock Period 
 
 
Fujita (2007) points out that if the local content policy had been strictly enforced, 
Chinese manufacturers would not have succeeded in penetrating the Vietnamese market. 
She notes that during the China shock period, there was virtually no local content in 
imported Chinese motorbikes (Fujita, 2007), and thus they should have been subjected to 
high import tariffs. In reality, the Chinese firms evaded tariff rates by lying to the 
Vietnamese authorities or by involving rent-sharing arrangements with locals. Two 
Vietnamese interviewees, who worked as local assemblers during this period, told me 
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that, to justify their claims on local contents, they imported second-hand machines from 
China, but never actually produced the components on their own. The machines were 
largely to falsify tax audits about the local content materials in Chinese motorbikes, 
which they assembled in Vietnam. As a result of the government’s failure to implement 
rent-created policies, Chinese lead firms and Vietnamese assemblers captured the rents 
originally meant to stimulate the transfer of technology from the lead firms to local 
suppliers. 
 
6.5.3. RMM Level 3 – Industry Organisation during the China Shock 
 
At the third level of the rent management analysis, there are three important rent 
management factors that were at work as demonstrated in Figure 6.4 above: (1) the 
introduction of simpler technology that were more closely matched to the initial 
capabilities of potential local firms leading to more successful learning efforts and 
technological adoption, (2) greater market competition, which induced the 
transformation of the foreign procurement network, but (3) the time horizon was too 
short as the incentives for the expansion of the Chinese motorcycle supply chain were 
based on informal arrangements that could not be formalized, and this cut short the 
learning period available to new local firms.  
 
6.5.3.1. Type of technology and local firms’ ability to upgrade 
 
The first important rent management factor was the import of Chinese 
technologies into Vietnam that were more closely matched to the initial technical, 
organizational and learning capabilities of local assemblers and suppliers. Prior to the 
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China shock period, there was no clear distinction between a handful of local firms, 
which had insufficient financial resources and capabilities necessary for incorporation 
into the Japanese and Taiwanese value chains (Mishima, 2005b). The China shock 
inadvertently created a huge demand for standardised parts for Chinese motorcycles, 
raising the demand for low-cost suppliers. This prompted local firms that had previously 
produced replacement parts, as well as firms engaged in related industries, to enter into 
the production of motorcycle parts, first by collaborating with Chinese firms (Fujita, 
2007).  
Starting in the late 1990s, Chinese lead firms started producing copies (in the 
form of knockdown motorcycles imported from China) of slightly modified versions of 
Japanese models and Vietnamese suppliers rapidly began to produce components and 
parts for these motorcycles. There was thus an increased demand for local suppliers to 
supply components for Chinese motorcycles. Initially, the Chinese components were 
mostly general in the sense that they were not customised to specific models, and they 
closely resembled the Chinese modular system in component production—one 
component could be used for a number of different Chinese knockdown models. In 
addition, neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese assembly firms demanded strict quality 
or delivery requirements from their suppliers, so exchanges of complex information 
between lead firms and suppliers were not needed (interview, 2011). This type of 
production process in the Vietnamese market is referred to as the local Chinese chain.101  
The relaxed quality standards of the Chinese lead firms allowed imitation and 
copying to happen across the board as entry barriers and financing requirements were 
low. In addition to assembling Chinese CKD and incomplete knockdown motorcycles, 
                                                
101 Fujita (2007) reported that in many cases, firms registered as “assemblers” turned out 
to be traders without production lines. Instead of assembling the parts themselves, they 
subcontracted the assembly to other local firms. 
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more local firms participated in learning simple technology to manufacture components 
for Chinese lead firms. The second stage of localisation, once realised, began to spread 
widely to local enterprises in the industry.  
By 2001, given the drastic increase in market shares, some local assemblers 
started to produce some parts in-house and to source other parts from Taiwanese, 
Chinese, and local suppliers based in Vietnam102 (Fujita, 2007). In-house production of 
parts was often achieved in collaboration with foreign, mainly Chinese, firms (Fujita, 
2007). Among the five local firms surveyed by Fujita in 2005, three firms revealed that 
the source of their technology for the production of motorcycles and core components 
was China. Two firms also listed Korea and Taiwan as additional sources. The local 
factory with the largest market share among local assemblers had a joint venture with a 
Chinese firm for the mass production of motorcycle parts (Fujita, 2007). 
Data from my fieldwork in 2011 confirmed that the extensive collaboration 
between Vietnamese and Chinese firms was largely due to the ease of imitating Chinese 
technology through local learning as well as the low quality requirements that allowed 
local suppliers to participate in the production chain. Two of the three business owners 
that I interviewed also said that they sourced component manufacturing to local suppliers 
despite the fact that they owned factories that could also produce the parts. Moreover, 
these interviewees said that it was much easier to collaborate with Chinese firms than the 
Japanese counterparts because Honda and other foreign firms were not using them. 
Is should be noted that the collaborative relationships of Japanese and Chinese 
firms with local suppliers are distinctively different from one another. Unlike Japanese–
Vietnamese supplier relationships, which were stable and fairly permanent, the lead 
firm–supplier relationship in the local Chinese value chains were largely based on price, 
                                                
102 Some local firms even achieved a local content ratio of 90 per cent, while the average 
was 63 per cent, in 2003 (Van-Nam, 2012). 
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and market demand and it involved temporary transactions in which the suppliers 
produced products as they received orders. This was possible because the parts used by 
Chinese and local assemblers were standardised and were based on the same modular 
characteristics. These arrangements were also due to the lack of capabilities and 
resources among the Chinese and Vietnamese assemblers to monitor the product quality 
of their part suppliers (Fujita, 2008). In making orders, Chinese and local assemblers 
provided samples without detailed specifications or drawings, unlike the case with 
Japanese lead firms and first-tier suppliers who would supply detailed specifications of 
their components. Chinese and local assemblers also frequently switched suppliers based 
on prices rather than assisting in improving the quality of the products because they did 
not have the technical capacities to assist the suppliers (Fujita, 2007). Again, this is in 
contrast to the Japanese assembler–supplier relationship.  
 
6.5.3.2. Market competition: Transformation of the Japanese production 
chain 
	  
In 2002, Japanese firms, seeing their market share significantly diminished, made 
serious attempts to recapture the market. Consequently, the Japanese production chains 
underwent a significant transformation, as the local Chinese chains started to take on a 
clearer shape (Fujita, 2007). There were three important factors underlying the 
transformations within the Japanese chains. First was the government’s local content 
policy, which was originally introduced at the end of 1998 but came into effect at the 
beginning of 2001. Second, there was the necessity to reduce production costs in order to 
compete with the Chinese motorcycles assembled in Vietnam. Third, Japanese investors 
realised the profit potential in the low-cost motorbike market, which motivated them to 
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increase the volume of production in these lines. All of these factors encouraged an 
increased use of locally sourced parts from local suppliers.  
In consequence, in 2002, Honda launched its first low-cost motorcycle model, the 
Wave Alpha, which was priced at VND 10.8 million (USD 510), which was nearly one-
third of the cost of its previous models and only slightly more expensive than Chinese 
motorcycles. The Wave Alpha immediately attracted large Vietnamese consumers and 
was favoured by local buyers for its affordable price and higher quality over Chinese 
motorcycles. Honda’s reputation for reliability and durability boosted consumers’ 
confidence in choosing the Wave Alpha model over Chinese motorcycles. Figure 6.5 
demonstrates that not only did the Wave Alpha expand Honda’s market share, it also 
allowed Honda to regain a large portion of the market share in the industry, from 11.9 
per cent in 2001 to 36.9 in 2005. This success continued into early 2010s. In 2011, 
Honda’s market share was more than 61 per cent (Quoc-Hung, 2012b). In Figure 6.5 we 
can see that both Honda and Chinese firms experienced drastic fluctuations in their 
market position between 1999 and the beginning of 2003. 
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Figure 6.5: Market Share of Major Firms During the China Shock (2001-2005)	  
	  
Source: Author’s adaptation from data provided by the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(2007) 
 
Honda’s success with the Wave Alpha in comparison with its two most popular 
predecessors, Super Dream and Future, could be traced in Figure 6.6. Both of these 
models had been Honda’s most popular models in Vietnam before the introduction of 
Wave Alpha.	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Figure 6.6: Wave Alpha versus Super Dream and Future	  
	  
Source: Nguyen (2006, p. 5)  
	  
In developing the new low-priced Wave Alpha, Honda imposed substantial cost 
reduction targets and announced that it was ready to switch suppliers provided that the 
alternative suppliers met the required standards and their costs were lower than those of 
the existing ones, regardless of nationality (Nguyen, 2006). Consequently, the structure 
of the Japanese production chain changed as the number of local suppliers increased. 
The first-tier suppliers initially responded to Honda’s pressure for cost reduction 
by replacing imported parts with parts produced by Japanese second-tier suppliers in 
Vietnam, and eventually by replacing those with parts sourced from Taiwanese or local 
second-tier suppliers (Ohara & Sato, 2008). In her survey in 2004 and 2005, Fujita 
(2008) interviewed six first-tier suppliers from Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. These 
suppliers used a total of 162 second-tier suppliers, at least 106 of which were 
Vietnamese firms. This drastic transformation marked the industry’s entry into its third 
stage of localisation, in accordance with Mishima’s framework, and it constituted a 
significant step in technological upgrading by local suppliers (see Table 6.3). 
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In addition to enhancing local learning based on less stringent production 
management, increased competition during the China shock period also transformed 
Japanese manufacturing production chains and created new opportunities for Vietnamese 
suppliers to participate in the production of motorcycle components for Japanese and 
Taiwanese manufacturers. Here, the competition for market share among Japanese and 
Chinese firms was the second important rent management factor affecting the allocation 
of rents and it provided important incentives and opportunities for local suppliers to enter 
the Japanese production chain, boosting their technical learning to reach the next level of 
technology adoption. 
	  
6.5.3.3. The Negative Impact of an Inadequate Time Horizon 
 
An interviewee who was a local assembler at the time told me that in 2002 the 
Vietnamese government finally started to enforce its local content policy and to audit 
alleged fraudulent cases from previous years, which stopped a number of local 
assemblers from production as they could not get access to import quotas for motorcycle 
parts. The same interviewee told me that the audit lasted for more than a year, and that 
during this timeframe those being audited were not allowed to import parts from China.  
By this time, Japanese investors were aggressively trying to recapture the market 
with new low-cost models, such as the Wave Alpha. Many Vietnamese assemblers who 
were taking advantage of these opportunities by trying to achieve learning through active 
acquisition of technological capabilities in component production, branding, and 
distribution began to stumble when competing with powerful Japanese lead firms and 
first-tier suppliers (Fujita, 2007). The few local assemblers that performed well were the 
ones that pursued low prices by relying on Chinese counterparts for components instead 
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of producing them in-house. They were not interested in building either their own brand 
or distribution networks (Intarakumnerd & Fujita, 2008). The Vietnamese assemblers 
who did focus on building their own brands via technological adoption, such as Hoa Lam 
Company and Sufat Vietnam, faced tremendous difficulty in competing with foreign 
competitors as the conditions enabling them to engage in learning began to change. In 
my 2011 interviews, local business owners cited Sufat Vietnam as one of the local firms 
who has been pursuing the development of a branded Vietnamese motorcycle but it was 
struggling to compete with foreign firms and, at the time of the interview, was facing 
operating losses. Hoa Lam Company, as the other example, was forced to join a venture 
with the Taiwanese firm Kymko to avoid bankruptcy, and so Hoa Lam stopped 
production of its Vietnamese brand motorcycles – Halim – when it entered the joint 
venture (Quoc-Hung, 2012a).  
In this case, the time horizon for learning was cut short, ironically because the 
Vietnamese government was enforcing its local content policy. This policy did not 
distinguish between Vietnamese and foreign owned companies operating in Vietnam and 
thus it did not provide local firms with any protection as they were developing their 
capability. Consequently, the enforcement of this policy did not allow time for the 
emergence of a new group of local firms and suppliers to rapidly learn and upgrade their 
capability, which was only possible by violating the strict letter of the domestic content 
law. The rapid decrease of local firms and suppliers, coupled with the re-emergence of 
Japanese and Taiwanese motorcycles in the market highlights our observation in Chapter 
3 that an insufficient time horizon can destroy learning effort, in this case, by local 
assemblers who were beginning to compete with foreign lead firms.  
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6.5.4. DRMA Step 4 – Outcomes: From Local Assemblers to Part Suppliers for 
Foreign Firms 
	  
With the introduction of Honda’s Wave Alpha and the Japanese cost-reduction 
strategy, some of the local suppliers in the Chinese chains were incorporated into the 
Japanese chains as first- and second-tier suppliers. This integration into Japanese 
production chains provided local suppliers additional upgrading that enabled mass 
production of parts in accordance with Japanese QCD standards. This is thanks to the 
Japanese firms exercising substantial control and supervision over their local suppliers 
(Fujita, 2007) by providing training in product management, quality assurance, and 
technical skills. Figure 6.7 illustrates how local suppliers took more active roles in the 
procurement network of Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese producers after the China 
shock period, and how this led to new learning and capacity development. Before the 
China shock, Japanese lead firms largely used components from Japanese and Taiwanese 
suppliers, along with a limited number of local suppliers. After the China shock, local 
Vietnamese firms emerged with their own production and supply chains to collaborate 
with Chinese firms; and local second-tier suppliers were able to supply components for 
foreign first-tier suppliers, which allowed for deeper integration and more technological 
adoption by local firms. 
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Figure 6.7: The Transformation of Value Chains within Vietnam’s Motorbike 
Industry	  
	  
Source: Fujita (2007, p. 15) 
	  
Fujita’s field research in 2004 and 2005 involved case studies of six local 
suppliers who took part in different levels of procurement with Japanese lead firms. In 
the survey, there were two first-tier suppliers for Honda Vietnam, both of which were 
state-owned enterprises. These SOE suppliers first started their production of motorcycle 
components in 1998 and 1999, respectively. Like other SOEs, they were originally 
engaged in the integrated production of a wide variety of products but only in small 
quantities. Once they became first-tier suppliers, they began to specialise in products and 
production processes specifically designated by Honda (Fujita 2007). Fujita also 
surveyed two second-tier local suppliers for foreign firms. These companies originally 
manufactured replacement parts but started to supply components for local firms around 
2000, and subsequently became second-tier suppliers for Japanese and Taiwanese firms. 
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These second-tier suppliers also came to specialise in specific production processes—
one in plating and the other in die-casting—and both experienced a rapid expansion of 
production in 2005.  
The last two suppliers interviewed by Fujita were suppliers to local firms. Unlike 
the four suppliers mentioned previously, these firms produced a wide variety of 
components and were engaged in various production processes. Their sales and 
production had expanded until 2002; however, at the time of Fujita’s interview in 2005, 
both of these suppliers were facing drastic declines. Given the contraction in demand for 
Chinese motorcycles and parts, one supplier invested to improve one of its major 
products, valves, by acquiring technology, equipment, and training from abroad. The 
other supplier took no substantial action to compensate for the loss of sales (Fujita, 2007). 
My interviewees who were an assembler and a supplier during this period confirmed this 
data. They observed that, on the face of the decline in demand for Chinese motorcycles 
and components, some firms attempted to upgrade their capability to increase their 
competitiveness such as Sufat Vietnam, while other firms continued to pursue a cost-
cutting approach or to do nothing. 
	  
6.5.5. Final Remarks on the China Shock Period 
 
The period of the China shock, from 2001 until 2004 was particularly instructive 
for the learning process in the industry. In the first period of the industry’s development 
(1995–2000), the learning rents provided to Japanese manufacturers for technology 
transfer largely failed, while in the second period (2001–2004) a configuration of a 
number of factors led to the emergence of local Chinese production value chains. This 
transformation was an implicit rent management story even though the rents were 
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creating incentives and opportunities for learning that were not the intended ones. A true 
learning experience was unleashed during the China shock period, which led to technical 
upgrading for Vietnamese firms but the conditions that allowed this to happen 
inadvertently changed as the government began enforcing domestic content requirements 
more effectively and Japanese firms changed their business strategy. Because learning is 
part imitation, Chinese technology, precisely because it was much less sophisticated than 
Japanese technology, was arguably more appropriate for the learning stage of 
development in Vietnam. This was particularly true given the low-skilled and 
inexperienced workforce and the lack of sufficient financial support from the 
government to acquire and transfer technology.  
In summary, at the level of political will, there was clear support for the 
industrialization of the industry via a number of rent policies – localisation requirements, 
import tariffs, and prohibition of CBUs. At the institutional level, the Vietnamese 
government failed to implement these policies, which led to the emergence of the China 
shock. In reality, the rent management factors that actually motivated technical 
collaboration and adaptation came from the organisation of the industry, and a failure to 
enforce border controls against illegal Chinese imports (see chapter 5, case study 2). This 
resulted in an influx of Chinese producers and the setting up of new production chains 
where technology requirements for local parts suppliers were more appropriate to the 
initial capabilities of local firms. A number of dynamic local firms emerged because they 
had the appropriate initial learning capability. In addition, the market competition 
between Japanese and Chinese firms enforced a meaningful cost-cutting localization 
effort in the Chinese–Vietnamese supply chains and the Japanese supply chain. Table 6.9 
provides a summary of the developmental rent management analysis of the China shock 
period. 
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Table 6.9: DRMA Summary of the China Shock Period 
Players Type of rents Incentives  
Factors affecting rent-
management 
mechanism 
Outcome 
Foreign 
and 
local 
firms 
- Rents based 
on local 
content 
requirements, 
import 
tariffs, and 
prohibition 
of CBU 
imports 
- Cheap and 
low 
technology 
Chinese 
imports and 
large rents in 
domestic 
market 
create 
incentives 
and 
opportunities 
for 
Vietnamese 
suppliers to 
integrate 
into new 
Chinese 
value chains  
First level: Political will to 
protect and boost 
upgrading in the industry 
 
Second: Failure to 
implement rent policies and 
to enforce border controls 
required for the policies 
 
Third: (1) The availability 
of simple modular 
technologies. 
- (2) Cost-cutting strategies 
by Chinese and Japanese 
producers in competitive 
market 
- (3) Time horizon 
insufficient for full 
transformation of 
Vietnamese suppliers into 
assemblers of Vietnamese 
branded products  
- Some important 
though short-
lived industrial 
upgrading for 
local firms 
 
- Transformation 
of Japanese 
production chain 
leads to 
participation of 
local suppliers to 
the lower-tier 
supplier network 
of foreign lead 
firms such as 
Honda 
 
 
	  
The China shock experience highlights the importance of the right technology 
being available for adoption and the context, which defines the presence or absence of 
incentives for collaboration and learning to take place. Furthermore, technology transfers 
are rarely automatic and must be based on an appropriate set of incentives and pressures; 
in this case, market competition, mostly by Japanese manufacturers with Chinese firms. 
Next, interventions must consider the learning capability of the local firms and where 
they stand in the production chain with foreign investors. Finally, the accidental 
conjunctures that created the right conditions in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry also 
meant that these conditions were vulnerable and in fact they lasted for an insufficient 
time to achieve a thorough transformation of the industry. The beginning of the end 
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came with the government’s ill-timed enforcement of local content policy, which cut 
short the learning process of a number of local assemblers and suppliers. Otherwise, it is 
probable that the local industry would have been in a stronger position to compete with 
foreign brands in the low-end market. 
	  
6.6. Demand Driven and FDI-led Market (Post-2004 Period) 
	  
During the FDI-driven period of development, which began in 2004, the 
motorcycle industry experienced three major events: (1) an FDI-led growth period due to 
foreign firms recapturing the Vietnamese market, (2) the reduction of trade restrictions 
and administrative regulations to embrace FDI and principles of market liberalisation, 
and (3) the emergence of new policies aimed at promoting supporting industries. These 
major events subsequently rearranged the structure of the industry and the local 
Vietnamese firms. Consequently, the market was once again largely dominated by 
foreign brands while local firms became second-tier and first-tier suppliers for the 
foreign-lead firms. 
	  
6.6.1. FDI-Led Development 
	  
After Honda and the other foreign manufacturers regained their market share, the 
industry experienced another FDI-led development period. The number of local firms 
shrank substantially as foreign manufacturers took over and expanded a large share of 
the market starting in 2004. As mentioned above, of the 51 Vietnamese firms surveyed 
by Fujita between 2001 and 2006, 35 left the industry, 16 continued motorcycle 
assembly, and 12 new firms entered the market (Fujita, 2010). Motorcycle production 
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continued to grow at a high rate as the market expanded considerably with Vietnam’s 
overall growth. According to Fujita (2010), in 2000, these 51 local firms produced 1.37 
million units, taking more than 80 per cent of the market share. However, changes in 
consumer preference for higher quality motorbikes, the launching of Honda’s Wave 
Alpha, the enforcement of the local content rules, and new regulations requiring all 
motorcycle firms to produce certain key components in-house meant that between 2005 
and 2008, the number of local firms declined between 30 and 40 per cent, with their 
production dropping to roughly 800,000 units per year (Fujita, 2010).  
By 2011, this number dropped again to 380,000 motorbikes sold by local firms 
(Quoc-Hung, 2012a). In the same year, the top five foreign firms—Honda, Yamaha, 
Suzuki, SYM, and Piaggio—sold close to 90 per cent of the motorbikes bought in 
Vietnam103 (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). In interviews I conducted in 2011 with two owners of 
local firms, they each confirmed that in the low-cost market segment, which targets rural 
and low-income consumers, they expected their market share to continue to diminish 
unless the government intervenes with supporting measures. One of my interviewees 
said that his firm is trying to find ways to become a Honda second-tier supplier but that 
his business lacks the capital to upgrade his equipment to Honda’s standard.  
The structure of domestic firms also changed during this FDI-led growth period. 
In contrast to 2001 when the majority of local firms were small, there was a rise of 
relatively large-scale firms in 2006. For instance, according to Fujita, in 2001 “more than 
half of the motorcycles sold were produced by assemblers producing fewer than 20,000 
units of motorcycles per year” (Fujita, (2010, p. 9). However, towards the middle of the 
2000s, production was concentrated on larger firms. For example, four firms produced 
more than 100,000 units in 2005 (Fujita, 2010). 
                                                
103 Total motorcycle sales were 3.7 million units, of which the top five foreign firms 
together sold 3.32 million units. 
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6.6.2. Removal of Trade and Administrative Restrictions  
 
In the later part of the 2000s, the Vietnamese government made an attempt to 
gradually liberalise the economy in anticipation of Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. To 
do this, the government removed prohibitions on motorcycle imports, repealed local 
content requirements, and reduced tariffs on imported components. Furthermore, 
regulations on motorcycle registrations were relaxed so that a driver could register more 
than one motorcycle under his name. In essence, the government’s efforts to loosen the 
market using both trade and administrative policies, together with the introduction of a 
low-cost motorcycle produced by Honda and other foreign manufacturers, substantially 
expanded the market and boosted sales. In 2007 the industry’s manufacturers sold 2.8 
million units, a number far beyond sales during the China shock period. Likewise, in 
2011, Vietnamese consumers purchased 3.7 million units, a 24 per cent increase in the 
market size compared to sales in 2011 (Quoc-Hung, 2012a). 
	  
6.6.3. Policy Frameworks to Promote Motorbike and Supporting Industries 
 
During the post-2004 period, the Vietnamese government moved towards 
developing a set of policies to help supporting industries. The two major policies were 
Decision No 34/2007-QD-BCN (Decision 34), introduced in 2007, and Decision 12 in 
2011. Decision 34 was the master plan for the development of the supporting industries 
until 2010, though it does still provide a vision for the government until 2020. Based on 
the Decision, responsible ministries would subsequently devise policies and instruments 
to carry out the general master plan set out by the government. A report from the 
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Vietnam Development Forum (2011) points out that one of the major shortcomings of 
Decision 34 was that the scope of the government’s definition for “supporting industries” 
was too broad. It encompassed nearly every part of the value chain from materials to 
marketing. For instance, it lumped the textile and garment industry with mechanical 
industries (such as electrical and electronics) and the automotive industry. This wide 
definition made it difficult to create targeted policies, for instance with a focus on 
technological adoption and industrial upgrading (Van-Nam, 2012). Given Vietnam’s 
limited capabilities and resources, such a large scope did not help the government to 
tackle constraints in important sectors or help provide meaningful support for upgrading. 
Decision 12, issued by the prime minister in 2011, provided a policy framework 
for developing supporting industries. It is considered to be the first official declaration by 
the Vietnamese government for promoting supporting industries, and local investors 
were particularly hopeful that it would offer meaningful assistance for certain important 
sectors. However, an industry expert at a research think tank and an official who worked 
at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, who were each interviewed during my 2011 
fieldwork, pointed out that decision has failed to assisted local suppliers, who are 
financially weak and continue to lack the technical capability to upgrade. The director of 
a think tank inside the MoIT, who participated in drafting Decision 12, commented that 
the content of Decision 12 was too general and could not be effective, especially since 
this decision is embedded in other bodies of law with higher authority, such as the 
Enterprise Law (Decree No. 56/2009/ND-Cp and Decision No. 105/2009/QD-TTg)). 
This means that if there is a conflict, Decree 56 and Decision 105 trump the effects of 
Decision 12. In addition, this director pointed out that Decision 12 has only a few 
provisions that are intended to assist local businesses that go beyond the already-
established government policies to support SMEs. 
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In summary, there have been major changes in the motorcycle industry since 
2004, especially from policy and industry organisation standpoints. Institutionally, the 
government relaxed trade and administrative restrictions and that enhanced market 
demand for motorcycles. The result was a period of FDI-led growth in which foreign 
firms (including Chinese producers) captured up to 98 per cent of the market. In addition, 
local firms had to restructure their production organisations during this period, and a 
small number of local assemblers ended up producing the majority of local motorbikes 
while other local firms left the industry. Lastly, the Vietnamese government devised and 
implemented some assisting measures to aid supporting industries but these were overly 
broad and ineffective. 
 
6.7. The Success and Failure of Rent Management and Policy Options for a 
Developmental Rent Management Strategy 
 
Since the beginning of its industrialization in the mid 1990s, the motorcycle 
industry in Vietnam successfully attracted foreign investors from abroad and achieved 
some important, local technological upgrading. The industrial experience of the industry 
can be understood through the developmental rent management analysis, which suggests 
that at the highest level, there was clear political will to use FDI as an instrument to 
develop technical learning and to adopt foreign expertise and technology for local 
suppliers. This political will, however, was diluted at the implementation stage (our 
second level of analysis) partly because the government was uncoordinated and naïve 
about market activities and did not understand the progress that local suppliers were 
achieving. This uncoordinated policy implementation resulted in the loss of a number of 
opportunities from which the industry could have benefited. First was the failure to push 
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Japanese and other lead firms to collaborate with local suppliers; second was a failure to 
support local firms so they could compete with foreign motorcycle manufacturers. As a 
result, there is not a single strong Vietnamese brand-name motorcycle to this day, and 
foreign brands occupy the majority of the motorcycle market.  
The failure to keep out Chinese firms, initially in violation of domestic content 
requirements, resulted in market competition between Chinese and Japanese firms, and 
induced cost competition that allowed local suppliers to join the production value chain. 
In addition, the availability of more appropriate technology from China helped local 
firms to upgrade their technical capability. Finally, local firms were dynamic and quick 
in their learning through collaboration first with Chinese lead firms and later with 
Japanese assemblers and suppliers. These three factors combined with the political will 
of the Vietnamese government define the characteristics of the developmental rent 
management that enhanced learning effort and upgrading for local enterprises. This 
period implies that despite implementation failures at the state level, technical and 
capability upgrading could take place at the firm level given a suitable set of rents 
creating incentives and pressures and appropriate market conditions. 
The rent management analysis suggests two important observations. First, the 
process of technology transfer from foreign investors cannot be relied upon to take place 
voluntarily or automatically. In order for rent policies to become growth-enhancing, 
government subsidies in the form of learning rents must be accompanied with credible 
incentives and pressures either from the state or the market. If the appropriate conditions 
have to be defined by the state, this can comes as a set of conditions such that foreign 
investors understand that the rents are provided in exchange for investment in local 
learning and diffusion of technology. In the Vietnamese experience, these pressures did 
not come from the government, but from market competition, particularly between 
 362 
Japanese and Chinese firms, in a context where the latter effectively ‘stole’ some of the 
rents that had been created for the former. This experience suggests that, despite the 
state’s inability to implement rent policies, market competition among foreign investors 
in a context where rents existed in the domestic market, potentially produced positive 
effects for local learning. This was based on a fortuitous and short-lived set of conditions 
in a context that local firms were dynamic and flexible in adapting and learning the new 
technology and know-how from foreign partners. 
Second, in this industry there were no powerful local rent seekers who could 
lobby the government for direct rent allocation for the local private enterprises. In this 
sense, the motorcycle industry is different from the telecommunications or textile and 
garment industry since, on the one hand, the state corporations—VNPT, Viettel, and 
Vinatex—each held major market shares in these industries. On the other hand, in the 
motorcycle industry, MNCs, noticeably, Honda, Yamaha and Suzuki, managed to 
capture substantial rents both before and after the China shock period because of limited 
competition in the late 1990s, their flexible and adaptive business strategy to recapture 
the market in 2002, and effective rent-seeking through the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency and business associations in Vietnam. As a result, the motorcycle 
industry remains an FDI-dominated industry while local firms struggle to accumulate 
technical learning and to acquire new capability. 
The second case study indicates that there has been some technological 
upgrading in the industry because of the rent management mechanism operating in the 
China shock period that created accidental learning effects. However, this type of rent 
management is problematic, as it occurred randomly and the benefits were limited and 
short-lived. In addition, until 2012, quantitative expansion was only achieved through 
market liberalisation, external opening, and large inflows of foreign capital. This growth 
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dynamic is vulnerable because it is not based on the strength and capability of the 
domestic industrial sector. In fact, Nguyen and colleagues (2008) and  Nguyen (2011) 
indicated that productivity measured by total factor productivity has gone down since 
2008 (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11). The implementation of WTO 
obligations and the completion of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area liberalisation 
process by 2015 will exert further and significant pressure on local enterprises. Kenichi 
Ohno (2008) predicted that “if local capability in technology and management remains 
as weak as today, a large segment of indigenous industries is likely to shrink or even 
disappear under severe competitive pressure, and Vietnam will be locked into the 
position of a producer of low-value good under the dominance of foreign firms” (p. 1). 
As international integration deepens, Vietnamese enterprises must greatly 
improve their capability if they are to survive and to effectively compete with global 
competitors. To realise Vietnam’s vision for an industrialised motorcycle industry and 
supporting industries, local firms must achieve higher productivity as well as technical 
and organisational capability and, not simple expansion of low value component 
production and assembly. To achieve this goal, Vietnam needs to modify its 
manufacturing model to one that focuses on value-added production and skilled 
manufacturing. In this context, our analysis provides the following observations for the 
formulation of a developmental rent management strategy as the industry moves forward. 
	  
6.7.1. Forging Political Will 
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 First, there must be genuine political will to boost the development of supporting 
industries104 by recognising their importance in Vietnam’s industrial development. This 
requires the Vietnamese government to acknowledge the urgency of creating effective 
and meaningful rents and a rent management framework that can address the issues 
facing local producers and suppliers: capital shortage, an ineffective credit market, 
difficulties in learning and transfer of technology, and uncoordinated policies among 
state agencies. The government must also coordinate agencies and garner support within 
the Communist Party to help push through important measures that were not possible in 
the past due to rent-seeking pressures from powerful interest groups in other industries 
and from foreign investors (interview MoIT officials, 2012). 
 
6.7.2. Strengthening Institutional Capacity  
 
Second, but no less important, there has to be a practical approach to strengthen 
rent management capabilities of the MoIT, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, and 
other governmental agencies. The Vietnamese government must make informed rent 
policies so that subsidies specifically target enhanced learning and technology 
acquisition. Once the rents are created to provide incentives and pressures for learning, 
the key to rent management from the state’s perspective is to: (1) monitor rent 
performance under the MoIT; (2) negotiate with foreign investors to transfer expertise 
and technical learning under the rubric of incentives provided by the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment; and (3) renegotiate rent policies if current ones are deemed 
ineffective. Monitoring could be based on specifying clear performance criteria, timing 
                                                
104 Given the industry’s structure, policies that promote the motorcycle industry must be 
merged with one devised for the supporting industries. At present, it is the supporting 
industries, especially the industrial sectors that need the focal attention from the 
government, more so than even the motorcycle industry. 
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of expected results, and organisational responsibilities in advance and by monitoring 
important investment projects, but with the flexibility of allowing some conditions to be 
altered if required under close supervision. 
 Furthermore, the Vietnamese government’s rent management capability requires a 
radical reorganisation to deepen its commitment to supporting industries. For example, 
in Malaysia, supporting projects are designed and implemented by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, and in Thailand they are within the Ministry of 
Industry. These ministries have several under-agencies that carry out a number of tasks 
to conduct market research, to promote technological adoption for local firms and to 
coordinate with other ministries for policy planning and implementation. To prioritise 
and coordinate supporting policies and activities, these ministries also have a national 
committee headed by top leaders of the respective countries.  
 In Vietnam, the initial process of conferring the primary responsibility and 
authority for coordination to the MoIT and building its necessary policy management 
mechanisms is just beginning. Budgeting and staffing of the MoIT’s newly created 
Centre for the Development of Supporting Industries remains very modest (Ohno, 2008). 
This centre should be the leading agency charged with real power and resources to 
promote supporting industries. Unfortunately, in my interview with the manager of the 
centre, she admitted that its power is currently limited to policy advice and drafting. It 
does not yet have the power to actually influence the policies that assist SMEs and the 
supporting industries. 
 
6.7.3. Enhancing Industrial Capability 
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 Third, as argued previously in the concluding sections of the preceding two 
chapters, new upgrading at the firm level is a prerequisite for sustaining growth. Despite 
the high local content ratio rate in motorcycles sold in Vietnam, there is a major gap in 
technological capability between local suppliers and foreign manufacturers. Therefore, it 
is critical that the government steps in and speeds up the process of technological 
adoption and adaptation for local firms, as this process does not take place automatically. 
In this context, the development of larger and more sophisticated local suppliers in the 
industry must proceed in tandem with the development of supporting industries. In the 
future, if Vietnam is to thrive in the fifth stage of the supply chain and to engage with 
research and development, the government must devise Schumpeterian rents to support 
investments in R&D. Although, this is yet an immediate priority given the stage of 
development of national capabilities, some R&D capabilities are required even at earlier 
stages of catching up. It is also critical to create mechanisms that support industry 
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions in order to develop larger and more 
capable local suppliers with the necessary scale and sophistication to compete with 
MNCs and to more effectively network with the MoIT. 
 
6.7.4. Managing FDI 
 
 Trade and FDI continue to play an important role in Vietnam’s industrial 
development by transferring technology and collaborating with local firms so that 
technical learning and adaptation can take place. This process is by no means automatic, 
and thus it requires a system of incentives and pressures either at the government level or 
the market level to induce technological transfer and learning. The government should 
opt for a mixture of an FDI-led strategy with its industrial-linkage building and 
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leapfrogging strategy to create independent, high-tech SMEs (Vietnam Development 
Forum, 2011). An example of a leapfrogging strategy would be a firm skipping steps in 
the stages of its development. This is because Vietnam has received a large volume of 
FDI in manufacturing, which can serve as a base for further industrialisation in Vietnam. 
The government should deepen this relationship by channelling more foreign expertise 
into building industrial linkages between local enterprises and foreign firms. To do so, 
the Vietnamese government will need to negotiate with foreign direct investors more 
skilfully so as to ensure that they commit to transfer expertise and technology at a larger 
and more systemic scale, while they benefit from policy-created rents and Vietnam’s 
low-cost labour force and large consumer market.  
 
6.7.5. Managing the China Factor 
 
 The China factor (see also Chapter 5, case study 2) plays an important role in the 
development of Vietnamese industrial sector. While the China shock forced important 
industrial transformations in the motorcycle industry in the second stage, illegal and 
inexpensive Chinese components remain a threat for local suppliers because they 
compete unfairly in the Vietnamese market. Loc Tien Vo, president of Vietnam’s 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a government research think tank, pointed out that 
in 2010 Vietnam imported a total of VND 264.5 trillion (USD 12.7 billion) worth of 
goods and merchandise from China, of which 55 to 60 per cent serve Vietnamese 
production for all industries, and 22 to 25 per cent of which are equipment and 
machineries (Bich-Diep, 2011). According to Anh Tran, owner of an equipment 
manufacturing company called Vikyno & Vinappro Company, there are some supporting 
industries that currently have a high potential for entry by foreign manufacturers, 
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especially Chinese, but these are also areas where Vietnamese suppliers could participate 
competitively. If Vietnamese government loses sight of illegal mechanical-parts imports 
from China, these products will unfairly compete with local suppliers, making it difficult 
to boost the development of Vietnam’s mechanical industry (see Bich-Diep, 2011). The 
China factor must be taken seriously because penetration of Chinese goods, especially 
smuggled industrial products will harm the Vietnamese supporting industries by 
distorting prices and incentives for local producers. 
 
6.7.6. Promoting Exports 
 
In 2012, the market demand for motorcycles in the major Vietnamese cities was 
close to its saturation point, so the excess production in Vietnam has prompted foreign 
manufacturers to finds ways to export to other developing countries (see section 6.2.). 
This export activity is beneficial for Vietnam because it creates new jobs and it deepens 
collaboration between local and foreign suppliers. Therefore, a policy structure that 
provides incentives for exporters to boost exports could be considered and implemented. 
Policies in this area are potentially important as they could open up the possibility for 
Vietnam to become an exporter of motorcycles in the international market. 
 To conclude, the success or failure of an industry often depends on the interaction 
and compatibility of a number of rent management mechanisms that rely upon the state, 
firms, and market dynamics. Sharing risks in technology acquisition or targeting 
industrial upgrading requires institutions that can provide not only the appropriate 
financing incentives but that also have the political ability to overcome resistance from 
interest groups within the economy. Given Vietnam’s commitment to global and regional 
integration, the industry’s next phase of development requires better and more 
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coordinated rent management mechanisms that could bring local firms to the next level 
of technological and organisational capabilities. 
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 Technology Adoption and Rent Management in Vietnam: Chapter 7.
Conclusions 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation set out to explore the factors that drove the process of 
technological upgrading and capability-building in three industries in Vietnam. By 
analysing aspects of development in these industries, a number of factors were identified 
as important in determining the pace and direction of technological upgrading and 
capability in a context of rents. These factors were categorized in three groups as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, Figure 3.2.	  
This thesis provides empirical evidence to support the analytical view that rents 
can be developmental and growth-enhancing under the right configuration of conditions 
that defines the relevant rents management system. In the telecommunications industry, 
the configuration of factors included a strong political commitment to develop the 
industry; the presence of effective institutions that monitored competition; strong 
incentives to enhance profits in firms that had internal and organizational incentives to 
seek profit; pressure from market competition; and relatively high levels of initial 
capability and resources for successful upgrading strategies in the relevant firms. In the 
textile and garments sector, the factors relevant for understanding the rent outcomes 
included the internal competition among the general corporations for rents within the 
state sector, which forced Vinatex and its subsidiaries to strive for industrial upgrading. 
In addition, there was competition between state-owned enterprises, domestic private 
enterprises, and foreign investors to export to the international market, and this created 
incentives and pressures to boost competitiveness in the low-skilled garment sector. In 
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the motorcycle industry, the rent management configuration was again driven by the 
political commitment to develop the sector in the late 1990s and early 2000s, followed 
by effective market competition between Chinese and Japanese manufacturers in the 
Vietnamese market. 
From an analytical point of view, the case studies in the dissertation can help to 
improve our understanding of how different rents management mechanisms affect the 
structure of incentives and pressures on firms to exert effort in technical learning, 
upgrading, and innovation in a developing country. An important observation was that 
there was no single configuration of factors that can explain success or failure across all 
three industries. Our analytical framework focuses primarily on different configurations 
of the factors summarized in Figure 3.2, (1) the political goals and commitments of the 
political leadership, and the macro-political context of political institutions and 
organizations that result in particular combinations of formal and informal institutional 
and policy outcomes; (2) the effective structure of formal and informal policies that 
support different types of rents, including the effectiveness of the implementation of 
different policies; (3) the structure of market competition, type of ownership and the 
initial capabilities and organizational structure of firms that determines responses of 
firms to rent opportunities.  
	  
7.2. Summary of Results 
 
The case studies demonstrate a number of characteristics of industrial 
development in Vietnam. First, growth was uneven across industries and sectors, and 
was often supported by ad-hoc policies of the government. Second, there were 
significant instances of learning and technological upgrading but success varied across 
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sectors and firms. Third, Vietnamese SOEs, especially state general corporations and 
economic groups played a dominant role in rent-seeking and unfairly competed with 
small and medium enterprises in the private sector. Successful rent seeking by these 
SOEs often resulted in the capture of rents without any productivity gains and these rents 
can be described as redistributive rents. Many experts interviewed during my 2011 and 
2012 fieldwork called for reforms of these SOEs, given their persistent inefficiencies and 
the distortions they inflicted on the domestic market. However, in some instances, as in 
the textile and garments and telecom industries, the rent capture strategies of SOEs have 
had some growth-enhancing effects. The continual transformations of these SOEs in the 
face of competition and rent opportunities suggest that they may continue to maintain 
their market power and yet be compelled to enhance their competitiveness. However, 
very specific configurations of conditions have ensured these desirable outcomes and 
small changes in these conditions could result in adverse changes in the strategies of 
SOEs and therefore in outcomes.  	  
Finally, in late 2012, the Vietnamese political context became particularly 
volatile with unfavourable implications for the growth processes given the intense 
political struggles between top leaders within the Communist Party of Vietnam (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.4). At the same time, the Vietnamese economy continued to be weak 
and fragile, with the possibility of a serious banking crisis coupled with a number of 
macroeconomic problems, notably high inflation, large fiscal and trade deficits, a 
depreciating currency, capital flight, loss of international reserves, and eroding investor 
confidence (World Bank, 2012b).  
In this context, it is particularly crucial to understand the importance of effective 
rent management and the potentially adverse and beneficial outcomes that can be 
associated with rents while the factors affecting rent management undergo evolution and 
 373 
transformation. Unfortunately, the state’s control over policy-determined rents has been 
weakening, particularly at the local government level (interview, 2011). Vietnam’s 
weakening economy and the greater fragmentation of the state perhaps explain why rent 
creation has increasingly been driven by rent seeking from below—by different interests 
within and related to the government apparatus—and why the outcomes associated with 
rent-creating policies have been deteriorating. This landscape will further change in 2015 
when Vietnam has to fully open its markets to a number of neighbouring countries based 
on trade commitments, especially to China in line with the ASEAN–China Free Trade 
Area Agreement (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1.). The next section summarizes the 
different rent management mechanisms identified in the case studies and offers some 
observations about the configurations of factors that were either growth enhancing or 
growth reducing in the Vietnamese context. 
	  
7.2.1. Summary of Factors Affecting Rent Management in Vietnam 
 
Table 7.1 summarises the factors identified in our rent management analysis–
politics, institutions and industry organization–that affected the structure of incentives 
and pressures determining effort exerted in learning, upgrading, and innovation in the 
case studies presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The (+) sign indicates positive effects of 
particular factors and conditions in terms of growth-enhancing outcomes while the (-) 
sign indicates negative or negligible effects. A combination (+/-) sign implies that the 
factors referred to created a combination of positive and negative effects. Both the (+) 
and the (-) signs are very simplified indications of the many nuances in the effects of 
particular factors and conditions that were discussed in more detail in the case studies. 
As analysed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the positive or negative effects vary a great deal in 
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each case study and the signs do not indicate equal effects in different cases. For instance, 
while the political commitment and support for upgrading had positive effects in both the 
telecom and textile and garments industries, the scale of the support and the outcomes 
achieved were both much more significant in the telecoms sector for Viettel than it was 
for Vinatex in the T&G industry. Finally, what constitutes a positive or negative factor or 
condition itself depends on the overall conditions of the sector, the policies that created 
rents, the capabilities of the firms and the types of technologies that were at issue. 
However, for the purpose of synthesizing the case studies evaluated using our DRMA 
framework, Table 7.1 summarizes the positive and negative effects associated with the 
factors affecting rent management outcomes (politics, institutions, and industry 
organization).  
In addition, in Table 7.1, the shaded cases are the more successful cases of 
technological upgrading, although the degree of success, again, varies widely. For 
instance, Viettel was much more successful than Vinatex in adopting new technologies 
and adding new value to their products. The cases that are not highlighted are relatively 
unsuccessful cases, as rent seekers captured rents without having any effect on upgrading 
and productivity improvement and the related industry lost opportunities during the 
period studied. Generally speaking, the successful cases had two or more factors or 
conditions with (+) signs and the unsuccessful cases had at least two factors or 
conditions with (-) signs. 
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Table 7.1:  Summary of the Case Studies 	  
Case 
# 
Industry 
  
Case Study Politics Institution Industry 
Organization 
1 Telecom VNPT Monopoly - - - 
2 Telecom Viettel + + + 
3 Telecom 3G Dongle + + + 
4 T&G Quota Period - - +/- 
5 T&G China Factor - - - 
6 T&G Vinatex/State 
Sector 
+ - +/- 
7 Motorcycle MNCs in 1995–
2000 period 
+ - - 
8 Motorcycle China Shock + - +/- 
 
On the basis of the insights provided by the case studies, this thesis offers three 
observations. 
 
7.2.1.1. Growth-enhancing rent management mechanisms 
 
When all three levels of the factors affecting rent management provide positive 
support for effort in technology acquisition, even if each level does not work perfectly by 
itself, an effective rent management mechanism can emerge with sufficient incentives 
and pressures for industrial learning and upgrading. This observation is exemplified by 
the successful cases in the telecom industry (Case 2: Viettel and Case 3: 3G dongle). 
These cases were perhaps the closest to the optimal scenario of rent management for 
learning because there was clear political will from the top leaders to support the 
development of the industry; there were informal and formal learning rents provided to 
the firms; the state was relatively capable of managing the rents and regulating 
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competition within the industry; there were strong internal incentives within the relevant 
firms to enhance profits, pressures from competition and the possibility of foreign entry, 
and sufficient initial capabilities of the firms to upgrade. This combination of factors 
created an effective rent management mechanism for the industry to industrialise and 
develop. 
	  
7.2.1.2. Developmental rent management despite institutional failures   
 
If the state is incapable of fully managing the policy-created rents to ensure 
growth-enhancing outcomes (because of failures at the second or implementation level 
of our rent management analysis), growth-enhancing outcomes may still be possible if 
other factors are supportive. Our case studies suggest that desirable outcomes are still 
possible if the political conditions ensure that there is some resistance to unproductive 
rent capture; the firms possess some initial capability for learning; there is an adequate 
time horizon to support learning efforts; and there is sufficient pressure (either from 
market competition or from other disciplining mechanisms) to create incentives and 
pressures on firms to put in high levels of effort in technological upgrading and 
capability building. 
For instance, the case of Vinatex (Case 6) is one of weak state commitment with 
low rent management capabilities on the part of the relevant rent monitoring and 
enforcement agencies (i.e. MoIT and VITAS). However, there was clear political 
commitment that Vinatex should stay competitive in order to further the government’s 
social objectives. In addition, Vinatex itself had internal compulsions to sustain its 
political support from the state relative to other general corporations and state economic 
groups. At the industry level, there were the incentives to gain profits in the international 
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market, and pressure from competition with the private sector. Taken together, these 
factors ensured that the rents created by policy also created incentives and pressures on 
Vinatex to stay competitive by improving capabilities.  
In the case of the China shock period affecting the motorcycle industry (Case 8), 
the Vietnamese government was once again incapable of managing rents in line with its 
formal policy objectives given its institutional weaknesses. Here, developmental 
outcomes were achieved because the political will to support the motorcycle industry 
created an overarching policy environment of supportive rents, even if they were not 
effectively managed as learning rents. There were also market incentives for profit, and 
effective pressures from market competition between Chinese and Japanese 
manufacturers. Most importantly, the institutional weaknesses of enforcing border 
controls had an unintentional positive effect in allowing less sophisticated Chinese 
technology to penetrate Vietnam with cost competition, and thus allowing the entry of 
Vietnamese component producers and suppliers. However, the China shock case 
indicates that this positive outcome was short-lived due to the inadequate time horizon 
for local firms to develop their capability given the vulnerable combination of factors 
that produced the learning outcomes. 
	  
7.2.1.3. Growth-reducing rent management mechanisms 
	  
If there are too few factors supporting learning effort at the three levels identified 
in our rent management analysis, the outcome could be rent capture in the form of 
redistributive rents or monopoly rents and the consequent loss of development 
opportunities.  
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For instance, in the case of VNPT (Case 1), the policy rents created had the 
character of monopoly rents and failed to induce upgrading because they provided 
insufficient incentives for VNPT to upgrade at all three levels of rent management. This 
is because the rents were granted without sufficient pressure from the top leaders or any 
disciplining mechanism operated by the state linked to outcomes. There was also no 
competition in the market at the time to pressure VNPT to upgrade.  
Similarly, in the case of the China factor (Case 5) operating in the T&G industry, 
there was a failure to generate incentives and pressures for upgrading at all three levels 
of rent management, leading to lost opportunities and heavy dependence on imported 
materials. In this case, the state was incapable of protecting rents for the productive 
sector by controlling illegal materials imported from China—which led to unfair price 
competition in the domestic market and the redistribution of rents to smugglers and other 
unproductive rent seekers. At the same time, Vietnamese textile manufacturers lacked 
the capabilities to immediately compete with Chinese materials by upgrading their 
technical skills and machineries or via joint ventures with foreign investors.  
In the motorcycle industry (Case 7) the rents that foreign lead firms received 
prior to the China shock period from 1995 to 2000 were also provided without any 
conditions from the state or pressures from the market to achieve diffusion of technology 
and expertise. Consequently, despite the political commitment of the state to develop the 
motorcycle industry, there were insufficient conditions to ensure a transfer of learning 
and technology from foreign multinational corporations to Vietnamese suppliers. 
Finally, the quota period (Case 4) provides another example of a missed 
opportunity in the T&G industry. In this case the state was not only incapable of 
managing rents but was also so corrupt that it extracted rents from the industry. Although 
there were formal rents created by policy, producers could not access these rents to 
 379 
improve their industrial capability or expand their investment in the textile sector despite 
the fact that they were dynamic and market conditions were supportive of learning and 
upgrading. In this configuration of conditions, local and foreign firms engaged in the 
rent-seeking scheme to obtain quotas for exports in ways that deprived them of most of 
the rents. 
 
7.3. The Role of the State in Rent Management: Analytical and Policy 
Implications 
 
For developing countries, the heart of a viable industrial and technology policy is 
to address the many market failures that constrain domestic firms from technical learning 
and upgrading so as to develop globally competitive and technologically competent 
domestic firms. However, globalisation has brought fundamental shifts in what poor 
countries can and should do to foster industrialisation.  
Perhaps the most significant change has occurred with respect to the role of trade 
policies, which were the principal instruments for industrial promotion in the past. The 
lowering of trade barriers, the proliferation of BTAs between developed and developing 
countries, and more stringent WTO rules on issues like domestic content rules and the 
protection of intellectual property rights have constrained the types of rent policies that 
are feasible (Haque, 2007). Apart from lowering trade barriers, the BTAs between 
Vietnam and other developed countries usually also contain provisions concerning rules 
relating to FDI, capital account liberalisation, intellectual property protection, and 
clauses on labour and environment standards. In addition to new rules governing 
international trade, the context and design of industrial policies have profoundly changed 
as a result of changes in global value chains, and the rise of international trading 
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networks, which have raised some of the barriers for new firms entering the world 
market. These changes have arguably constrained the policy space that developing 
countries enjoyed in devising rent strategies, but they have not removed the policy space 
entirely. 
  The problem of economics is not about coming up with the most thorough and 
extensive laundry list of policies, but to identify areas of constraints and externalities that 
can be corrected given the country’s political economy. Furthermore, policymaking is 
contextual; there is no blueprint of “good policies” that countries should adopt. The 
choice of industrial specialisation and policies that go with it have to be determined 
according to an individual country’s circumstances. The challenge is to fit policy-
amenable variables with those that are exogenous so that the overall configuration of 
factors affecting rents management can ensure conditions for effective learning and the 
development of capabilities. This thesis provides evidence that effective configurations 
of factors for rent management requires multiple levels of rent management—politics, 
institutions, and industry organization—to interact in order to produce positive 
incentives and pressures that encourage learning and capability-building.   
In addition, the analysis suggests that the political commitment to use rents to 
support development has been limited to interventions that were consistent with the 
vested interest of major political and economic actors, such as government agencies, 
SOEs, and enterprises informally connected to the government. Building on insights 
from Fforde, Masina (2010) observes: “[T]he existence of a high level of ‘competitive 
clientelism’ among different groups inside and around the state sector has contributed to 
a higher level of efficiency in the use of resources …, thus explaining the overall positive 
contribution of the state sector to economic growth” (p. 196-197). However, starting in 
the late 2000s, the configuration of factors that supported this dynamic began to change. 
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It has been widely reported in the media that competition between the clientelist 
networks has been intensifying, and this can result in rents being captured without a 
sufficient time horizon for the beneficiaries to ensure productive investments (Agence 
France Presse, 2012; AmCham Vietnam, 2012; Bloomberg News, 2012; Vandenbrink, 
2012; World Bank, 2012b). In these cases rents take on the character of redistributive 
rents rather than growth-enhancing rents like learning rents.  
Politics aside, the government could take steps in five related areas to help 
Vietnam to the next level of development. First, the ability of the private sector to take 
risks in technology acquisition is absolutely vital for Vietnam’s development. However, 
the analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 suggests that the Vietnamese private sector is 
weakening and is losing out to both FDI and to the SOE sector. The continuation of this 
decline is likely to damage Vietnam’s economy and its ability to continue learning and 
developing new industrial capability.  
From this perspective, the Vietnamese government’s rent strategies need to pay 
greater attention to domestic enterprise development. Here, the most important task is to 
address some of the most critical constraints and bottlenecks identified in this thesis, 
such as access to credit and capital markets, low technical and managerial skills, weak 
coordination between the state and firms and between international buyers and domestic 
sellers, heavy reliance on imported materials, out-dated machineries, and inadequate 
production expertise. 
Vietnamese firms have to increase value addition in their production, especially 
in industrial goods (Khan, 2009a; Masina, 2010; Ohno, 2008). To do this, there has to be 
a policy focus on upgrading technical and organisational capabilities at the firm level. To 
accomplish this, the playing field between the state and the private sector has to be 
levelled to a greater extent since SOEs cannot drive technology acquisition and 
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capability development on their own into the indefinite future given their monopolistic 
characteristics and access to political rents. Next, policy has to ensure an overall mix of 
conditions such that rents go to those who can put in the most effort in learning and 
upgrading technical skills and capabilities. This may involve having performance 
benchmarks, making beneficiaries accountable for their performance, and specifying 
time limits for protection in order to avoid unlimited redistribution of the rent as well as 
ensuring that rents are not captured in unstable conditions with very limited time 
horizons. These measures can involve strengthening the rent management capabilities of 
the state, for instance through government institutions such as central and local business 
development agencies and intermediaries associations. However, in a context of weak 
institutional reform capabilities, policy could also focus on devising interventions that 
create rents in ways that market competition can serve to create the pressures and 
compulsions for capability development.  
Rent policies are frequently opposed by industrial countries, which argue that 
they discriminate against foreign firms. Vietnam has done well in resisting this pressure. 
In the early stages of industrialisation, competition may need to be restricted in order to 
allow local firms to gain capabilities and to compete in the domestic market. However, 
excessive reduction of competition can be counter-productive. Additionally, international 
trade agreements has made rent creation through trade restrictions more difficult. The 
focus should be to provide rents to domestic firms through other mechanisms, but in a 
context of moderate competition, to ensure capability development. This is generally a 
difficult balancing act as the government may risk losing foreign partners and 
investments from abroad if it gets the balance wrong.  
Second, while exports remain a significant source of income, it is difficult for any 
developing country to sell labour-intensive products in foreign markets without the 
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danger of being trapped within established supply chains or trade networks. The 
establishment of national trading companies as proposed by Pack and Saggi (2001) could 
help overcome this trade barrier and bridge the gap between local Vietnamese exporters 
and international buyers. In the meantime, Vietnam must re-examine and address the 
factors, which constrain it to be an exporter of low-skill and low-value goods. This is a 
difficult problem; and any national development strategy must also take into account the 
fact that the Vietnamese market in general has been flooded with cheap materials and 
imports from industrially advanced developing countries and increasingly China. In 
effect, this reality limits the opportunity of local firms to gradually build their capability 
and to add value in their manufacturing activities in the domestic market. Once again, 
rent policies have to recreate these opportunities in the context of limited policy space.  
Third, Vietnam needs stronger business associations and state agencies to create 
greater embeddedness between firms and government agencies. Rodrik (2004a) 
underscores the “need to embed private initiative in a framework of public action that 
encourages restructuring, diversification and technological dynamism beyond what 
market forces on their own would generate” (p. 1). So far, like VITAS, most Vietnamese 
associations are strongly connected to the government or to SOEs and thus fail to 
represent the private sector. The creation of more effective, private and independent 
associations operated and represented by businesses in the private sector will be vital for 
dialogue and policymaking between the government and any industry. They would help 
the state to devise policies that address realistic issues faced by the private sector and to 
support business activities for growth. 
Fourth, the China factor is important enough to be separately considered given 
the challenge it poses to the industrialisation of Vietnam due to the influx of cheap and 
even below-market-price imports. So far, the Vietnamese government has failed to 
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address this issue or to remedy its negative effects. This is largely due to the state’s lack 
of political will and capacity to confront China, combined with its own weak monitoring 
and enforcement capabilities in targeting illegal trade across the border. In 2015, 99 per 
cent of goods traded between Vietnam and China will in any case become tax-free 
because of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area Agreement coming into effect, and thus 
border controls will no longer be an optional solution for the China factor. Nonetheless, 
the Vietnamese government must consider and devise new strategies to address the 
negative effects caused by Sino-Vietnam trade. It could do this, for example, by targeting 
capability development of domestic firms in niche markets where Chinese goods are not 
as competitive and by taking advantage of China’s large consumer market. Otherwise, 
the Vietnamese economy will continue to be overshadowed by China and continue to 
miss many more opportunities to develop its own economy. 
Finally, the question of how to reform the state sector in Vietnam needs to be 
noted; although, this issue goes beyond the scope of this thesis. The analysis throughout 
the case studies suggests that to improve the state sector, Vietnam must at least have 
rigorous and effectively enforced regulations that promote competition, information 
disclosure, and even-handed management of conflicts of interests between the SOEs, 
especially the general corporations and the state economic groups. Otherwise, the next 
round of equitization is likely to fail, like the previous ones, in the sense that equitization 
has largely created incentives for SOE managers to capture rents based on their 
monopoly or oligopoly position in the domestic market and their advantageous access to 
state capital and land (Pincus, 2009). These changes require a high level of political will 
on the part of the leadership to override powerful interests that will seek to block or 
modify meaningful reforms.  
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7.4. Future Research 
 
This dissertation is the first step in a larger enquiry into the configuration of 
factors affecting rent management in Vietnam, even though it has focused solely on three 
industrial sectors—the telecommunication, textile and garment, and motorcycle 
industries. A more complete story of development in Vietnam requires an analysis of 
other important industrial sectors, such as oil and gas, electricity, electronics, and 
information technology and critical nonindustrial sectors, such as coffee in agriculture 
and different parts of the service sector. Furthermore, a clearer perception of the informal 
institutions and political dynamics within and around the CPV and the government must 
be included in the larger project of developmental rent management analysis.  
Vietnam also needs a better analysis of its options in solving the China factor. 
While China poses challenges to Vietnam’s development, scholars such as Oya (2006, 
2008, 2009) suggest that the China relationship via trade, investment, technical 
assistance and aid could be beneficial as well. Our case studies suggest that the China 
problem has to be better understood in the context of multiple levels of rents 
management affecting different sectors (politics, institutions and industry organization). 
Consequently, sector-specific strategies and agreements may be the way forward. 
Vietnam could also benefit from China’s growing consumer market if there is better 
access for Vietnamese producers to penetrate Chinese economy.  
Finally, the Vietnamese state as a domestic and cross-border investor through 
some large state economic groups such as Viettel and VNPT, is investing heavily in 
other developing countries. This is a growing phenomenon. What are the impacts of 
these types of foreign investments to Vietnam’s own development? These topics remain 
important areas for further research.  
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APPENDIX: FIELDWORK QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A.1. GENERAL INDUSTRY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
(applied to all industries) 
 
1. How did the sector establish and spread initially? 
2. What are the constraints in this industry? 
3. Given the constraints, what motivates and pressures local firms to upgrade its 
technology and capability-building? 
4. What is the standing of this sector in the market and the Vietnamese economy? 
5. What technologies are used in this sector? 
6. How sophisticated are the technologies? 
7. How do the firms able to adopt the technologies? 
8. What are the current technology obstacles within this industry? 
9. What are this industry’s spillover effects for other industries in Vietnam? 
10. What are the horizontal transfers of technology (to other activities), if any? 
11. What are the vertical transfers of technology (within the production process), if 
any? 
12. What is blocking the upgrading or capability-building of this industry? (i.e., 
competition, corruption, etc.)? 
13. What kind of support do the local firms need from the government and other 
institutions? 
14. What is forthcoming in terms of market competition? What do you expect the 
industry is heading towards in the near- and long-term future? 
15. What are the government’s future policies/strategies for this industry (for 
example, more liberalisation, better governance, etc.)? How will it be carried out? 
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16. Is the sector driven by particular rent-seeking groups and activities? If so, how is 
it done?  
17. What are the rent policies that promote technological adoption?  
18. What are the policy debates, if any, that will move the upgrading process forward 
(i.e., more technology, improved skilled labour, or improvement in the credit 
markets)? 
19. What are the roles of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology within this 
industry? Is it necessary? In what way is FDI important for this industry? 
20. What is the impact of the 2009 financial crisis to this industry?  
21. How have the firms coped with the changes in market conditions? 
 
A.2. MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
 
Questionnaire for Business Owners in the Motorcycle Industry 
 
1. What are the focal points of your business?  
2. What is your niche market? 
3. What is your company’s process for training labour? 
4. What are the issues related to labour that you have encountered? 
5. What, if any, any competition pressures from Chinese components (especially illegal 
imports) are you under?  
6. What is your business strategy to overcome challenges imposed by Chinese goods? 
7. Do you outsource some of your production to other local firms? 
8. What is the potential for the supporting industries, in your opinion? 
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9. What kind of support do you need from the government in order to develop and 
grow? What could the government do to improve or support your business (i.e., 
streamline logistics, reduce inflation, etc.)? 
10. How do the current macro-imbalances and instability within the economy change the 
dynamics or business direction of your business? 
11. What is constraining your business development now and into the future?  
 
Questionnaire for Government Officials at the Ministry of Industry and 
Technology 
 
 
1. In the first period (1995–2000), did the government intend to create policies to 
promote technology transfers and learning, or were the policies primarily focused 
on bringing in FDI? 
2. In the second period (2001–2004), did the government realise the positive effects 
of technology acquisition imparted by Chinese–Vietnamese collaboration during 
the China shock?  
3. Why did the government not support the local suppliers so that they could stay in 
business and to continue upgrade after 2001, 2002? 
4. Also in the second period, why did the government fail to enforce local content 
policies? What was the actual cause? For instances:  
a. Corruption 
b. Deliberate policy by the government 
c. Political pressure from the Chinese government and the lead firms 
d. Pressure from domestic importers who want to capture the rents 
5. How did the ministry deal with the pressure of illegally imported components 
from China in the second period? 
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6. Why is the scope of the supporting industries defined so broadly, and not 
specifically focused on manufacturing industries (with technology and skills 
spillover advantage)? Did the broad scope allow for more interest groups to 
participate in the rent distribution system? 
7. Why were there coordination failures among the ministries and between MOIT 
and the firms? 
8. What has the government done to lessen the number of coordination failures? 
9. Why did the government/ministry not devise industrial policies to aid the 
supporting industries until 2011? (Decree 12)? 
10. What incentives (subsidies/rents) did the government provide to support local 
firms, and to boost technology transfers from FDI via Decisions 34 and 12? 
11. Is there an effective Vietnamese association that represents local suppliers and 
assemblers in the motorcycle industry?  
12. What kind of supports is the government offering local suppliers/firms at the 
moment (in 2012)? For instances: 
a. Management systems 
b. Equipment 
c. Guidance and training 
 
 
 
A.3. TEXTILE & GARMENT INDUSTRY 
 
Questionnaire for Government Officials and Experts 
 
1. Please tell me what you know about the quota period?  
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2. What was your role in the T&G during that period? 
3. Did the government have genuine intention to promote development in the T&G 
industry? 
4. How did the quota market establish? Under what mechanism? Why did the 
government corrupt? 
5. Why did A Chau report the corruption scandal?  
6. What was the role of foreign investors and foreign buyers during the quota 
period? Did they know? What did they do to limit their damage? 
7. What mechanisms that put the system back to balance? 
8. Did Tuyen Dinh Truong and his higher authority know of the corruption scandal 
before it erupted? If yes, why did they not do anything about it? 
9. Please evaluate Vietnam’s competition with other garment-exporting countries 
(Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.).  
10. Do Vietnamese producers have a competitive advantage over these countries? If 
so, in what way? 
11. Why wasn’t an SOE created to compete with Vinatext, as seen in the case of 
telecom industry – competition within the state sector? Why doesn’t Vinatext 
have rivalries such as the case of the telecom industry? 
a. Is it because it’s more powerful than VNPT or the Ministry of Defence?  
b. Is it because of a historical reason? 
12. Is the textile sector being left for the free market at the moment (as with the 
motorcycle industry)? If so, why? If not, in what way is the government 
monitoring and supporting the textile sector? 
13. What are the factors that are constraining the upgrading process in the textile 
sector? 
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14. Why is there a 0 per cent tariff for imported materials used for exports? What is 
the origin of this policy? Who lobbied for it? 
15. Investors claimed that the infrastructure and firm capability are insufficient to 
improve or promote more investment in advanced technology that would increase 
the quantity and quality of textile production. What is your opinion of this claim? 
16. Were there contestations between the textile and garment manufacturers? 
17. Do you believe that to develop the textile industry, Vietnam must increase 
production of cotton and other raw materials? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
18. By 2015 most imports from the China–ASEAN block will flow into Vietnam 
with 0 per cent import tariff. What will the challenges and opportunities that 
Vietnam will face? What are the strategies that the government will employ to 
take advantage of the benefits and to deflect the negative effects? 
19. Who else owns Vinatext? What is the ownership arrangement within Vinatext? 
20. Evaluate the following claims about Vinatex: 
a. It is a general corporation competing with other businesses in the industry. 
b. It is a government institution, which is in charge of managing and 
directing state resources. In this case, is it a rule-maker and a credit 
holder? 
21. Is there a sufficient or insufficient institutional structure? 
22. Does Vinatext maintain equal power as the government, or does Vinatext control 
the government? 
23. Do you think that Vinatext uses rents properly to acquire new technology to 
enhance learning and to increase production of raw materials for textile 
manufacturing? 
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24. How did Vinatext use its political power and subsidies provided by the 
government, either directly or indirectly? 
a. Did the rents get redistributed? 
b. How does Vinatext monitor its rents? How did it level competition and 
market conditions with private and foreign investors? 
25. How does the institutional structure of Vinatext induce different sets of 
outcomes: 
a. Does it pass on opportunities to subsidiaries? 
b. Does it exploit opportunities from its subsidies for personal benefit? 
26. Why didn’t Vinatext, VITAS, or MOIT identify other opportunities in the textile 
industry, such as materials for sofas, raincoats, etc.?  
27. These are profitable and unexplored markets. Are there any research institution 
units in charge of doing this research? 
28. Was it a correct strategy to equitize the subsidiaries of Vinatex?  
29. What are the advantages and disadvantages of equitizing Vinatex subsidiaries? 
30. Why is there a huge enforcing issue in this industry, especially in regards to 
Chinese goods smuggled into the Vietnamese market? 
31. Is it premature for the government to open the textile industry for FDI by 
reducing the tariff rate for textile imports (12 per cent)? If yes, why? If no, why 
not? 
32. Is there still a need for upstream linkages now that the region is freely traded 
among ASEAN countries and China (the ASEAN + China Trade Area), in which 
Vietnam will fully participate in 2013? 
 
A.4. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
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Questionnaire for Firms, Government Officials, and Experts 
 
1. Please give an example of a (or your) company lobbying to the government for 
rents? 
2. In 2012, the industry will be completely open the market for foreign competition. 
How is the industry ready for it? 
3. What is your take on the issue of privatisation/equitization of VNPT (mobile 
phone), Viettel, etc.? 
4. Why was the telecom industry protected? Why weren’t other industries (i.e., 
national security, or rents protection for interests)? 
5. What is your evaluation of role of the Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC) in its performance in monitoring and developing the 
telecom industry? 
a. Is a new institution needed to replace or support the MIC? If yes, why? If 
not, why not? 
b. What is the institutional make-up of the MIC in the telecom industry (its 
power, authority, and regulation mechanisms)? 
c. What is the MIC’s enforcement mechanism? 
6. What ensured Viettel’s learning effort (for example, market competition, pressure 
from the government or incentive systems, opportunity for profits, etc.)? 
7. Do you think the on-going price competition within the telecom industry damage 
the development of the industry? Why (i.e., reduce price  reduce profit  
reduce learning; training and upgrading; and capability-building, etc.) or why 
not? 
8. Evaluate the MIC and the industry’s ability to compete by 2012 with foreign 
companies. 
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9. Why is the enforcement (market and institution) capability weak in this industry?  
10. What is the current enforcing mechanism that keeps the system in place? 
11. Did the government provide Viettel with any financial supports (rent)?  
12. Did the government provide support (rent) to any company other than to VNPT? 
13. Why was the BCC form of business rather than joint venture chosen with foreign 
investors/businesses?  
14. Should the state play a guiding role in this industry or should it leave it to market 
forces? 
15. How did the other seven telecom companies prepare themselves to compete for 
market share against VNPT and Viettel? 
a. What were their business strategies? 
b. What is deterring them from upgrading and capability-building? 
c. What are the financial resources? 
d. How could they lobby the government? 
16. Why was the 3G beauty contest selected as the form of competition? 
17. Do you think the MIC chose the correct selection system to grant the license? If 
yes, why? If no, why not? 
18. Do you think the licensees deserve their license or should other company(ies) 
have licenses too? 
19. Please evaluate the quality of 3G service.  
20. For experts and firms: please evaluate the growth and development of 3G 
technology in Vietnam. 
 
A.5. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERTS AND POLITICAL 
ECONOMISTS 
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1. Does rent-seeking occur only at the state sector? If yes, why? If no, why not?  
2. Does the increasingly powerful private sector, which connects to the state (i.e., 
Viet Capital), affect the development of the country? If yes, why? If no, why 
not? 
3. What makes a sector grow after rents are created? 
4. What are the biggest and most important problem/obstacles/issues in Vietnam’s 
development? 
5. In the last two periods (1986–1999 and 2000–2010), what were the political 
arrangements that helped the development of the three industries (T&G, 
telecommunications, and motorcycle), as well as the industrial development of 
the economy as a whole? 
6. Is the state strong? Is the government strong? Why, or why not? 
7. Are there a lot of contestations within the government? If so, how does it 
occur? 
8. What are the informal mechanisms that hold the government, the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (CPV), and the ministries together? 
9. What is the distribution of power between capitalists, different factions, and the 
state? Where does the power lie? 
10. What is the relative power of each organisation and their interface with each 
other (general corporations and state economic groups versus the CPV versus 
other social groups)? 
11. How much control does the state/government has over rents? Does it have the 
power to withdraw and reallocate rents? 
12. Where does the bargaining power lie in Vietnam? 
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a. Is it within the state, government, or the CPV? What are their 
motivations (i.e., to develop the economy, seek rents, etc.)? 
b. Does bargaining power go beyond the state? Please explain. 
c. Do firms have any power and sayings to the state? If so, why and how? 
If not, what are the constraints on the firms? 
13. How much control does the state has over rents to enforce learning and 
upgrading? If not much control, is it intentional?  
14. Do you think the state, its body, historical reasons, or institutional structure of 
the party and the government is capable or incapable? Please explain. 
15. What are the conditions for rent creation through the broader political and 
institutional process? 
16. What is the informal institutional structure that allows value-enhancing rents to 
be created by the government? 
17. What are the conditions that could ensure efficiency and effort with a system of 
rent-seeking from below? Is it at the firm level? 
18. Is the power of interest groups proportional with an industry’s gains or losses? 
If not, why?  
19. Is there something missing in the institutional structure that prevents the 
interests of these different groups to be reflected in the institutional structure? 
a. Could it be that the institutional structure did not enable all of interests 
of groups inside the government to be internalised because the industry 
was structured in a way that certain interest was given more weight than 
others? (for example: tax benefits, subsidies etc.)? 
20. Can only insiders (member of the Communist Party of Vietnam or the 
government) play the rent-seeking game? If no, who else could take part in it?  
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21. Does the state have control at the margins, when rent-seeking threatens the 
legitimacy and certainty of the state? If so, who determine the margins (the 
boundary before the Vietnamese people fed up and revolve)?  
22. How does the state learn (i.e., from their mistakes, experience)? How effective 
is it over controlling those who looses out in the rent-seeking game and easing 
out contestation? 
23. What is the nature of the political economy in Vietnam? 
24. What is the nature of the political settlement in Vietnam? 
25. What is your opinion on why the state does not enforce its own policies (such 
as industrial policies)? 
 
A.6. FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS (2012) 
 
1. What is the role of the private sector? 
2. What is the government’s intention/plan/strategy in managing the private sector? 
3. Did the Vietnamese government misunderstand the Big Push theory? Why, or 
why not? 
4. Do you think most of Vietnam’s industrial success was accidental because there 
wasn’t a clear role of the government? If yes, why? If no, why not? 
5. How can the China factor be solved? Why has it not be accomplished? 
6. Why does the government struggle with enforcement?  
7. How are possible mechanisms to discipline nonperforming SOEs and state 
organizations?  
8. How did interest groups help or deter the process of industrial capability-
building? 
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9. What is the role of SOEs in recent economic development? What are the options 
to boost their performance and upgrading? 
10. What is the role of government institutions in managing Vietnam’s development 
strategy?  
11. How can the principle (state)-agent (state bodies and SOEs) solve any problems? 
12. What is the role of the private sector in the success of some industry’s 
industrialisation? 
13. How can capability be boosted in this sector?  
14. What is constraining this sector’s development at this time? 
15. Evaluate the impact of recent changes in international market, especially since 
the 2007 global recession. 
16. How did changes in the international market impact Vietnam’s development in 
the past and how will it influence Vietnam’s development in the future? 
17. What is the role of FDI in Vietnam’s development?  
18. How can FDI’s positive impacts be promoted and the negative effects limited? 
19. Are co che xin cho (granting mechanism) a mechanism that allows rents to be 
distributed among the interest groups within the state body? If yes, why? If no, 
why not? 
20. What are the development policies/strategies that Vietnam should focus on for 
future development? 
21. How do various interest groups help or deter the process of industrial capability-
building? 
22. What are the dynamics of rent-seeking activities in Vietnam? 
